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
BAPTISMAL CONTROVERSY

BY

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LATE CANON OF CHRIST CHURCH, AND REGIUS PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

SECOND EDITION



New York

E. P. DUTTON AND CO.

PUBLISHERS BOOKSELLERS AND IMPORTERS

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PREFACE.

THE Baptismal Controversy was the controversy of the first half of this century. It produced treatises from a succession of writers,—Archbishop Laurence, Bishop Mant, Mr. Biddulph, Mr. Faber, Bishop Bethell, Dr. Pusey, Dr. Goode, Archdeacon Wilberforce, and others. It came to a head in the Gorham trial, and has since dropped. A review of a field of past controversy, and an attempt to arrive at a judgment upon it, may not be without use to the theological reader.

A controversy, if we collect the strong points and reasonable admissions of the different writers in it, has sometimes a force and value as a whole beyond the separate works of which it is composed; the different works taken together tending to establish a conclusion which is not proved in any one of them singly. In the present controversy Archbishop Laurence and Bishop Bethell, on the one hand, admit that all infants are not regenerate in baptism in the sense, claimed for that term, of actual goodness. On the other hand, Dr. Pusey and Mr. Faber, both disciples of antiquity, claim that sense for this term. If these conclusions are both of them correct, as agreeing, the one with common sense and experience, the other with

the natural meaning of Scripture, we have the direction of this controversy as a whole, and the issue to which it tends.

I have, however, in the present treatise, confined myself to two positions: one, that the doctrine of the regeneration of all infants in baptism is not an article of the faith; the other, that the formularies of our Church do not impose it. Moderate and needful fulness, in the proof of main positions, will lead a writer unavoidably into questions not identical with those positions; but a candid reader will distinguish between such collateral questions, and the main positions which it is the object of a treatise to prove.

These two positions, which occupy respectively the two Parts of the present Treatise, have this connexion, that if the one is proved, the way is favourably prepared for the proof of the other. We cannot, indeed, considering all the objects which a Christian Church has in view, insist on limiting its safeguards to fundamentals; but thus much must be allowed, that, if a particular doctrine is not an article of the faith, there is no special reason for expecting that the formularies of our Church will be found to impose it; and, in entering upon the examination of this latter question, we are saved that anxiety which we should feel, supposing the subject-matter of the question were a fundamental.

The construction which has been put upon our Formularies in this treatise is the same which, judging from

their practice, was put upon them by our School of Standard Divines. The division of opinion on this question was as patent a fact in their day as it is in our own. Had they regarded, therefore, one of these opinions as contradictory to our Formularies, they would have arraigned the public maintainers of it. But in no one instance did they do so. The attempt which was made ten years ago to convert a difference into a ground of exclusion, however sincere the convictions from which it proceeded, was wholly new and unprecedented. The late learned Bishop Kaye defended the Gorham Judgment upon this ground, that it represented the tradition of the English Church, denying that it "sanctioned any innovation in the doctrine of the Church respecting the efficacy of infant baptism."¹ The Bishop of St. David's defended the Judgment upon the same ground, viz. that those who pronounced it "wished to leave the doctrine of the Church precisely as they found it, not to erect but to prevent the erection of any new barrier to the exercise of the ministry within her communion."² The Bishop of Oxford has supported the Judgment, by the statement

¹ Volume of Charges, p. 448. One of equal learning, who aided the Tractarian movement by his laborious life and singular and saintly simplicity of character, wrote: "If Mr. Gorham himself would set up his defence strictly upon the ground of this writer, we might allow it to be probable that the unfettered Church would bear with him." Review of "Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination," by the late Mr. Charles Marriott. Literary Churchman, June 30, 1855.

² Charge in 1851.

that "the Prayer Book is the common standing-place" and "common statement of truth," for both parties in the Church.³

The attempt, therefore, made on that occasion in the direction of exclusion, may be retired from without any surrender of our historical Church Standard. It may happen to religious parties, as it does to political, that they may sometimes in the warmth of zeal make a mistaken move, and commit themselves to a claim for which there is not sufficient ground. But there is nothing in the Gorham Judgment which involves any departure from Anglican principles, and the acceptance of it need not rank as a party badge, or be exposed to the reproach of unsound Churchmanship.

³ Speech in Convocation, February, 1858, and Charge in 1861.

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PART I

CHAPTER I

PROOF FROM SCRIPTURE

THE question of Fundamentals to which so much difficulty attaches, only enters, to a very limited extent, into the argument of this Treatise.

No rule has been laid down for determining Fundamentals which will bear a strictly logical test of adequacy.¹ The Roman test, besides being one which we do not admit, is hardly so much a test of Fundamentals, as of simple obedience to Church authority. For though it leaves a distinction still standing between certain questions which are open, and others which are decided, the decision of such a multitude of points great and small, all without distinction under anathema, practically ignores intrinsic distinctions of rank in doctrines, and only tests ecclesiastical obedience. Of the two rules which our own divines acknowledge, the first, that no doctrine shall be held necessary to be believed which cannot be proved by Scripture, is not in its very terms a rule for deciding what *is* a fundamental, but for deciding what is *not* one; the second, or the Vincentian rule of

¹ "It is the masterpiece of all the divines of Christendom to say what is fundamental in Christianity and what is not." Thorndike, "Principles of Christian Truth," b. i. c. 22, s. 2.

quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus, rests upon no logical basis, for no valid reason can be given why some things not necessary to be believed may not yet in matter of fact have been universally believed in the first ages of the Church.

Some divines have attempted, in the absence of definite external test, to lay down an intrinsic criterion, and have formed systems of fundamentals by selecting certain central and cardinal truths singled out as such by our religious sense and feeling, and their own evident rank in Scripture.² Such a criterion, failing as it does in definiteness and precision, has still great and just weight, from the circumstance that we cannot help ourselves being judges as to what is essential or not to the religion to which we ourselves belong; our hearts naturally fix on certain truths which appear the most deep and central ones; nor, perhaps, however argumentatively defective, is there any criterion which does such practical service in

² See "Waterland's Rationale of Fundamentals," vol. v. p. 79: "Such doctrines as are found to be *intrinsical* or *essential* to the Christian covenant are fundamental truths, and such as are plainly and directly subversive of it are fundamental errors." No particular doctrine as to the Sacraments figures in his scheme as a fundamental, but only the general acknowledgment of the two sacraments as means of grace. "The discarding the two sacraments, or either of them, and the denying their use or necessity, is erring fundamentally," p. 82. Stillingfleet's criterion is an appeal to the reason of Christians: "No rational man who considers the nature of the Christian religion, but must assert the profession of all these things to be necessary to all such who own the Christian religion to be true." "Vindication," vol. i. p. 88. Sherlock's is the same. "A fundamental doctrine is such a doctrine as is in strict sense of the essence of Christianity, without which the whole building and superstructure must fall; the belief of which is necessary to the very being of Christianity, like the first principles of any art or science." "Vindication of Def. of Stillingfleet," p. 256.

producing substantial agreement among Christians. But I leave this informal criterion, and confine myself to the two recognized tests mentioned.

1. The rule "*quod semper*," &c., must be taken in such a sense as to render it capable of application. If a given doctrine has literally been held *semper*, and *ab omnibus*, it was held by all the Apostles, but we can have no evidence of this literal *semper*, &c., except the writings of the New Testament, and to go to this evidence is to supersede the Vincentian rule by merging it in proof from Scripture. The rule then must be understood in a modified sense as appealing to no more than general early consent. But thus modified, this test of an article of the faith is defective in ground of reason, because no reason can be given why some things not necessary to the Faith may not yet from an early date have been in matter of fact believed. We cannot limit even this universal belief to necessary subject-matter, so that it may not comprehend something extra. The Vincentian rule is thus a rough kind of test, getting at what is necessary by a process which carries along with it what is extraneous, and imposing the whole *corpus* of *de facto* received opinion, that it may secure the substance of the Faith. The rule presupposes, for its reasonable application, something added to the mere external fact of general acceptance; it leaves something for the judgment to decide with respect to the intrinsic qualification of the received point for the rank of an article of the faith. Thus coupled and conjoined with other rules it is of weight; but it cannot be pretended that every single piece of belief entertained in the first ages,—however obviously secondary, as regards the matter of it, and below the intrinsic criterion of a fundamental,—is still a fundamental, by virtue of the simple fact of having been generally received.

Indeed, for the purpose of proving articles of faith, this rule has not been turned by our divines to any great practical account. The real use of the rule has fallen a good deal short of its professed use; and, in the actual application of it, it has not been made to serve as a test of doctrine beyond the limit of such doctrines as Scripture itself proves without its aid. Some writers have hinted at a deficiency of Scripture proof on some points of necessary belief to be supplied by antiquity, but these hints are not followed up or moulded into argumentative form; and those who have most respected the Vincentian rule have practically made the plain sense of Scripture the basis of articles of faith.

The purpose to which the Vincentian rule has been practically applied has been, first, the defence of the Church's external polity, as the guarantee for the true existence of a Church, and, secondly, the proof of the nature and character of the two Sacraments. The evidence supplied by antiquity on these points has been much insisted on,—not for the purpose, however, of enforcing *belief*; the facts being treated as essential, but not the belief in the facts. It was necessary for the Christian *status* of a person that he should *be* in a Church thus organized, and should receive true Sacraments; but it was not necessary that he should believe in the necessity of this Church organization, or in the true nature of the Sacraments. "The Sixth Article," says Mr. Keble, "leaves ample scope for the province which Bishop Taylor assigned principally to tradition: practical rules relating to the Church of Christ. For anything stated in this Article such rule might be both divine and generally necessary to salvation, and yet not be contained in Scripture; *but the doctrines or propositions concerning them would not be necessary*: it would be wrong to insert them as Articles of the Creed. For instance, St. Ignatius

writes as follows: 'Let that Eucharist be accounted valid which is under the Bishop, or some one commissioned by him.' Wherein he lays down the rule, which we know was universally received in the Primitive Church, that consecration by apostolical authority is essential to the participation of the Eucharist, and so far generally necessary to salvation. Now, supposing this could not be at all proved from Scripture . . . still it might be accepted, on the above evidence, as a necessary rule of Church Communion, without infringing on our Sixth Article: but it *could not be turned into a proposition*, and put into the Creed, because that would make not only the rule itself, as observed by the Church, but the knowledge of it by the individual necessary to salvation; and it may be thankfully admitted that knowledge of the true nature of Sacraments is nowhere required in Holy Scripture as a condition of our receiving the grace they impart."³

The Vincentian rule then, or the test of consent of antiquity, has not been practically applied by writers of our Church to determine articles of the faith, but only to prove points of necessary observance as distinguished from belief: the very points which *are* necessary to be observed not being considered to carry with them the obligation to *believe* that they are thus necessary to be observed.

2. The second rule, that nothing is to be regarded as an article of the faith or necessary to be believed, but what may be proved by Scripture, is founded partly upon the authority of antiquity, partly upon a natural assumption respecting Scripture. If a revelation is accompanied by a series of inspired writings, obviously containing a general account of that revelation, and designed by God for the use of all ages, the natural inference from such a

³ Postscript to Sermon on Tradition, p. 351.

fact is that these writings contain at any rate the fundamental truths of that revelation. It may be said that they were addressed, in the first instance, to Christians already acquainted with the truths of their religion; but when certain writings are distinguished from all other writings by the fact of being inspired; when they possess thus a special character, and fulfil a special design of God, extending to the remotest ages of the world, we are not at liberty to consider only the accidental circumstances of their original communication, to whom they were addressed in the first instance, and what temporary occasions and objects called them out; nor have we a right to look upon each of these writings wholly apart from the others, as if they were a collection of scattered documents to which the collector alone gave unity and the appearance of a whole; but the common characteristic of plenary inspiration gives them of itself a unity and wholeness, possessing as they do this remarkable attribute for a particular Divine object, viz. for the manifestation of this religion to successive ages of the world, and instruction of mankind in it. Looking upon them in this light, though there is no reason why each book of Scripture separately should contain all the fundamental truths of Christianity, we naturally assume that all the books together do; i.e. that all having this common attribute of inspiration for the specific purpose mentioned, and being constructed under this special Divine providence for this purpose, should be so constructed as one with another to contain all the fundamental truths of the religion, for the unfolding, enforcing, and explaining of which they *are* thus inspired; one book of the whole providential series fulfilling what may be wanting in another; just as in the whole production of some human author, it is not necessary that the fundamental principles or objects of the work should appear in every chapter or

portion of it, while there is certainly a very strong reason why they should appear in the work as a whole. It may be true that Protestants are apt to look upon the Bible too much as one book; but so far as the whole of it is the production of One Inspiring Mind, dictating all the writings successively for one great object, this popular idea of it is just, and represents, though it may be wanting in critical discrimination, an important truth: for we ought not to allow ourselves so to dwell upon the accidental manner and circumstances of the original appearance of the various writings which compose the Bible, as to supersede that unity of Authorship which belongs to it, so far as the Divine Inspirer is concerned, and which is not the least interfered with by any amount of what is accidental in the outward form and occasion of these writings, their separate and scattered character as they first came out; all which irregularity may be as simply instrumental to one Divine purpose working underneath as the greatest regularity of outward construction.⁴

The doctrine of plenary inspiration then being supposed, the assumption that Holy Scripture contains all the fundamental truths of Christianity, is a natural and reasonable assumption; and when we say "contains" them, we mean of course that it contains them in such a way as that we can, with proper attention, *see* them so contained, as having been stated for that purpose. We cannot do altogether without assumptions in religion; what we have to look to is the kind of assumptions we make, that they should be moderate and natural ones. The Roman assumption of the necessity of a constant Infallible Judge in the Church, is not wrong because it is an assumption, but because it is an unnatural and

⁴ See some able remarks in Chapter v. of "Scepticism and Revelation," by the Rev. H. Harris.

violent one, opposed to the whole analogy of God's providence.

This second test, then, viz. that of proof from Scripture, though a negative test only, deciding what is *not* an article of the faith, not what *is*, is for its professed purpose a more logical criterion than the other, standing on the sound rational ground which has been just explained. It is moreover a test which has been formally adopted by our Church, and is therefore strictly binding upon us, the Vincentian having only the recommendation which the authority of antiquity gives. I will add that it is the only test with which the argument of this treatise is concerned; for a negative test is sufficient for a negative conclusion.

With respect to the interpretation, then, of this rule or canon, three points are to be observed: first, that by Scripture proving a doctrine is meant more than Scripture admitting of being interpreted in consistency with it; secondly, that there is implied in this proof from Scripture an ultimate appeal to our reason as the judge of it; thirdly, that we are concerned in this Canon with the *fact* of the presence or absence of such proof, as distinguished from any explanations of this fact.

I. When proof from Scripture, then, is in this Canon laid down as a condition of an article of the faith, by proof from Scripture we understand an obligation resulting from the terms of Scripture alone to assent to the doctrine in question as the teaching of Scripture. This is the natural and only legitimate meaning of proof *from* a document, viz. that the language of such document of itself conveys a particular truth or fact as its necessary meaning; in the absence of which evidence from the language itself, such truth or fact is not proved *by* the document, however it may be by other evidence. Such proof admits of different degrees, and less than

the large and full amount which some doctrines receive from Scripture, might yet be sufficient to constitute proof from Scripture.

A particular explanation of this Canon, however, has been offered by some who appear to consider it enough to constitute proof from Scripture if, a doctrine having the consent of antiquity, Scripture only admits of being understood in agreement with it. But this Canon requires that the doctrine in question should be proved by Scripture, not simply that it should not be disproved by it, or that Scripture should be susceptible of the interpretation. Nor can the consent of antiquity ever, according to this Canon, supply the place of proof from Scripture, as if where the former was very prominent the latter might be proportionably reduced, till at last only absence of disproof was necessary ; but proof from Scripture is the previous condition, in the absence of which the consent of antiquity is for the purpose of raising a doctrine into an article of the faith, of no force. Such an explanation indeed of proof from Scripture entirely changes the meaning of it ; for, inasmuch as a doctrine is not proved by Scripture simply because Scripture admits of being understood in agreement with it, to allow the consent of antiquity to raise a doctrine into an article of the faith, only with the salvo that Scripture shall admit of being interpreted in agreement with it, is to allow the consent of antiquity to determine an article of faith in the absence of proof from Scripture.

The case must be recognized indeed of particular statements in a book being, in default of internal clearness, correctly explained from collateral sources, i. e. of facts or truths being asserted in a book according to the intention of the writer, while the proof that they are thus asserted in the book, comes from another quarter than the book. But recognizing such a case we still could not designate

the proof instanced in it as proof *from the book*, which it plainly is not; whereas in this Canon proof from the book itself is the proof mentioned and required.

Proof from Scripture must thus be specially distinguished from what are called "hints" from Scripture. The duty is sometimes urged of accepting hints from Scripture, as if omission were designed to try our faith; and this as a different duty from that of merely carrying out into particulars *general principles* and precepts of Scripture, which are *more* than hints. Such a point of view in which to regard omissions in Scripture, to whatever purpose we apply it, requires caution, inasmuch as it represents humility and obedience as tested by *adding* to Scripture; for to supply a meaning to statements not strictly contained in them, is to add to such statements; and, there being a risk that the ideas by which we thus supplement Scripture will represent our own mind rather than the mind of Scripture, such a criterion of humility and obedience should be used with great qualification. But there is one purpose to which this point of view is quite inapplicable; because whatever be the design of these alleged "hints" of Scripture, it is not to establish articles of the faith, for which purpose there is specially required *proof*.

Such being the natural meaning, however, of proof from Scripture, we encounter on going into the practical application of this Canon three objections to this meaning.

The first is an objection drawn from the influence of custom, tradition, and education, in determining our sense of Scripture. It is urged that we practically obtain our meaning of Scripture from tradition and education, and that therefore proof from Scripture only means practically a sense put on Scripture by tradition.

There is a good deal that is questionable then in the statement of fact here made. To a certain extent we

doubtless depend upon education and custom as interpreters of Scripture; still we are rational beings, and are able, with a moderate attention, to see whether such and such is the natural meaning of a statement in Scripture or not; and if it is not, it is gratuitous to suppose that we should always go on thinking it was, because we had been so taught. But however this may be, the consideration here urged is an irrelevant one. For the meaning of proof from Scripture is not in the slightest degree affected by the mode in which we gain our perception of such proof, whether by our own judgment, or by education and tradition. It often happens that when we have not seen the meaning of a statement in an ordinary book by ourselves, on somebody coming and pointing it out to us we see it quite clearly. But when we see it clearly because it has been pointed out to us, we still see it as being implied in the words themselves, and shown to be the meaning *by* the words. The light which has been thrown upon the passage, even if a borrowed one, shows the sense of the passage all the same as being contained in the language. In seeing a truth, then, to be proved by Scripture, whether we have arrived at that meaning of Scripture by our own judgment or by education and tradition, in either case we must see the meaning in the words themselves, and as necessarily contained in them; otherwise it is incorrect to say that we do see the proof in Scripture. Proof from Scripture does not suppose that Scripture may not have been interpreted to us by education or tradition, but only that, when it has been interpreted, the meaning in question is then seen to be contained in the words themselves, and to be their obligatory meaning, not one only among others which they admit of. We may be wrong in asserting—and we are liable to error whether our guide be tradition or our own judgment—that certain words

do prove a particular doctrine; still that they must *prove* it is what we assert in this Canon, not only that they must *admit of* the construction.

When then it is said that tradition "first teaches certain doctrines, and then proves them out of Scripture," there is nothing in such a statement inconsistent with the Canon we are now considering, provided we understand that the proof from Scripture which tradition gives, when she *does* give it, is of this sort, viz. that we *then* see such to be the necessary meaning of the language of Scripture itself.⁵ For if Scripture is treated as so obscure, that even when its meaning is pointed out we see it only as the meaning of which the words are *susceptible*, not that which they demand, it is ridiculous to speak of proving anything *by* Scripture.⁶ Tradition may indeed, on such an hypothesis, extract *a* meaning out of Scripture, which meaning, if tradition is infallible, will be the true one; but it is incorrect to say that this meaning *in* Scripture is proved *by* Scripture, when by the very supposition it is only proved to be *in* Scripture *by* tradition.

⁵ The text, "I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob," appealed to by our Lord as proving the doctrine of a future state, only proves this doctrine to those who *see* the latent argument in it, after it has been pointed out, and so see the proof in the words themselves. Those who do not see the proof in the words, doubtless accept this meaning of them upon *our Lord's authority*, but the doctrine is not proved to them *by* this text of Scripture.

⁶ "The difference between their opinion and ours concerning this difficulty is, that they think the Scripture so obscure and hard to be understood, that heretics may wrest and abuse it at their pleasure, and no man be able to convince their folly out of the wisdom of Scripture itself. . . . But we say that men not neglecting the right of direction which the Church yieldeth, nor other helps and means, *may be assured* . . . that they have found out the true meaning of it." Field on the Church, p. 365.

We may indeed easily exaggerate the obscurity of Scripture, the language of which, where it relates to truths which most Christians agree in considering fundamental, is as plain as the language of ordinary intelligible books. And though variety of interpretation, where there has been such universal, anxious, and curious examination, would not, if it existed to a greater extent than it does, show the obscurity of Scripture itself, so much as the torturing nature of the ordeal to which it was exposed; still, as a matter of fact, we may observe a very general agreement among Christians in the fundamental doctrines they extract from Scripture, and consider to be proved by it. The Roman Church imposes various articles, indeed, on the express ground of tradition or Church authority, which she does not profess to rest upon Scripture proof, not considering such a condition necessary; but, if we except one or two sects, there is a very general agreement among Christians in the truths which are considered to be proved by Scripture itself.

Secondly, in order to explain away the meaning of proof from Scripture, advantage is taken of this Canon omitting to say who is the *judge* of proof. But the meaning of proof is in no way affected by the omission to decide who is the judge of proof; because whoever the judge is, the question of which he *is* the judge is the same, viz. of proof of a particular doctrine from a particular document. Whether the Universal Church, then, or a particular Church, or an individual, be the judge of such proof, it is this proof, and this alone, of which he has to judge. The decision which the judge, whoever he be, undertakes to make, is whether such and such a doctrine is satisfactorily proved by the terms of Scripture alone; diverging from which question, and coming to the decision that Scripture *admits* of an interpretation in

agreement with this doctrine, supposed to be proved by antiquity, he deserts his proper task, and abandons the office of judge of *proof* from Scripture.

On a question of ordinary fact, what is called "proof from evidence" leaves it wholly open who is the *judge* of such proof; but proof from evidence does not the less mean proof from the evidence itself, i. e. from that whole collection of facts which is adduced in the case. When we speak of proof from any ordinary book, a history, or a treatise, that such and such a fact or opinion is asserted in it, the meaning of proof in these cases is the same, whoever is the judge of it.

Thirdly, it will be urged that some important points of established practice among Christians have no clear warrant in Scripture, such as Infant Baptism, the observance of the Sunday, and others; and therefore that, inasmuch as we accept these points, we admit the ground of tradition as distinct from that of Scripture. But the answer is, that though we undoubtedly admit the ground of tradition, we do not admit it for establishing articles of the faith, which is the question at issue. Neither Infant Baptism nor the observance of the Sunday come under the head of Articles of Faith, though they are generally received as matters of Christian practice. Though it was a proper answer, then, to the Puritans who forbade the Church all rules and customs but such as could be found in Scripture, to instance certain points of practice which they themselves admitted, and which yet were *not* found in Scripture; it is irrelevant to urge this fact against the position that *articles of faith* must be proved from Scripture, upon which it has no bearing whatever; and such a reply is Hooker's just retort upon the *Puritan* prohibition, illogically transferred to another and wholly different one.⁷

⁷ It is for the same argumentative purpose that the remark is

Could any case be shown indeed of an *article of the faith* which we admit without proof from Scripture, we should be committed in principle to tradition, as a warrant for articles of the faith. But no such case can be shown. It is sometimes urged indeed that the doctrine of the Trinity is not clearly contained in Scripture, but though the word "Trinity" is not in Scripture, the *doctrine* plainly is; the Unity of God being the great doctrine of the Bible from beginning to end, and the existence of Three Divine Persons being clearly declared in the New Testament.^s These two revelations together compose the doctrine, nor would it be possible to extract anything else out of these several communications respecting the Divine Being in Scripture, than what we hold under the phrase "Trinity in Unity," which is in meaning simply identical with those communications taken together.

But is not the Canon of Scripture, it may be asked, an article of the faith, and do we not obtain that plainly from tradition, inasmuch as Scripture, even if it asserted, could not in the nature of the case *prove* its own inspiration? I reply that it is not correct to say that the Canon of Scripture is an article of the faith. The acceptance of the main Canon of Scripture, as handed down by tradi-

sometimes made, that the law of monogamy cannot be proved out of the Bible, and that therefore we are obliged to fall back upon Christian tradition. Everything, however, that a Christian must observe in practice, is not therefore an article of the Christian faith, according to the distinction which was drawn above, p. 4. And, moreover, this law *is* proved by Scripture (Gen. i. 27) as interpreted by our Lord (Matt. xix. 4).

^s The Scripture proof of the Personality of the Holy Spirit, though less full than that of our Lord's Divinity, is still properly proof, when we take in the whole of it, which connected statements of it, such as Pearson's and Barrow's, only assist us in doing.

tion, is indeed essential *in ordine* to a belief in the doctrines of Christianity; and a person who rejected it could not entertain that belief, because he could have no proof, without the admission of such Scripture, of the revelation of such doctrines. But the Canon of Scripture is not on *its own account* of necessary acceptance, as is shown by the fact that individuals have at different times, with the consent—though justly cautious and jealous—of the Church, exercised the right of rejecting smaller portions of it, where such a right could be exercised without interfering with the Scriptural proof of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity.

The distinction is indeed sufficiently clear between the Canon of Scripture and an article of the faith. An article of the faith belongs to the substance of revealed truth; but the channel of the communication of the truth is no part of the substance of the truth: the instrument of disclosure is external to the thing disclosed. If I receive a message, it is necessary, in order to accepting the intelligence conveyed in it, that I should believe that a messenger has brought it; but the messenger and his credentials are no part of the message. There is no logical inconsistency then in saying that tradition proves the inspiration of Scripture, and yet does not prove articles of faith; because the inspiration is the medium of communication, the article of faith is the thing communicated. If the Bible contains, according to the natural construction of its language, certain truths, tradition may prove the Bible, but the Bible proves the truths.⁹

⁹ Hooker and Laud meet the fallacious difficulty of the Church proving Scripture, and Scripture proving the Church, by supposing an incipient belief in Scripture upon the assertion of the Church, which is converted into assurance by personal insight into Scripture (Eccl. Pol. iii. c. viii. s. 14. Laud's Conference

II. The meaning of proof from Scripture being stated, the next point to be observed in this Canon is an ultimate reference which is implied in it to our own reason as the judge of such proof.

If the rule which requires proof from Scripture as a condition of an article of the faith, leaves it open who is the primary judge of such proof, and allows for the function of the Church as interpreter of Scripture in the first instance, it yet implies as absolutely essential to the rational use and application of it, an *ultimate* reserve in favour of the right of our own reason to this office. For it belongs to the very nature and subject-matter of the decision here, that our own reason has an ultimate responsibility in it, for we cannot help ourselves being judges upon such a question as whether certain words have a certain meaning, and whether certain statements of Scripture prove that a particular doctrine is taught there. Did the proof of doctrine indeed *end* in the Church's assertion, no judicial capacity would be assigned to our reason in the matter; but inasmuch as the proof goes on, by an appeal of the Church herself, to Scripture warrant, we cannot, without an absurdity, be under a

with Fisher, s. 16). For this somewhat hazardous ground on which to rest the ultimate proof of inspiration, Thorndike substitutes the correcter ground of testimony simply; the presenter of this testimony being the Church, but not, as he draws the distinction, the Church *as* a Church, which would be involving himself in the argumentative circle just mentioned, but only as a body of competent witnesses testifying to the assertion of certain men, who gave the guarantee of miracles for the truth of it, that their writings were inspired ("Principles of Christian Truth," c. iii. s. 18, 19). Bishop Marsh rests the proof of inspiration upon the same ultimate ground of miracles:—"We must have established the divine origin of our religion before we can prove inspiration. For nothing but either divine testimony or prophecy can confirm it." Lecture ii. p. 36.

dogmatic and theoretical obligation to accept any statement whatever, *as* such warrant, however wholly wide of the mark it may be. And therefore the appeal to Scripture proof implies in itself an ultimate reserve of a judicial function to our own reason in the acceptance of such proof.¹

It may be asked, what is the practical advantage of this right to the individual, if, whenever by the exertion of it, he arrives at a different conclusion, on a fundamental point, from the Church to which he belongs, he exposes himself to excommunication. But the answer is, that the right is still a solid advantage. It is true the Church must impose certain fundamental articles of belief on her members, otherwise she has corporately no belief at all; but if the Church acknowledges an ultimate right in the individual to judge what constitutes proof from Scripture, she is obliged in consistency, and for her own security, to select the doctrines she imposes by a fair and generally recognized standard of Scripture proof: otherwise her members, feeling themselves by her own admission possessed of this ultimate right, will leave her upon her coming into collision with it. This admission thus dictates the Church's point of view from the first, and ties her *in limine* to a fair and broad criterion of proof from Scripture.

III. A third point to be observed in the Canon which requires proof from Scripture for an article of the faith is, that it only looks to the *fact* of the presence or absence of such proof in Scripture, and does not enter into the reasons and explanations of its absence. Explanations of the absence of certain doctrines in Scripture might sometimes be given, drawn from the circumstances

¹ Those of our divines who stand up most for the authority of the Church acknowledge this ultimate right in the individual. Note 1.

of the times in which the inspired writings came out, by which such omission might be made to appear accidental, and owing to temporary causes keeping such doctrines, though true, in the background ; but with such explanations we have nothing to do in the application of this Canon, because this Canon makes the fact of the absence of proof in Scripture the test and criterion, and the fact only. All we have to ask ourselves is,—Is the proof there? Is there a sufficient amount of actual statement in Scripture to constitute proof? If there is not, it is then irrelevant to proffer reasons *why* there is not. For no possible reasons that can be alleged for the absence of this proof can make it present ; and it is the presence of the proof which is required in this Canon. Indeed, if we were once to admit the authority of explanations, this Canon would not be worth much, and it would be almost better not to hold a rule in theory which would be futile in practice. But this rule draws us away from such speculations, and allows no other criterion of the intentions of Scripture but the facts of Scripture.

CHAPTER II

THE DOCTRINE OF BAPTISM SO FAR AS CONTAINED IN SCRIPTURE

IN the inquiry whether the position that all infants are regenerate in Baptism is an article of the faith, the first question, upon the principles of the preceding chapter, to be decided is, whether this position can be proved by Scripture; the absence of such proof excluding it from this class of fundamental doctrines.

On referring then, in order to decide this question, to the original institution of baptism, as described or alluded to in Scripture, we find, in the first place, no mention made in Scripture of the baptism of infants at all, and no statement in Scripture from which the obligation to baptize infants can properly be inferred. God declares, indeed, His good will towards infants, especially in the text, "Suffer the little children to come unto Me, and forbid them not."¹ But though, when we rightly use the liberty which Scripture does not deny us of baptizing children, we suitably associate the act with God's declaration of His good will toward them, such a general declaration does not prove, in the first instance, that infants are qualified for the benefit of that particular ordinance. Nor again is such a fitness proved by the natural innocence of children, though Scripture in various places recommends this natural innocence to us as an example, and a type of the Christian character, telling

¹ Mark x. 14.

us that "of such is the kingdom of God,"² and that "except we be converted and become as little children, we shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven."³ Nor because baptism is generally necessary for salvation, which we gather from John iii. 5, is the obligation to baptize infants evident, because for anything we know the case of infants may be a peculiar one, and may be an exception to the general rule thus laid down. The obligation to apply this ordinance to them presupposes their fitness for it; and that an ordinance itself is generally necessary does not prove the fitness of a particular class for the reception of it. The Sacrament of the Lord's Supper is generally necessary to salvation, but we do not therefore think infants fit to receive it. The promise, again, is "to us and to our children,"⁴ but we cannot gather anything more with certainty from this text than that God's promise applies to successive generations.

The bias of theology, Reformed and Anglican, was indeed at first to the assertion of the necessity of infant baptism, as a practice, the obligation to which could be inferred by certain deduction from Scripture; but the first controversy with the Anti-pædobaptists was conducted with too much exasperation to lead to correct theological decisions, and no quarter was allowed a sect that had disgraced the Reformation by its excesses. The Reformers had, too, on this question the natural fear of concession which men have who feel the responsibility of the beginning of a movement, when the consequences of a point yielded cannot be foreseen, and therefore admit of being exaggerated. After reading and reflection, theology moderated its claims on this head. The most orthodox writers used a different language; and the second Anti-pædobaptist controversy, which obliged our divines

² Mark x. 14.³ Matt. xviii. 3.⁴ Acts ii. 39.

to test their own arguments and re-examine the case, while it issued in a clear defeat of the exclusive position of one side, extracted also the formal admission from the other that infant baptism was not proved by Scripture, nor therefore to be considered a necessary practice.⁵

Indeed, when we consider that Scripture only mentions adults as baptized at all, and only mentions such conditions of baptism as adults can fulfil, it is not perhaps too much to say that the aspect in which the institution of baptism comes before us in Scripture, is that of an institution primarily for adults, under the operation of which infants would come, however naturally and legitimately, still secondarily. Except, indeed, on this supposition, it is difficult to account for the language of the whole Church from the first, with respect to the baptism of infants, in which there has always been a reference to the adult condition of *faith*, as indirectly and by a fiction of Christian law, fulfilled by the baptized infant. For why such a peculiar machinery of language, why a reference to faith at all in the case of an infant, but that it was felt that infant baptism was an offshoot from adult, which, however valid, should still own a connexion with the parent stock, and not set up wholly for itself? This idea runs through even the doctrinal language of antiquity, and especially do all the ancient baptismal offices bear an unconscious witness to this

⁵ The conclusion at which Wall arrives in his great work is that Pædobaptism should be treated as an open question, which is not to separate members of the same Church. The point on which, as distinct from refuting the mistake, he censures the conduct of the Anti-pædobaptists, is that they did *not* treat the question as an open one, but a fundamental, leaving the communion of the Church in consequence, whereas he would have had them remain in the Church, adhering, if they could not be dissuaded, to their own practice; which was the line taken by a portion of this school at its first rise. See Note 2.

apparent primary design in the institution of baptism. The infant is admitted to baptism on the supposition of faith and repentance: he is made to say, that he believes that he renounces the world, and desires to be baptized. But why this recourse to a supposition, and to an indirect admission of the infant upon the adult ground instead of upon his own status as an infant, if it was not that the practice of infant baptism had to be maintained in combination with the idea of an institution primarily for adults? Even when the supposition was not expressed, as it was in the offices,⁶ the baptismal theory of the Church supplied it as the tacit accompaniment even of the most naked administration of the rite. The faith of the parent or sponsor stood for that of the child:⁷ if the child had neither, the faith of the Church did the same; the infant never left the ground of a supposed adult qualification, and the Church has with remarkable caution, and in spite of much temptation, never, to this day, ventured upon the step of a total removal of the infant from the basis of the adult in baptism. Our Church, accordingly, in her account of the Sacrament of Baptism in the Catechism, treats it primarily as an institution for adults, pronouncing faith and repentance to be *the* conditions of baptism,—“that which is required of *persons* to be baptized.” She then introduces infants to the benefit of the sacrament, but still through the medium of the adult conditions, not

⁶ Mature reflection might have taught the Puritans of a former day, and might still teach some objectors of our own, that the institution of sponsors is a witness rather against than for a superstitious doctrine of baptism, as connecting the infant with the conditions of an adult.

⁷ “Prodest ergo non credentibus? Sed abest ut ego dicam non credentes infantes. Credit in altero qui peccavit in altero . . . unde credunt? Quomodo credunt? Fide parentum.” Augustine, Sermon. 294, c. 18, 19.

upon the ground of their own status as infants,—“because they promise them both by their sureties, which promise when they come to age themselves are bound to perform.”⁸

It has been urged, indeed, that baptism and circumcision stand on the same ground as infant rites, but the two ordinances differ considerably in the whole manner and circumstances of their institution. Circumcision was by the very form of its original institution a rite for infants and adults equally. “This is My covenant which ye shall keep between Me and you, and thy seed after thee; every man child among you shall be circumcised. And he that is eight days old shall be circumcised among you, every man child in your generations.” Adults and infants then stood on equal ground with respect to circumcision by the very letter of Scripture. But when Scripture describes the original institution of Christian Baptism, it makes no mention of infants, and everything relating to the rite is given in connexion with adults.

If this distinction in the original type of the institution be true, it would seem that practice has been in the contrary direction to original type, has selected for the field of growth not a first application but a second, and has made an institution almost wholly for infants out of an institution primarily for adults. But whether we accept this distinction or not, it still remains true that the practice of Infant Baptism is no essential part of the original institution of baptism, but only the particular shape it has taken in its practical working in the Christian

■ This answer admits of two meanings, according to the kind of anticipation to which we interpret it to apply; whether the reception of the sacrament previous to the grace, or the reception of the grace previous to fulfilment of the conditions of the grace. In either case, however, the infant by the act of “promising” is associated with the future adult.

community. For some centuries even of Church practice there was by no means the same regularity on this point that there is now, and such passages as the celebrated one in Tertullian "*Quid festinat innocens ætas,*" &c., and others, though not admitting of the interpretation which Anti-pædobaptists have given them, or inconsistent even with the belief in the necessity of infant baptism as the alternative of going without baptism altogether, still show that the practical standard of those times on this point was very different from that of our own. Though the institution then has thus attained so extensive a practical development in one direction, this must not divert us from the original type of the institution itself, which was neutral and open on this point, leaving its own future working and mode of application, so long as the substance was secure, to the natural feeling and discretion of Christians.

Such being the state of the case, then, with respect to the practice itself of infant baptism in Scripture, the omission in Scripture of infant baptism, carries with it the omission of infant regeneration by baptism. It is possible indeed that without any express mention of infant baptism, some Scriptural statement might still prove the regeneration of infants *if* baptized. But no such statement occurs. We find in Scripture a general connexion of regeneration with baptism; but after thus generally connecting this grace with this sacrament, and mentioning faith and repentance as the conditions of receiving this grace in the case of adults, the New Testament stops short, and does not inform us of the relations in which those stand to this sacrament, who from tender age are incapable of fulfilling these conditions.

Various attempts have indeed been made to extract from this general language of Scripture, in which regeneration figures as the grace of baptism, the particular

result that *infants* are regenerate in baptism ; but none with any success. This general language of Scripture has, because it is general, appeared to some to be “unlimited,” and that baptism “is the washing of regeneration,” has been considered to imply in its very meaning as a phrase or statement, that baptism is this *to all* who are baptized.⁹ But such a logical inference is plainly untenable, because it cannot be maintained, and is not in fact maintained by those who draw this very inference, that everybody who is baptized is regenerate, whatever be his personal state and condition. Indeed such a mode of treating Scripture language proceeds upon a misapprehension altogether of the force of general or indefinite statement, which can connect a benefit with a particular ordinance without following that connexion into particulars. It may be true that we have no right to “restrain” such language, but neither on the other hand have we the right to give it definite extension beyond the cases of application which are given.

Assuming, then, on the ground of the evident connexion of the two in Scripture, that regeneration is represented in Scripture as the grace of baptism, we must bear in mind that what we are concerned with now is another and a further question, relating to the recipients of such grace. The grace of the sacrament is one thing, who receive it is another. Supposing that baptism conveys regeneration to qualified persons, who these qualified persons are, and in particular whether all infants are

⁹ “Where the language of Holy Scripture is unlimited we are not to restrain it. But Holy Scripture speaks universally ; it says ‘The washing of regeneration and the renewing of the Holy Ghost,’ ‘born of water and of the Spirit . . .’ Scripture pronounces baptism *absolutely* to be ‘the washing of regeneration and renewal of the Holy Ghost ;’ and what Scripture calls it it must remain, at all times, and however applied to infants as well as to adults.” “Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism,” p. 63.

such, is altogether a further question, which must be decided by reference to the rules and conditions of the institution of baptism, so far as we are informed about them. Consider the case of the other sacrament. The assertion of the grace of the Eucharist does not imply more than that a certain grace attaches to that sacrament as such, leaving the question who are the recipients of such grace to subsequent decision.

There is indeed one theory according to which these two positions are identical, and the admission of the grace of the Sacrament of Baptism is the simultaneous admission that all infants are recipients of such grace; the theory, viz., which has been expressed in the dictum "*sacramenta semper suum effectum habere non ponenti obicem.*" It appears to some to follow logically from the fact of a sacrament conferring grace at all, that it confers it upon all who do not interpose any obstacle to the reception of it; it being assumed that infants do not or cannot do this; upon which theory it follows that the particular position about infants is contained in the general one about the grace of the sacrament. But can we admit the correctness of such reasoning? We cannot, in the first place, assume that infants do not present any *obex* to the reception of the grace of baptism, because they do not present the *obex* of personal sin:¹ inasmuch as the doctrine of original sin represents them as having, though physically unable to commit actual sin, sin of some kind in them, which has been transmitted by birth; as prior to baptism children of wrath, lying under the Divine curse, and polluted by an internal though undeveloped source of corruption. That beings in this state are, on account of the absence of personal sin, qualified for receiving the grace of baptism, cannot

¹ "Responde prius quis ad baptismum innocens veniat, excepto illo," &c. Augustine contra Literas Petiliani, l. 2, c. 101.

be taken for granted, unless it is so declared in Scripture. In the next place, were it true that infants presented no *obex* to the reception of the grace of baptism, we could not still infer with any certainty that such a negative condition was qualification enough for this grace; because it must be remembered that the absence of personal sin in infants is quite a different thing from the same freedom in adults. The absence of personal sin is in adults positive goodness, in infants it is only a physical incapacity for action by reason of the immaturity of nature. But that such a neutral condition as this is an adequate qualification for the grace of baptism cannot be assumed, unless it is so declared in Scripture.

The Sacrament of Baptism, then, admitted to possess grace, it still depends upon the laws and conditions of the institution of that sacrament who receive that grace. Nor can this question of the recipients be decided by logical inference from the first position; but it is a question of fact to be settled by reference to the proper sources of information on the subject. We do not admit, for example, that because the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper confers grace, it therefore confers grace upon infants. This inference does indeed appear to have prevailed at one period, and to have dictated, even in the West, an extensive practice of Infant Communion,² which established itself permanently in the Eastern Church; but it has not been generally acknowledged. It is true that Baptism is an initiatory sacrament, but the conditions of an initiatory sacrament can no more be decided by such reasoning than those of another.

Now in this state of the case one side fills up the omission of Scripture in one way, another in another. Some fill up the void with the statement that infants, as such, receive regenerating grace in baptism, upon the

² Waterland on Infant Communion, vol. vi. p. 41.

ground that the infantine state in infants is an equivalent to faith and repentance in adults. Others fill it up quite differently, by converting the omission of the effect of baptism upon infants, as such, into a denial of it. The omission of Scripture is thus on both sides converted into a statement, either affirmative or negative, which is on either side to exceed the limits of the written word. Those who put the infantine state in infants, and faith and repentance in adults, on a par as conditions of baptism, may assert something to which on abstract grounds there is no objection; still the important difference remains, that Scripture does mention faith and repentance as conditions of baptismal grace, and does not mention the infantine state itself as such a condition. Those again who deny all conditions but faith and repentance, can allege that no others are mentioned in Scripture; still the important difference remains, that Scripture does not *deny*, but only *omit* other conditions.

It is upon these two interpretations of Scripture that the two great schools of doctrine on this subject, which may, in broad terms, be called the school which preceded the Reformation, and the school of the Reformation, have been founded. The school which preceded the Reformation, comprehending the fathers and the schoolmen, maintained that the infant, as such, was qualified for the grace of baptism, the infantine state being considered an equivalent in infants to faith and repentance in adults.³ And the basis of this position was a *division* between infants and adults, that adults stood upon one ground with respect to baptism, and infants upon another; that the grace of the sacrament was in the one case con-

³ Though this position was modified in some quarters by a limitation of the infant's benefit in baptism to the negative part of the baptismal gift or remission of sin, as distinguished from the positive or renovative. See Note 14.

ditional, in the other unconditional. The divines of the Reformation, on the other hand, discarded this double principle, and insisted upon a simplification of the baptismal scheme, which would bring the whole operation of it under one law. They maintained that the grace of baptism was always conditional, and that infants and adults stood upon the same ground—one, and one only, qualification of baptism being mentioned in Scripture, viz. that of faith and repentance. Under this scheme, then, the infant had to be connected with faith and repentance, and brought under the head of an adult, before he could be pronounced a partaker of baptismal grace. And for this purpose two principal arrangements were made, one that baptism was in the infant's case an anticipatory rite, and was only attended by grace when its recipient as an adult believed and repented; the other that the certain *seed* of a future faith was implanted in some infants by Divine grace previously to baptism, which, counting for the actual grown quality, made them *at the time* persons fit and qualified for the grace of baptism. The latter is the theory of "prevenient grace," which was not a gratuitous hypothesis of the Reformation divines, proceeding from mere fancy, but an integral part of a plan for the admission of the infant to the grace of baptism, in consistency with alleged Scriptural rule and law. Prevenient grace is by universal admission necessary for the regeneration of adults in baptism, because without this prevenient grace they cannot have faith, which is the condition of their regeneration. Prevenient grace was, according to the Reformation divines, necessary for the regeneration of infants as well, and for the same reason, viz. because without it they could not have faith—in their case a seminal faith.

The principle of this whole later scheme was equality between the infant and adult in regard to baptism. Why,

it was asked, should infants be placed in so much more advantageous a position than adults with respect to baptism, as that they should be certain of regeneration by the simple fact of being baptized, while adults have only the same grace by the fulfilment of express conditions? Such *ipso facto* reception of the grace was not necessary for the virtue and efficacy of the sacrament; was it the right or due of the infant partaker? Analogy seemed rather to point to some equalizing rule which would arrange a substantial identity of the terms of regeneration, only differing according to the difference of age.

Between these extreme positions then, that of dogmatically claiming for infants, as such, the grace of regeneration in baptism, and that of dogmatically denying it to infants as such, a middle course is open, viz. that of leaving the omission in Scripture as it stands, and acquiescing in an absence of positive doctrine on the subject.⁴

The regeneration of infants, as such, in baptism may be seen to be a position supplementary to and additional to Scripture, the more clearly, perhaps, if for the term regeneration, the association of which with infants custom has rendered so familiar, we substitute justification. The substitution of this term makes no difference to the reasoning in the present case, because justification, or the Divine act by which sin ceases to be imputed to us, is an integral part of regeneration; so that, on the supposition that infants, as such, are regenerate, they are also justified in baptism.⁵ But the doctrine of Scripture is that we are

⁴ Note 3.

⁵ "Justificatio est revera regeneratio." Luther, Op. i. p. 388.

"Regeneration is the spiritual grace of baptism in reference to the change in ourselves, whereas justification is the spiritual grace of baptism in reference to our reconciliation with God." Bp. Marsh's second Letter to Simeon, p. 20.

justified by faith; and though some interpret this faith as including works, and others reject this interpretation, all agree in accepting as the condition of justification mentioned in Scripture, an act or state of mind which, we know, can belong only to adults, and of which infants are incapable. Most persons would indeed, I think, admit that justification without faith was a strange notion, on being first placed before them; and that it carried a difficulty with it as not being in the line of Scripture language. Nor could they well help this impression, because Scripture only contemplates forgiveness as applying to the actual sins of moral agents who are capable of faith, and therefore cannot be pardoned without it; the application of which forgiveness, therefore, to the case of those who, as not being moral agents, are capable neither of actual sin nor faith, is a position supplementary to Scripture; though it is a position which has the sanction of antiquity, which *filled up* the void in Scripture with the positive statement of the justification of all infants in baptism.

Luther was vastly perplexed by the difficulty of reconciling infant justification in baptism with his own great doctrine of justification by faith, and in order to meet it went almost to the extravagant length of asserting that infants had literal and actual faith excited in them by an act of Divine power, to qualify them for justification in the sacrament.⁶ The Wittenberg Conference drew a more moderate assertion from him of their endowment with “a faith according to their capacity and measure;”⁷ but the true existence of faith in the infant was still insisted on as the essential condition of his justification, and many Lutherans for a long time clung to the older

⁶ Note 4.

⁷ “Initium quoddam fidei in infantibus extare, secundum ipsorum mensuram et modulum.” Bucer, *Angl. Script.*, p. 656.

language of their founder.⁸ The great controversies on justification in our own Church have all along assumed faith, in the narrower or larger sense, as the condition of man's justification; the case of those who from natural immaturity cannot possess faith, being either left out of the calculation altogether or treated as an exceptional case, which God provides for in an extraordinary manner. "God is the donor," says Waterland, "and He can dispense the grace to some without faith as to infants, and to others without baptism, as to martyrs principally, and to catechumens prevented by extremities; but still the ordinary rule is first to dispense it upon a true and lively faith, sealed with the stipulations mutually passed in baptism."⁹ Infant justification is here regarded as an exceptional appendage to the regular Divine method, and the want of faith is put on the same ground as the want of baptism, as a want, viz., which in certain cases is supplied in an extraordinary way.

This want in infants, then, of express Scriptural qualification for justification applies equally to that of which justification is an integral part, viz. to their regeneration, which, without faith and repentance, is a supplement to Scripture, as is their justification without either.

Not that by the expression, "supplement of Scripture," it is meant that such a supplement is presumptuous, or one that we are forbidden to make, or that it is not in itself true and correct. The same Providence which has left unfinished doctrine in Scripture has also endowed us with that reason which moves us,—and within certain limits innocently,—to build further to it, as we think

⁸ "Tamen Lutherani hodie non contenti hac mitiore expositione actualem in pueris fidem constituunt." Whitaker, *Prælect. de Sacr.*, p. 284.

⁹ "Summary View of the Doctrine of Justification," vol. vi. p. 12. See Note 5.

appropriately and considerably ; but such supplement is still no integral part of revelation.

A neutral conclusion, however, on this subject will not be allowed to pass without some objections.

1. It may appear an anomaly then that, when to the Divine foreknowledge it was certain that the baptism of infants was going to become with the spread of Christianity the general rule and that of adults the exception, we should be so much better informed of the relation of adults than of that of infants to this ordinance.¹ But to this objection the general answer may be made which is made to the same kind of objection in other cases, viz. that we are no judges beforehand upon such a question. Such a combination of information with want of information as to the operation of a sacrament, is not out of analogy with the general course of Divine revelation in the dispensations alike of nature and of grace. On how many subjects connected with the invisible world does the Bible tell us something, and then suddenly stop short, leaving off, as it were accidentally, with partial and fragmentary truth? And this general answer receives additional weight when we take into consideration what was mentioned above, that the practice of infant baptism, though unquestionably divinely foreknown in its full extent as almost wholly superseding adult, is still no essential part of the institution of baptism, but only the particular shape which it has taken in its practical working in the Christian world.

2. Another objection to a neutral position respecting

¹ "To us, to the vast majority of the Church, since the day that the writer of the Epistle wrote those words under the guidance of the Holy Spirit foreknowing that state of things, the doctrine of baptism *is* the doctrine of Infant Baptism; in that shape, practically, it concerns us." Lord Lyttelton's Tract on Infant Baptism.

the regeneration of infants as such, comes in the form of an appeal to our consistency : for why baptize infants at all, it may be said, when we have no certain information that they receive at the time the beneficial effect of baptism ? But it can be no sufficient reason for not baptizing infants that we do so with partial knowledge, or want of absolute information. If natural feeling, religious instincts, and the analogy of the older dispensation are all in favour of admitting infants to the initiatory rite of a Divine covenant, we are, in the absence of prohibition, justified in doing so.

This particular objection, however, may assume the more formidable shape of a doubt thrown upon the whole subsequent baptismal state of those who are baptized in infancy ; on the ground that, as persons cannot be baptized again, if baptism is administered to them, when it is not certain that they receive the grace of it, the same doubt cleaves to their state ever after. I shall reserve this question for another chapter, but in the mean time I shall take for granted, what the whole history of baptism from its first institution abundantly proves, that this is an incorrect assumption ; and that the supposition, even if made, that infants are not regenerate by baptism at the time, does not hinder but that they are regenerate by virtue of that same baptism afterwards, upon fulfilling the required conditions.

The general statement then of the baptismal question, so far as this chapter goes, may be summed up as follows :—

1. To state in the first place what the doctrine *is*, concerning the presence or absence of which in Scripture we are now inquiring. It is not the doctrine of baptismal regeneration generally, which is assumed, but the position that *all infants* are regenerate in baptism. The identity of these two positions has indeed been assumed in recent

controversy, the one having been taken to *mean* the other; so that, had any one spoken of the doctrine of baptismal regeneration in any other meaning than that of the regeneration of all infants in baptism, he would have been regarded as using words in a non-natural sense, and adopting an outward phraseology with an inward reserve. But, though the verbal question is not important, it must be seen that these are in reality two distinct positions,—that of baptismal regeneration, or that baptism confers regeneration upon qualified persons, and that infants are qualified persons.

The question of a sacrament possessing a particular grace is decided not by the fact who are the recipients of that grace, but by such a grace attaching to it as a sacrament—the way in which we decide this point in the case of the Eucharist. It is true, that if we are in addition informed that such a class of persons are recipients, this additional fact becomes a part of the true doctrine relating to that sacrament; but, in the absence of such information, we cannot insert a *fixed* class of recipients—such as, e.g., in the present case infants—in the essence of the sacrament, and incorporate it with its substance and basis.

2. To state with still further accuracy what the doctrine is which we are inquiring about, it is that of the regeneration of infants, *as such*, i.e. as distinguished from the same infants grown up to years of discretion. This distinction is important because, on the supposition that an infant is not regenerate as such in baptism, he may still be regenerate afterwards, as an adult, by virtue of the same previous baptism; nor with any more doubt attaching to his case, than what necessarily attaches to all cases in which personal conditions have to be fulfilled, the same doubt which must always attach to adult baptisms.

3. There being two modes of proof by which the regeneration of infants, as such, in baptism, might be established as a doctrine of Scripture; one its express mention in Scripture, the other the extraction of it by logical inference from the general doctrine of baptism in Scripture; of these two the former is absent, the latter is an incorrect application of reasoning.

4. On the assumption that baptism does not convey regeneration to infants at the time, it still is not a barren form, for it conveys a pledge of and title to regeneration upon certain conditions fulfilled, and so transfers the infant out of a wholly natural and uncovenanted state, as will appear more clearly in the next chapter.

5. The real difference between the baptismal state of infants upon this supposition and upon the other is not so great as might at first be thought. Upon the one supposition they have regeneration from the moment of baptism, but they are only in an elementary stage of the state, till it is developed by action; upon the other they have from the same date a conditional pledge to the *full* state, which the same course of action secures; this pledge being also accompanied by a preparatory grace, such as that which the catechumens of the early Church enjoyed, and which partakes of the true nature of Gospel grace.

The main question, however, which has been decided in this chapter, is a question of fact relating to Scripture, viz. that Scripture asserts nowhere, either explicitly or implicitly, the regeneration of infants in baptism. Without neglecting the consideration of consequences, it must still be remembered that no appeal to them can undo or set aside the plain fact of its omission in Scripture. It is impossible, then, with this fact before us, and with the rule before us that nothing that is not read in Scripture, or may be proved thereby, is to be required of

any man that it should be believed as an article of the faith, to maintain that the regeneration of infants in baptism is an article of the faith.

It may be said that Scripture may be interpreted *consistently* with this position, and that antiquity does so interpret it; but the imposition of a sense on Scripture, which the words only admit of and do not oblige, is not *proof* from Scripture.² It may appear to some again that the omission is accidental, and owing to the circumstance that the most prominent subjects of baptism at the first promulgation of the Gospel were, in the nature of the case, adults; but the rule of faith, which requires proof from Scripture for an article of the faith, looks only to the *fact* of the presence or absence of such proof in Scripture, without concerning itself with the reasons.³ The test which is laid down in this rule of faith is a matter-of-fact test. We may seem to ourselves to be able to account for the omission of infant baptism in Scripture simply and naturally enough, by a reference to the circumstances under which the writings of the New Testament were composed, the state of things which accompanied the first preaching of the Gospel, when the conversion of adults was necessarily the most conspicuous and important work; and we may then explain the omission of infant regeneration in Scripture by the omission of infant baptism in Scripture. But if we think we can explain the second of these omissions by the first, and the first by something else, this cannot undo the fact of these omissions; and the fact of the absence of proof in Scripture is all that we are concerned with in the application of this rule of faith.

² P. 9.

³ P. 19.

CHAPTER III

THE BAPTISMAL CHARACTER

ONE reason which has undoubtedly contributed much to the assumption of infant regeneration in baptism, as a *necessary* part of the doctrine of baptism, is an inference which is drawn respecting the condition of all those who have been baptized in infancy, if this assumption is *not* allowed; the inference, viz. which was noticed at the end of the last chapter, that if it is allowed to be doubtful whether such persons received the grace of baptism at the actual time of being baptized, a doubt must attach to their baptismal condition ever after.¹ Such a result would of course unsettle the baptismal condition of nearly the whole Christian world; and, nobody being prepared to allow this uncertainty, the inference is drawn that the regeneration of infants as such cannot be permitted to rank as an open question, but must be considered as part and parcel of the fundamental doctrine of baptism.

It is, however, a principle testified to in Scripture, and universally maintained in the Christian Church from the first, that the grace of baptism does not depend upon the personal state or condition of the baptized person

¹ "Do all the promises and descriptions of baptism apply to Infant Baptism? Certainly, unless they did in effect, Infant Baptism were wrong; for so *we should be depriving our children of whatever benefits it were supposed that Adult Baptism conferred, and Infant Baptism was incapable of.*" Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism, p. 63.

at the time of the administration of the rite, but is received subsequently, upon the proper conditions of it being fulfilled. This law, or *modus operandi* of the sacrament, is connected with its fundamental character as an initiatory rite, which can only be administered once, and does not admit of repetition. The law of this sacrament would indeed be severe if both of these conditions attached to it at once, i.e. if together with the rule of its institution that it cannot be repeated, the benefit of it also altogether hung upon the particular disposition of the recipient at the time. Along with the one rule, therefore, another also is found to attach to the sacrament, viz. that of a suspended beneficial effect; that the grace, even if forfeited by unworthiness at the time, still remains conditionally attached to the state of the baptized man, and is received upon his becoming worthy.²

It is the same when the state of unworthiness is not simultaneous with but subsequent to baptism, and is a fall from the previous possession of baptismal grace. As in the former case the grace remains suspended till it is had, so in the latter it remains suspended after it has been lost, to be recovered again upon repentance; though in this case the recovery is not absolutely complete. The two cases rest essentially on the same ground, and are met by the same law.

Baptism, correctly administered, has thus one effect which is universal and invariable, whatever be the state

² The late Mr. Faber (*Primitive Doctrine of Regeneration*, p. 113) rejects the principle of suspension as untenable upon the ground that "suspension importing non-communication *at the time*," and communication importing non-suspension, there is no room for this middle effect. But this argument altogether misses the point, because it just leaves out and does not take cognizance of the very idea of suspension, which is that of a *future* communication in connexion with a present act as the condition of it.

or condition of the baptized person at the time, viz. a title to or pledge for the grace of the sacrament upon worthiness; an effect which places him in a certain sense in a covenanted state; for the promise of any gift upon conditions is a covenant, and therefore one who has the promise of regenerating grace upon conditions is in a covenanted state, and is taken out of the simple state of heathenism. This effect is indeed no more than a *continuation* and *extension* of the rite itself: still it is on that very account something *beyond* the rite itself. In later theology it obtained the formal name of the baptismal character, a term which only really stood for this *modus operandi* of the sacrament; ³ though the Schoolmen after their fashion materialized its meaning, and put the cause for the effect, assigning the *character* as the reason for the non-repetition of baptism, instead of the non-repetition of baptism as the reason for the character.⁴ I retain the scholastic name as a convenient one, and one for which there is Augustinian authority,⁵ for this invariable effect

³ "Character sacramentum est et sacramenti effectus." Bellarmine, De Effectu Sacr. l. 2, c. 22. "Res et sacramentum est character baptismalis." Aquinas, S. T., p. 3, Q. 66, A. 1. "Baptismus ex communi sententia aliquod sacramentale confert etiamsi percipiatur sine fide . . . aliquem effectum sacramentalem habet præter gratiam." Bellarmine, *ibid.*

"Fictione recedente character totum supplet quod sacramentum sine fictione faceret." Bonaventure, t. v. p. 81.

⁴ "*Causa* quare non potest iterari baptismus est character quem imprimit." Bonaventure, tom. v. p. 75. "Baptisma non potest repeti . . . sed vera causa non potest assignari hujus discriminis nisi character." Bellarmine, De Effectu Sacr. l. 2, c. 22.

⁵ "Nam si Christiani baptismi sacramentum etiam apud hæreticos valet et sufficit ad consecrationem, quamvis ad vitæ æternæ participationem non sufficiat; quæ consecratio reum quidem facit hæreticum extra Domini gregem habentem *dominicum characterem*," &c. Ep. 98. "Ovem quæ foris errabat et dominicum *characterem* a fallacibus depredatoribus suis foris acceperat, venientem ad Chris-

of baptism, which is, it will be observed, distinguished by its very definition from regeneration, existing before the possession of and after the loss of the *grace* of baptism.

The New Testament nowhere formally states this particular effect of baptism. It is clear, however, that those who lost the grace of baptism by wilful sin were not, according to Apostolic practice, cut off for ever from the new Covenant; but on their repentance were treated as again partaking of a grace which had only been suspended by unworthiness, being re-admitted to the Church and the state and privileges of Christian brethren. We gather no less plainly from Scripture that even when baptism was received in the first instance without the proper qualifications, and therefore without grace, it still gave a conditional title to that grace, and imparted a new distinction of some kind. When we read of three thousand being baptized in one day by the Apostles, and of the admission into the Church of five thousand at once on another occasion, we cannot suppose that every one of that large number of adults was in a state of mind which constituted a qualification for the saving grace of baptism; but we cannot reasonably doubt that all without exception, in being "added to the Church," were brought within the Christian covenant, in this sense, that they were admitted to a state and a title which distinguished them from heathens; and that upon the

tianæ veritatis salutem ab errore corrigi, *characterem* tamen in ea dominicum agnoscere potius quam improbari; quandoquidem ipsum *characterem* multi et lupi et lupis infigunt," &c. De Bapt. contra Donat. l. 6, c. 1. This effect of baptism, however, he more commonly expresses under the terms—"integritas sacramenti," "veritas sacramenti," "visibilis sanctificatio," "Christi baptismus usque ad celebrationem," "Christum induere usque ad Sacramenti perceptionem," "verum baptismum," "baptismus sanctus," "baptismus vivus," &c.

strength of this title every one of them, whatever may have been his disposition of mind at the time of being baptized, had subsequently upon worthiness the saving grace of the sacrament.

With reference to this point, indeed, another and an important consideration comes in, viz. that of the free and liberal policy of the new dispensation from the first, with respect to the rule and tests of admission into its pale. Faith and repentance are undoubtedly laid down in the case of adults, as necessary for receiving the grace of the sacrament, but the criterion for ascertaining the existence of these qualifications in individuals has never been a rigid one. The Gospel, in this respect, stands in remarkable contrast with the precision of particular sects which have aimed at too much perfection in the constitution of the visible Church, and have only in consequence narrowed and circumscribed their limits as Christian bodies, without even really attaining their own object of a higher standard,—for no human test can exclude hypocrisy. The Gospel plan of admission has been from the first large and comprehensive, applying no scrupulous touchstone of inward personal qualifications, but content rather with the outward hold of men in the first instance, trusting to its own power of moulding and disciplining them afterwards. Our Lord's parables describe the area of the Christian Church as wide, and the occupation as miscellaneous, the tares and the wheat both finding their way in together, to await in a large mixed society the final division; and the parting command to the Apostles was,—“Go and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.” Nor, as has been observed, when we come to New Testament practice and the scale of Apostolic baptisms, does this rite at all figure as one designed to be administered with a sparing hand and by the use of nice tests.

But such a liberal rule of admission as this is altogether inconsistent with the rigid supposition, that the whole future benefit of the new Covenant to the individual should be dependent upon the disposition of mind he was in at the particular time of his first admission into it. In that case, the practice of baptizing men in masses, upon a general desire indeed expressed for the sacrament, but certainly without any strict examination of individual qualifications, would be attended by the most fearful risks, and would indeed be a positive cruelty rather than an indulgent or wise policy : for it would be the extremity of rashness and precipitation, it would be sporting with men's souls and eternal interests, to invite them in crowds to baptism, if a certain inward state of mind at that particular time was everything, in the absence of which, so to speak, all chance was gone. But, indeed, such a supposition as this latter receives no kind of warrant from any part of the New Testament ; for though Scripture, so far as it speaks on the subject, attaches *moral* conditions to the reception of the grace of baptism, it attaches no conditions of *time*, nor ever once implies that the grace of baptism, in order to be had subsequently to baptism, must have been had simultaneously with it.

The Church has followed the liberal rule of Scripture in this matter, and the fundamental characteristic of the new Covenant as one of mercy has, like a general principle of equity interpreting a civil statute, dictated the catholic law of baptism. It was held universally from the first, that in the case of the *Fictus*, or the person who received baptism in a state of unworthiness, the grace, though not received at the time, was received afterwards upon his change of inward disposition. In other words, the Church drew a distinction between the grace or salutary effects of baptism and a title or character which it

conferred, by which grace, at the time absent or present, the recipient was removed from the position of a heathen. The same distinction was applied to the case of persons who fell into states of unworthiness subsequently to baptism which they had received at the time worthily. A small party—the Novatian—took a hopeless view of the condition of persons, who, having once enjoyed the grace of baptism, afterwards fell away from and lost it by wilful sin; but the Church recognized a Christian title which continued good throughout, even while the grace of the sacrament was lost; which title, without any fresh baptism, re-admitted them to grace upon true repentance.

This admitted operation of baptism in the case of the *Fictus* became, indeed, the basis upon which other large and important baptismal rules in the same direction were maintained; and the Church rested upon it as her argumentative *fulcrum* in deciding the point at issue in the Cyprianic and Donatist controversies, i.e. in establishing the validity of schismatical and heretical baptism. St. Augustine appeals to it throughout his anti-Donatist works as a settled point, which he could take for granted without fear of challenge; and upon the ground of the subsequent profitableness of the baptism of the *Fictus* assumed as universally admitted, argued for the same effect the case of the person baptized in schism and heresy.⁶ The two cases were indeed, upon the assumption of certain effects of schism, almost identical; the preliminary obstacle being in both alike unworthiness in the recipient, only occasioned in the one place by personal defect, in the other by a want inherent in a position external to the Church, outside of which the spiritual disposition of love could not be had, inasmuch as it was only within her that

⁶ De Baptismo contra Donat. l. 1, c. 12; l. 5, c. 20; l. 6, c. 34, and passim.

the Holy Spirit operated. The validity of heretical baptism was thus raised as a superstructure upon the basis of the operation of baptism in the case of the *Fictus*, assumed to possess an antecedent undoubted position as an established catholic truth.

In maintaining this general position with respect to the operation of baptism, the Church doubtless did not altogether shut its eye to a certain evident expediency, for very awkward consequences would have followed upon any different ground taken. Any uncertainty attaching to the sacramental profitableness of baptism afterwards, if received without faith and repentance at the time, would have introduced doubt on the largest scale into the actual mass of existing baptisms, would have imperilled the spiritual state of thousands, and have infected the whole atmosphere of Christendom with distrust. Nor probably were the limbs of the main position maintained without an eye to the effect upon the centre if *they* were abandoned: and the validity of schismatical and heretical baptism may have been adhered to the more firmly from the idea that those cases, if given up, might react upon the baptism of the *Fictus*, or baptism received in a state of sin. It was a first principle with the Church to establish the validity of baptism upon as plain and matter-of-fact a ground as possible, simplifying the tests of it, and relieving it from doubt and uncertainty; so as to set people's minds at rest, and leave no room for fears and apprehensions on that head. And therefore the two conditions of the matter and the words ascertained, nothing was allowed to interfere with the validity of baptism, or its subsequent profitableness, where the proper conditions were fulfilled. But though the Church did not probably shut out practical consequences altogether from her view, the doctrine that she laid down was clear and decisive; and the operation of baptism in the case of the *Fictus* was always

appealed to as a known, admitted, and universally received truth.

The law that the subsequent grace of baptism does not depend on the qualification of the baptized person at the time, is thus part and parcel of the doctrine of baptism itself; it dates from the very institution of the sacrament, and carries with it the unanimous assent of the Church in every age. It is, indeed, this law of baptism which has been erroneously expressed by some divines as “once regenerate, always regenerate.” The regenerate state may be lost because it is essentially a state of pardon and acceptance, which is lost when the person falls into a state of sin: but the baptismal character is not lost.

Waterland draws attention to this distinction between, as he expresses it, “the baptismal consecration and the covenant state consequent,” and “the saving effect of baptism, the new birth or spiritual life,” in the case of adults baptized in sin.⁷ The real and full truth of the case I take to lie in the particulars here following:—

1. It is certain, in general, that the Holy Spirit, some way or other, has a hand in every true and valid baptism; God never fails as to His part in an awful sacrament, however men may guiltily fail in theirs.
2. The Holy Spirit is in some sort offered to all that receive Christian baptism; for the very nature of a sacrament requires that the sign and the grace should so far go together, and the unworthy could not be guilty of *rejecting* the grace, while they *receive* the sign, if both were not offered them.
3. As the Holy Spirit consecrates and sanctifies the *waters* of baptism, giving them an *outward* and *relative* holiness, so he *consecrates* the *persons* also in an *outward* and *relative* sense, whether good or bad, by a sacred dedication of them to the worship and service of the whole Trinity;

⁷ V. iv. p. 441.

which *consecration* is for ever binding and has its effect, either to the salvation of the parties, if they repent or amend, or to the greater damnation if they do not. 4. I must add that even the unworthy are by their baptism put into a Christian state; otherwise they would be as mere Pagans still, and would want a new baptism to make them Christians. Therefore as they are by baptism translated out of their *natural* state into the state Christian, they must be supposed to have pardon, and grace, and Gospel privileges conditionally made over to them, though not yet actually applied by reason of their disqualifications: a grant which will do them no manner of service, but hurt, if they never repent; but if they do repent and turn to God, then that conditional grant suspended as it were before, with respect to any *saving* effects, begins at length to take place effectually; and so their baptism which had stood waiting without any salutary fruit for a time, now becomes beneficial and saving to the returning penitents.”⁸

The law of baptism then being clear and decisive that the profitableness of it does not depend upon the qualifications of the baptized person at the time, but commences subsequently as soon as those qualifications are obtained; it is evident that the baptism of infants, supposed not to have at the time the proper qualifications for the grace of baptism, comes strictly and properly under it. For let this be supposed of infants, still all that can be said of infants, even on this supposition, is that they are human persons who are baptized without being qualified at the time for the grace of the sacrament; and as thus described the above principle applies strictly to them; and their baptism has a suspended grace accompanying it, which comes into operation upon their growing up and becom-

⁸ V. iv. p. 443.

ing qualified for it. The principle has been undoubtedly laid down in the Christian Church from the first, that the grace of the sacrament is not tied to the time of its administration ; that the simultaneity of the sign and the thing signified is not necessary, but that on the contrary the sign may precede the grace by an indefinitely long interval.

The only answer indeed which I can suppose being made to this distinction that infants may not be regenerate in baptism at the time, and yet receive in baptism a title to regenerating grace upon becoming afterwards qualified for it, is the plea that this title as carrying with it a kind of covenanted state, is *itself* regeneration. But to assert this would be simply to misapprehend at the very outset the very nature of this title or *character*, which is by its very definition, not regeneration, but only a conditional right to it. Regeneration is undoubtedly grace, but nothing can be more clear and decided than the distinction, maintained by the whole of antiquity and pervading all subsequent theology, which separates the baptismal character from grace.⁹ Regeneration is in its own nature and at the very time it is given, beneficial, being, besides other things, the actual pardon of sin, which is a present advantage : but the baptismal character does not remit sin, and is no benefit at the time, but only a title to benefit subsequently upon conditions fulfilled. Regeneration is only received by the adult upon faith and repentance ; but the baptismal character is received by every baptized person, and even without faith and repentance. These two things, therefore, are entirely distinct ; and that all infants receive the baptismal character in baptism does not at all imply that all infants are regenerate in baptism.

When, then, among other language, the divines of the

⁹ Note 6.

Reformation held that infant baptism was an anticipatory rite which, though it was not beneficial at the time on account of the want of qualification in the recipient, became beneficial afterwards¹ upon his obtaining that qualification, they had a parallel case provided for them in antiquity. They were only applying to infants the same law and rule of baptism, which the Fathers had applied to unqualified adults. The case of the *Fictus*, which had received the unanimous and uninterrupted assent of the Church, involved unquestionably the great principle just mentioned. The Reformers applied this principle to Infant Baptism, nor in doing so did they admit that they at all depreciated the virtue of the sacrament. The *identity of time*, in the connexion of the sign with the thing signified, was the only point affected by this arrangement, and that, besides that it was evidently no intrinsic or fundamental part of the relation of the two, had been completely given up by antiquity in the case mentioned. Such a separation in time between the sacrament itself and the virtue and benefit of it, no more derogated from the former as the *channel and instrument* of the latter, in the case of infant baptism, than it did in the case of the baptism of the *Fictus*.

¹ Note 7.

CHAPTER IV

REGENERATION CONSIDERED AS REMISSION OF SIN

Two definitions of Regeneration may be said to divide theological opinion; according to one of which it is a state of pardon and of *actual goodness*, according to the other a state of pardon and a new *capacity* only for goodness, or an assisting grace.

In this state of the case, then, the first observation that we make is, that, upon either definition, regeneration is a complex thing, consisting of parts of which it is the whole or sum; only existing in any person by the presence of both those parts, and cancelled if either is absent; those parts being, the one, remission of sin past, the other, one or other of the two alternatives just mentioned. It is from overlooking this complex character of regeneration that various mistakes have been made. We hear of a *non-beneficial* regeneration, which is received by impenitent adults in baptism;¹ but if persons would examine what it is which constitutes regeneration, they would find that, in the nature of the case, the gift cannot be otherwise than beneficial; because, as the *res sacramenti* of baptism, it undoubtedly comprehends the Divine pardon, which is in its own nature an advantage and a benefit. They would find that for that reason an impenitent adult cannot receive regeneration in baptism, inasmuch as that would be to suppose sin pardoned without repentance.² They would find again that it is not “once regenerate,

¹ Note 8.

² Note 9.

always regenerate ;” because that would be saying, “Once in a state of pardon, always in a state of pardon.” The baptismal *character* is indeed received by impenitent adults, and always remains, but the baptismal *character* is not regeneration.

This preliminary remark, however, made, it will be convenient, in approaching the question of the real or Scriptural meaning of regeneration, to eliminate, in the first instance, from the two antagonistic definitions that which is common to both, viz. this particular benefit of remission of sin, in order to clear the ground for a comparison of the two on the point on which they differ ; and to relieve ourselves from the necessity of carrying about with us throughout the discussion an extra weight of language, caused by the perpetual junction of that which is *not* with that which is in dispute.

In eliminating, however, from the two rival definitions of regeneration, the common benefit of remission of sin, we must pause a short time to consider a question relating to this particular gift of remission, which bears immediately upon the main point of difference between the two definitions. For whereas the two received definitions of regeneration differ in this respect, that one does and the other does not make regeneration actual goodness, the question may be raised whether this gift of remission of sin, which both adopt in common, does not of itself constitute actual goodness ; inasmuch as it may be argued that a man must be good in the sight of God as soon as ever sin is no longer imputed to him.

What is it then which is involved in remission of sin ? In examining the precise effect of remission, and what actually takes place in this Divine act, we find that we cannot describe this effect, regarded by itself, as being more than the removal of an existing *impediment* in the way of the individual’s goodness. It is the nature of sin

that, though the *act* passes away, it leaves a result behind it³ in that stain upon the soul which we call guilt—a result which affects the *character* even after the *act*, making the character of the individual, so long as this guilt attaches to him, bad. The guilt of past sin then being an impediment to the present goodness of the individual, remission of sin is the removal of that impediment: but the removal of an impediment to goodness is not goodness, because the removal of an impediment is only a negative thing, whereas goodness is a positive quality, and consists in certain actual habits and dispositions, which are active and living principles of goodness within the soul, producing acts upon the opportunity and power being supplied. The individual is by remission relieved of a certain effect of his past wrong acts, but has he therefore right habits and dispositions? Has he a present inclination to virtue simply on account of such forgiveness of past vice? We must see, if we examine the matter, that the absence of a certain effect of past wickedness is altogether a different thing from the production of positive goodness within the soul, that these are in their own nature different spiritual facts. And we must also see that it is no derogation from the Divine act of remitting sin to insist on this distinction; it being no defect in a Divine act that it should be the act which it professes to be, and not another, and that the end in which it issues should be its own appropriate end and no other.

The Divine act of remission of sin is in its own nature then limited to the removal of an effect which has followed from past sin, and does not of itself produce the existence of actual goodness in the soul. Nor is it true to say that the individual is good in the sight of God by virtue of the non-imputation of sin simply; because God sees things as

³ “Manent peccata reatu, quæ præterierunt actu.” Augustine contra Jul. Pel. l. vi. c. 19.

they are, and if actual goodness is not produced in the person by simple remission of sin, actual goodness is not perceived in him by God as the effect of such remission. The argument might, indeed, at first sight commend itself that pardon is an act of love, and that Divine love implies goodness in the object of it; but this would be an inference drawn from a word which had one meaning in the premiss, and another in the conclusion. In one sense God only loves the good, but in another sense God's love is bestowed upon the creature as such, of whose welfare it is the desire.⁴

It is true that remission of sin in the case of moral agents supposes a certain actual goodness in them as the *condition* of it, viz. faith and repentance: but such goodness as being the condition of remission, and therefore preceding it, is plainly not the *effect* of such remission, or contained in it as its cause, or constituted *by* remission of sin;—which is the question with which we are concerned.

The Schoolmen, who went with their usual minuteness into the nature of the Divine gift of remission of sin, were particular in drawing attention to this distinction, that the non-imputation of sin did not constitute actual goodness. They identified justification indeed with actual goodness, but justification, in the Roman and Scholastic sense, means more than remission of sin, viz. the actual infusion into the creature of good habits, and of the virtues of faith, hope, and charity. This infusion, then, of actual goodness into the human soul, was decided in the schools to constitute such actual goodness, but the simple remission of sin was pronounced not to do so. And though the doctrine of the later Schoolmen was that infusion of virtues and remission of sin went together *de facto*, in the Divine dispensation; the goodness of the justified person was attributed expressly to the infusion and not to the

⁴ Note 10.

remission. A section of the schools indeed went so far as to maintain only one Divine act in justification, viz. that of infusion of virtues, and with it this result, that so far from remission of sin causing actual goodness, on the contrary, it was the infusion of actual goodness which caused remission of sin, "extinguishing it by contrary disposition."⁵

Calvinism,—and the same may be said of Lutheranism,—is less decided against the claim of remission of sin to constitute actual goodness, and appears at first sight to contemplate a point in the life of the soul, at which it is good in the sight of God, simply by reason of delivery from guilt, viz. when the Divine grace arresting the sinner in the midst of his pollution, and conveying to him instantaneously a pardon in full of the past, by this pardon justifies him. But justification, in the Calvinistic sense, does not coincide with the precise idea of actual goodness in God's sight, being distinguished by the Calvinist himself from that insertion of the habit of holiness and goodness, i.e. sanctification, which he upholds as a necessary accompaniment of justification.⁶ For by maintaining the

⁵ Thorndike, *Covenant of Grace*, b. 2, c. 30, s. 19. "Vasquez acriter contendit remissionem peccati nihil prorsus in re esse, nisi infusionem justitiæ, tribuitque hanc opinionem quibusdam Romanensibus." Forbes' *Considerations*, l. 2, de Justif., c. 4. Occham on the contrary,—“Deus de potentia sua absoluta potest remittere culpam et pœnam sine infusione gratiæ . . . Tamen dico de facto quod gratia infunditur, quia hoc sonant auctoritates sacræ Scripturæ et dicta sanctorum.” In Lomb. iv. 3. And Bellarmine,—“Reatus pœnæ et offensa possent quidem tolli sine infusione justitiæ, nihil enim impedire videtur quo minus possit Deus velle non ordinare pœnam et condonare offensam, et non habere pro inimico illum cui donum habitualis justitiæ non concesserit.” De Justificatione, l. 2, c. 16.

⁶ “Cum justificatione sanctificatio necessario conjungitur.” Whitaker de Sacr. Q. 5, c. 3, p. 146. The Lutheran doctrine is the same: “Opera sequuntur justificationem fidei infallibiter.” Luther, tom. i. p. 373.

necessity of inward sanctification as the criterion of justification, the Calvinist substantially requires more than simple pardon as necessary to constitute the man actually good in the sight of God. The Lutheran doctrine is the same as the Calvinistic.

The bearing of this negative characteristic of remission of sin, viz. that it does not constitute actual goodness, upon the case of baptized infants, deserves attention. Remission to adults of actual sin presupposes, in the shape of faith and repentance, certain actual goodness: but the remission to the infant of original sin, not requiring, as in the nature of the case it cannot, any such conditions, we have in consequence, in the state of the baptized infant, simply the effect of remission of sin itself, abstracted from adjuncts and accompaniments. What then is the effect of this naked and pure remission of sin upon the baptized infant? It is evident from the foregoing considerations what the effect is *not*,—that though the infant has of course the goodness of natural innocence, he does not possess goodness in a moral or theological sense, by reason of the remission of original sin. He is free, indeed, from personal sin, and he is admitted to Divine favour; but neither does the admission into Divine favour,—inasmuch as God loves us independently of goodness in us,—neither does the absence of personal sin, where this is the effect of mere physical immaturity; nor do both of these together constitute actual goodness: in the place of which an impending and as yet uncertain struggle between concupiscence and grace, the flesh and the spirit, between an inherent principle of evil and a latent germinal principle of good, forms a morally neutral and indeterminate state in the infant to whom original sin is yet remitted. He has implanted spiritual faculties of which after-life may show either the culture or neglect, but at present his character is wholly unformed for good or for evil, and the

issue is in suspense, and awaits a future contingency. Nor has he by reason of such remission even an implanted or seminal habit of goodness. He possesses, therefore, in no sense a determinate moral character, and therefore is not good in a moral or theological sense.

The later Schoolmen refused indeed to recognize this neutral and indeterminate state in baptized infants, and insisted upon the point that they possessed positive goodness; but, as has been said, they assigned them this goodness as the consequence of a distinct infusion of habits into them, and not as the result of remission of original sin. Resting upon the maxim that the remission of sin and implantation of goodness, though in the abstract separable, always went together *de facto* in the Divine economy, in the same way in which the Calvinist asserts that justification and sanctification go together, they maintained that, together with the remission of original sin in baptism, the infant had also the habits of faith, hope, and charity infused into him. Nor was the refusal in this case to separate a state of pardon from a state of actual goodness an unnatural and unreasonable refusal, had the pardon which is supposed in this case been a pardon of the natural and comprehensible kind; for certainly when a being enjoys the Divine pardon in the natural and comprehensible sense, it is only reasonable to conclude that he is in a state of positive goodness. But the pardon which is here supposed as the privilege of the baptized infant, viz. remission of original sin, is not pardon in the ordinary and natural, but in an incomprehensible sense; because the sin being *incomprehensible* sin, the forgiveness of it is incomprehensible forgiveness—a distinction which accounts for the forgiveness of the infant being without the *moral* accompaniments of the forgiveness of the adult.

If we adopt the Scholastic notion, then, of the im-

plantation of the actual habit of goodness in the infant, that is another and a distinct ground on which to lay the infant's claim to moral or personal goodness ; but the remission of original sin is no ground for this claim ; it does not give him moral character, or therefore make him good in a moral sense. He is as yet an unformed being in moral respects, and his condition is neutral, suspended, and as yet undetermined either to good or evil. Anglican divines are unanimous on this point, viz. that remission of original sin does not constitute actual goodness. They maintain the remission of original sin in baptism, but they entirely reject at the same time the idea that the baptized infant is good in a moral sense ; they regard him as incapable of possessing such goodness, because they regard him as incapable of possessing moral character in any sense,—although a *pardoned* being, having received remission of original sin.⁷ They look upon him as a being endowed with latent moral faculties, the use or neglect of which in after-life will determine then his character either for good or evil ; but as a being at present neither good nor bad morally, but in a state altogether neutral and indeterminate.

⁷ “He may question me respecting the regeneration of infants, whether or not I believe that a *moral* change takes place in them. Without the slightest hesitation, however, I answer I do *not* ; and for this plain reason, because I am persuaded the thing itself is impossible ; morality and immorality being alike incompatible with their state of being.” Abp. Lawrence, *Efficacy of Baptism*, Part ii. p. 25. “Infants are indeed sanctified in a certain sense, but not in the sense of proper renewal of mind and heart.” Waterland, *Summary View of Justification*, vol. vi. p. 7. It must be observed, however, that this neutral state of the infant is no obstacle to his salvation, if he die as an infant ; it being in the power of God in the act of admitting him to eternal life to bestow such supplementary qualifications as are necessary for that new state of existence.

CHAPTER V

SCRIPTURAL SENSE OF REGENERATION

IN a preceding chapter it appeared that Scripture was silent on the subject of the regeneration of infants, as such, in baptism. The question, however, with which we are concerned is not whether *any* infants are regenerate in baptism, but a very different one—whether *all* are. But on this latter question an additional consideration arises.

For can the *term* “regenerate” in its true meaning, as used in Scripture, be applied consistently with the facts of our experience to *all* baptized infants? This is an important question, and to answer it we must first ascertain what is the Scriptural sense of the term, which will be my object in this chapter.

All agree then that regeneration involves a true power to possess holiness and goodness; but is it not also described in Scripture as implying more than this, viz. goodness and holiness itself?

The term *regenerate* only occurs a few times in the New Testament, twice in the substantive shape of “regeneration,” once as a verb, if we are to adopt our English translation of γεννηθῆναι ἄνωθεν in John iii. 3, and once as a participle. But we need not infer from thence any scarcity of Scripture language to decide the meaning of this term, because confessed synonyms abound in the New Testament, the meaning of which is partly by the

synonymous terms themselves, and partly by their context, made sufficiently clear and evident.

The principal synonym, then, which stamps the meaning of "regenerate," or "born again," is the expression "born of God" or "child of God." It is confessed on all sides that these two expressions, "born again" and "born of God," mean exactly the same thing, and are convertible terms; one who is born *again*, being in the nature of the case born *of God*; because, the first birth being from man, the second birth must, by virtue of the very contrast, be from God; so that the two are substantially one and the same term.¹

Assuming the complete identity then of these two terms, I shall observe, in the first place, that the term "child of God" in Scripture is not an isolated one, but that it belongs to a *class* of expressions; and that the meaning which attaches to the class fixes the meaning of this individual specimen of it. The phrase "son of," when used *as* a phrase in Scripture, and out of its literal signification, expresses a similarity of character in the person who is called the son, to the other whose son he is said to be, whether the likeness involve good or evil. The phrase assumes that the offspring is like the parent, not only in nature, but in character,—a fictitious assumption, but one which serves for a phraseological purpose. A "son of valour" is a courageous man; a "son of thunder" is a vehement and energetic man; a "son of

¹ "Born of God, i.e. regenerate." *Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism*, p. 18. The term "child of God" is used in the Catechism obviously as an equivalent to "regenerate," which is the term used in the Baptismal Service.

In using therefore in this treatise the terms "regenerate," and "regeneration," I use the former term as the head of the class of Scriptural terms and synonyms, "born of God," "Son of God," &c.; and the latter term as the substantive of the former.

Belial," or wickedness, is a bad man; a "child of disobedience" is a disobedient man. A "child of Abraham" is one who resembles Abraham in faith and obedience; a "child of the devil" and a "child of hell" is one who resembles the devil and the occupants of hell, in malice and wickedness. The "children of light" and the "children of darkness," the "children of the world" and the "children of the resurrection," the "children of the kingdom"² and the "children of the wicked one," are those who are respectively like light and darkness, this world and the eternal world, the powers of heaven and the powers of hell, in character. A "son of wrath" and a "son of perdition" have a cognateness rather than a likeness to "wrath" and "perdition." The phrase is not always used with complete exactness, but it invariably denotes an actual character good or bad, and not only a capacity for good or evil. A "child of the devil" is not a man who has the power to be wicked—in which case every man who was a free agent would be a child of the devil—but an actually wicked man. The phrase "son of" thus attributes to the person to whom it is applied, not only a power to copy a certain type, good or bad, but an actual expression and representation of the type.

If the particular phrase "child of God," then, or "born of God," carries on the analogy of the class, it undoubtedly means an actually good man, one who is like

² When our Lord speaks of "the children of the kingdom who shall be cast into outer darkness" (Matt. viii. 12), it is evident that He does not mean those who are really the children of the kingdom, inasmuch as He Himself declares that "the *good* seed are the children of the kingdom" (Matt. xiii. 38); but only those who professed to be such, "who *took themselves to be* the children of the kingdom." Lightfoot, vol. i. p. 569. Some suppose a Scriptural *secondary* sense of "kingdom of heaven," viz. as the Visible Church (Beveridge, Sermon. 35), which is regarded as the "kingdom of heaven" by *profession*.

God in character. The term "child of God" can no more mean one who has simply the power of attaining virtues, than "child of the devil" can mean one who has simply the power of contracting vices. Goodness is not indeed the only attribute of God in which men can imperfectly resemble Him, for they may resemble Him in power; and the verse in the eighty-second Psalm, "I have said, Ye are gods; and ye are all the children of the Most Highest," has generally been considered by divines to have been spoken of rulers or princes, in accordance with the classical expression, *Διογενεῖς βασιλῆες*. Nor perhaps does the whole of poetry contain a more vivid outbreak of conscious royalty than the utterance of David upon first ascending the throne of Israel, when he represents the voice of God addressing him, "Thou art My son, this day have I begotten thee." But though the phrase "son of God" may in rare cases express a likeness to another attribute of God than that of goodness, it always expresses an *actual* likeness to God, and not only the power of attaining such likeness. And this is the sense in which our Lord uses the term "Son of God," viz. as implying an actual resemblance to the Divine Goodness. "If God were your Father," He tells the Jews, "ye would love Me. . . . He that is of God, heareth God's words: ye therefore hear them not, because ye are not of God."³ And in the Sermon on the Mount He says, "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you; that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven."⁴ In one sense indeed, which is only an extension of the literal one, we are sons of God by virtue of creation, as we are sons of our parents by natural generation; but the metaphorical phrase "child of God" expresses always

³ John viii. 42, 47.

⁴ Matt. v. 44, 45.

an actual likeness to God, and, as a general rule, a likeness to Him in respect of goodness and holiness.

But we have not to do in the present argument with the term "born of God" or "child of God" simply, but with the term as used in a particular connexion, and under particular circumstances. We have to do with this term as expressing a certain change which takes place in the soul under a new and spiritual dispensation. Our Lord in the saying "that which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit," points distinctly to a remarkable inward change of some kind, which is produced by the Holy Spirit under the Gospel dispensation; and the Epistles constantly refer and appeal to this change as the most important one in the whole life of the soul, and the basis of all hopes of eternal happiness. The question, then, with which we are concerned is not what the term "born of God" means as a term simply, but what it means when it is used in this connexion, and to express this change; and on this head Scripture is clear, full, and decisive. We are not left to collect the meaning of the term "born of God" from the general analogy of the phrase, or the principle upon which the *class* of phrases is founded; but we have positively and directly described to us what a "son of God" is, his distinctive qualities and characteristics, and what it is which constitutes this sonship. And this it is which composes the main evidence of the Scriptural meaning of this term.

Wherever then the New Testament describes a "child of God," or one who is "born of God," it invariably describes him as a good and holy person, and describes the state as involving these qualities and characteristics. "As many as are led by the Spirit of God," says St. Paul, "they are the sons of God." And he exhorts the Philippians to be "blameless and harmless, the sons of

God, without rebuke, in the midst of a crooked and perverse nation." "Behold," says St. John, "what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called the sons of God: therefore the world knoweth us not,"⁵—knoweth us not, because we are the sons of God, and because the sons of God differ wholly in life and conversation from the world. "Every one that doeth righteousness is born of God,"⁶ says the same Apostle. "Whatsoever is born of God overcometh the world," "Whosoever is born of God sinneth not, and that wicked one toucheth him not."⁷ "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin, for his seed remaineth in him, neither can he sin, because he is born of God."⁸ "In this the children of God are manifest, and the children of the devil; whosoever doeth not righteousness is not of God."⁹ "He that is begotten of God keepeth himself."¹ "Every one that loveth is born of God."² Words could not declare more plainly that the regenerate state involves actual goodness and holiness, and not only a capacity for obtaining these qualifications.³

We get the same result from other terms which are used in Scripture as identical in meaning with "regenerate." The term "new creature" obviously means the same as "born again," and the term "new creature" plainly signifies a man of changed heart and life. "Dead unto sin," and "alive unto God," are other expressions

⁵ 1 John iii. 1.

⁶ 1 John ii. 29.

⁷ 1 John v. 4, 18.

⁸ 1 John iii. 9.

⁹ 1 John ii. 10.

¹ 1 John v. 18

² 1 John iv. 7.

³ The accuracies of classical scholarship have a questionable place in the interpretation of the Greek of the New Testament. The distinction, however, between the regenerate state and *abiding* in the regenerate state, even if gained out of the Greek perfect, *γεννηται*, is a needless refinement for the purpose of the present argument; for if *abiding* in the regenerate state is actual goodness, the regenerate state is actual goodness.

which have the same meaning as "born again;" all three phrases alike signifying a first life ended, and a second life begun; but there can be no doubt that this death to sin and this life to God, are an actual abstinence from sin, and actual good living. All three phrases, indeed, "born again," "new creature," "new man," mean in Scripture what the same kind of phrases mean in the common language of mankind. When we say that such a one,—referring to somebody who has hitherto borne a bad character,—has become "quite a new man," we do not mean that he has got a new capacity for alteration of character, but that he is an *actually* altered man. And in the same way "regenerate," "new creature," "new man," in Scripture, do not denote a capacity for goodness only, however high and promising a one, but actual goodness.

Some divines appear indeed to suppose that by exalting the capacity for goodness which the Gospel imparts, as a capacity, they can supply an adequate and sufficient meaning to these phrases. They describe regeneration as "the communication or transmission of the nature of the second Adam," "the grafting into the second Adam," "the reconstruction of humanity in the second Adam," "the communication of Christ's humanity," "the re-fashioning of our nature in its head and model," "the reconstruction of humanity at large in Christ's manhood." But if all that they *mean* by these phrases, when they use them, is that regeneration is the implanting of a new capacity for goodness in human nature, this conception of regeneration is altogether inadequate, notwithstanding the loftiness of the language by which it is covered. For a mere capacity for a thing can by no difference in its magnitude be made the thing; the most vicious man may possess in the lowest depths of his actual degradation, the capacity for the very highest form of goodness; but

he is not therefore good ; and regeneration implies in its Scriptural sense actual goodness.

We get the same result from certain recognized types and figures of the new birth. The ablutions of the old law were an actual cleansing of the flesh, and therefore the antitype is an actual purification of the heart. Circumcision was an actual cutting off of the flesh, and therefore the antitype is an actual mortification of corrupt nature. The new birth is, according to St. Paul, inward circumcision, and there can be no doubt what inward circumcision is.

This being the natural and obvious meaning, however, of Scripture, various reasons are urged in some quarters, why these statements of Scripture should not be understood in their natural and obvious sense. The language of St. John especially has, in consequence of its remarkable simplicity and decision, become prominent subject-matter of explanation, and objections have been raised against the literal interpretation of this language, as, upon sound principles of exegesis, impossible.

It is urged, then, that the statement of St. John, that "whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin," is incapable of a literal interpretation, because according to such an interpretation, nobody in the world would be regenerate. But this is to judge of the meaning of a statement by a totally irrelevant test, viz. whether such a statement is *exemplified* by the present behaviour and temper of Christians. The *meaning* of language is one thing, its *application* to persons around us is another. It is no proof that St. John does not mean what he says in this statement, that such a meaning is not realized in the conduct of Christians in this life.

It will be replied, however, that the term "regenerate" is a term which is realized in this world, some persons being undoubtedly regenerate now and in this life ; and

that it is not a mere ideal and anticipatory term: and that, therefore, we are obliged to understand it in a sense which is a different sense from the literal one in this statement. But admitting that the term "regenerate" is one which is realized in this world, we are not, therefore, obliged to understand it in a different sense from the literal one in this statement, but only in a different degree of the same sense. The perfectly regenerate man is perfectly good; the imperfectly regenerate man is imperfectly good; the distinction does not involve a different sense of the word, but only more or less fullness of the same sense. We may see the same difference in the use of the word "*good*" itself. We have the best authority for saying that "there is none good but One, that is God;" and yet we speak of good men. Nor when we speak of good men do we use the word "*good*" in a different sense from its literal one in our Lord's saying, but only in a different degree of the same sense. Good is an unrealized epithet according to one standard, a realized one according to another; in a perfect degree nobody in the world is good, in an imperfect degree many are good; but these two standards do not involve any different sense of the word "*good*," for good still means good, whether it is higher good or lower. In the same way the regenerate state admits of degrees, and is an unrealized state in one degree, a realized one in another; but this does not involve a different sense of "regenerate," any more than the same distinction involves a different sense of "*good*."

It is true that underneath the broad meaning of the term in Scripture as implying actual goodness and holiness, we do upon a closer examination see variations. We see, as has appeared just now, that the regenerate state is sometimes spoken of as an unmixed state of goodness, and sometimes as a now realized state of goodness,

which therefore admits of the mixture of sin. And just as we observe two modes of representing it in regard to its purity, we may also observe two modes of representing this state with regard to its durability. The more prominent and pervading idea of Scripture, perhaps, is the indefectibility of the regenerate state; for when the supposition is made of the regenerate state being fallen away from and lost, it appears to be made as what we might call an extreme supposition. But still the supposition is made, and in more than one text; and so far the regenerate state is represented as a defectible state. But whether represented as indefectible or as defectible goodness, the regenerate state still always figures as goodness; nor does the possibility of a fall from it show that it is not, but rather that it is a state of actual goodness. For a fall or lapse, such as Scripture speaks of, is *from* a state of actual goodness, and is the serious thing it is on that very account.

Though the ideal sense of the term then, which appears occasionally in Scripture, is sometimes made an argument for explaining away the natural sense of the term in Scripture altogether, such an argument is altogether untenable. The natural meaning of the term in Scripture, as involving actual goodness, is not done away with because that goodness is sometimes represented as perfect and indefectible, and sometimes as imperfect and defectible. There can be no reason why a word should not sometimes be used in an ideal sense, and sometimes in a more practical one. Christians are evidently addressed on both grounds in Scripture; sometimes as already citizens of heaven, sitting in heavenly places, and arrived at the heavenly Jerusalem, so that it is spoken of as a kind of impossibility that they should sin, for "how shall they that are dead to sin live any longer therein?" sometimes on the matter-of-fact ground, as persons of a

good and spiritual habit of mind for the time being, who are however in danger of losing that habit by neglect. It is very common for the meanings of words to exhibit variations, which variations however do not unsettle that general meaning of which they are variations. And with variations of meaning, according as it is regarded in a higher or lower aspect, the regenerate state in Scripture still always figures as actual goodness.

There appears to be no reason, therefore, for attributing to the Scriptural descriptions of regeneration as actual goodness that which divines call the "tropological" sense. The tropological meaning of a term is a meaning founded upon a moral use and application of its literal meaning. Thus the "circumcision," mentioned in the second chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, has not a literal but a tropological meaning, founded upon a moral application of the literal meaning. In like manner, it is maintained that the meaning of regeneration in Scripture as actual goodness is a tropological meaning; the intended *effect* of regeneration, used and improved, being put for regeneration itself. "Whosoever is born of God overcometh the world;" i.e. it is added, if he rightly improves that spiritual faculty.⁴ But this is an interference with the natural meaning of the words, and an interference for which there is no call or reason. The received rule of interpretation is, that we should always take Scripture in its literal sense where we can; i.e. where there is no overwhelming obstacle to such meaning. But what is the obstacle to the literal meaning in the present case? We know nothing about the meaning of the term "born of God" at all till we come to its use in Scripture; and therefore there can be no more objection to a meaning of the term implying goodness and

⁴ Bishop Bethell on Baptismal Regeneration, p. 306. Archdeacon Dodgson's Controversy of Faith, p. 43.

holiness, if such is the natural sense of Scripture, than to any other meaning. We go to Scripture for the meaning of this term, as we should go to any authoritative writing for the meaning of any particular word we wanted to know, and finding the meaning, we take it as we find it. Such interpolations then as this are wholly unwarranted, and contrary to the law of Scripture interpretation. The tropological sense of a term implies a certain obvious and familiar sense in the background, with which it takes the liberty in question for a didactic purpose. There is this literal meaning in the case of circumcision; but no original literal meaning meets us in all Scripture of the term "born of God," upon which the sense of actual goodness can rest as the tropological meaning. Actual goodness, on the contrary, is the first and obvious meaning attaching to the term.

But though the attempt to explain away the actual statements of Scripture on this subject fail, and the natural sense of the language is too clear to be disturbed by artificial interpretations, other arguments are still resorted to by way of a set-off against these statements, in order to counterbalance and neutralize from without language which cannot be unsettled or weakened from within. One of these arguments is so obviously irrelevant that little more than a notice of it is enough. The fact that the Epistles abound in exhortation to the regenerate is appealed to as showing that regeneration is a faculty only, and not actual goodness; the argument being, that if it was actual goodness, those who possessed it would not need exhortation to goodness. But it is evident that the good require exhortation to continue in goodness, as the sinner requires exhortation to attain it. And this, it may be observed, is the form of practical address which prevails in the Epistles, viz. exhortation to continue in a state in which those who are addressed

are already assumed to be. Christians are addressed as having undergone a remarkable change of heart, having passed from death to life and from the power of Satan unto God, and they are exhorted to abide in this new state and habit of mind. The form of exhortation is, that because "the old man has been crucified" in them, *therefore* they "should not henceforth serve sin;" that they have already "died to sin," and therefore "should not live any longer therein;" that "having been made free from sin, and become servants to God," they "should have their fruit unto holiness."⁵

Some arguments, however, on which much stress has been laid, as proving that the sense in which the term "son of God," as used in Scripture, does not imply actual goodness, will require longer notice.

1. One is the argument from the alleged appropriation of the term "regenerate" to the spiritual change which takes place in baptism. Regeneration, it is said, is evidently referred to in Scripture as connected with baptism; this connexion being implied in a whole class of phrases even where it is not explicitly stated. The regenerate state then, it is argued, is *distinguished* in Scripture from actual goodness, and therefore does not in Scripture *imply* actual goodness.

But there is an evident mistake in such reasoning as this, for let it be assumed that regeneration has in Scripture a special and appropriate use in connexion with baptism, does it, therefore, lose in this connexion the meaning which it bore antecedently as a word? The laws of language, and the very consistency of language, are against such an inference; for why should one word rather than another be selected for a special use, but because that word has a particular signification which is

⁵ Rom. vi. 6, 2, 22.

wanted for that use? It is plainly not any word which will do for such appropriation, but some one word is taken in preference to others, on account of its meaning as a word. But if that meaning is the reason why it is selected, why is that meaning dropped as a consequence of its selection? The word "regenerate" then, or "born of God," evidently implying in its meaning as a word actual goodness in Scripture, this meaning still goes on when the word is appropriated, and regeneration in baptism is still regeneration in its antecedent and natural sense.

This is, indeed, a fallacy which pervades the remarks of some very respectable divines on this subject. It is assumed that if regeneration is *distinguished* from actual goodness, it therefore does not *mean* actual goodness; but words may, and constantly do, include in their meaning that from which they are distinguished, retaining a general and antecedent meaning, though at the same time distinguished from it by a special application. Thus law, truth, light, spirit, covenant, faith, Church, kingdom, power, glory, good tidings, become in Scripture the law, the truth, the light, the Spirit, the covenant, the faith, the Church, the kingdom, the power, the glory, the good tidings or Evangel; but these terms retain their antecedent meaning as terms, and do not lose it on account of the appropriation. The law of Moses was a law in the true and antecedent sense of the word; the truth is truth, the light is light, the covenant a covenant, the Spirit spirit. Life, death, salvation, damnation, judgment, and other words have a like appropriation in Scripture, but they retain notwithstanding their original and antecedent meanings. And, according to the same law of language, baptismal regeneration is still regeneration: the word does not cease to mean a particular thing, because that thing is conveyed by a particular channel. *How* that

thing is conveyed by that channel is a question with which we are not at present concerned. As a law of language, the old meaning which existed before this connexion goes on with it, and whatever the word meant as a word, that it continues to mean as an appropriated word. It may gain additional meaning, as involving in its special connexion remission of sin and admission to a new covenant, but it does not forfeit its old meaning. Regeneration even in the Calvinistic definition is *distinguished* from actual goodness, as being an actual goodness which is infused into the soul at a particular time, viz. at the moment of the effectual call, or in elect infants at baptism or before baptism; and also as involving in addition the pardon of sin past; but it does not the less *mean* actual goodness in the Calvinistic sense.

The baptismal controversy has thus exhibited a mistake on both sides. On the one side it has certainly been a mistake to deny, in the face of such strong evidence, that the term "regenerate" has an appropriate use in connexion with baptism: but on the other side it has also been a good deal forgotten that this term has a meaning of its own apart from its connexion with baptism, which meaning it does not lose, but retains in this connexion. If asked where this antecedent meaning is to be found, I go back to the proof which I have already adduced on this subject, to those statements of Scripture which have been already referred to, in which the phrase "son of God," or "born of God," is evidently used as implying certain qualities and characteristics. It is therefore not enough, in describing regeneration, to say that it is baptismal regeneration, unless we also state what it—regeneration itself—is; i.e. go back to its natural and antecedent meaning as a word. For it is reversing the proper order of things to deduce our idea

of regeneration from baptism, instead of our idea of the baptismal gift from regeneration.

But it is not necessary to appeal to the laws of language for deciding this question, for the passages in Scripture which are cited on this question, as containing an express or implicit reference to baptism as the act by which Christians had become regenerate, decide it of themselves; obviously referring to the state into which Christians had by that act entered, as a state of actual holiness and goodness. It is remarked by divines that in various passages in the Epistles the new spiritual condition of Christians is put in the *past* tense, and they thence infer an implied reference in these passages to baptism, as the act by which this new spiritual condition had been obtained. How then is this new spiritual condition described in these passages, and what are the characteristics given of it in this connexion? Is it described as a mere capacity or power? By no means, but plainly as a state of actual goodness and holiness. "Now if we *died* with Christ"⁶—"Now if we *died* to sin,"⁷ says St. Paul; "how shall we live any longer therein? . . . for he that *hath* died is free from sin."⁸ "We *were* buried with Him by baptism unto death"⁹—"We *were* planted together in the likeness of His death"¹—"Our old man *was* crucified with Him"²—"Having been made free from sin, ye *became* the servants of righteousness"³—"Having been made free from sin, and *having* become the servants of God, ye have your fruit unto holiness"⁴—"The law of the Spirit of Christ *hath* made me free from the law of sin and death"⁵—"Ye *received* the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father."⁶ The

⁶ Rom. vi. 8.

⁷ Rom. vi. 2.

⁸ Rom. vi. 7.

⁹ Rom. vi. 4.

¹ Rom. vi. 5.

² Rom. vi. 6.

³ Rom. vi. 18.

⁴ Rom. vi. 22.

⁵ Rom. viii. 2.

⁶ Rom. viii. 15.

phrases "having died to sin," "the old man having been crucified," "having been made free from sin," "having become the servants of righteousness," "having become the servants of God," imply in their natural signification an actual mortification of carnal, and the sway of spiritual, affections in the soul, or an actual state of holiness and goodness. And therefore the actual language of those very passages in which regeneration is contemplated in connexion with baptism shows that regeneration continues to imply holiness and goodness, and by no means loses that meaning in this connexion.

2. Another argument against the term "child of God" implying in Scripture actual goodness arises from the application of the term in the Old Testament to the Jewish people. The Jewish nation is called in the Old Testament God's son,—“Israel is My son, even My firstborn.” “Ye are the children of the Lord your God,” says Moses to the people, and the name is applied to them on several occasions, especially in the prophetic writings. It is argued, then, that the only reason there could be for the application of the term to them, was that the Jewish people were admitted into covenant with God, and to particular privileges in connexion with it; and therefore, that the term is evidently not used in Scripture to imply actual goodness, but only admission to covenant relations and privileges.

But, in the first place, the language of the Old Testament as a whole throws extreme doubt upon this as a true and adequate account of the application of the term to the Jewish nation. The Jewish nation was admitted indeed to a covenant with God, and to various privileges in connexion with that covenant, especially to the knowledge of the true God, of His nature, His will, and of the true worship of Him. But we must also consider what was the immediate consequence of this admission

of the Jewish nation to this remarkable spiritual light from which the rest of mankind were excluded. The consequence of the Jewish nation being *admitted* to this knowledge of God and of the worship of Him, was that it did actually possess a true faith in God, and practised a true worship of Him, which no other nation of the world possessed or practised. Its faith and its worship were not opportunities only, or capacities only, but performances; and the nation is represented in Scripture as not only admitted to a covenant, but as having received an actual religious mould from the fashioning hand of God. And accordingly we find the Jewish nation, as it is called in the Old Testament the “son of God,” so also called in the same Old Testament “the *righteous* nation”—not, of course, that all the individuals of it possessed a true faith, or gave God a true worship, but that some did; and that, according to a common figure of speech, the nation was represented after the type of the better portion of it. However great a mixture the Jewish people, regarded only as an aggregate of individuals, may have been; regarded as a *unity*, the nation is represented in Scripture as—though guilty indeed of backslidings and great sins, as righteous persons often are—still righteous;⁷ and as righteous entering in the page of futurity into its eternal reward, and admitted into that paradise which brightens the distant horizon, and forms the closing scene of prophecy. “Ah, sinful nation,” says the Almighty, through the Prophet, “a people laden with iniquity;” but it follows, “I will purely purge away thy dross, and take away all thy tin;

⁷ “Deus electos suos a se aversos per peccatum revocat sane ad se, ut revocavit Davidem, Petrum, et alios multos . . . Nec de alia Dei gratia ad aversos ab ipso electos ejus testantur dicta prophetarum . . . ubi de *totius populi Dei*, non de singulorum hominum restitutione vates loquitur.” Bucer, *Script. Angl.*, p. 811.

afterward thou shalt be called, The city of righteousness, the faithful city.”⁸ The tongue of prophecy never wearies with describing the spiritual greatness and glory of the chosen nation. “I will make thy officers peace, and thine exactors righteousness . . . thou shalt call thy walls Salvation, and thy gates Praise.”⁹ “Open ye the gates, that the righteous nation which keepeth the truth may enter in.”¹ “Thy people shall be all righteous, they shall inherit the land for ever.”² “I will place salvation in Zion for Israel My glory.”³ “They shall go to confusion together that are makers of idols. But Israel shall be saved in the Lord with an everlasting salvation : ye shall not be ashamed nor confounded world without end.”⁴ It makes no difference if the Jewish people is, as the subject of these prophecies, a typical people—a type of the true Israel, and of the Elect. For if “the righteous nation” is typical, the nation whom God calls His “son” is typical also : it is enough that it is the same collective personage which is called the “son,” which is also called “righteous;” that it is the same people and the same name of “Israel” that unites both epithets. Indeed, that the Jewish nation is, as it confessedly is, the type of the Elect, is a circumstance which throws peculiar light upon the other fact, viz. that God addresses it as His son.

The term “son of God” then does not, when we examine the language of older inspiration as a whole, appear to be used in the Old Testament except in connexion with actual goodness,—whether belonging to an abstract or a typical personage, or a real person, is irrelevant ; but, in the next place, we must consider that in the present argument we have to do not with the Old Testament, but with the New Testament use of the term. We

⁸ Isa. i. 4, 25, 26.⁹ Isa. lx. 17, 18.¹ Isa. xxvi. 2.² Isa. lx. 21.³ Isa. xlv. 13.⁴ Isa. xlv. 16, 17.

have to do with this term in a particular connexion, viz. as expressing a particular change which takes place in the soul under the later and spiritual dispensation; and the meaning of the term, as expressing this change, is what it has been stated to be.

3. Again, in answer to the proof of the sense of the term "son of God" in the New Testament, the application of this or synonymous terms to whole bodies of Christians is appealed to as evidence that when Scripture apparently speaks of the regenerate state as involving actual goodness, this is not its real meaning; for that, if it was, Scripture would not address, in this way, all Christians as regenerate. But to rest upon this ground for the disproof of the natural meaning of express statements of Scripture, is to rest not only upon unsafe ground, but upon ground which the admissions of all schools of divines have made altogether untenable. It may be granted, indeed, that this state is attributed in the Epistles to whole Christian bodies, if not expressly, by allusion and implication; the members of those bodies being constantly addressed in them as regenerate persons; phrases equivalent to this being used if the exact word is not. But it is universally admitted by divines that Scripture makes use of presumptive or hypothetical language. This a known and recognized principle, which is constantly taken into account in the interpretation of Scripture: indeed it would not be easy to mention any principle of construction, of a special sort, which was of more familiar occurrence than this, or had obtained more general and undoubted acceptance, with all schools of expositors. It is a principle which is constantly appealed to in our standard commentaries, and which is had recourse to without any hesitation for the explanation of various statements of Scripture. No doubt, indeed, has ever been entertained of the fact that this is a form of speech which is in use in Scripture,

i.e. as to the principle itself of supposition being adopted by Scripture: it is therefore appealed to, circumstances appearing to require it, by divines, as naturally and as confidently as certain conventional constructions and figures of speech in language are appealed to by grammarians. It is generally allowed that when all Christians are addressed in the New Testament as "saints," "dead to sin," "alive to God," "risen with Christ," "having their conversation in heaven," and in other like modes, they are addressed so hypothetically, and not to express the literal fact that all the individuals so addressed were of this character; which would not have been true.

When then we have this plain and strong evidence of the Scriptural sense of the term "child of God" before us, viz. that wherever Scripture describes him, explains what he is, and tells us what his characteristics are, it invariably describes him as a good and holy person, and makes these the characteristics of sonship; we cannot give up this as the Scriptural sense of the term, in consideration of such an argument as this—an argument, be it observed, not resting upon any plain statements of Scripture, but only upon an *inference* from a certain application of the word, and that inference open to the answer here given. Could any positive statements of Scripture indeed be appealed to which actually described the regenerate man in a different way from that in which he is described in the statements which were above cited, such language would form a proper ground for another meaning of the term: in which case we could only say that Scripture contained two different meanings of this term. But this *application* of the term in Scripture is no ground whatever for another *sense* of the term; showing as it does, not that the term as applied to the whole Christian body does not mean actual goodness, but only that *meaning* this, it is applied hypothetically. The difficulty which is

raised is solved by another explanation than that which is brought forward, and that an explanation in perfect harmony with the style and rules of Scripture.

Some divines have indeed preferred as a theological arrangement a secondary sense of the term "regenerate" to the hypothetical application of it in its true sense. But what is this secondary sense when we examine it? It is *itself* no more than the true sense hypothetically applied. They therefore gain nothing by the exchange, and only avoid one form of doing a thing in order to do the same thing under another. They say that the regenerate state, when attributed to whole bodies, means that they are regenerate, new creatures, members of Christ, children of God *by external profession*. But what is an external profession but a supposition which men make or desire to have made about themselves? Divines have in the same way maintained a Scriptural secondary sense of the term "*saint*," as "*saint by outward vocation and charitable presumption*;"⁵ but this is in very terms only the real sense of the term applied hypothetically.

We have thus from an examination of the language of Scripture, ascertained what is the true and Scriptural sense of the term "regenerate," or "born of God," which we should distinguish from certain incorrect and inadequate senses. 1. Regeneration is not simply *grace*, though these words have been commonly used as synonymous in recent controversy. Grace is the generic term including even altogether fruitless grace, or mere assisting grace even if it produces nothing in the person to whom it is given; but regeneration is a grace which implies fruit, or an actual state of goodness in a man. 2. Regeneration is not simply remission of sin actual or original, but involves a positive quality of goodness. 3. Regeneration is not a

⁵ Pearson on the Creed, Art. ix.

mere change of federal relations to God, or admission to a covenant containing the promise of eternal life, *if* we are qualified, but involves the qualification. 4. Regeneration implies not a mere capacity for goodness, but goodness itself.

Two *false* distinctions may be noticed in conclusion:—

1. Regeneration is pronounced by some to be totally different from renovation; Waterland drawing the distinction thus: “Regeneration,” he says, “is a kind of renewal, but then it is of the spiritual state considered at large, whereas renovation seems to mean a more particular kind of renewal, namely, of the inward frame or disposition of the man.”⁶ This distinction is untrue, for regeneration is certainly presented to us in the New Testament as “the renewal of the inward frame and disposition,” and therefore so far it is exactly the same as renovation. Regeneration, indeed, only differs from renovation, in being renovation and something besides, viz. remission of sin: the term as appropriated to express the grace of baptism, involving this addition.

2. Another false distinction is the contrast between regeneration as a *birth*, and a certain spiritual character and disposition which has to be formed and *grow* into existence after this birth by the contingent exertion of the will. The act of regeneration is a birth, but it is a birth into a state of actual possession, not of means of acquisition only; and from the moment that it takes place goodness exists, and has not to grow *into existence*, though it admits of growth. The regenerate man may rise indefinitely in the scale of perfection, but he is still, from the moment that he *is* regenerate, a formed spiritual man, having actual goodness; of which his birth is the beginning and first enjoyment indeed, but not the mere rudimental capacity.

⁶ On Regeneration, vol. iv. p. 433.

CHAPTER VI

PATRISTIC SENSE OF REGENERATION

WITHOUT going to the Fathers to ascertain the true meaning of the term *regenerate*, which has been already ascertained from Scripture,—inasmuch as whatever be the sense in which Scripture uses the word, that is the true one,—it is not unimportant to observe that the Scriptural meaning of this term as stated in the last chapter is accepted and carried on by the Fathers.

1. And first, as has been already observed, this word has a meaning of its own *as* a word employed in language to signify something. What is the meaning then which attaches to it in the Fathers, in this independent use, and apart from a sacramental connexion?

We rarely meet then with the very term *regenerate* in the Fathers in this independent use, though it occurs sufficiently often to have its meaning clearly stamped upon it, and that meaning the Scriptural one. Clement of Rome says that “Noah preached regeneration,” evidently using the term as a synonym for “righteousness,” of which St. Peter calls Noah a “preacher,”¹ and for “repentance,” of which Clement himself has just before called the same Noah a preacher.² Clement of Alexandria

¹ 2 Pet. ii. 5.

² Νῶε πιστὸς εὐρεθεὶς διὰ τῆς λειτουργίας αὐτοῦ παλιγγενεσίαν κόσμῳ ἐκήρυξεν. 1 Ep. ad Cor. s. 9. Νῶε ἐκήρυξεν μετάνοιαν, s. 7. The explanation of St. Clement's meaning, as being that Noah announced baptismal regeneration, by foretelling the Flood, which was a type of the latter, is far-fetched.

calls the young man's return to piety after a post-baptismal lapse into a robber's life, regeneration, and applies the same term to the repentance of the adulteress.³ "How shall a man," says Hippolytus, "be regenerated? By not committing adultery, murder, or idolatry, by overcoming pleasure and pride, by throwing off the defilement and burden of sin and corruption."⁴

But for the proof of the Patristic meaning of "regenerate," in its independent use as a word, we are not restricted to the occurrence of that very word itself, because, as has been observed, there is another term which is perfectly synonymous with it, and is to all intents and purposes the same word, viz. the term "born of God," or "child of God." Whatever this latter phrase then means, in its independent use as a phrase, that the former means as well. But this opening admits us to a field of evidence as large and ample as could be desired;

³ Διδοὺς μέγα παράδειγμα μετανοίας ἀληθινῆς καὶ μέγα γνῶρισμα παλιγγενεσίας. Ap. Euseb. Hist. l. 3, c. 23.

Ἡ γάρ τοι πορνεύσασα ζῆ μὲν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ἀπέθανεν δὲ ταῖς ἐντολαῖς ἥ δὲ μετανοήσασα, οἷον ἀναγεννηθεῖσα κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν τοῦ βίου, παλιγγενεσίαν ἔχει ζωῆς, Strom. l. 2, c. 23. Much is made by some of the οἷον here, as if it were a confession of incorrectness in the use of ἀναγεννηθεῖσα in the sense here given to it. But if οἷον does stand here for "as it were," all that we can gather from it is, that "born again" is a *metaphor* for change of life, not that change of life is not the correct meaning of the metaphor: it is, however, rendered in the translation of Sylburgius which Potter adopts simply—"ut quæ sit." The use of the term in these two passages is explained by some as having reference to regeneration in baptism *reviving* upon repentance and amendment after a course of sin; and regeneration is understood in them to mean not simply regeneration, but "a sort of second regeneration." This is an assumption, however, for which there is no ground. Not indeed that much difference would be made were this gloss even admitted. For how could return to goodness be a second regeneration, if goodness was not implied in the first regeneration? For Clement's sense of the word in other passages, see Note 11.

⁴ In Theoph. s. 10.

for the term "child of God," or "[born of God," is of constant occurrence in the Fathers as signifying a good and holy man.⁶

2. But the word "regenerate" has in the Fathers, besides its use as a word, a special and appropriate use in connexion with baptism; therefore the next question is, what is the meaning of the word in the Fathers as thus appropriated? Does its antecedent meaning as a word still go on attaching to it in its sacramental connexion; and does regeneration continue to imply actual goodness, when it becomes *baptismal* regeneration, as before when it was regeneration?

There appears to be, as has been already observed, a prevalent assumption, that when the term regenerate contracts a special use and becomes appropriated to baptism, it drops its antecedent meaning as a word; but such an assumption, as has been explained,⁶ is contrary to the laws of language, because a term is selected for a special use on account of its antecedent meaning, to part with which therefore on account of its special use would be a result wholly inconsistent and irrational. The thing which the term signifies continues the same it was before, only with the addition of the instrument by which it is conveyed.

⁶ Thus Origen,—“Every man who has attained to maturity is either a child of God or a child of the devil. For either he commits sin or does not; if he does, he is a child of the devil; if he does not, he is a child of God.” In Joan. tom. xx. 13. “They are sons of men,” says Augustine, “when they do ill, sons of God when they do well.” On Psalm lii. And again, “Love alone distinguishes between the children of God and the children of the devil. Let all sign themselves with the sign of the cross, let all say Amen, let all sing Hallelujah, let all be baptized, let all come to church, the children of God are only distinguished from the children of the devil by love. They who have love are born of God, they who have not love are not born of God.” In 1 Ep. Joan., Tract. v. s. 7.

The Fathers then retain for the word as appropriated to baptism, the meaning of actual goodness. Other aspects of the gift, indeed, such as that of pardon, admission to a covenant, a new spiritual faculty, have an established place in their language, and may for a time exclusively occupy their attention, but these are not exclusive of the gift of actual righteousness, but additional to it.

If we take the terms which the Fathers apply to baptismal regeneration in a mass, we have the following collective description of it. We see it called righteousness, sanctification, transformation, renovation, purification, the perishing of the outer man, the formation of the inner; the life of virtues, the death of crimes; the port of innocence, the shipwreck of sins; the sprinkling of the conscience, the new infancy of innocence, the return of the original formation, the cleansing with the invisible hyssop; the presence of a new heart and new spirit, the removal of the stony heart; the destruction of the devil, the dissolution of bondage, the stripping off of the filthy garment, and the putting on of the incorrupt and spotless clothing—the robe of royalty, the garment of princes, the robe of glory, the garment of redemption; the resurrection to immortality, the drinking in of immortality, the putting on of immortality; the enjoyment of the inheritance, the glory from on high, the gleaming with the rays of righteousness as with the brightness of the sun; incorruption, salvation, deification, eternal life, paradise, and heaven. Such language is certainly the description of more than a mere state of ability to attain even sublime holiness and goodness, which would be compatible with actual wickedness: it is the description of a state of actual righteousness.

To come to particular passages, the two following belong to a class, as it may be called, of panegyrics of baptism; lofty statements presenting with considerable pomp chains of high privileges and virtues attaching to

that ordinance, and intending to give the idea of a solemn triumphant procession. Chrysostom thus enumerates "the ten honours of baptism :"—"Blessed be God, who alone doeth wonders ; who maketh all things and changeth all. Behold, they enjoy the calm of freedom who a little before were held captives, they are citizens of the Church who were wandering in error, and they have the lot of righteousness who were in the confusion of sin. For they are not only free, but holy ; not holy only, but righteous ; not righteous only, but sons ; not sons only, but heirs ; not heirs only, but brethren of Christ ; not brethren of Christ only, but co-heirs ; not only co-heirs, but members ; not members only, but a temple ; not a temple only, but instruments of the Spirit." ⁷

"Baptism," says Gregory Nazianzen, "is the brightness of the soul, transformation of life, the answer of a good conscience toward God, the help of infirmity, the putting off of the flesh, obedience to the Spirit, communion with the Word, restoration of the creature to rectitude, the cataclysm of sin, participation of light, dispersion of darkness, the chariot to God, migration with Christ, the prop of faith, the perfection of the understanding, the key of the kingdom of heaven, change of living, dissolution of bondage, unloosening of chains, the recreation of the whole man." ⁸

So much of the language of the Fathers which furnishes the recognized proof of their doctrine of baptism is language of this kind, or approximating to it, that we cannot explain away these passages as rhetorical without, in the proportion in which we do so, reducing our proof of the Patristic doctrine altogether. We must understand them as declaring something doctrinal as to the nature of the baptismal gift or regeneration, and we find

⁷ No. 1, Note 12.

⁸ No. 2, Note 12.

that the most moderate and apparently literal items of the description are terms denoting actual holiness and goodness :—"Holy" and "righteous" being the terms which Chrysostom applies to the regenerate man ; "transformation of life," "the answer of a good conscience," the "putting off of the flesh," "obedience to the Spirit," "change of living," being the terms Gregory of Nazianzen applies to the regenerate state.

Or take the following, which are more of the didactic type :—"Approach, O man, and be regenerated," says Hippolytus, in a passage already partially quoted. "And how, saith he? If thou do not commit adultery or murder; do not worship idols, art not overcome by pleasure or pride: if thou throwest off the filth of impurity and burden of sin, puttest off the armour of Satan and puttest on the breastplate of faith; as saith Isaiah, 'Wash you, seek judgment, relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow. Come now, and let us reason together, saith the Lord. Though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be white as snow; though they be red like crimson, they shall be as wool. If ye be willing and obedient, ye shall eat the fat of the land.' Thou seest, beloved, how the Prophet foretold the purification of baptism; for he that goeth down into the laver of regeneration with faith quits evil and joins himself to Christ, renounces the enemy and confesses Christ to be God, puts off slavery and puts on adoption, ascends from baptism bright as the sun, and emitting the rays of righteousness."⁹ The writer begins here with the natural use of "regeneration" as a word meaning morally converted; but does he give up the sense when he comes in the next place to connect regeneration with baptism? By no means. The natural sense of the term as involv-

⁹ No. 3, Note 12.

ing actual goodness still continues, and regeneration, as "the purification of baptism," retains all that it implied as simply regeneration.

Gregory Nyssen refers renewal and regeneration to baptism; but does he change the signification of those terms as thus appropriated? By no means. "Ye who boast of the gift of regeneration and renewal," he says, "give evidence of that mystical grace by a change of morals. . . . There are plain signs by which we know the new-born man; the abandonment of old habits, and a new life and conversation will show that the soul is born anew of another parentage. . . . Was the man before baptism licentious, covetous, rapacious, a reviler, a liar, a sycophant, let him now be orderly, moderate, content with his own and giving of that to the needy, truth-loving, respectful, affable, practising all that is praiseworthy. . . . So ought the sons of God to have their conversation; for after grace we are called His sons, and therefore it behoves us accurately to attend to the Paternal characteristics, that fashioning and moulding ourselves into likeness to our Father, we may show ourselves to be His genuine sons, and not a spurious offspring. Our Lord, in the Gospels, bids us pray for them that despitefully use us and persecute us, that we may be the children of our Father which is in heaven. . . . Ye are sons, He says, when you imitate your Father's goodness."¹ What I observe of this passage is, that it does not represent a good life and conversation only as the fruit which ought to follow regeneration, but also as a test which decides the fact of it; and that it thus represents regeneration, even that which is connected with baptism,—not as a faculty only which is consistent with contrary practice, but as an inward disposition and habit which implies a corresponding practice.

¹ No. 4, Note 12.

Justin Martyr, in the well-known passage in the Apology which describes the process of baptismal admission into the Christian Church and Covenant, regards regeneration, even as appropriated to baptism, in the light of an actually holy disposition of mind, "being made the child of freedom and choice:" and the "illumination," which in him and other early writers figures as so prominent a characteristic of the baptismal gift, is not a mere faculty, but a habit of mind, and that of a religious and moral kind.² Clement of Alexandria appropriates, like Justin, regeneration to baptism; but still how does he describe regeneration even as tied to a sacrament? "Being regenerated," he says, "we forthwith received perfection, for we were enlightened, and that is to know God. Baptized, we are enlightened; enlightened, we are adopted; adopted, we are perfected; perfected, we are made immortal. . . . We believe that we are perfect so far as is possible in this world. . . . We wash away all our sins, and are no longer bent upon evil. For this is this very grace of illumination, that we are no longer the same in moral disposition that we were before baptism. . . . We are purified by baptism, and run up to the immortal light as children to their father . . . that being children of God who have put off the old man, having stripped ourselves of the tunic of wickedness and put on the incorruptibility of Christ, we may, as a people new-made, holy, regenerated, preserve the unpolled man."³

Cyprian, in the well-known letter in which he describes

² Ὅπως μὴ ἀνάγκης τέκνα μηδὲ ἀγνοίας μένωμεν, ἀλλὰ προαιρέσεως καὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀφέσεως τε ἁμαρτιῶν ὑπὲρ ὧν προημάρτομεν τύχωμεν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, ἐπονομάζεται τῷ ἐλομένῳ ἀναγεννηθῆναι, καὶ μετανοήσαντι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἡμαρτημένοις, τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων καὶ Δεσπότης θεοῦ ὄνομα . . . καλεῖται δὲ τοῦτο τὸ λουτρὸν φωτισμός. *Apolog.* l. 1, s. 61.

Μία χάρις αὕτη τοῦ φωτισματος τὸ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ πρὶν ἢ λούσασθαι τὸν τρόπον. *Clem. Alex. Pæd.* l. 1, c. 6.

³ No. 5, Note 12.

his own regeneration in the baptismal water, still describes that regeneration as "a conversion."⁴ He describes the effects of this new birth by water much, indeed, in the same way in which one of a modern school, who connected the new birth not with water but with the impulse of the Spirit only, would describe those effects, i. e. as *conscious* and felt, as a sensible inward enlightenment and elevation, and the immediate possession of a new temper of mind and a new point of view in which to look at everything. "Forthwith, in a wonderful manner, doubtful things began to certify themselves, shut things to open, dark things to shine, difficult things to be easy, things impossible to be practicable; so that one could not but recognize the difference between that which being subject by carnal birth to sin was earthly, and that which being quickened by the Holy Spirit had begun to be of God." Though he contemplates regeneration then as imparted in and by baptism, the term still retains with Cyprian, in this connexion, its natural meaning of an actual conversion of heart and temper.

Augustine, in the well-known passage in which he answers the objection of the absence of faith in infants as recipients of baptism, identifies regeneration even in its sacramental connexion with actual conversion of heart. "As in Isaac, who was circumcised the eighth day after birth, the sign of the righteousness of faith preceded, and when he grew up the righteousness itself followed; so in baptized infants the sacrament of regeneration precedes, and, if they preserve Christian piety, that conversion follows in the heart the sacrament *of which* preceded in the body."⁵ To call

⁴ "Difficile prorsus ac durum opinabar ut quis *renasci* denuo posset . . . Qui possibilis aiebam, est tanta *conversio*." Ep. 1.

⁵ "In baptizatis infantibus præcedit regenerationis sacramen-

baptism alternately the sacrament of regeneration and the sacrament of conversion is to identify one of these terms in meaning with the other: there cannot be a plainer proof that, to the writer's mind at the time, both terms meant the same thing. The natural sense of regeneration then, as implying actual goodness, still goes on adhering to it, even as appropriated to baptism, in this statement of Augustine.

It is true Augustine goes on to say:—"The Sacrament of Baptism is one thing, conversion of the heart is another;" and hence Bishop Bethell extracts a ground for the following remark upon this whole passage, viz. that "it appears to him to be a direct example of the manner in which the Fathers separated regeneration from conversion." But Augustine is not distinguishing here between regeneration and conversion, which he has obviously just identified with each other, but between "the Sacrament of Baptism" and conversion.

We come now to a later and more advanced language descriptive of the baptismal gift. "What mind," says Leo, "can comprehend this sacrament? what tongue can describe this grace? Iniquity returns to innocence, and old age to newness; aliens come into the adoption, and strangers into the heirdom. Men begin to be just from being ungodly, bountiful from being covetous, chaste from being incontinent, heavenly from being earthly. What is this transformation but the right hand of the Most High?" "Not only the glorious fortitude of martyrs," says the same Father, "but the faith of all the re-born, in the very act of regeneration, suffers with Christ; for while they renounce the devil and confess their belief in God, while they pass from old age to

tum, et si Christianam tenuerint pietatem, sequitur etiam in corde conversio *cujus* mysterium præcessit in corpore." De Bapt. contra Donat. l. 4, c. 24.

newness, while they put off the image of the earthly and assume the form of the heavenly, a certain similitude of death and resurrection takes place; so that being taken up by Christ and taking up Christ, the man is not the same after baptism that he was before it, but the body of the regenerate becomes the flesh of Christ.”—“The new creature in baptism is not stripped of the covering of real flesh, but of the infection of the old condemned nature, so that the man is made the body of Christ because Christ is the body of man.” “It is manifest that all incur damnation by birth in Adam, unless they are rescued by being re-born in Christ; wherefore we must accurately consider what it is which is done in the gift of regeneration. Although all the portions of the same mystery meet together in one, what is enacted visibly is one thing, what is solemnized invisibly is another; the form of the sacrament is not the same as its virtue, the form being administered by man, the virtue being imparted by God; to whose power it is to be referred, that while the outer man is washed, the inner man is changed; a new creature made out of an old, vessels of wrath transformed into vessels of mercy, the sinful flesh changed into the body of Christ; from ungodly men become righteous, from captives free, from sons of men sons of God.”⁶

Here is a view of baptism which connects it more intimately and radically with the Incarnation than the earlier language of the Fathers did; incorporating it as it were in that fundamental mystery, and constructing a rationale of the sacrament upon a basis of theological science and system. It is a view which was elicited by the Eutychian heresy, which denied the proper human nature of our Lord, and by this denial extracted from the orthodox side a stronger and intenser contradictory

⁶ No. 6, Note 12.

rationale of that human nature, making it even a *more* active centre in theology, with more of ramification and result. Baptism, upon this view, incorporated the humanity of the individual man in the central human nature of our Lord, who, as the second Adam, was the typical man, the exemplar and true representative of humanity. The sacrament—if the term “physical” can be applied to spiritual things—thus produced something of a physical change in the soul in the shape of an actual participation of our Lord’s human nature, and imparted to it a positive form and mould in the impress of the image of the second Adam. But what was this change as a *moral* change, or a *moral* rise in the condition of the soul? Was it the being endowed with a faculty only by which the individual was *enabled* to attain holiness and goodness? Leo certainly describes more than a faculty when he says, that “while the outer man is washed, the inner man is changed;” that “he is a new creature made out of an old,” “a righteous man begun out of an ungodly, a charitable out of a covetous, a captive out of a free;” that “the image of the earthly man is cast off, and the form assumed of the heavenly man,” and that “he is not the same man after baptism that he was before it.” “What is this transformation,” he says, “but the right hand of the Most High?” The new moral state thus described is certainly a state inconsistent with the person who is in it being at the time wicked; and therefore is a state of actual holiness and goodness.

This general representation of baptismal regeneration in the Fathers as implying actual goodness and holiness, will be confirmed by some points of detail.

1. The delivery or release from sin imparted in baptism, appears in the Fathers to include more than what is commonly understood by “remission of sin,” or release from the guilt and penalty of past sin, viz. an actual

purification of the soul from present sin; and thus a good deal of the language of the Fathers which at first sight might appear to express only "remission of sin" virtually expresses a state of actual holiness, as the effect of baptism. Clement of Alexandria distinguishes between these two effects of delivery from sin. "Baptism," he says, "is called the laver because it is that by which we cast off our sins, the gift because it is that by which are remitted the penalties due to our sins."⁷ And it is a purification from present sin which he describes when he says,—"clearing away in baptism the darkening cloud of our sins, we have our spiritual eye free and unimpeded."⁸ The cleansing of baptism is here made to consist in the removal of present sin, as well as the remission of past. Chrysostom understands the baptismal release from sin in the same sense, in his comment on Rom. vi. 2, "We that have died to sin, how shall we live any longer therein?" "What is died? Our becoming dead to it, believing and being enlightened. What is becoming dead to it? Obeying it no longer. For this hath baptism done for us once; it deadened us to it. . . . What the cross and burial then was to Christ, this hath baptism been to us, though not in the same material; for He died and was buried to the flesh, we to sin; as the death of Christ to flesh was real, so was ours to sin real."⁹ This deliverance from sin in baptism is spoken of as a spiritual resurrection. "One resurrection is a delivery from sin, the second is the resurrection of the body; He hath given the greater; expect the less, for this is indeed much greater than the other; the delivery from sin far greater than the resurrection of the body. . . . We have risen the greater resurrection wherein we cast off the death of sin so difficult to get rid of, and

⁷ No. 5, Note 12.⁸ Ibid.⁹ No. 7, Note 12.

put off the old garment; let us not despair of the less when we long ago had the greater in baptism.”¹ The baptismal deliverance from sin, then, in the sense in which the Fathers understood it, was not only remission of past sin, but purification from present, and so implied actual goodness and holiness.

2. Regeneration in baptism always figures in the Fathers as the reality of which circumcision was the type; it is represented as spiritual circumcision. “The hand applieth not this circumcision,” says Chrysostom, “but the Spirit; it circumciseth not a part, but the whole man. The body is circumcised in both, but in the one corporally, in the other spiritually. Ye have put off like the Jews not your flesh, but your sins. When and how? In Baptism.”² “Our circumcision,” says Theodoret, “is not bodily but spiritual, not made by the hand but divine, not the riddance of a little flesh, but the delivery from all corruption.”³ But there can be no doubt that spiritual circumcision is actual goodness and holiness. If regeneration in baptism then is spiritual circumcision, regeneration in baptism is actual goodness and holiness.

3. In practical exhortation we employ two different kinds of language, according as we suppose men simply to have a faculty for goodness which they ought to use to become good, or an actual habit of goodness which they ought to guard, maintain, and properly improve as an existing treasure. In the one case the argument is—you are not yet good, and therefore you must endeavour to become so; in the other it is—you are good, and therefore you must take care and remain so; and express and embody your inward habit in all your actions. This latter argument becomes—persons who are the proper

¹ No. 8, Note 12.² No. 9, Note 12.³ No. 10, Note 12.

subjects of it being supposed—the most forcible and stirring inducement there is to a good life and conduct. For it must be remembered that persons do not cease to be subjects of exhortation because they are good ; they have a most important work to do to which they are to be strenuously urged, viz. to sustain and advance their own goodness, for people may easily neglect even their own virtue, and fall away from it. In this case then the appeal to men to keep up an existing goodness, is the strongest of all arguments, because it reminds them of the rich treasure, of which the loss would be indelible disgrace, involving as it were gratuitous suicide. The possession of goodness is indeed the greatest and highest of all responsibilities, the appeal to which is adapted to stir up the whole man and awaken the most wholesome fear and vigorous resolution.

We observe in the Fathers then a permanent use of this latter argument. They do not in practical exhortation urge the baptized only to cultivate a faculty, but to guard an actual goodness which they became possessed of in baptism. It is thus that Chrysostom, commenting on the text, “He that is dead is freed from sin,”⁴ exhorts the baptized:—“If thou hast died in baptism, remain dead, for a dead man cannot sin any longer. He lies dead, and therefore is delivered from sinning any more. So is it with him who has come up from baptism. He died there to sin once : it behoves him to remain dead to it.”⁵—“Baptism,” he says again, “hath done this once for us ; it deadened us to sin ; but for the rest we must by our exertions verify this constantly : so that, though sin issue ten thousand commands, we should obey it no longer, but remain motionless as the dead.”⁶—“God gave us the renewal of regeneration in the laver of bap-

⁴ Rom. vi. 7.⁵ No. 11, Note 12.⁶ No. 7, Note 12.

tism, that having therein put off the old man or wicked actions, and having put on the new, we may tread the path of virtue.”⁷—“Gape not, therefore, after luxury and splendid dress, for thou hast already the glory from on high, and Christ is become everything to thee, table and garment and house, and head and root; for as many of you as have been baptized unto Christ have put on Christ.”⁸—“For this is regeneration, not when the house is rotten rebuilding it on the old foundation, but building it up anew altogether, as He hath done to us.”⁹ “Thou renouncedst sin,” says Theodoret, “and becamest dead to it, and wert buried with Christ. How then is it possible for thee to take to sin again?”¹

This, as it is a comment upon, so is evidently also a carrying on of, the same method of exhortation that we observe in St. Paul’s Epistles, in which the Apostle so affectionately urges Christians as *having* died to sin, and having been made free from sin, and having become the servants of righteousness, to act in consistency with this already existing goodness and heavenly-mindedness. The death to sin, which the mature Christian shows in practice, is contemplated in these passages as only the death to sin which took place in baptism *continued*—the same state with it, not the contingent result of it. The *ἐπανόρθωσις πλάσματος* of Gregory Nazianzen seems to express the same idea, viz. that man is “set right” in baptism, re-endowed with the habit in which he was created, and so given a fresh start, with the advantage of being placed again in an initial state of virtue, in which he has only to remain and persevere, in order to obtain his final reward.

It may be asked, indeed, how such actual goodness, as the Fathers describe regeneration to be, is imparted by

⁷ No. 12, Note 12.

⁸ No. 13, Note 12.

⁹ No. 14, Note 12.

¹ No. 15, Note 12.

an outward rite. But we have only to do here with the fact of the Patristic sense, not with any ulterior question which may follow from it. There are interpreters, indeed, of the Fathers who come forward with an explanation on this point. These interpreters say that the Fathers having principally in their minds, in their use of this language, the case of zealous and devout adults, who came to baptism with already formed devout dispositions, are not to be understood too literally in the assertion that such dispositions are imparted then and there by the visible sacrament, which is rather a mode of speaking, meaning substantially that baptism is the climax and consummation of that whole previous process of conversion which has produced these dispositions. I am not, however, concerned in the present chapter with any difficulty resulting from the Patristic sense of regeneration, or any explanation of it, but only with the Patristic sense of regeneration itself.

Again, the whole of this language of the Fathers has received a particular interpretation from divines of the Anglican school, who, maintaining the doctrine of baptismal regeneration upon the authority of the Fathers, have yet explained all this language as descriptive of a *faculty* only for attaining actual goodness. They have apparently given it this sense from deciding that it was *wanted*, to accommodate such language to the facts of Christian life, which do not indicate an actual state of goodness as uniformly derived from baptism. But when a large mass of language lies before us, and the question is what it means, this is a question which must be settled, not by considering what is wanted to suit the needs of theology, but by the natural force and signification of the language itself, which being clear and decided, it is not then allowable that an outside difficulty resulting from some ulterior question should unseat this natural

interpretation, and cancel the intrinsic meaning of such language. Examined by this plain test, this language refuses the explanation just mentioned. Nowhere do the Fathers represent regeneration as a faculty only, a "potential principle" as distinguished from actual righteousness: on the contrary, they describe it, as plainly as they can do by words, as being actual righteousness.

CHAPTER VII

SCHOLASTIC SENSE OF REGENERATION

WE come now from the Fathers to the baptismal language of the Schools. The Scholastic sense of regeneration is, with all the peculiarity and quaintness of the forms in which it is expressed, a remarkable witness to the tenacity with which the Scriptural sense has clung to the term amid much foreign incrustation, and the growth of artificial subtleties and refinements. The Fathers use language to one general purport, but the more accurate Schoolmen brought matters more to a point: and when they had formally raised the question what regeneration *was*, declared without hesitation that it involved actual goodness and all the Christian virtues. This definition of the baptismal gift was expressed in the formula that "*baptism conferred grace and the virtues*"¹—a formula which substantially explains itself, but which, being cast in an antiquated mould of language, not familiar to the ear of an ordinary reader of English divinity, may require some elucidation.

The term "*gratia*" then may at first mislead the Anglican reader accustomed to understand that term in the sense of *assisting* grace, or an imparted faculty. It has a much higher sense in this formula, and stands for a grace which is positively creative, not only imparting the power but the very fact of goodness—the sense which it

¹ "Per baptismum conferuntur homini gratia et virtutes." Summ. Theol. P. 3, Q. 69, A. 4.

apparently bears in one portion of Scripture language. This creative sense, though not necessarily implying the predestinarian hypothesis, was indebted for its preservation to the predestinarian school in the Patristic Church, in whose guardianship the deposit remained, till from Augustine and his followers it came down to Lombard and Aquinas. In the theology of these two chiefs of the schools "grace" figures as an actually creating and fashioning agent, not only inserting the faculty, but the *habit* of virtue in the soul, and imparting *ab initio* to it the final spiritual mould; it figures as a cause which brings with it simultaneously its effect in the shape of a moral conformation then and there produced of the inner man; it is *gratia gratum faciens*,—grace which makes a man of such a character as that God is pleased with him; grace which makes a man virtuous, *efficiens virtuosum*; grace which inserts goodness in the creature, *ponens bonum in creatura*; grace, "which is a quality of the soul of man, as beauty is a quality of the body, constituting him an object of moral love;" grace, "whereby the soul is moulded into the very form and likeness of God, by which likeness it is made worthy of the life eternal;" grace which contains and includes all the virtues, as the abundant source and the productive root contain the stream and the plant.²

And hence the juxtaposition of grace with the other term, *virtutes*, which is presented to us in this formula: the stream is given with the source, the plant with the root. The Schoolmen draw different subtle distinctions in defining the relation of "grace" to the "virtues;" Lombard considering that grace *is* virtue,³ by which he appears to mean that grace is that common substance of

² Note 13.

³ "Illa gratia virtus non incongrue nominatur." Lombard, l. 2, dist. 27.

which the virtues are different forms; Aquinas, that grace is rather a root or substratum of the virtues,—a radical habit out of which the virtues are necessarily produced and derived.⁴ “Grace is a universally directing *habit*,” says Alexander Hales, “each virtue directing to its own act, but grace to all. Grace is the light, virtue is the ray; the same in substance and differing only in relation, because the ray is the *direction* of the light into this or that part of the atmosphere, and in the same way virtue is the manifestation of grace in this or that form in the soul.”⁵ It is enough, however—for such subtle refinements are wholly beside the main question—that grace in this formula is not merely an *assisting* grace; but that, whether as a common substance containing them, or as a radical habit *de facto* producing them, grace actually, and not potentially only, includes the Christian virtues; and that, standing in this relation to each other, grace and the virtues, the root and the branches together are inserted in the soul in the act of regeneration.

Thus much for “*grace*.” The “*virtues*”—to turn to the other term in this formula—are again defined with sufficient precision as to their nature and rank. First, they *are* virtues, correctly defined according to the science of ethics, which asserts virtue to be a “*habit*,” and a “*habit*” to be “a quality difficult to remove, by which a man acts easily and pleasantly.”⁶ “A habit,”

⁴ “*Gratia est habitudo quædam quæ præsupponitur virtutibus sicut earum principium et radix.*” Aquinas, S. T., 1ma, 2dæ, Q. 110, A. 3. “*Gratia purificationis aut est charitas cum fide et spe; aut certe est quædam alia qualitas cum qua infallibiliter conjunctæ sunt tres illæ virtutes.*” Bellarmine, De Sacram. Bapt. l. i. c. 11.

⁵ Summa Theol. p. 464.

⁶ “*Virtus est habitus, ad cujus rationem pertinet quod sit qualitas difficile mobilis, per quam aliquis faciliter et delectabiliter operatur.*” Sum. Theol. P. 3, Q. 69, A. 4.

says Durandus, quoting another Aristotelian definition, "is that by which a man is well or ill disposed to himself or another: a habit is that which determines the faculty to good or evil."⁷ "Every faculty which suffers under difficulty in the performance of its act wants a facilitating principle; which principle is a habit."⁸ Such being a habit, a virtue is a *good* habit. "Virtue," says Lombard, quoting Augustine, "is a good quality of the mind by which we live aright, *bona qualitas mentis qua recte vivitur*."⁹ "Virtue," says Bonaventure, quoting the same authority, "is the habit of a well-constituted mind, *habitus mentis bene constitutæ*."¹ "The virtues" then, which, according to this formula, are involved in regeneration, are true and real virtues of the texture and composition prescribed in the science of ethics.

So much for the *nature* of the "virtues." Their *rank* is decided by the character of the dispensation to which they belong. They are not the prudential or the simply moral habits attaching to a state of nature, but they are the transcendental and supernatural virtues of a state of grace,² laid down in Scripture as principally three—faith, hope, and charity; which three "theological virtues" therefore, to give the Scholastic name, are according to this formula inserted in the soul in the act of regeneration.

Such being, however, the fundamental formula of the Schools, an important difference appears in the earlier

⁷ In Lomb. p. 198.

⁸ In Lomb. p. 252.

⁹ L. 2, dist. 27.

¹ Compendium Theol. l. v. c. 5.

² "Virtutes theologice hæc modo ordinant hominem ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per naturalem inclinationem ordinatur homo in finem sibi connaturalem." Aquinas, S. T., 1ma, 2dæ, Q. 62, A. 3. "Præter habitus morales acquisitos indigemus theologice habitibus . . . Actus quibus ordinamur ad beatitudinem supernaturalem procedunt ex potentiis perfectis per habitus." Durandus in Lomb. p. 254.

and later application of it, and the language of Peter Lombard invites attention as exhibiting considerable differences from that of his successors in the Schools. Lombard adopts the radical formula just mentioned, that the thing given in baptism, i.e. regeneration, is an actual habit of goodness—"the deposition of vices, and the collation of virtues." "It is this," he says, "which constitutes the new man; abolition of sin, adornment with the virtues: the abolition of sin expels foulness, the apposition of virtues confers splendour, and this is the *res sacramenti* of baptism."³ But while Lombard thus defined regeneration or the grace of baptism, he hesitated when he came to the question of infants as recipients of this grace, and finally declined to assert that they received the *whole* of it, that they had this gift of regeneration imparted to them in its fulness and completeness. He expresses this opinion in a celebrated passage,⁴ in which having allowed infants the negative part of regeneration or the remission of original sin, and meeting the question whether they receive the positive—the grace, "*qua ad majorem venientes ætatem possint velle et operari bonum*," he replies, "*Videtur quod non*:" because only recognizing grace as a *habit* of goodness, he says that infants cannot possess habits. "*Quia gratia illa charitas est et fides. . . . Sed quis dixerit eos accepisse fidem et charitatem?*"

But the limitation which Lombard attached to the infant's reception of baptismal grace altogether dis-

³ "*Causa vero institutionis Baptismi est innovatio mentis, ut homo qui per peccatum vetus fuerat, per gratiam baptismi renovetur, quod fit depositione vitiorum et collatione virtutum. Sic enim fit quisque novus homo, cum abolitis peccatis ornatur virtutibus. Abolitio peccatorum pellit fœditatem, appositio virtutum affert decorem; et hæc est res hujus sacramenti.*" L. 4, dist. 3.

⁴ Note 14.

appeared in later Scholasticism. Aquinas and the formal mediæval school laid it down distinctly and summarily that "infants in baptism receive grace and the virtues;" and Bellarmine only expresses a long-established decision in asserting that "the habits of faith, hope, and charity are infused into infants at baptism."⁵ The infant left the baptismal font, endowed not only with the faculties, but with the habits of all Christian goodness already miraculously formed in him: he rose out of the water with a soul not only directed towards but already fashioned upon the true exemplar, and moulded into the perfect form of the spiritual man. It was true that infants were incapable from natural immaturity of expressing these habits in action, but they still possessed the habits: they were not yet "able to entertain the motions of free will," but they were still susceptible of moral goodness "by means of the Divine information of their souls;" i.e. by the original reception of a moral mould and a rudimental character from the Divine hand.⁶

Such was the Scholastic doctrine of the regeneration

⁵ "Pueri in baptismo gratiam et virtutes consequuntur." S. T., P. 3, Q. 69, A. 6.

"Infantibus in baptismo infunduntur habitus fidei, spei, et charitatis." Bellarmine, De Sacr. Bapt. l. i. c. 11.

"Anima rationalis duobus modis dicitur esse susceptibilis virtutes, uno modo per acquisitionem, alio modo per infusionem. Per acquisitionem, parvulus manens parvulus non suscipit virtutem. Sed per infusionem suscipit virtutem antequam utatur: sicut patet in Salomone, cui infusa est scientia cum dormiebat." Alexander Alensis, Sum. Th. p. 184.

"Dantur parvulis habitus perfecti virtutum quamvis per illos non operentur." Bonaventure in Lomb. iv. p. 64.

⁶ "Pueri non sunt capaces motus liberi arbitrii, et ideo moventur a Deo ad justitiam per solam informationem animæ ipsorum." Aquinas, S. T., 1ma, 2dæ, Q. 113, A. 3.

of all infants in baptism ; its fundamental characteristic being that it did not give up but retained the Scriptural sense of regeneration as actual goodness ; only making that difference in the actual goodness of the infant which his infantine age required, viz. that it was a seminal habit, not a habit in action. The notion of regeneration as a mere faculty or capacity was not even entertained. Such a scheme had to meet the difficulties attaching to the theological application of the doctrine beyond the limits of Scripture, but did not tamper with the natural meaning of a Scripture term.

The question, indeed, immediately arose upon the construction of this bold baptismal scheme, how it was to be reconciled with facts. A habit was, by its very Scholastic definition, "a quality of the mind not easily removable, by which one acts easily and pleasurably." How was it then that those who possessed these habits, by the implantation of them in their souls in infancy, did not show them as they grew up, in the usual way in which habits are shown, by expressing them in action, and by performing good actions with that facility and pleasure which a habit imparts ? Instead of which we unfortunately see the great mass of each Christian generation as it grows up, living in carelessness and sin instead of virtue, and hardly any practising virtue from the first with ease, as if they had already the habit of it. But the tendency of the mediæval mind, in theological as in other science, was not to allow facts to interfere with theory. The facts were indeed too strong for denial, but the theoretical spirit maintains its ground sometimes, not by refusing to admit facts when they are patent, but by not allowing them *when admitted* to interfere with theory, and satisfying itself with a feeble and insufficient explanation.

So long then as the infant remained such, the expla-

nation of this difficulty was easy, viz. that though the implanted habit was in him, it was in him only in a latent and unconscious stage, and he could not act upon it by reason of the immaturity of nature.⁷ But then came the real test of the theory. The infant grows up, attains the use of his natural faculties, and becomes a reasonable and responsible agent; but he still does not, and may not for his whole life, show such habits. How was this? The excuse of natural immaturity could now no longer apply, and recourse was had to another and a much more intricate and subtle one.

The explanation of the difficulty was then asserted to lie in the fundamental nature of habits: that habits did not move themselves, but required the free will of the agent to put them in motion on any successive occasion in which action was required. A man did not act in a particular way at any given time, simply by *having* the habit, but by acting *according* to his habit. It thus depended on the prevailing motion of the agent's will at the time, whether a habit was used, and expressed itself in action, or whether it lay dormant and idle.⁸ If therefore, in addition to these infused habits *themselves*, a suc-

⁷ "Videntes pueros inhabiles ad actus virtutum crediderunt eos post baptismum nullatenus virtutem habere. Sed ista impotentia operandi non accedit pueris ex defectu habituum, sed ex impedimento corporali." Aquinas, S. T., P. 3, Q. 69, A. 6. "Hic effectus non statim inest puero post baptismum. Hoc autem non est propter defectum virtutis, sed propter impotentiam naturæ agentis." Bonaventure, Comp. Theol. l. v. c. 3. See Note 15.

⁸ "Habitus non facit ut operemur, sed ut, cum operari volumus, facile operemur. Scitum est apud omnes philosophos habitum esse in nostra potestate, quo uti possumus cum volumus, sed non facit ut velimus, imo quiescit donec voluntas eum pro libitu exerceat." Morinus, De Pœn. l. 8, c. 2.

"Non est habitus qui facit facere." Jansen, De Grat. Christi, p. 186.

cession of special motions were given to the will to *use* them, either by Divine grace simply or by the will of the agent himself conjointly with Divine grace, the infused habits were then brought into active use ; if these special motions were not given, then the habits slept and the agent fell back under the dominion of concupiscence, under which he indulged in sinful acts.

This is the well-known Scholastic doctrine of “special grace,” as distinguished from “habitual grace.” These infused virtues bearing, as *habits imparted by grace*, the technical name of “habitual grace” in Scholastic divinity, it is a maxim in that system that a man cannot act by “habitual grace” alone, but wants the addition of special grace besides it to make him act⁹—in common language, that, as a man cannot act at any given time simply by his habit, he requires besides his habit a special motion of the will to make him act. Habitual grace, then, thus needing the aid of special in order to bring it out and convert it to practical use, or, in other words, the general habit needing a particular impulse or motion to make it act on any given occasion, how was this special motion given? It depended on the system of the theologian, whether it was a motion of the independent human will aided by grace, or whether it was a motion of sovereign grace alone. Bellarmine makes it sometimes the one and

⁹ “Homo ad recte vivendum dupliciter auxilio Dei indiget, uno modo quantum ad aliquod habituale donum . . . alio modo ut a Deo moveatur ad agendum.” Aquinas, S. T., 1ma, 2dæ, Q. 109, A. 9.

“Neque enim auxilium speciale est habitus infusus; sed actio qua Deus hominem movet ad operandum, vel cum eo operatur.” Bellarmine, de Grat. et Lib. Arb. l. i. c. 2.

“*Gratia habitualis* non est illa gratia quæ facit velle et facere, quæque donat voluntatem et actionem; nam alioquin justus semper vellet et faceret.” “Necessarium adjutorium *gratiæ actualis* quod tunc datur quando actu volumus et operamur.” Jansen, De Grat. Christi, pp. 186, 151.

sometimes the other:¹ Aquinas makes it sovereign and irresistible grace alone. In the “*Summa Theologica*,” this whole goodness of the regenerate creature, implanted in him at the moment of his new birth, figures, as however fixed a habit, only as the Divine formation preceding the final gift of action itself. It is the perfect disposition *for* action, standing on the very edge of proximity to it, and ready to turn into it in a moment, like matter trembling upon the point of crystallization; but still needing this last Divine impulse to convert it into the form of practice, and without that impulse lying dormant and sluggish, like the inanimate machine before the spring is touched. The Deity would have everything prepared for Him before He takes the finishing step; He therefore endows the creature with good *habits*, i.e. puts him into a state of perfect readiness and promptness for virtuous action, that with this admirable facility already formed in him, he may be moved instantaneously by the final touch.² But if, in accordance with a secret eternal decree, the final touch is withheld, this whole Divine creation lies motionless and unproductive, habit just stops short of action, and the regenerate being, amid the fullest endowments of virtue, is left in the mass of original corruption, and perishes in his sins.

Here was the explanation, then, of the important diffi-

¹ “*Auxilium Dei vere sufficiens adfuisse nonnullis, qui tamen reipsa conversi non sunt, ac per hoc auxilium illud efficac non fuisse . . . quibusdam concedi efficac auxilium.*” De Grat. et Lib. Arb. l. i. c. 11.

The “*auxilium sufficiens*” of Bellarmine however was a mockery: —“*Nam tanquam pie credamus omnibus dari pro loco et tempore auxilium sufficiens, quo possint credere; tamen Scriptura docet reipsa non credere, nisi illos qui habent auxilium efficax.*” Ibid. l. ii. c. 12.

² “*Infundit aliquas formas seu qualitates naturales secundum quas suaviter et prompte ab ipso moveantur.*” See Note 16.

culty of habits possessed, and not at all shown by action ; the bold explanation, viz. that it was fundamentally unnecessary that habits should act at all ; because the agent could not act according to his habit without "special motions," which special motions he might never have. Another reason which was alleged to explain this difficulty was substantially the same, and only differently expressed. Inasmuch as in the absence of special motives to make him act, the agent fell back under the dominion of concupiscence as his practical impulse, it was alleged that habits were prevented from acting *by concupiscence*.³ Human nature, it was said, was in a peculiar condition as an agent, and was not to be judged of by ordinary tests. A deep and radical principle of evil, called concupiscence, resided in it, by which the internal action of the machine was disordered, and the natural operation of these habits was obstructed ; so that when it came to the point of actually doing or not doing something, concupiscence stepped into the seat of habit, and possessed itself of the spring of action in the soul. It was the continual repetition of this process which produced the case which was to be explained, viz. that of an individual who never acted according to his habit. A man indulged in perpetual malice, or was the slave of avarice, or rioted in gluttony and drunkenness, for his whole life ; the reason was not that he did not possess the habits of temperance, generosity, and love, which he had by infusion, but that there was, so to speak, a hitch in the operation of the habits, something wrong in their executive and administrative functions ; it was habit in an abnormal and exceptional state.

There was for this reason, then, no objection to be

³ "Difficultas ad bonum et pronitas ad malum inveniuntur in baptizatis *non propter defectum habitus virtutum, sed propter concupiscentiam.*" Aquinas, Sum. Theol. P. 3, Q. 69, A. 4.

alleged on the score of fact to the universal infusion of these habits in baptism, because at no stage of their existence was it necessary that these habits should produce action. They could not act in the infant on account of immaturity; they need not act in the adult on account of concupiscence. The habits were there, but the man might be wholly different from them, and to all practical purposes the same as if he were without them.

The mistake in this whole train of reasoning is apparent, and would not be worth pointing out were it not that there is a use in noticing what structures of words ingenious men will raise in order to maintain an hypothesis. It is quite true that a habit does not necessarily produce action at any given time, and on any given occasion. A man does not always act *according* to his habit; one habitually meek may commit a violent act, and one habitually brave a cowardly one. But though a good habit need not produce right acts on this particular occasion or on that, it must produce right acts on the whole. It is not *habit* otherwise, for what we *mean* by a habit is a disposition which on the whole produces action in this or that direction. The Scholastic theory gives a man the habit of liberality, which he cannot exert on account of the love of money; and the habit of sobriety, of which he cannot avail himself on account of the desire to drink. But in our very meaning of habit we imply the general fact of overcoming a contrary inclination.

Such is the Scholastic doctrine of "Infused Habits"—a tenable doctrine, so far as it only asserts—what we see exemplified in nature—the Divine power of implanting *habits*, which are thus infused as distinguished from acquired habits; an inconsistent, artificial, and absurd doctrine, so far as it erects a class of habits which are real habits without producing action. A perfect Church was thus, by the mere force of theory, erected in the world,

and renewed by the inexhaustible fertility of the baptismal font, which sent up a perpetual succession of souls divinely fashioned and armed in the full panoply of Christian virtue; this miraculous metamorphosis of sinful into virtuous and just beings was a perpetual process going on under the dispensation of grace; but theory could, after all, only produce an illusory creation which eluded all grasp, and vanished at the first contact with the waking senses; the whole erection was ideal and fictitious, and before the eye could fasten on it, melted into space.

The boldness of Roman theology is at the same time joined to a considerable flexibleness in this speculation. The character of the formed Christian combines the true habit of virtue with the *diminution* of concupiscence; the two, indeed, are but different aspects of one change, for in proportion as habit strengthens, concupiscence decays, and exerts a less imperious yoke. The baptismal gift then, as embodying the true habit of virtue, reduced concupiscence in the Scholastic system to that tenuity which was consistent *with* that habit,—to a principle of corruption which, just felt, but deprived of all force, “had not the nature of sin.” But while a weakened and only just not extinct concupiscence was wanted on one side of the theory to *combine* with the infused habit of virtue, a strong one was wanted on the other as a counteracting principle to account for that habit’s unproductiveness, and being wanted was asserted. The Scholastic system thus bent concupiscence to its own convenience, and made it strong or weak, in accordance with its own needs.

But without criticizing the boldness or the misapplied ingenuity of the Scholastic doctrine of baptism, or following the evolutions of mediæval theological science, it is enough to observe the fact for the sake of which this examination was entered upon, viz. a fundamental inter-

pretation of regeneration as implying actual goodness. It is true that Scholasticism, having laid down its baptismal formula, endeavours by logical artifice to escape the consequences of it; but the formula itself is no less positive, and the interpretation contained in it no less clear.⁴

Before quitting this baptismal theory, however, it is proper we should append to it its correct theological name. The doctrine which has been described, then, in this chapter is the Roman doctrine of Justification which, after a long reign in the Schools, had the finishing stroke of authority put to it in the decree of the Council of Trent, which lays down as the formal cause of (i.e. that which constitutes) justification, "the righteousness of God, not that whereby He is righteous, but that by which *He makes us righteous* ; being endued with which, we are renewed in the spirit of our minds, and not only are accounted, but are truly called, and *are* righteous;" for that "in justification, together with remission of sin, faith, hope, and charity are infused into us." ⁵ The Anglican doctrine of justification⁶ lays down some real goodness as necessary to justification, but it maintains it as the *condition* of, and not as the *contents* and material of, the gift. Understood in a forensic sense as a declaratory act of God accounting us righteous, justification presupposes as the ground of this imputation the goodness of faith and repentance in us, but does not itself insert or implant this goodness.

⁴ Note 17.

⁵ Note 18.

⁶ "Notate actum Dei hominem justum æstimantis, non justum facientis." Bull, Harmonia, Dissert. Prior. c. 1. Thorndike, Covenant of Grace, b. ii. c. 30, s. 21.

Bishop Forbes inclines to the Roman view, "... ita ut post justificationem nihil maculæ peccati mortalis et gravioris maneat in anima peccatoris, quod nunquam ordinarie fit absque infusione inhærentis gratiæ." De Just. l. ii. c. 4. Anglo-Cath. Ed. v. 1, p. 166.

But the Roman justification, while it requires, with the Anglican, conditions in the shape of certain preparatory workings of the heart, is not like the Anglican, only a forensic and imputative act, but an act by which God literally infuses habitual righteousness into the soul, which has only experienced good motions before, inserting in it the habits of faith, hope, and charity. Justification is thus, in the Roman sense, the making a man actually good, and is, indeed, identical with sanctification; for sanctification is also this endowing of the soul with actually good and holy affections, habits, and dispositions. And being such, justification is the grace of baptism, and is thus identical *with*, and stamps this whole meaning *upon*, *regeneration*; which state of regeneration, therefore, involves actual goodness in the Roman sense.⁷ And it will be observed that this question has nothing to do with the correctness or incorrectness of the Roman sense of *justification*: that is a matter of controversy: but, whether the Roman sense of justification is right or wrong, the Roman sense of regeneration or the grace of baptism, as identical *with* justification, is alike fixed by it.

It is remarkable indeed, that as we leave the Fathers, and enter upon Scholastic ground, the term "regeneration," to a great extent, disappears, and the term "justi-

⁷ "The ancient moralists," says Bishop Bethell, "make a just and reasonable distinction between faculties or dispositions and habits. Faculties or dispositions are potential principles of action, which must be elicited by education or opportunities, and formed into habits by use and exercise. Habits are the same principles in a state of activity, and of readiness and aptness for use. But according to the doctrine of the Scholastic divines, those principles which are said to be infused into the soul when it is *regenerated*, do not follow the order of moral causes, but are at once in a state of activity, and produce free acts, as soon as they have the opportunity of exerting themselves." *Treatise on Baptismal Regeneration*, p. 164.

fication" rises in its place, to express the *res sacramenti* of baptism.⁸ The great Patristic term was taken up again, after the lapse of centuries, by the Anglican divines, who professed a recurrence to the Fathers, but it suffered a long intermediate obscurity. The reason of the substitution may have been that regeneration is a metaphor, and that as theology became more scientific, it became impatient of the metaphor, and chose a term which seemed etymologically to express the *fact* involved in regeneration,—the being made just or righteous.

Justification, indeed, *as* the baptismal gift, and connected specially with the new dispensation, carried with it a privilege which previous to Christian baptism it did not. *As* the baptismal gift and identical with regeneration, it was the *apertio januæ cœlestis*, which it was not before. The door of heaven opened forthwith to the Christian saint, while the justified fathers of the Old Covenant, who were justified without being regenerated, reposed in a separate realm allotted to them, and were restricted for a preliminary period to the peaceful, though longing, expectation of the *Visio Dei*.⁹

⁸ "Res ergo hujus sacramenti justificatio est." Lombard, l. iv. dist. 3, s. 12.

"Interior justificatio quæ est res hujus sacramenti." Aquinas, S. T., p. 3, Q. 66, A. 1.

"Res sacramenti scilicet gratia cum virtutibus." Bonaventure in Lomb. iv. p. 64.

Bellarmino makes more use of the term regeneration, but still only as subordinate to the other term. "Justificatio est regeneratio et renovatio per lavacrum baptismi in nobis facta. Hanc autem regenerationem, quæ est ipsa justificatio, fieri per aliquod donum inhærens probari potest ex ipsa natura et ratione regenerationis; neque enim intelligi potest quemadmodum regeneretur aliquis sine ulla sui mutatione . . . Regeneratio aliquid in ipso homine ponit, ob quod filius Dei nominetur et sit . . . primarium donum quod est charitas." De Justificatione, l. 2, c. 3.

⁹ "Illi [Sancti Patres] habebant carentiam visionis cum expecta-

But while Christian justification, i.e. regeneration, was thus distinguished from the justification of the patriarchs and saints of the Old Covenant, the distinction was *no more* than this ; it was one of reward or privilege, not of substance of spiritual condition ; appendant and temporary, not intrinsic. Both the Fathers and Schoolmen, indeed, acknowledge more fellowship and common ground with the Old Testament saint,¹ than do some modern divines who represent this interval between sanctification and regeneration, as if it divided two radically different conditions of the human soul, and as if the ancient saints did not partake of the same grace of which baptized Christians did. This is a new and an unauthorized depreciation of the spiritual rank of the old patriarchs, whom ancient theology describes as justified and sanctified by the same grace by which Christians are, and one flowing from the same Incarnation, though in the one case prior, in the other posterior, in time to that event. There has been but one fundamental dispensation in the world since its creation, viz. that of the Gospel, the consummation of which was prospective to the older saint, retrospective to the later, but was, whether looked forward to or looked back to, the object and source of the same essentially Christian faith ; nor do the Fathers scruple to call the saints of the Old Testament Christians.²

A great advantage undoubtedly attaches to the later stage of this great inclusive dispensation, as compared with the earlier one ; and an advantage to which natural

tione, et ideo quia visionem Dei expectabant non tantum in limbo, sed in sinu Abrahæ dicebantur esse . . . Sinus autem Abrahæ in bonum quia est ibi requies." Bonaventure in Lomb. iv. p. 582. See Mr. Owen's "Introduction to the Study of Dogmatic Theology," chap. xvi.

¹ And were freer too in their concessions to the sacraments of the old Law. Note 19.

² Note 19.

reason as well as formal theology testifies. Christianity has given a wonderful stimulus and expansion to our moral nature, and has produced a character superior in power, freedom, and comprehensiveness to that of the saint of the Old Testament. Even the intellectual enlightenment of the Christian, his superior insight into many sublime truths, and the largeness of his field of sympathy, are a great excitement to his moral powers. The true test of character, however, is the root rather than the expansion; whether we attend to the cautions of common sense, or whether we take our standard from poetry, which, impatient of the outer organization and framework of human character, pierces to its core, in order to find that sterling truth of nature, which makes the man according to the design of God. The mind of the poet penetrates within to reach the centre, the substance of the uncorrupted heart, which may be more or less richly and largely developed according to circumstances, but of which the true worth is itself. High and refined knowledge is indeed in an especial way penetrated by this reactionary test, which dismisses form and outer growth to recur to the foundation, and grasp the root of sincerity in man. It is thus that the highest civilization fosters the poetical aspect of the poor, because in the midst of growth and development, the craving more especially arises for the native rudiments,—those elementary forms of character which witness to their own truth, and which have the purity and strength of primordial substance. Half-formed thoughts, unconnected words, ejaculations, and mere looks, are prized above the most complete manifestations of the educated mind, as glimpses of a world of truth, escapings from the fountain-head, and fragments of a genuine original.

The Christian character thus existed in its root in the patriarch and saint of the Old Testament; it had not that

development indeed which a later stage of the dispensation gave to it, but the whole greatness of the foundation was there,—the faith which, dim in the apprehension of its object, certain of itself, led the way and made the wonderful beginning; performed the first great act of foresight, and cast the first fixed look out of visible nature; drew the rough outline of futurity, and beheld afar off the city whose builder and maker is God. The patriarchal character is thus essentially a spiritual and a Christian one, the type and exemplar to which the Church still appeals as containing the whole substance of Gospel faith and sanctity. And, as such, it is the creation of the same Divine grace which works in the Christian Church.

It may indeed help us to see how the substance of the Christian character could exist in the ancient patriarch without the expansion, that, *vice versâ*, in the Christian there is sometimes seen the expansion without the substance. The history of character under Christianity has its mysteries; the greatness of the revelations made to man has sometimes not abased him, but the contrary; and he has used Christianity, as Alcibiades used Socrates, for the power which its truths have given him over others, rather than for the profit of them to himself. The largeness which they have given to our field of view, the new world which they have opened, furnish him with a fulcrum for moving the feelings and controlling the wills of others, with which the whole of ancient philosophy had nothing to be compared. He has seen his advantage, and he has availed himself of it without scruple. And thus it is that the marvellous gift of a rich religious imagination, and an outer ethical formation, even upon a transcendental pattern, have sometimes not excluded in the Christian teacher and man of power an inner eye to vanity, a regard to a fleeting unsubstantial end. We see a want of simplicity and singleness in the fundamental aim of a soul desiring

dominion over men's minds, and pursuing a carnal greatness even in the sphere of spiritual things. We see that something is grasped at which is external to the Divine law, and which therefore must involve a subtle self-seeking. Yet this inner unsoundness is surrounded with an outer depth of idea and feeling, with brilliant aspirations, and the signs of powerfully realized Christian truth. The expansion is perfect and admirable, but the mind within is not the mind of Christ.³ *Vice versâ*, the patriarchal mind was the mind of Christ, but without the advantage of expansion. Its religious greatness consisted not in any beautiful diversity of outer ethical growth, but in an inward singleness of mind—that strong stock of truth upon which, as upon its native stay, the rising Church leaned undoubtedly, turning thenceforward and for ever to it, as to the original exemplar and type of faith. Such was the justification and sanctification of the saints of the Old Testament, the gift of the same Holy Spirit which descended on the day of Pentecost, and the work of the same Divine grace which now sanctifies the elect people of God.

³ “Si habuerit virtutem magnam et devotionem nimis ardentem, adhuc multum sibi deest . . . scilicet unum ut se relinquat.” De Imitatione Christi. “S'ils vous ont donné Dieu pour objet, ce n'a été que pour exercer votre superbe.” Pascal.

CHAPTER VIII

CALVINISTIC SENSE OF REGENERATION

THE testimony of the Calvinistic School on the question now before us will perhaps be considered by some not to deserve much attention, but notwithstanding the partial and rigid character of this system, we cannot with fairness put out of court a school which can show so many great theological features, and whose learning and intellectual power and acuteness have been combined with the deepest faith. It need not be said then that regeneration involves actual goodness in the Calvinistic definition. Nor, as the preceding chapters have shown, was this definition any innovation on the part of the Calvinists. We are apt to represent this school as having supplanted an old established sense of regeneration by a new one of its own, but, by the admission of Bishop Bethell himself, the Calvinists found the idea of regeneration "as a radical change of heart, and an implantation of a new character and disposition," already established in the Schools before them; nor, in adopting it, did they do more than follow the lead of recognized theology.

The tendency of Calvinism, however, as a popular system, has been to fix as the date of this great inward change, not baptism, but the moment of the effectual call, when God, by a sovereign act of grace, transfers the sinner from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan to God, implanting in him new affections and inclinations. Up to this time the elect have indeed been the subjects of

a Divine decree predestinating them to everlasting life, but nothing has been done to put this decree in execution, and the internal condition of the elect has been the same as that of the sinful mass; but at the call they are actually separated by a change of internal condition from the latter, and are endowed with a spiritual habit and disposition of mind.

Bishop Bethel thus decides that the Schoolmen and the Calvinists define regeneration substantially alike. "According to the Schoolmen, man is endowed with the habit of justifying grace, containing in it the habits of faith, hope, and charity, when he is baptized; the Scholastic Calvinists asserted that regeneration consists in such a habit of grace bestowed upon the elect at the moment of the *effectual call*."¹ But both Schools, he observed, agree in maintaining "that habits of belief and holiness are implanted in the soul by a literal creation or miraculous action of Divine power,"² in the act of regeneration; both identify regeneration with "a change of affections and inward feelings," with "an infusion of particular virtues,"³ with "the renewal of the whole inward frame, and a radical change in all the parts and faculties of the soul."⁴ Though in recognizing the fact of this substantial agreement of two different Schools in a particular definition, Bishop Bethell hardly seems to give it the weight which is due to it—to the concordant testimony of two such opposite and independent witnesses to one meaning of regeneration as the true one.

The Calvinistic definition, however, *added* to the sense of regeneration as actual goodness, and farther extended it. A temporary habit of goodness is not enough in the opinion of the Calvinist to constitute so high a privilege as that of being a son of God; for which privilege some

¹ Treatise, p. 162.

² P. 183.

³ Pref. p. 30.

⁴ Pref. p. 39.

guarantee seems to him requisite that the person who is good now, should also be good in eternity. Sonship is necessarily an immortal state in his idea, because it is being the son of the "Eternal and Immortal," a participation of a nature which is imperishable and cannot fail. To talk of a man then being a son of God now, and not being a son of God at a certain date from hence, is condemned as simple trifling, and the idea of a temporary sonship is altogether rejected as an incongruity and a solecism in reason. The condition is required, therefore, by the Calvinist, in assigning the title of son of God, that once possessed it should never be parted with ; nor is such a condition to be set aside as wholly unreasonable or unscriptural, appealing as it does to a natural maxim which we cannot altogether discard, that the end is the test even of the reality of the present, and favoured as it is by certain striking portions of Scripture language.

The too rigid adherence, however, to the condition of permanence and indefectibility as essential to regeneration, involved the Calvinist in difficulties as great as the concession of a temporary regeneration would have entailed. It may seem unnatural and incongruous to say that a man is a son of God now, who will be a child of the devil at a certain date from hence, but still the fact must be admitted that men do *fall*, and from a good life change to a bad one. How, then, are we to describe the previous state of goodness ? Was it altogether a deception without inward reality ? We might say so, perhaps, if it vanished for ever and never appeared again. But what if it revives, and revives to continue to the end ? It must be admitted then to have been a real goodness, and therefore true sonship ; and yet to have been apparently only temporary, stopping at a particular time. The Calvinist then explained this difficulty by supposing in such a case a *root* of goodness, which remained in the human soul even

when the visible fruit, in the shape of an apparent actual life of goodness, was gone, and the man was sunk in vice; —from which it followed that the sonship had never really ceased, but only suffered an eclipse.⁵ But that a man should be in root and essence a son of God, at the very time that he is wallowing in the pollution of sin, is not a Scriptural idea. It is true that by a figure of speech Scripture represents what is *certain to be*, as already present, and in this sense a profligate man may be a saint now *to the Divine prescience*, but he is not a saint in himself. The Calvinist thus bridged over the interval of the elect's lapse at the cost of his definition of regeneration, and obtained his continuous line of sonship by an unauthorized reduction of the meaning of that term.

Regeneration was thus *ultimately* defined not as a *habit*, but as a *process*; by virtue of which goodness did not necessarily then exist, but was in sure progress to formation. It was a process which when once begun in man by the Holy Ghost, was never wholly abandoned, but though sometimes thrown back upon its original starting-ground, with all the fabric hitherto erected demolished, had still an ultimate footing reserved to it in the soul, upon which the Spirit commenced in due time His work afresh, till the spiritual man was built up. The Calvinistic and Scholastic definitions thus agreeing at the outset, parted company at a certain stage of the argument; and regeneration from an actual "*habit*" of goodness, which

⁵ "Ego tamen non dubito quin semen illud quo electos suos regenerat Deus, ut est incorruptibile, ita perpetuam vim habeat. Fieri quidem posse concedo ut interdum suffocetur, quemadmodum in Davide: sed tamen quo tempore videbatur extincta esse omnis in eo pietas, carbo vivus sub cineribus latebat. Conatur quidem Satan avellere quicquid Dei est in electis; sed ubi plurimum illi permittitur, manet semper occulta radix, quæ deinde pullulat." Calvin on 1 John iii. 9.

naturally shows itself in the practice of goodness, became the *process of the formation* of goodness, all the first introductory part of which could be secret, and simultaneous with a life of the grossest sin.

• This modification of the definition of regeneration, helped a section of the Calvinistic School out of another difficulty.

The Calvinistic School could not consistently with its principles hold the regeneration of *all* infants in baptism. Indeed they were in a difficulty here antecedently to the objection arising from their own peculiar tenet. For the only definition of infant baptismal regeneration, which, by the admission of Bishop Bethell, was presented to the Calvinists upon their first birth as a school, was the established Scholastic definition, that all infants had the habits of faith, hope, and charity infused into them at baptism. But they could not accept this position, but were obliged to reject it, not only because it was opposed to Calvinism, but because it was contrary to fact.

But though the Calvinistic School could not consistently hold the regeneration of *all* infants in baptism, and though its popular tendency has been to defer that change to the age of consciousness, it has still as a school never given up the connexion of regeneration with baptism, but adhered to the teaching of its early authorities, who maintained the regeneration of *infants*—those who were elect—and baptism as the instrument or the seal of this regeneration.⁶ But how was the regeneration of the elect in infancy consistent with the obvious fact that *many* of the elect lived years in sin before their actual conversion? In what mode and sense were they regenerate throughout this previous life? By “initial regeneration,”⁷ it was answered. But what was this? If it was an implanted habit it would come out with the growth of reason,

⁶ See Chapter vii. Part II.

⁷ Note 20.

whereas the elect person might live up to a point of middle or perhaps even declining life in sin. This initial regeneration then was not an implanted *habit*, but only the commencement of an infallible *process*, which had to work its way through a long conflict of opposing forces, and gradually shape the rough material of the human soul into the spiritual form. Such an incipient stage of a *process* is not the regeneration of the New Testament; for though the decree of *predestination* can attach to a person in and throughout the longest period of sin, he is not during this period in the Scriptural sense of the word regenerate. This modification, however, of the definition of regeneration got the sacramental Calvinist out of a difficulty, out of which the Schoolman never extricated himself. For the Scholastic implanted *habit* provoked the challenge to come out and show itself with the growth of reason; whereas the Calvinistic *process* invited no such challenge, only being obliged to show itself when it was *completed*, which it might not be till even the end of life.

An examination into the Anglican sense of regeneration would now follow in natural order. I use the term "Anglican" because this is the ordinary designation of a particular school which succeeded the Calvinistic in our Church, and which contains most of our well-known divines. The Anglican School, though a divided witness, still gives the main strength of its testimony to that sense of regeneration which has been maintained in this treatise as the true and Scriptural one; but an examination of the method of treatment which the divines of this school applied to this question is reserved for another place in this treatise.⁸

⁸ Chapter xi.

CHAPTER IX

REGENERATION OF ADULTS IN BAPTISM

THE case of adult regeneration in baptism is easily stated with respect to the conditions of it. That no adult is regenerate in baptism without faith and repentance is the unquestionable doctrine of Scripture and the universal Church.¹

An opposite language, viz. that even wicked adults are regenerate in baptism, though not beneficially, is held by some, but such a notion is entirely without warrant. Those who maintain such a position seem to do so upon the idea that regeneration is only the imparting of a *power* or *faculty*; in which case they see no inconsistency in the notion of a man being regenerated while wicked, because it is a law of the Divine dispensations that great faculties are conferred upon good and bad alike. But regeneration is a complex thing, including in the essential idea of it, besides this power for the future, remission of past sin, to which forgiveness the wicked cannot possibly be admitted while they *are* wicked. They receive the baptismal character indeed, which is perhaps what these persons mean; but this character is not regeneration.

But when we go from the *conditions* of the gift, to what the gift *is* in the case of adults, the case becomes more difficult. The main distinction which a preceding chapter² has established is, that the regenerate state is

¹ See p. 50, and Notes 6 and 8.

² Chapter v.

in the Scriptural sense a *habit* of goodness and not a faculty only. It was shown to be actual goodness, and by goodness we *mean* a habit of goodness. But here a question arises. For regeneration is confessed on all sides to be an absolute gift of God, but can *habits* be absolutely given, and created by Divine power? Our faculties are universally acknowledged to be simply given us, but according to the Aristotelian doctrine, habits are acquired by our own use of the faculties, or by successive acts. The answer to this question is that habits, even as distinguished from faculties, can be implanted in the soul by Divine power. Instances of this appear indeed in the course of God's natural providence. Sudden impressions from outward events, or sudden impulses from within, have been known to give an immediate turn to character and to produce a settled moral bias and mould of mind which has influenced the conduct of the individual from that time forward. And we recognize the fact of what we call "natural character," which is a moral *habit* of mind imparted to the individual at birth, causing him to act in a certain way as he grows up. Nor is such a doctrine of the implantation of habits by Divine power Calvinism; because it does not follow, if a man is endowed with a good habit, that therefore the contingent acts of free will are dispensed with in sustaining it. He is undoubtedly placed at an advantage in regard to moral action; still acts do not in our present state necessarily flow from habits without any effort of the will, and therefore such imparted habits are attended by risk, and require the exertion of the will to maintain them. Primitive theology represented Adam as created not only with the faculty, but with the habit of goodness, but that habit did not prevent a fall afterwards by voluntary neglect and sin.

But though there appears to be no objection to assert-

ing that a moral habit can be implanted by Divine power, a further question is raised when we come to the sacrament of baptism as the means by which such a habit is implanted. For is it reasonable to suppose that a moral habit can be imparted to a human being by a particular outward rite? Such a result is less startling in the case of infants, because the germ and commencement of life is itself a kind of mystery, and so harmonizes more with such a mysterious creation. But let us place before our minds an adult in the full possession of his reason and faculties, and we must feel great difficulty in the idea of a moral habit being formed by an external rite, in the grown and mature man. Such an effect of the sacrament comes into direct collision with reasonable modes of thinking of which we find ourselves possessed. There is this important consideration too in the case of the adult, that a good disposition is the previous condition upon which he receives the grace, and therefore cannot be the effect of it. And though a good disposition may exist without a formed habit, the adult may often have the latter as well, and come to baptism already a mature Christian in character.

The case of adult regeneration in baptism has thus difficulties peculiar to itself. Were regeneration only defined as an admission to an outward covenant and spiritual privileges, the way would be clear; but regeneration being an inward moral and spiritual habit, the question arises whether such a habit is imparted to an adult in and by baptism; and the effect of baptism upon adults becomes a separate subject for consideration, involving peculiar difficulties, apart from those attaching in common to the whole baptismal question.

Theology has accordingly, in its treatment of the baptismal question, always trod with peculiar caution upon this particular portion of the ground; and the

questions which arose out of adult baptism ultimately produced an opening through which a good deal of relaxation and modification of doctrinal language crept in. The case of adults from time to time necessitated important concessions, and moral considerations were allowed to outweigh those of ritual, till at length the *obsignatory* theory triumphed in this particular case, and it was decided that the faithful adult was regenerate *before* baptism, though this did not release him from the obligation to receive the outward seal of the sacrament. The difficulty of a moral and spiritual habit, such as regeneration is, being imparted to an adult *in* baptism, was thus got rid of by antedating in his case regeneration *to* baptism, and regarding him as possessing the *res sacramenti* by virtue of his faith and holiness before the outward rite. But this explanation was not immediately arrived at, but was led up to by a series of steps.

The first of these was the case of unbaptized martyrs. Adults possess moral character. They possess evidently—some of them—when they have had the advantage of Christian instruction, even *Christian* character, antecedently to baptism; and this was a fact which the greater prevalence of adult baptism, involving as it did a constant number of grown-up persons who had though unbaptized the Christian faith and temper, brought forcibly home to the mind even of the early Church, amid all its high regard to sacraments. Could it be said that a catechumen who suffered martyrdom for the faith was not a member of Christ, because he was not baptized? Moral feeling rejected such an idea, and it was decided that martyrdom of itself conferred upon him regeneration, for which it gained the name of the baptism of blood. But the course of concession could not stop here, because a catechumen who was not martyred might have the

spirit of a martyr, might have been as willing as the other to suffer death for the faith, had he had the call. Was such an one then not a member of Christ because by accident he had died without baptism? Moral feeling again rejected such an idea, and it was decided that faith of itself supplied the place of baptism in the believing catechumen. The exception allowed to martyrdom thus established, as the next step, a much wider and more general modification of the doctrine of baptism; the ruling principle in such concessions being the plain ground of morals which must ultimately outweigh any other that comes into competition with it, viz. that *the* acceptable thing in the sight of God is actual holiness and goodness, and that where this is had no defect of ritual can possibly interfere with the individual's favour in His sight. St. Ambrose, therefore, claimed this concession without hesitation.³

But the course of concession could not stop even here, for *if* the act of baptism made a real inward change in the pious and believing adult, as compared with his state before; if he entered into a new spiritual condition in and by that act; to suppose that God supplied the want of this to the believing adult who died without baptism, by an extraordinary arrangement, was an *assumption*. But it was not satisfactory that so important a claim should rest upon so irregular a footing as a mere pious assumption; and therefore, as a security to the faithful unbaptized, the next step was to modify the effect of baptism upon the faithful baptized; and it was decided ultimately that the latter possessed the substance of regeneration before baptism, and had thus nothing wanting in the substance of his spiritual condition for baptism afterwards to supply. The regeneration of the faithful

³ "Qui habuit spiritum tuum, quomodo non accepit gratiam tuam." De obitu Valentiniani consolatio, s. 52.

unbaptized thus no longer stood as a divergence from the regular doctrine of baptism, but was incorporated in that doctrine; and the success of an exceptional claim resulted at last in a modification of doctrinal basis.

This modification, however, was some time obtaining a recognized place in theology. The ordinary language of the Fathers does not, perhaps, present any noticeable difference in describing the effect of baptism upon believing adults, and upon infants,—though, when Cyprian in middle life attributes his own regeneration, which he pointedly describes as a *conversion*, to the simple rite of baptism, it is difficult to suppose that he means such language to be understood quite literally. The sudden moral and intellectual change which he relates would, as produced by the simple administration of an outward rite, have been a miracle, and he does not profess to be relating a miracle.

But, though the ordinary language of the Fathers does not present much that is distinctive on the subject of adult baptism, occasional modifications appear, especially when they have the case of pious believing and instructed adults expressly before them. Justin Martyr and Clement of Alexandria both appear to sanction the antedating of illumination,—which was another term for regeneration,—as the growth of discipline and instruction,⁴ to the actual administration of baptism. Tertullian meets the

⁴ Καλείται δὲ τοῦτο τὸ λουτρὸν φωτισμὸς, ὡς φωτιζομένων τὴν διάνοιαν τῶν ταῦτα μαθητῶν, Justin, Apol. l. 1, s. 61. Illumination, which is always spoken of by the Fathers as the gift of baptism, is here made to precede baptism, as the result of preceding instruction. Clement declines tying illumination to the actual rite. "Οτι δὲ ἡ γνῶσις συνανατέλλει τῷ φωτίσματι, περιαστράπτουσα τὸν νοῦν, καὶ εὐθέως ἀκούομεν μαθηταὶ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς· πότερον πότε, τῆς μαθήσεως ἐκείνης προσγενομένης; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔχοις εἰπεῖν τὸν χρόνον. Potter's Ed. v. i. p. 116.

question, why a person who has already true Christian faith is baptized, seeing that Abraham was justified by the sacrament of faith only, and he answers it by saying, that before our Lord's Passion and Resurrection faith "naked" was enough; but that, after faith had enlarged its subject-matter by the addition of the articles of the Nativity, Passion, and Resurrection, "an augmentation was added to the sacrament of faith, viz. the seal of baptism; a *clothing*, as it were, of the faith which hitherto was naked."⁵ The addition which the sacrament makes to faith is explained here as one more of an outer than an inner kind; for the body is more the substance of the man than the clothing, and faith stands for the body, the sacrament for the clothing. Again, in combating the idea which persons had that they might live in sin up to the time of baptism, relying upon everything being wiped off by that act, he says,—“Baptism is the seal of faith, which faith starts with and is proved by repentance. We are not therefore washed that we may *cease* to sin, inasmuch as we are already washed in heart.”⁶ Two points may be noted in this language. First, baptism is the *seal* of faith. The explanation of baptism as the *seal* of faith, like the former explanation of it as the clothing of faith, does not describe the sacrament as producing any change in the substance of the spiritual condition of the individual who has already true faith. The substance of a document is its *language*, in which the person engages

⁵ “Fuerit salus retro per fidem nudam ante Domini passionem et resurrectionem. At ubi fides aucta est credendi in nativitatem, passionem, resurrectionemque ejus, addita est ampliatio sacramento, *obsignatio Baptismi* vestimentum quodammodo fidei quæ retro erat nuda.” De Bapt. c. 13.

⁶ “Lavacrum illud obsignatio est fidei; quæ fides a pœnitentiæ fide incipitur et commendatur. Non ideo abluimur ut delinquere desinamus, quoniam jam corde loti sumus.” De Pœn. c. 6.

to do such and such things; the seal is a formal rather than a substantial addition. The language even without the seal has of itself a binding power, because a man cannot declare in words that he will do a thing, and afterwards not do it, without being convicted by those very words. And therefore, though the law may choose to require the addition of the seal, such an addition does not appertain to the substance of the document, which lies in the natural force of the language composing it. As the seal of faith, therefore, baptism does not add anything intrinsic and essential to faith. The other point is the assertion, that those who come to baptism in a right state of mind are already baptized in heart—*corde loti*. Inward baptism is regeneration.

St. Augustine evidently feels a difficulty when he finds himself confronting the case of an adult possessing the true Christian faith and temper before baptism, and required to state what it is which is effected in such an one by baptism. In such a case, he says, “What the *bodily sanctification* of the sacrament avails, and what it does in the man, *it is difficult to say*;⁷ but unless it availed much, our Lord would not have received the baptism of a servant. So little ought any one, however spiritually advanced before baptism, to despise that sacrament which is applied corporally by the minister, and by which God works the spiritual consecration of the man. Nor for any other purpose was the office of baptizing given to John, than that our Lord who gave it to him might, in not disdaining to accept the baptism of a servant, commend the path of humility and declare how much His own baptism was to be valued. For He foresaw that there would not be wanting that pride in some, who having attained proficiency of understanding and morals,

⁷ “Quid autem valeat et quid agat in homine corporaliter adhibita sanctificatio . . . difficile est dicere,” &c. See Note 21.

might rank themselves above many of the baptized in life and doctrine ; which would induce them to think baptism in their own case superfluous, inasmuch as they would feel themselves to have attained already that habit of mind to which many baptized persons were still striving to ascend."

The first remark to make upon this explanation is, that the difficulty is felt more clearly than it is answered. The writer, however, while he uses many high expressions to show the value of baptism in such a case as he describes, evidently avoids asserting any substantial inward change as the effect of the sacrament. The effect he ascribes to it is "a spiritually wrought consecration ;"—an indefinite expression, indeed, but one which does not contain the idea of a substantial inward change or actual regeneration. The appeal also to our Lord's "fulfilment of righteousness," in submitting Himself to John's baptism, and to the duty of humility and not despising ordinances of Divine appointment, points rather to an act of obedience, conferring a blessing as such, than to the reception of an inward substantial change. It is evident, indeed, that our Lord's baptism was an act of simple obedience to a positive ordinance without an inward effect: the prominent use of this case then, as the one on which to rest the obligation of the believing adult to submit himself to this ordinance, suggests the motive of obedience as the principal one enjoined in this and other passages of Augustine.

The famous maxim of Augustine, "*Legis opera sequuntur justificatum, non præcedunt justificandum*," may be added to the concessions of antiquity upon this subject. This maxim, which mainly affects the question of the part which *works* have in justification, also incidentally, but still substantially, affects the question of the part which *baptism* has in justification, in a particular case, viz. in the case of the adult who has before baptism practised

good works, or exhibited a good and holy character. The result of the maxim is in his case to make justification precede baptism; for, where good works precede baptism, a maxim, which antedates justification to good works, still more antedates justification to baptism. This celebrated maxim of Augustine has indeed been explained as assuming that justification is in baptism, and only meaning to assert that works after baptism have the exclusive title to the name of "Christian works or righteousness properly so called." But Augustine admits to the fullest extent the possibility of good works and of Christian works before baptism; and therefore this is an artificial explanation of this maxim, which must rather be taken as one of those Augustinian dicta which qualify the sacramental system, and reveal an opening into another and counterbalancing one.

The incidental and desultory concession, however, of the Fathers was more methodically adopted by the Schools. The Schoolmen were, indeed, so strongly committed to the position that the baptismal gift or regeneration was an actual *habit* of goodness, that this concession in the case of adults was forced upon them. For what were they to say? That an adult had a moral habit imparted to him in and by an outward rite? That was plainly unreasonable. And, moreover, the faithful adult came with a good disposition already formed to baptism. The language of theology accordingly, contrary to the general tendency of sacramental statements, which was to greater rigidity, became more systematically free on this subject. Peter Lombard, who built his structure of divinity entirely upon a Patristic basis, hardly professing it indeed to be more than a digest of the Fathers, pronounces distinctly, or rather, what is still more significant, treats it as a point universally admitted, that adults who come to baptism in faith and love are, upon

the strength of this inward disposition, justified or regenerate already.

“It is wont to be asked,” he says, “concerning those who come with faith and love to baptism, being already sanctified by the Spirit, what it is which baptism bestows upon them. For it appears to bestow nothing, inasmuch as they are already justified by faith and repentance, and have received forgiveness of sin. To which it may be replied, that those persons *have been indeed, through their faith and repentance, justified*, i. e. cleansed from the stain of sin, and absolved from the debt of eternal punishment: yet that they are bound to temporal satisfaction such as that to which penitents in the Church are liable. But when they receive baptism, they are both cleansed from their sins committed, if so be, in the interval after conversion, and are absolved from exterior satisfaction; and assisting grace and every virtue is *increased* in the baptized person, so that he may be called really a new man. The *fomes peccati* also is still *more* weakened in him. Wherefore Jerome saith that the faith which makes men believers, is either given or nourished in baptism, because to him that hath not it is therein given, and to him that hath it is given that he have more. Whoso approaches baptism then clean, is therein made cleaner, and to every one that hath there is given then more. . . . Wherefore baptism confers much even upon one *already justified by faith*; because coming to baptism he is borne, like the branch by the dove, within the ark, having been before within in the judgment of God, but being now within in the judgment of the Church.”^s

^s “Solet etiam quæri de his qui jam sanctificati spiritu cum fide et charitate ad baptismum accedunt, quid eis conferat baptismus. Nihil enim eis videtur præstare, *cum per fidem et contritionem jam remissis peccatis justificati sunt*. Ad quod sane dici potest, eos quidem per fidem et contritionem justificados, i. e. a macula peccati

In this statement it is first assumed that adults who have faith and love are regenerate before baptism. They come to baptism already justified, *jam justificati*; and justification, as the *res sacramenti* of baptism,⁹ is identical with regeneration. This assumed, however, the statement proceeds to combine with this truth, the reservation of something still for baptism to confer; which further advantage is pronounced to consist first in visible Church membership, and next in an *addition* made to the inward state. Was he clean before? he is now cleaner. Had he faith? he has now more faith. Had he virtues? they are now increased. But while *additions* are left to be conferred in baptism, the truth is still assumed, as one of general consent, that the *res sacramenti* of baptism is possessed by believing adults before baptism. Nor can the position laid down in this statement be distinguished in any substantial respect from that which the divines of the Reformation maintained on the same subject. The divines of the Reformation maintained that the faithful adult was regenerate before baptism;¹ while at the same time they

pergatos et a debito æternæ poenæ absolutos; et tamen adhuc teneri satisfactione temporali, qua poenitentes ligantur in Ecclesia. Cum autem baptismum percipiunt, et a peccatis quæ interim post conversionem contraxerunt, mundantur, et ab exteriori satisfactione absolvuntur; et adjutrix gratia omnisque virtus in eo augetur, ut vere novus homo tunc dici posset. Fomes quoque peccati in eo amplius debilitatur. Ideo Hier. dicit quod fides quæ fideles facit, in aquis baptismi datur vel nutritur: quia non habenti aliquando illi datur, et jam habenti ut plenius habeat datur. Sic et de aliis intelligendum est. Qui ergo mundus accedit ibi fit mundior, et omni habenti ibi amplius datur . . . Multum ergo confert baptismus etiam *jam per fidem justificato*; quia accedens ad baptismum quasi ramus a columba portatur in arcam; qui ante erat judicio Dei, sed nunc etiam judicio ecclesiæ intus est." Lib. iv. distinct. 4, s. 6.

⁹ See p. 115.

¹ "Divines of the Anglican school have also not scrupled to use the same language. 'Ablution is not the *cause*, but only the sign

were perfectly willing to admit the increase, *auctio*, of the Divine gift, in the sacrament.²

Lombard then comes to the question, "*Cujus rei baptismus, qui datur jam justo, sit sacramentum;*" and he settles it in the same way, viz. that, though there is an increase of grace given at the time and baptism is a sign of this increase, the grace of justification, that grace which is the *res sacramenti* of baptism, is possessed before, and baptism is the sign and seal of this preceding grace,— "*Sacramentum rei quæ præcessit, i. e. remissionis ante per fidem datæ.*" "*Nec mireris,*" he adds, "*rem aliquando præcedere sacramentum, cum aliquando etiam longe post sequatur.*"³

The doctrinal assumption of Lombard, that the justification of the faithful adult precedes baptism, was accepted by a whole line of commentators on the Sentences, and by the most distinguished divines of the mediæval Church. Aquinas acquiesces in it as being a decision "*de baptismo eorum qui prius rem sacramenti acceperant,*" and asserts that the believing adult is before baptism a member of Christ spiritually—*mentaliter*; to be made one corporally and sacramentally in baptism.⁴ "One who is justified," says Durandus, "by the baptism of the Spirit is still bound to receive the baptism of water, not for the sake of remedy, which he does not need, but on account of the Divine precept, and to supply that which is sacramental and outward. . . . For baptism was instituted not only for a

of the spiritual grace which is conferred at baptism; and the spiritual grace is *a consequence of that faith and repentance* which must precede the ablution.'" Bp. Marsh's Second Letter to Simeon, p. 9.

² Note 22.

³ Lombard, lib. iv. distinct. 4, s. 7.

⁴ "*Adulti prius credentes in Christum ei incorporantur mentaliter; sed postmodum cum baptizantur ei quodammodo corporaliter, scilicet per visibile sacramentum.*" Sum. Theol. P. 3, Q. 69, A. 5. Also In Lomb. iv. 4.

remedy against sin, but also for public utility.”⁵ Bradwardine asserts “the justification of adults before the baptism of water, by the baptism of repentance, and the baptism of the Spirit through faith.”⁶ Bellarmine maintains as an established truth, that “adults are by faith and contrition justified before they come actually to the sacrament,” and explains their case as analogous to that of the fathers of the old law, who received their justification by the instrumentality of faith.⁷

These admissions in the case of believing adults, were elicited by the plain force of moral principle. No goodness of fallen man can indeed be pleasing and acceptable to God without a Mediator, nor indeed without a Mediator can this goodness be attained and exist; but a Mediator supposed, and man supposed to have attained to goodness and holiness, the moral nature of the Deity requires that when this character is presented to Him, He must regard it with an absolute favour, which arises immediately upon

⁵ “Justificatus baptismo Flaminis adhuc tenetur baptizari baptismo fluminis, non propter remedium quo non indiget, sed propter præceptum divinum et ut suppleatur in eo quod sacramentale est et exterius in ritu baptismi, et interius in collatione characteris. Baptismus enim institutus est non solum in remedium personæ contra culpam, sed etiam propter utilitatem publicam et conformitatis membrorum ecclesiæ.” Durandus in Lomb. p. 303.

⁶ “Quis non profitetur Concilium Nicenum, ‘Confiteor unum baptisma in remissionem peccatorum?’ Multi tamen adulti ante baptismum aquæ seu fluminis, in baptismo Flaminis credendo in Christum, et in baptismo pœnitentiæ a peccatis omnibus sunt mundati.” De Causa Dei, p. 414.

⁷ “Hoc est discrimen inter sacramenta legis veteris et novæ, quod nostra conferunt gratiam, illa solum eam significabant. Non autem est consequens Veteres Patres non habuisse gratiam, aut habuisse sine organo applicante Christi merita. Nam etiamsi non habuerunt eam per sacramenta, tamen habuerunt per fidem. Sicut nunc adulti per fidem et contritionem veram justificantur antequam reipsa ad sacramentum accedant.” De Effectu Sacramentorum, l. 2, c. 13.

the existence of the character, and therefore cannot wait for the accident of an external rite. It is true the renewed man is still under an obligation to obey positive ordinances of Divine appointment, the voluntary neglect of which is therefore contrary to the original supposition of his goodness; but such ordinances cannot make any substantial change in his condition, as in God's sight. No new type or mould of the inner man is bestowed upon such a person in baptism, because he is already formed upon that new pattern.

Should such an admission as this be regarded by some as too great a modification of the doctrine of baptismal grace, it should be borne in mind what extreme importance attaches to moral considerations, lying as these do at the bottom of the whole evidence of religion. We should be careful not to let our estimate of sacraments betray us into any collision with these. Religious truth is too complex indeed to admit of such a supremacy being given to the doctrine of sacramental efficacy, as that all other considerations must give way to bringing out this one truth; which we must rather be content to hold as a limited and modified principle, adjusting it to sound and reasonable claims from other quarters.

It only remains now that this language of the Schools with reference to the regeneration of adults in baptism, should be considered in connexion with a certain prominent part of the baptismal language of the Reformation divines.

There were two positions which were maintained by the divines of the Reformation in relation to the regeneration of infants in baptism, which though one of them had led practically to the other, were still two distinct positions. One was that faith must be implanted by prevenient grace, in the infant as well as in the adult, before baptism, as the *condition* of his regeneration. The other was that the

existence of this seminal faith in the infant actually *constituted* his regeneration ; and that he had really the new nature before baptism in that very gift of faith, which made him the worthy recipient of baptism ; which when received was only the seal of a sonship justification and adoption already possessed. In the first, then, of these two positions, the Reformation divines received no support from the Schools. The Schools only regarded regeneration in baptism as conditional, and requiring antecedent faith, in the case of adults. But the first position of the Reformation divines with respect to the condition of faith in the infant assumed, these divines then received a strong support from the Schools for their second position, viz. that the infant was regenerate and justified before baptism by virtue of this faith. The Schools asserted this of the believing adult : on the assumption, then, of the infant's belief, the Reformation divines had the same right to antedate the infant's regeneration before baptism, that the Schoolmen had to antedate the adult's. An antecedent inward holiness supposed in both, both stood upon the same ground with respect to an antecedent regeneration by virtue of it.

When the divines of the Reformation, then, came to construct their obsignatory theory of baptism, they found the basis of it ready to hand in the Scholastic doctrine of adult baptism. Theirs was indeed a larger and completer scheme, but the foundation was laid for it. They took up the theory which the Schools had confined to adults, and applied it to infants. The Schools drew a sharp line of demarcation between infants and adults as recipients of baptism ; the Reformation divines overthrew this distinction, and reduced both cases to one principle ; but it was a difference about infants as a class of recipients that constituted the difference between the Scholastic and Reformed doctrines of baptism, and

not a difference about the obsignatory theory itself, which in substance preceded the Reformation. The two Schools differed in their application of the doctrine of prevenient grace, one limiting the need of this grace for implanting faith to adults, the other extending it to infants; but both treated the grace which preceded regeneration as regeneration itself. Nor was the difference between the two on the head of regeneration before baptism, but only as to the cases which came under this head.

One result of the present and previous inquiries will be noticed in conclusion, viz. the important latitude and modification which is gained for the traditionary doctrine that regeneration is "*in baptism.*"

The formula or phrase that regeneration is "*in baptism*" appears at first sight to imply that regeneration must always take place at the moment of baptism, and that if it does not take place then, it does not take place at all. This is the meaning which the naked phrase conveys, apart from all comment and interpretation: but when we come to the comment and interpretation by which this phrase has been in fact attended, we find that, in its actual use and acceptance, it by no means contains so rigid a position as the one just mentioned, but allows of very large exceptions to regeneration "*in baptism;*" exceptions, indeed, so large and formal as to amount to counter rules. We observed before, in the case of the Fictus, the admission that the rite of baptism precedes the grace by an indefinite interval in all unbelieving adults; we have now the admission that the grace precedes the rite by an indefinite interval in all believing adults. The result of both admissions taken together was, that no adult whatever was regenerate "*in*" baptism, but always either before or after: if believing, before; if unbelieving, after. The formula then that regeneration is "*in baptism,*" allowed in actual use and acceptance for the exception of the

whole class of adult recipients. It might have been thought indeed beforehand that, though the *subsequence* of the grace to the rite in one whole class of cases was allowed, the theologians of the ante-Reformation period would still have opposed its *precedence*, as apparently contradictory to the relation of cause and effect between the rite and the grace. But in matter of fact the latter concession appears to have been made as easily as the former; Lombard only saying, “Nec mireris rem aliquando (i. e. in the whole class of believing adults) præcedere sacramentum, cum aliquando etiam longe post sequatur, ut in illis qui fide accedunt.”⁸

When divines of the Reformation then applied the same language to infants, whom they sometimes spoke of as regenerate before baptism by virtue of an antecedent implanted faith, and sometimes as regenerate after baptism by virtue of a subsequently obtained faith,⁹ they did not say anything more counter to the formula “*in baptism*” than the Schoolmen had done before them. They only interpreted the formula as open to the same exception, in the case of infants, to which the Schoolmen had treated it as open in the case of adults.¹

Indeed, on so mysterious a subject as the connexion of a spiritual grace with an outward sign, especially with other causes of complication, and different cases arising calling for modifications of doctrine to suit them, we cannot be surprised if the precise coincidence of the sign and the thing signified in point of *time* has given way; and if this formula has from allowing various exceptions,

⁸ L. iv. distinct. 4, s. 7.

⁹ See Note 22.

¹ Even Mr. Gorham's extreme statement, which he elsewhere qualified, that “the filial state is given to the worthy recipient before baptism, not in baptism” (Examination, p. 113), does not appear to be more than Lombard's statement, that the adult is justified by faith before baptism—*jam per fidem justificatus*, applied to the infant.

at last, as we may say, *included* such exceptions, and become a large and general heading, comprehending different relations of precedence and consequence.

This part of the subject has an important bearing again upon the interpretation of baptismal services. The ancient baptismal offices imply in their form that the person, whether adult or infant, is unregenerate up to the moment of baptism, and regenerate immediately upon baptism. But the history of the doctrine of baptism shows that this form of the Baptismal Office does not represent an actual *doctrine* to this effect. First we have it ruled from the very commencement, in the case of the Fictus or unbelieving adult, that baptism may *precede regeneration* by an indefinitely long interval. But the Service in every case asserts that the baptized person is regenerate *then and there*. The character of the Service, then, as speaking doctrinally upon the point of time, altogether breaks down under the pressure of actual received interpretation; the Service saying one thing, and the doctrine of baptism, as ruled in the case of the Fictus, saying another. And it must be observed that the latitude of construction now mentioned as attaching to the *time* of regeneration asserted in the Service, is distinct from and additional to the hypothetical construction of the *fact* of regeneration asserted in the Service, which is in the case of the adult the universally admitted construction.² Again, and on the other hand, we have it laid down in the received Scholastic doctrine of adult

² The case of the Fictus involved a double latitude in the construction of the Church's Baptismal Office. First the assertion in the office that he was regenerate had to be construed hypothetically, as made upon the assumption of his faith and repentance; and, secondly, the assertion that he was regenerate *then* had to be interpreted as consistent with a regeneration coming *subsequently* upon the fulfilment of conditions.

baptism, that regeneration, or justification, which was the term then more in use in theology, may *precede baptism* by an indefinitely long interval; whereas the form of the Baptismal Service assumes that every person is *unregenerate* up to the moment of baptism. The character of the Service, then, as speaking doctrinally upon the point of time, again breaks down under the pressure of actual authorized interpretation; and we find now that the form of service is consistent with the person being regenerate *before* baptism, as we found above that it was consistent with his being regenerate not till *after* baptism. Upon the point of time, then, the Service is not doctrinal, and the *declaration* of the fact of regeneration *upon* baptism allows for its *existence* either before baptism, or not till after baptism. The history of the doctrine of baptism is a comment upon the Church's ritual language, and a comment which fixes this latitude of construction upon it.

Nor was it more than the application of the same liberty to another case, when divines of the Reformation treated the language of the Baptismal Office as open to the same interpretation in the case of infants. The position of these divines was that the new nature was not conferred upon the infant in the actual instant of baptism, but antecedently in that gift of implanted faith which he had before baptism, and of which the sacrament was the seal; and they interpreted the Baptismal Service with a latitude in harmony with this position, regarding the *declaration* of the fact of regeneration upon baptism, as consistent with its *existence* before baptism. But this interpretation in the case of infants no more violated the natural meaning of the Service, than the same interpretation did in the case of adults; for the apparent assumption that the person is unregenerate up to the moment of baptism, is, and always has been, exactly the same, in

Baptismal Offices, in the case of infants and of adults. The Baptismal Service, then, had already contracted a latitude of construction on this point, before it came under Reformation comment and treatment; and the divines of that epoch only copied and extended a precedent which had been handed down to them from the Schools.

CHAPTER X

REGENERATION OF INFANTS IN BAPTISM

THE Scriptural sense of the term “regenerate” having been decided in a previous chapter, the question arises whether, in this sense, viz. that of actual goodness, the term can legitimately be applied to all baptized infants.

The notion then may, I think, at once be set aside as altogether untenable, that infants just born can be pious and virtuous agents; but though this is impossible from the immaturity of nature, it may still be asked whether they are not capable of possessing actual¹ goodness and holiness in some sense and manner. It is true, it may be said, adults alone come under consideration in Scripture, and therefore the regenerate state in Scripture is described as the goodness of the adult, the goodness of actual life and conduct. But are we debarred on that account from giving the term an application to infants, in some way and manner, corresponding to the difference in the stage of life, and in proportion with an incipient and embryo reason?

I answer that if this claim is conceded, we must still take care that in transferring the term from the adult to the infant, we do not reduce its sense below the Scriptural one, and altogether alter the meaning of the word. We must only make such difference in its application to the infant,

¹ I use the word *actual* throughout this treatise only to express goodness itself, as distinguished from the capacity for it: not, of course, as implying action.

as is required by the difference of his condition; and not under colour of consulting the capacity of the recipient, totally change the nature of the gift.

1. An infant is not regenerate in the sense of being actually good, if he has only a new capacity for goodness implanted in him at baptism. A faculty or capacity for attaining goodness is a totally different thing from goodness, the power altogether a distinct thing from the fact. It matters not by what name we call such a new spiritual faculty. A "new nature" in the sense only of new implanted faculties and capacities, does not constitute a being actually good. The inhabitation of the Holy Spirit, as a prompting and assisting Divine influence within the soul, does not make that soul actually good. The inward impulse to good which exists in man by nature, does not make him morally good; no more does the peculiar and higher impulse under the Gospel make him spiritually good. By no exaltation, then, of the rank or magnitude of a new spiritual faculty, as a faculty, can we make that faculty to be actual goodness; otherwise the most abominably vicious man may be simultaneously a virtuous man; for the most depraved person may possess in the lowest depth of his guilt and pollution, the capacity for the very highest form of goodness.

2. An infant is not made actually good in baptism, if he is only freed from the guilt of original sin; because the cessation of the imputation of sin does not constitute goodness, which is a positive quality, and consists in a good moral character or habit; not possessing which he would be, notwithstanding such remission of original sin, in a morally neutral and indeterminate state.²

3. An infant is not made good in baptism by being admitted into a new federal state or covenant with God;

² See Chapter iv.

because this federal state, so far as divines explain it, is only a combination of the two states just mentioned, viz. forgiveness of sin, and the opportunity, by means of the enabling grace of God, of attaining salvation.

It may be suggested, however, that there still remains a mode in which the infant may be made actually good in baptism, viz. by what is called *implanted character*.³ Implanted character is represented as more than a *faculty* for attaining a particular character, and yet not that character in *full* existence and literal operation, i. e. as a seminal or rudimental character—like implanted reason which is *in* the infant, but only in a latent, unconscious, and incipient stage.⁴ It may be said that in ordinary life we recognize what we call “natural character,” i. e. a certain original moral conformation belonging to the individual from his birth, and coming out with the advance of his reason; that in the same way the Christian or spiritual character may be implanted in an infant at baptism, and that the infant endowed with this character is regenerate in the Scriptural sense of the word.

If infants then can be regenerate at all in baptism in the Scriptural sense, implying actual goodness, they only can be in this sense just mentioned, this qualified and accommodated sense of actual goodness—accommodated to their special case; i. e. by having actual goodness in a rudimental and seminal form, or a seminal character or habit implanted in them in baptism. And therefore the alternative lying between this kind of regeneration, or none at all for them in the Scriptural sense, the question

³ I use *character* in the common English sense.

⁴ “The reasonable soul is infused so soon as the body of an infant is organized and made capable of such an inhabitant: yet it doth not presently act, or enable the infant to act rationally so soon as it is infused So is it in the spiritual being.” Burgess on Bapt. Reg. of Infants, p. 265.

is whether *all* infants are regenerated in this way in baptism.

On this question, then, I need hardly call attention, in the first place, to this inevitable result, that *if* this implanted character does universally accompany infant baptism, it must show itself in those infants as they grow up, and show itself in all of them, coming out with the advance of their reason and faculties. Only waiting the growth of nature, it must manifest itself as nature opens out, and manifest itself in the ordinary way in which character is wont to do. It may not be necessary, indeed—though we may easily make too free with such a supposition, when as a matter of fact “implanted character” is so rarely lost—it may not be necessary that such implanted goodness should, *having* come out, always continue: because goodness, even if implanted, may require the concurrence of free will to sustain it, and therefore may in course of time, for want of this attention, be lost. But even granting this, before it is lost, it must have appeared, and appeared as the character of the man.

Let us take the case, already referred to, of what we call a “natural” character. It is commonly considered that certain moral tempers are natural in some persons, or belong to them from their birth, that one man is naturally meek and gentle, another zealous, another brave, and so on. But what is the test of the fact of such tempers having been implanted? Evidently their actual appearance in the individual. Nobody would think of talking of a natural temper in a man, which temper however had never come out and never been seen. The exhibition of it by the individual is essential to the fact of its original implanting. In the same way it would be absurd to speak of spiritual goodness, or the Christian character having been implanted in those in

whom, as they grew up, this character never came out and became apparent.

What impediment is there which can be supposed in the case, such as can be accepted as a valid reason for the non-appearance of this character in those in whom it has been by the hypothesis implanted, as those persons grow up and show character of some sort or other? Have they lost it by unseen internal wrong acts *before* they have had the opportunity of showing it outwardly? Such a supposition would be absurd, because as the infant becomes a moral agent, and becomes capable of inward action, he also becomes capable of *outward*. The character, then, is by the supposition in him, and before anything can have intervened to suppress that character, he acts, he reveals himself, he expresses what is in him. Why does he not express, why does he not act according to that character? His own action could alone destroy that implanted character, if it was in him, and therefore that character is necessarily in him up to the moment that he *begins* to act; and therefore that same character must be in him simultaneously with his *first* action, and expression of himself; and therefore that same character must come out and manifest itself *in* that first general behaviour, manifest itself on the whole. Till he is a moral agent he can have done nothing to counteract this character, still less to suppress and extinguish it; as soon as he *is* a moral agent he shows it. Where is the interval then between the point up to which this character is by the hypothesis secure, and the point at which it becomes, if it exists, visible, in which this character can be effaced and destroyed? There is in the very nature of things no such interval; and therefore it is impossible that a certain positive character and temper should have been implanted in the infant by a Divine act, and yet that it never should from the first have appeared in him, never come out, and

never have been observed by those who were constantly with him, and watching all his actions, words, and moral symptoms. Such a supposition is plainly absurd and untenable, contrary to every principle of common sense and every rule of evidence.

Were it a case of adults, every one would see immediately how absurd it would be to ascribe a religious and virtuous character to them which never appeared; but infants being the subject, the necessity for expression appears to some to be done away with altogether, because it is *deferred*, and implanted goodness, because it is seminal at the time, seems to entail no manifestation of it either *then* or *ever*. But the law of expression is as certain in the case of the infant as in the case of the adult; its operation only is suspended. The character, if it is there, is not relieved from the necessity of expressing itself when it can, because it was excused from expressing itself before it could. Nor must we try by representing goodness when it is present as *seminal*, and when the time comes for showing itself as *lost*; by excusing first the infant in respect of the future, and then the moral agent in respect of the past, to elude the law of expression altogether, and balk manifestation at both ends. This is the turning-point of the whole case. If persons think that actual goodness can be implanted in infants without any appearance or manifestation of it whatever, earlier or later, either when they are infants and cannot show it, or afterwards as they grow up and can: if they think that this goodness can be, not a suspended disclosure, but a permanent secret, totally passing away and vanishing before one single presentation to human cognizance, then the absence from the very first of all visible signs of such a character will be no proof to them that it has not been implanted, and they will altogether deny the relevance of the test of fact in the matter.

But if, on the other hand, it is admitted that if actual goodness is implanted in an infant at baptism, it must come out and show itself in him as he grows up, then the criterion of fact must apply, and the absence of such appearance be taken as proof against such implantation.

It may be urged, indeed, that an infant may possess actual goodness, not only in the sense of a seminal habit, but also in the sense of a *process* having commenced in him, or a gradual work of the Holy Spirit, by means of which he will one day attain actual goodness; and that such a process begun in him does not require any manifestation of character immediately upon the growth of reason, but only when the character itself is completed, which may be at any time of life near or remote. It appears to me that if the former sense be a fair liberty taken with the actual goodness of Scripture, this latter is a decided strain upon it; because if we allow that an implanted habit, which is ready for action upon physical power and opportunity being given, is present goodness, it is still a different thing to allow that an infant is now good because the process of the *formation* of such a habit has commenced in him, which may not be completed till after a whole adult life of sin. Provided, however, this process is an infallible one and the issue certain, it may be granted that, in an incorrect and metaphorical sense, he may be called good now as being so to the Divine prescience; because we represent God as regarding things as they are in their end, and this end as already present to the Divine eye. But if this sense of actual goodness is allowed, it must be remembered that it is so only on the condition that the issue is certain, because the future fact must be first supposed and assumed in order to be antedated. There can be no pretence for calling a being actually good, who is neither good now nor can give any guarantee that he ever will be. And

if this condition is granted, then exactly the same criterion of fact decides whether this *process* has begun in all baptized infants, which decides whether the habit has been implanted in them. Because in that case all baptized infants must at any rate become good men, if they live, at some stage of life or other, early or remote. Indeed this infallible process is what the Calvinist places in the elect.

It is, indeed, common to say that a “seed” of goodness is implanted in all infants in baptism, but that it is not necessary that this seed should produce fruit; but a seed that need not produce fruit is not actual goodness, but only a metaphorical name for an implanted faculty. If this “seed” is in any sense actual goodness, it must, whether as a seminal character or the beginning of an infallible process, *produce* actual goodness; and then the test of visible fact is what must decide whether this seed has been implanted.⁵

The test then of the character having been implanted,

⁵ The “implanted goodness” about which the question is raised in this chapter is identical with the “infused habit,” or *habitualis gratia* of the Schools, discussed in Chapter vii. The “infused habit” of the Schools was a seminal character or disposition which was implanted in the infant at baptism; and it got the name of *habitualis gratia*, or habit of grace, because it was an elementary habit implanted by grace. The Schoolmen decided against the whole evidence of facts, which they met by the evasions and refinements noticed in Chapter vii., that this habit of goodness was implanted in all infants in baptism.

The Calvinists of the Reformation adopted the *habitualis gratia* or *habituale principium gratiæ*, of the Schools, in the sense however, not of an implanted *habit*, but the commencement of a *process*, or course of operation on the part of the Holy Spirit, which continued till the individual *reached* the habit of goodness, which might be at any point of life, early or late (see Chapter viii.). They assigned this gift however to the elect only, not to all the baptized.

being the appearance of it in the individual as he grows up, does this character, as a matter of fact, appear in every baptized infant as he grows up? Or do we not rather, as a plain matter of fact, see the greatest mixture in every rising Christian generation; some exhibiting a religious character, and others—the majority it must be said—not doing so? Indeed, if, side by side with the supposition of an actual goodness universally implanted in baptism, we place the real state of the case, what an unaccountable annihilation have we of an immense spiritual formation,—not, be it observed, destroyed by neglect, but never once apparent,—gone for ever, before it to human eye existed, and extinguished before the first perceptible dawn of moral agency. What an unmeaning, absurd, and incredible abortion have we here!—a whole world of character annihilated before it has begun, and a whole moral creation effaced before all visible moral action.

What a peculiar stamp again would, upon this supposition, be impressed upon all want of religion among Christians. All want of religion in people who had been baptized would, according to this supposition, be a *fall* from previous individual piety and virtue, and would present itself to us in that aspect. But do we look upon it as such? It is true that, as a race, we are fallen from our first estate in paradise; and it is true that we are all personally fallen from the natural innocence of infancy, in the sense that we are guilty of sins from which the immaturity of infancy saved us; but that, as distinct from these two changes, the common run of sinfulness in Christians is a fall from a previously spiritual and gracious character, is obviously untrue, and such an aspect of it is plainly artificial.

There is nothing, then, in the facts of the world around us, to show that a seminal character or habit of goodness

may not be implanted in *some* infants at baptism; but to maintain that it is implanted in all is to maintain something which does altogether contradict plain facts. But such being the case, all infants are not regenerate in baptism in the Scriptural sense; for the Scriptural sense implies actual goodness, and this actual goodness can only by possibility be possessed by infants in the shape of this seminal and implanted goodness. Senses short of the Scriptural one do not indeed involve any collision with facts, because an implanted faculty, simple remission of original sin, admission to a covenant, involve no phenomenon of goodness as the consequence, and therefore provoke no challenge of this kind. But if we take the word in its Scriptural sense, the application of it to all baptized infants incurs this test and is plainly contradicted by the facts of our experience.

What are the objections, then, to this conclusion, in the silence of Scripture on the whole subject? Did Scripture assert indeed the regeneration of all infants in baptism, this conclusion would place us in opposition to an assertion of Scripture. But, inasmuch as Scripture nowhere asserts or implies this, if *we* assert it, when we cannot reconcile the assertion with the Scriptural sense of regeneration, the difficulty is of our own making.

1. But it will be said in the first place that we must not test the truth of a mysterious Divine act in a sacrament by its "visible fruits." But where a Divine act is defined in its very nature to be such as that "visible fruits" must proceed from it, if it has really taken place, this is a reasonable and a necessary test to apply. It is no presumptuous objection of rationalism, but it is the natural criterion of the existence of the Divine act in question. The test of "visible fruits" is one which we cannot indiscriminately condemn as inapplicable to *all* Divine acts as such; it depends on the nature of the act

whether this test properly applies to it or not. Were the Divine act one of implanting a spiritual faculty only, such a test would be an impertinent and irrelevant one, because the existence of the faculty is consistent with the total neglect of it by the individual, and therefore with the absence of all visible fruits. But the act in question being that of implanting a character, this test does properly and necessarily apply to it, for if the character had been implanted it would have shown itself, i. e. there would have been visible fruits.

2. The ground of mystery will be appealed to against the test of fact; the argument being that regeneration is too mysterious a thing for such an argument to be founded upon its meaning. To that extent, however, to which a state is clearly described in Scripture, in language addressed to our natural understanding, such a state is not a mystery to us, but a thing known; and it is an illegitimate use of the ground of mystery to employ it to intercept the natural argument from such plain meaning of Scripture where we have it. Regeneration is plainly described in Scripture as a state of actual goodness, and if it is described as such, we have a right in deciding the existence of regeneration, to apply those tests by which we ascertain the existence of actual goodness.

3. This objection of fact again to the supposition of the universal regeneration of infants at baptism, will be met with the answer that regeneration is a "*past act*," which is not interfered with by any amount or duration of subsequent wickedness in the individual who has undergone it. Much stress is laid upon this distinction, and it is observed that in the passages in the New Testament in which the Divine act of regenerating is directly or indirectly referred to, the verb which expresses it is put in a past tense in the original, though our translation does

not give it so; thereby showing, it is said, that regeneration is a past act. But though regeneration, as being a "past act," is quite consistent with a *present* bad character in the individual, it is not consistent with there never having appeared a *former* good one. And it is not the subsequent rise of the bad character which is the objection to be met here, but the previous non-appearance of the good one. The "act" may be past, but if it is of the nature here supposed, we have a right to ask for some fruits of it, present or past.

4. The argument just quoted is sometimes put into the form of a distinction between regeneration as an act, and regeneration as a state. A person, it is said, may not be in the *state* of regeneration, or of actual goodness, and yet the *act* of regeneration implanting such goodness in him, may have passed over him. This is a true distinction, but not at all to the point. Regeneration is doubtless an act of God, as well as a state of man, but the act involves the existence at some time of the state, and the state, even if it has ceased now, still involved visible fruits before its termination.

5. The test of fact again is met by the answer that this implanted goodness is not indefectible. It has been lost, we are told, and that accounts for your not seeing it now. Yes, but before we talk of it being lost, let it first be ascertained that it was ever had. The objection of fact which is here raised is no Calvinistic one; it is based upon no peculiar theory of grace, and indeed upon no theory whatever; but upon the simple and plain ground of common sense that if a character has been implanted in an individual, it must somehow or other appear and show itself. In the case of what we call a natural character, or a character implanted by nature, we make it necessary that it should come out, and if it never comes out, then we say it has not been implanted. And on the same prin-

ciple, if a character has been implanted in a man by grace, that character must come out, and if it never comes out, then we must say that it never has been implanted.

6. The loss, however, asserted under the last head, of all this once existing goodness, is sometimes explained and defended by the supposition of a *universal early fall*. A particular kind of language is in use in some quarters, which assumes a universal early lapse from baptismal goodness. But what is it which is meant by this language? In the first place, it is not the fall of the *race* from *original* righteousness, but a universal *personal* fall from *baptismal* goodness, which is asserted. But if we examine the different meanings in which this assertion can be understood,—for writers are not very clear in it,—we shall find that there is either some confusion in the idea of baptismal goodness, or a mistake in the fact that there has been such an universal lapse from this goodness. Do they mean to assert the loss of the natural innocence of infancy? The loss is true, but the thing lost is no result of baptism. Do they mean to assert the loss of a state of pardon resulting from the remission of original sin, in the absence of capacity for actual? If that state has been lost, that state did not constitute goodness.⁶ Lastly, do they mean the loss of an implanted habit or character of goodness? That may be admitted to be goodness; but then that goodness has not been universally lost, because if it had been, it would have appeared as universally *before* the loss.

I may conclude by observing that the whole weight of Anglican authority is against the regeneration of all infants in baptism in the sense of an implantation of actual goodness in them.⁷ Bishop Bethell, who may be

⁶ See Chapter iv.

⁷ Note 23.

taken as a legitimate representative of the English School, pointedly repudiates the idea that any "change of affections or inward feelings, or creation or infusion of moral habits or virtues,"⁸ is implied in baptismal regeneration; and allows that, if it were, the doctrine of the regeneration of all infants in baptism would be untenable, and contrary to experience. "If it were," he says, "a self-evident truth that regeneration is an implantation of a habit of grace, containing in it the habits of all Christian graces and virtues, or that it is a radical change of all the parts and faculties of the soul, it might be absurd to suppose that those infants who, as they grow up, exhibit no signs of spiritual habits or dispositions, have been regenerated in baptism." But, he adds, "that sound masculine theology which our Church has adopted, knows nothing of these speculations, which are inconsistent with Scriptural truth and simplicity, the experience of human nature, and the frame and constitution of the human soul:"⁹ and he defines regeneration as the "potential principle of a new life, independently of its moral operations and legitimate effects," combined with "forgiveness of sin."¹

Bishop Bethell's argument so far differs, then, from my own, that he denies first that regeneration *itself* implies actual goodness, even in its true and Scriptural sense, in which I think he is mistaken; and secondly, that he appears to assert that the implantation of the actual habit of goodness in the creature by Divine grace, is "contrary to the frame and constitution of the human soul;" in which also I think him mistaken;² but his argument entirely

⁸ Treatise on Regeneration, p. 165. Pref. p. 30.

⁹ Ibid. 124, 127.

¹ Ibid. 120.

² Bp. Bethell, as a disciple of the Fathers, could hardly have remembered when he laid down this principle, that the Fathers always represent Adam as *created in goodness*, i. e. as commencing existence with the habit already created in him.

agrees with that of this chapter upon the question of fact which is at issue in it, viz. whether regeneration in the sense of actual goodness is conferred upon all infants in baptism; deciding positively that it is not, and that it would be contrary to experience to assert that it was.³

³ Another authority on this subject, Mr. Davison, in arguing for the universal regeneration of infants in baptism, is also particular in telling us in what sense he understands the word in this assertion; that he does not “conceive of regeneration as either inducing a present habit of moral holiness, or as determining the formation of it afterwards”—as “including the conversion of the man to Christian principles in act or habit,” but as “a state of grace, with promise of pardon for sin, and aid of heavenly power.” Remains, pp. 323, 346, 327.

CHAPTER XI

SECONDARY AND INCORRECT SENSES OF REGENERATION

WE have only dealt hitherto with the true sense of the term *regenerate*, but the term in the hands of theologians contracted, in course of time, secondary and incorrect senses, which deserve attention. By a secondary sense I mean a sense which, while it claims a right of use, professes to *be* a secondary and not the true sense; by an incorrect sense I mean a sense which is incorrect, with the profession of being true. I will take these two classes of untrue senses in order, and first notice the secondary senses of the term.

1. A technical or conventional sense of *regenerate* early grew up in the Church, according to which it simply stood for the visible fact of being baptized, as where it was said that Constantine was regenerated, and Constantius was not regenerated, and the like. Whether or not such a sense rose out of the recognized language of supposition in use in the New Testament, according to which all the baptized were presumed to be regenerate in heart and life, it is of common use in early writings. It is well known that this term was in Jewish use before it was adopted by the new dispensation, and that as a Jewish term it contracted a technical meaning, and stood for the admission of a proselyte, which took place by baptism. "The common phrase," says Wall, "was to call the baptism of a proselyte his regeneration or new birth."¹ It

¹ Oxford Ed. vol. i. p. 31.

contracted the same conventional sense in the Christian Church, which “appropriated,” as Wall says, “the word regeneration as much to signify baptism as we do the word christening,”² i. e. as a convertible term for it.

2. A tendency existed in the Cyprianic and Donatist controversies to create a use of the term “regenerate” in a secondary sense, as standing for the baptismal *character*. The nature of the baptismal character has been explained in a previous chapter,³ viz. that it is a certain universal and irremoveable effect of baptism, belonging to it as a sacrament which can only be administered once, and does not admit of repetition,—a title which it confers once for all upon every baptized person to the grace of the sacrament, upon fulfilling the conditions; admitting him to the grace upon subsequent fulfilment, even when he did not receive it at the time he was baptized from the absence of fulfilment; and reinstating him in the grace upon the return of fulfilment, even when he has lost it by the cessation of fulfilment. It was this conditional *title* to grace as distinguished from grace itself. When this particular effect of baptism was brought out prominently, as it was by the controversies just mentioned, various names were employed to denote and express it—*integritas sacramenti*—*veritas sacramenti*—*visibilis sanctificatio*, and others. St. Augustine, however, occasionally goes further, and though he never calls it regeneration, applies to it terms somewhat like and parallel. The Church, he says, “brings forth all by baptism—*omnes per baptismum parit*—either out of her own womb or out of another’s,”⁴ i. e. in her own or a schismatical communion. Even a schismatical communion produces sons—*generat filios*—by baptism, though not *as* schismatical, but as having a bond of union with the true Church, “non ex hoc generat unde

² Vol. i. p. 59.

³ Chapter iii.

⁴ De Bapt. contra Donat. l. i. c. 15.

separata est," but "ex hoc unde conjuncta est."⁵ When wicked men receive baptism within the Church, *the Church brings them forth* as Rebecca brought forth Esau; when they receive baptism outside of the Church they are "*generated* in God's people from Sarah, but through Agar, —tales in Dei populo *generantur* Sara quidem, sed per Agar."⁶ Here baptism in a state of sin and in a state of schism, in neither of which cases the regenerating grace of it is received, is still spoken of as a kind of spiritual birth; though, in the nature of the case, this is using the expression in a secondary sense, inasmuch as in its true sense it necessarily implies present grace.⁷

⁵ De Bapt. contra Donat. l. i. c. 10.

⁶ Ibid. c. 16.

⁷ The establishment of the validity of schismatical baptism has been supposed to have a tendency in the direction of ecclesiastical comprehensiveness. It only admits however the spiritual instrumentality of a schismatical communion on one point, viz. the bestowal of the baptismal character; this is an effect which distinctly stops short of grace; and it is the being a channel of grace which decides that a communion belongs to the Church. Augustine says, "*Ecclesia omnes per baptismum parit, sive apud se, sive extra se.*" This implies *some* common ground between schismatical bodies and the Church, but not such a common ground as makes them parts of the Church. He allows a common baptismal character; but this does not test a Church, because it is not grace. When the baptized person has abandoned his state of schism, his baptism operates as an instrument of grace, but not before, *because* the communion in which he was before was *not* part of the Church. Thus the same law of baptism which implied something in common between schismatical bodies and the Church, implied also complete separation in the ecclesiastical sense, i. e. that the former were not parts of the Church. St. Augustine, it is true, calls the Donatists "brethren"—"*Fratres nostri estis,*" but not in the sense of their belonging to the Church, which he guards specially against, but of confessing one Christ—"unum Christum confitemur, *in uno corpore, sub uno capite esse debemus.*" (In B. 32.) Any common ground of whatever kind, and to whatever extent, is, of course, *so far* union, and sometimes favours, and has a tendency to promote that point of view; and Augustine's language is evidently affected

3. The term regenerate is used in a secondary sense by the Calvinistic School. Generally preferring to understand the regeneration co-extensive with baptism as hypothetical, the Calvinists of the Reformation still acknowledged a universal literal "*sacramental* regeneration," or regeneration *sacramento tenus*, in baptism.

Under this head, however, we may notice the more subtle and higher secondary sense which the modified Calvinism of Ward and Davenant devised for the term. These two divines diverged from the established language of the School, so far as to construct a regeneration which consisted simply in remission of original sin, *unaccompanied* by sufficient grace for the *future* life of the individual. The object of which distinction was to give them a ground for calling baptism in some sense beneficial to *all* infants, even to the non-elect, in opposition to the ordinary Calvinistic view, which limited the benefit to the elect.

Ward and Davenant maintained this sense of "regenerate," in its application to all infants, as being the *Augustinian* sense of the term in that application. And this interpretation of Augustine is favoured by his language so far as this,—that the anti-Pelagian treatises, which are the chief repository of Augustinian testimony to infant regeneration and furnish the principal supply of *catenæ*, are occupied with regeneration exclusively in the light of remission of original sin. The object of these treatises is to prove the existence of original sin against

by the consideration of the common ground involved in the law of baptism. The primary motive however to this strong defence of the validity of schismatical baptism was not that of ecclesiastical comprehensiveness, so much as that of the security of baptism; which it was necessary to vindicate by relieving it of impediments, and reducing it to as simple a test as possible—the matter and the words; so as not to expose people, when baptism could not be repeated, to doubt and uncertainty as to the validity of their own baptism.

the Pelagian who denied it, and for this object the writer insists constantly on the Catholic practice of infant baptism; the argument being that baptism conveyed remission of sin, that therefore infants received remission of sin in baptism, that infants, however, had not personal sin to be remitted, that therefore the sin which was remitted in their case must be original. This being the exclusive object then of the anti-Pelagian treatises, the argument of these treatises has only to do with regeneration in the aspect of remission of original sin. Nor is it concerned with this grace as connected with power for the future, but only as forgiveness of the past; for though we naturally associate the two together, still remission of the past does not in the bare idea of it involve power for the future, and to be freed from the guilt of original concupiscence is not the same thing with being enabled to conquer the growing strength of it. So that the prominent sense in which regeneration figures in the anti-Pelagian treatises is a partial and incomplete one, representing one side only of the gift to the exclusion of the other.

But this whole contrivance of Ward and Davenant was in truth but a verbal artifice without solid meaning. These divines were rigid Calvinists at the bottom, who could not, in consistency with their own system, afford a *true* regeneration to all baptized infants; the majority of whom they regarded as cut off, by an eternal decree antecedent to all action of their own, from the possibility of attaining salvation. The benefit thus conferred then upon non-elect infants was a benefit in name only; for the remission of original sin, if it is taken in its natural connexion as accompanied by admission generally to the favour of God and His enabling grace, is a benefit undoubtedly; but if it is artificially separated from these, what possible advantage can it be to a man to be forgiven his original

sin, if he is certain to be eternally punished for his actual,⁸ which he has not the power given him to avoid? If the non-elect, as Dr. Ward admits, “*never come to be justified by a true and lively faith, nor ever are by that bond mystically united to Christ,*”⁹ i. e. if, inasmuch as uniformity proves a *law*, this state is *unattainable* by them, the remission of original sin in such a case becomes a mere barren theological technicality. This “*temporary ordination to life without the benefit of election,*”¹ was perfectly useless for the purpose of salvation, if election was *necessary* for that purpose, and these divines held firmly that it was.

The baptismal scheme, then, of these two divines, though it has been sometimes referred to² as evidence that Calvinism can be held consistently with the true regeneration of all infants in baptism, proves no such conclusion; because the regeneration which was made co-extensive in this scheme with infant baptism, was not

⁸ Ward and Davenant had, as Calvinists, to meet the objection that, inasmuch as some of the baptized body perished finally, by allowing remission of original sin to all the baptized, they allowed a grace which was *lost*;—a concession which was against the Calvinistic doctrine of the indefectibility of grace. They replied that the non-elect always retained the forgiveness of their original sin, and were only condemned on account of their actual. “*Etsi asseram parvulos non-electos et finaliter perituros a reatu originalis peccati baptismo liberari, atque adeo justificari; tamen simul assero taliter justificados nunquam excedere ab illa justitia, nec in id quod remissum est recedere, nec in originali peccato damnari, sed propter postrema crimina morte affici.*” *Vindiciæ Gratiæ Sacramentalis*, p. 127.

⁹ Parr’s *Life of Usher*, p. 436.

¹ “*Temporanea ordinatio ad vitam absque beneficio electionis.*” Davenantii *Epistola*, p. 13. “*Hæc sola remissio originalis peccati non sufficit ut idem sufficienter ordinetur ad vitam pro statu adulti.*” Ward’s *Determinations*, p. 195.

² Wilberforce’s *Doctrine of Holy Baptism*, p. 268. Dodgson’s *Controversy of Faith*, p. 83.

a regeneration which gave the power to attain salvation ; and therefore it was not a true regeneration. These divines admitted this themselves. They confessed that it differed in *kind* from adult regeneration ;³ and that it was no gift peculiar to the new dispensation, but only the same which circumcision had conferred under the old law.⁴ They maintained everywhere as an impregnable truth, that real regeneration involved in its very nature final perseverance and ultimate salvation, whereas this infantine regeneration was by the supposition a gift which consisted with final reprobation. And, lastly, they called the latter expressly “*regenerationem Sacramentalem parvulis regenerandis idoneam*,”⁵ whereas true regeneration they defined as “*conversionem sive novi cordis creationem, quæ proprie regeneratio dicenda est*.”⁶

From the secondary senses of “regenerate,” which profess to be such, we turn now to an incorrect sense of the term, which has obtained wide acceptance within our own Church, under the profession of being a true and adequate sense.

One true sense of the term “regenerate” has hitherto occupied the ground, descending from the New Testament to the Fathers, from the Fathers to the Schoolmen, and from the Schoolmen to the Calvinistic divines, viz. that

³ “*Nec quæ dicitur regeneratio parvuli est ejusdem speciei cum hac nova creatione, sive spirituali renascentia adultorum.*” *Vindiciæ Grat. Sacr.*, p. 19.

⁴ “*Ipse ritus circumcidendi præputium parvulorum in V. T. a Deo præscriptus Gen. xvii. 10, non obscure innuit imo plane docet ante actum circumcisionis, ubi potest haberi et adhibetur, ipsum reatum originalem manere et parvulis imputari ; et post circumcisionem auferri et non imputari. Id quod pariter pronunciandum de baptismali ablutione ; quæ ibidem denotat ante ablutionem reatum originalem manere et imputari parvulo, post ablutionem auferri, nec amplius imputari.*” *Vindiciæ*, p. 135. Gataker, p. 26, 136.

⁵ *Ep. Dav.*, p. 20.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 8.

implying actual goodness. One difficulty has indeed accompanied this sense, viz. how to reconcile it with the truth of the assertion that all infants are regenerate in baptism; but that difficulty has not as yet affected the sense of the term. The Fathers combine the sense with this baptismal assertion without explanation; the Schoolmen combine the two with a fallacious explanation; the Calvinist retains the sense at the cost of this baptismal assertion.

But now another and a different sense of the term appears for the first time in theology. For ordinary purposes indeed the Anglican School uses the term regenerate in its natural and Scriptural sense, viz. that of actual goodness and conversion of heart. This sense is of regular and familiar occurrence, used with perfect freedom, and without the least apology, as any reader of Hammond, Jeremy Taylor, Bull, South, Beveridge, and Bishop Wilson, may observe for himself. These writers do not only, as has been asserted, occasionally slide into it as a confessed incorrect and informal, or, as it is called, tropological sense; but employ it habitually as its natural, legitimate, and correct one.

But this being the case, how could the term "regenerate" be applied to all baptized infants? The Anglican divines had more respect for antiquity than the Calvinists, and more consideration for facts than the Schoolmen. While they maintained, therefore, the assertion of antiquity that all infants were regenerate in baptism, they could not but see the difficulty of reconciling such an assertion with the plain facts of experience, *if* the term was to continue bearing this sense of actual goodness. The Scholastic theory of infused good habits which need not produce action, was not likely to satisfy the practical judgment and common sense of this School. The Anglican divines then surmounted the difficulty by constructing

a new and special sense of the term “regenerate” as used in connexion with baptism; employing the term, in this connexion, to denote only an implanted *faculty* for the attainment of goodness and holiness,—a capacity to be improved, a power to be cultivated, an assisting grace to be used. “The new birth,” says Hammond, “is not the actual forsaking of sin, for this is the consequent task of him that makes a right use of the grace of baptism. This grace of baptism is the strength of Christ, of supernatural *ability* to forsake sin and live godly. We have in baptism that strength given us by Christ that will *enable* us to get out of a servile and dangerous state.”⁷ “We conceive,” says Thorndike, “the regeneration of infants that are baptized to consist in the habitual *assistance* of God’s Spirit; the effects whereof are to appear in making them *able* to perform that which their Christianity requires at their hands, so soon as they shall understand themselves to be obliged by it.”⁸ It would be easy to quote much more to the same purpose, but the Anglican sense of regeneration in connexion with baptism is too familiar and well known to require large citations; and Bishop Bethell only sums up the ordinary language of the School, when he defines regeneration as the “*potential* principle of a new life, independently of its moral operation and legitimate effects.”⁹

Here then is certainly a new sense of the term “regenerate,” which it has never yet expressly borne in the page of theology. Following the history of the term from its appearance in Scripture to this date, we see only one continuous apparent sense of it as implying actual goodness. It was altogether, then, a new definition of it, to describe it as “a potential principle” only. It was a new

⁷ Practical Catechism, p. 351.

⁸ Laws of the Church, book iii. c. viii. § 25.

⁹ Treatise on Regeneration, p. 120.

arrangement, for which there was no authority hitherto in the language of theology, to construct a special sense of the term "regenerate," as connected with baptism, opposed to its ordinary sense. The Fathers make no distinctions in their application of the term to baptism, as if they cancelled any portion of its ordinary sense in this connexion; they institute no special reduced sense in this connexion; no accommodation to suit a special case. But the Anglican divines using the term ordinarily in its natural sense as implying actual goodness, institute a different sense, in which it stands for a power or capacity only, in connexion with baptism.

Though a secondary sense of "regenerate," then, was not unprecedented, the Anglican *double* sense was an innovation in theology, the term never having been used in two different *true* senses before. And we note the new definition, to suit theological convenience, as we should any new theory or explanation in science or history. Endowed with great sagacity, reasoning power, and reading grasp, the Anglican School has yet not been without failings, one of which has been to invent new meanings of words in Scripture, when they were wanted for theological convenience. Some important Scriptural terms and phrases change their meaning in Anglican use; "Salvation" meaning power to attain salvation; "death to sin," power to forsake sin; "putting on Christ," the power of putting on, and "circumcision in the Spirit" the power of cutting off; "a new creature," one endowed with the power of becoming a new creature; "predestinated to be conformed to Christ's image," predestinated to the power of being conformed to it; and "the elect," those who are admitted to Christian privileges. The great Schools have, under the pressure of the need of theological adjustment, adopted different expedients according to their respective characters; and the practical sagacity of

the Anglican School preferred the awkward apparatus of a double sense of regeneration to a collision with the facts of experience, which the compact but bold Scholastic theory of baptismally "infused" goodness seriously challenged.

But while the Anglican divines institute a new sense of "regenerate," they use it with considerable scruple and hesitation as to its *being* a true sense; and wield the theological instrument of their own contriving, with a divided and faltering arm. Those whose peculiar task leads them to compare these two senses together, and distinguish the rank of the two, do not scruple to speak of the former of these two as the true sense, and the latter as a secondary one. Bishop Nicholson, for example, explains the synonym for regenerate or child of God,—the term "member of Christ," as having two senses, "an univocal" one, in which it applies "to true believers," and an "equivocal" one, in which it applies to all baptized Christians.¹ The same precedence is given to the former sense of the word, in Dr. Mayer's Catechism published under Laud's Primacy, and a book of some authority at that time,—“In our baptism we are sacramentally and instrumentally made the children of God, and really and truly when we are baptized with the Holy Ghost.”

¹ “Christ is the head of the Church, and all Christians the body, of which every one that profeseth the Christian religion is a part, and so to be esteemed. But these parts are of two sorts, first, either *equivocal* parts, so taken and reputed by us, such as are a glass eye or a wooden leg to a man, which are so called, but truly are not such; and whosoever profess the supernatural verities revealed by Christ, and make use of the holy sacraments, may, *in this sense*, be called the members of Christ, because they are reckoned for parts of His visible body. Secondly, of *univocal* parts, that in name and nature are true believers. . . . They are united to Him, live in Him, and are informed by His Spirit. They are washed and *regenerated* by His blood.” Exposition of the Catechism (Ed. Anglo-Catholic Library), p. 13.

Nicholl, in his Commentary on the Book of Common Prayer, though he protests against the "new-fangled" use of the term "regeneration" as change of heart, still involuntarily refers to it as the true meaning of the word. "There have been some very unreasonable exceptions made against this expression (in the Baptismal Service 'that this child is regenerate'), as if all persons who were baptized were *truly* regenerate;" whereas, he says further on, "by being a child of God is not understood one who is a child of God by *spiritual regeneration*, and actual holiness, but one who is a child of God by covenant and adoption." Bishop Bradford's Discourse "on Baptismal and Spiritual Regeneration," showing that the one does not at all imply the other, concedes, by its very title, the point of the *true* meaning of the term, for spiritual can alone be *true* regeneration. A later School of Anglican divinity indeed has exactly reversed this estimate, and claimed for the limited and special sense of the term in connexion with baptism, the *precedence* above the other higher and fuller sense, as if it was the former that was the true original one, and the latter that was the innovation. The sense of actual conversion of heart is stamped as an incorrect and secondary one, into which the word has slid by custom in some quarters, and which, though occasionally met with in the works of sound divines, has to be apologized for. But this is a departure from the older Anglican School, which always uses this sense with perfect freedom as a true one, though it does employ the limited sense in the special case of baptism.

What are we to say then, in conclusion, to the use of a secondary sense of regeneration? The answer is, that there is no reason against it, provided the sense is understood. The preceding chapters have only denied the regeneration of all infants in the *true and Scriptural sense*. Looking simply, however, to the use of the term, there

can be no doubt that it has from very early times been applied to all baptized infants, and that not hypothetically, but literally. Nor is there any objection to continuing this universal literal application of it, provided we are not required to believe that it is used in the Scriptural sense when it is so applied. Such language has an authorized place in theology, held in such senses as the different Schools within the Church can afford, in consistency with their respective principles, to give to it; the Anglican School involving in this universally conferred gift, a real inward power of attaining ultimate holiness and eternal life; the Calvinists, who cannot in agreement with their characteristic tenet afford so much, involving in it admission to all the outward advantages and blessings of the new covenant.

Some cautions, however, should accompany the use of a double sense of the term: for it being evident that the sense in which the term "regenerate" is applicable to *individuals* only, and that secondary sense in which it is applicable to the whole Christian body, being two different and distinct senses of the word, the whole result of one theological treatment of this question has been to confound and identify them; i. e. to insist on the application of the term to the whole baptized body, *in that very sense* in which it is only applicable to individuals. These being two senses have been treated as *one* sense; and a whole peculiar doctrine of baptismal grace has been founded on this artificial unity. The Scholastic doctrine of infused good habits which did not produce action was thus an attempt to retain the sense of actual goodness for the term, and yet to extend it to all baptized infants; and the theory of an universal early personal fall has the same aim, viz. at erecting in the distance an actual goodness as the condition of all once by baptism, though afterwards lost. Both these are attempts to understand

the term in its very highest sense, and to combine with this highest sense an indiscriminate application; to use the term of the whole body in that very sense in which it can only be used of individuals. But if these are, as they plainly are, two different senses, with two different applications, we should apply the term to the body in that sense in which it is applicable to the body, and to individuals in that sense in which it is applicable to individuals, and not insist on the *one* application in the *other* sense.²

Another caution attending a double sense of the term "regenerate" is, that before persons dispute about regeneration in baptism, they should first ascertain the sense in which they respectively use the term. If each side attends to its own sense of the word, not observing that the other takes it in another, the result is that one arguer supposes the other to *deny* the regeneration of all infants in baptism in the *same* sense in which he *affirms* it; whereas, if they compared their respective meanings, the one would find that the other only denies it in a sense in which he would deny it also if he took it *in* that sense.

Attention to this ambiguity will solve with comparative ease questions, about which persons often dispute at great length. Thus, on the question of visible fruits, as the criterion of regeneration, persons may argue for a long time on this question if they do not compare at the

² Dr. Pusey's Tract on Baptism, while its seriousness gave it great practical value, was defective as a doctrinal treatise in this respect, that, while the writer earnestly rejects any other sense of the word "regenerate" than the very highest, or that implying actual goodness, he yet deprecates any less extensive application of the term, than that which includes all baptized infants. This combination of the highest sense with the universal application is nowhere explained in the tract.

outset their respective meanings of the term ; but if they do, surely the solution of it is not difficult. Do we mean by regeneration actual goodness, then visible fruits are the proper and necessary criterion of it ; do we mean only a faculty, then we could not have a more irrelevant test than that of "visible fruits ;" for the existence of the faculty is perfectly consistent with the uniform neglect of it, i. e. with the absence of all "visible fruits."

CHAPTER XII

THE PATRISTIC ASSERTION OF THE REGENERATION OF ALL INFANTS IN BAPTISM

THE great assertion of baptismal regeneration, which runs through antiquity, has at first sight and to a cursory reader a complete unity and wholeness. The language is bold and decided, and it forms upon a distant and general view one undivided mass. But upon a nearer examination this complete wholeness gives way; and just as in a natural landscape some large object that had for many miles appeared a unity, breaks up upon a nearer approach into a group, this one mass of Patristic language divides upon a closer view into different formations and component structures.

We observe first one large formation, which may be called poetical, rhetorical, or hypothetical. I mean that it describes, under the head of regeneration, a state of things which, regarded as the condition of the whole Christian body, is obviously untrue and inconsistent with facts. This whole mass of language describes the regenerate state as righteousness, sanctification, transformation, renovation, purification, salvation, incorruption, deification, eternal life, paradise, and heaven; and such being the sublime and transcendent nature of the state, the whole body of the baptized is spoken of as being in it. Such language is important, as showing that regeneration in the idea of the Fathers involved actual goodness; but so far as it assumes that all the baptized

are in this state, this body of statement can hardly be considered other than hypothetical. We cannot indeed overlook the conspicuous fact of a whole remarkable formation of language, which, commencing in prophecy, adopted by the New Testament, and thence borrowed by the Fathers, has exhibited a certain great community of men, Jewish or Christian, nation or church, in a different light from that of matter of fact. The Prophet describes the Jewish nation as, with all its wanderings and lapses, "the righteous nation;" and as such entering, after the fluctuations of its earthly course, into that final state of peace and glory which constitutes the eternal life of the Old Testament, and forms the closing picture of prophecy. This righteousness and this final reward apply only in strict matter of fact to certain individuals of the nation; but the whole nation is by supposition regarded as being what only certain individuals of it really are. From the Old Testament we come to the New, where we find the same language continued with an application to the existing Christian Church, which is described in somewhat the same terms in which prophecy describes the glorified Jewish nation. From the New Testament we come to the Fathers, who succeed by religious inheritance to the language of the Apostles, and only expand and amplify the style of the Epistles in speaking of the Christian body. We cannot ignore this great stream of hypothetical statement, which, rising in prophecy, flows through the inspired writing of the new dispensation, and is thence received into and carried on in the language of the Fathers.

From this hypothetical body of language we come to a technical or conventional one, which was noticed in the last chapter, in which regeneration is only used as a term for visible baptism.

Putting aside, then, these two formations of language

as no basis upon which a doctrine can be founded, we come to the *doctrinal* language of the Fathers ; and under this head we have first the general statement that regeneration is the grace of baptism ; secondly, the statement that adults are regenerate in baptism upon the condition of faith and repentance ; and thirdly, the statement that all infants are regenerate in baptism. Upon which structure of doctrine I will make the following preliminary remark.

It has been common to identify the whole of the Patristic doctrine on the subject of regeneration, with the particular statement relating to *infant* regeneration ; and to assert that this latter position could not be rejected, but at the cost of overthrowing the *whole* baptismal language of antiquity. But this appears to me an exaggeration of the rank and situation which this particular assertion holds in the general body of the language. This is a particular statement, distinct and separable from the main body of Patristic language, which asserts the grace of the sacrament *generally*, without involving the further point of the reception of that grace by the infant as such. This latter is a subordinate statement,—subordinate to the main doctrine of baptismal regeneration, or the general assertion of the grace of the sacrament. The great mass of language descriptive of the value, loftiness, and majesty of the baptismal gift, which supplies the great proof of the Patristic doctrine of baptismal regeneration, and furnishes the ample magazines of quotations on this subject, is language of a general character, declaratory of a sacrament, and of a grace bestowed in that sacrament, but not specifying recipients. Those high encomiums—as we may call them—of baptism, consisting of ascending successions of great benefits and graces, are all general language. That large structure of typical exposition, which sees

baptism prefigured and foreshadowed in the Deluge, in the passage of the Red Sea, the well of water which was discovered to Hagar in the wilderness, the well out of which Rebecca drew water, the wells which Isaac dug in the valley of Gerar, the water which bore the infant Moses in the ark of bulrushes, the water which gushed out of the rock of Horeb, the sweetened waters of Marah, the water of Jordan in which Naaman washed, is all general language, referring to the virtue of baptism as a sacrament. Indeed it is not irrelevant to bear in mind that a large part of this vast mass of statement, which, as I observe, supplies the proof of the Patristic doctrine of baptism, was constructed under the special contemplation of adult baptism,—a side of the operation of the sacrament in which the grace of it certainly does not appear as at all coincident with the administration of it. It is not too much, perhaps, to say that the main body of language in exaltation of baptism, which the three first centuries produced, was composed with adult baptism specially in the writers' minds. This naturally *would* be the case by the force of circumstances, for the way in which the Church of that period grew and expanded was more by adult conversion, than by births within her; and even with respect to those born within her, infant baptism was by no means universal, even if it was dominant. But the allusions show that this *is* the case. Undoubtedly the Fathers of this period in their baptismal expositions and exhortations make references to infant baptism to prove its legitimacy, and to recommend it,—though often with considerable limitations; but the very manner of reference shows that this side of the administration of the sacrament was not uppermost or even prominent in their thoughts, while they were erecting that imposing fabric of language which so elevates the dignity, mystery, and efficacy of that sacra-

ment. The statement, then, of the regeneration of *all infants* in baptism, has by no means that wide and absorbing position in the Patristic structure which some would attribute to it, nor would it be correct to say that with it the whole baptismal language of antiquity stands or falls. It is one particular assertion inserted in a vast body of general assertion of the virtue of the sacrament; which latter would remain even if *it* were removed. The language of Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory Nyssen, would in the main stand. The substance of the Lectures of Cyril of Jerusalem, and Chrysostom to Catechumens, would not be removed by the withdrawal of an assertion respecting infants.

These observations are not without importance, for it being admitted that the Fathers make the assertion that all infants are regenerate in baptism, it is still not a point irrelevant to the present argument to distinguish the rank and position which this assertion holds in their language: for if the main assertion of the Fathers is a general one, we are able to examine the ground of the particular and subordinate assertion, with less disturbance of their language and authority. Is the Patristic dictum, then, that all infants are regenerate in baptism, an article of the faith? On that question I submit the following considerations.

1. In the first place, then, it must be admitted that this statement is an *advance* upon Scripture; that it cannot be proved by Scripture; and that, therefore, whatever be the concurrence of antiquity in it, it cannot consistently with the rule of the English Church be allowed the rank of an article of the faith. So long as the Fathers confine themselves to the general assertion of the regenerating grace of baptism, so far they only state what is implied in Scripture; but when they go

beyond this general position to erect a fixed class of persons who receive this grace without conditions, i. e. to pronounce upon all infants as recipients of such grace, they plainly exceed the limits of Scripture, and their dictum, therefore, clearly comes within the excluding scope of the canon laid down in our sixth article. The Vincentian rule indeed, if it be carried to the extreme length of saying that every single point, whatever be its intrinsic nature, or rank, or subject-matter, which has, as a matter of fact, obtained early general consent, is an article of the faith, is wholly untenable in reason ; because no valid reason can be alleged why some things, not necessary to Christian belief, may not still have been generally believed in fact. But at any rate, we of the English Church do not acknowledge the Vincentian rule carried to this extent ; nor do we allow the authority of the Fathers, in the silence of Scripture, to establish of itself an article of the faith. Indeed the fact is certain that there are points of belief which do not now obtain general consent in the Church, which yet obtained general consent in the ancient Church.¹

2. But in the next place, even taking the ground of antiquity alone, the most serious defects attach to the general position of this statement, as regards its claim to be considered an article of the faith.

This statement appears in no creed, and has never been asserted by any General Council.² But whatever may be said of articles of faith existing in the unwritten creed of the Church antecedently to any formal declaration of them, and only indeed needing such formal declaration when they come to be disputed, there can be no doubt that when a point *is* disputed, it can only by the law of the Church be enforced as an article of the

¹ Note 24.

² Note 25.

faith, by the Church's synodical adoption of it, and insertion in some Catholic formula; not having obtained which, it has not the formal and ultimate position of an article of the faith.

The relation, indeed, in which the creeds stand to articles of faith or fundamentals, has not been accurately defined by our divines, and perhaps does not admit of being so; nor has it been formally settled whether everything contained in the creeds is an article of faith, or whether all the articles of the faith are contained in the creeds. The latter point, however, has been much more confidently disposed of than the former. "The ancient and primitive Christians," says Wall, speaking of the article of infant baptism, "for certain did not reckon this point among the fundamental ones. For they drew up short draughts and summaries of the faith, which we call creeds; and into these they put all those articles which we call fundamental or absolutely necessary. Now though some churches had their creeds a little larger than others; and some councils or meetings of Christians did overdo in putting in some opinions, which they valued more than need was, into these creeds; yet there never was any creed at all, that had this article in it."³ "Whether all those declarations," says Stillingfleet, "which were inserted in the enlargements of the Apostolical Creed by the Councils of Nice and Constantinople, and in that creed which goes under the name of Athanasius, were really judged by the Catholic Church of all ages to be necessary to salvation, is not here my purpose to inquire; but there seems to be a great deal of reason for the negative, that what was not inserted in the ancient creeds was not by them judged necessary to be believed by all Christians."⁴ These are rough decisions,

³ Vol. ii. p. 549.

⁴ Vindication, vol. i. p. 89.

requiring finish and filling up, and should be taken perhaps as including under the head of creeds, the express determinations of General Councils, even if not inserted in creeds, according to the test of heresy laid down in the Act of Supremacy: these statements, however, and others of other writers like them, amount to a practical judgment on the part of our divines, that the Church has by this time declared and put down in writing all those points which are articles of the faith; and, therefore, that if any particular position is not to be found in writing, in some existing document of the Catholic Church, such a position may be set down as not being an article of the faith.

3. But waiving the obstacle just raised, which may be thought by some of too technical a nature, though when really examined it will be found to involve important rules of common sense and Church practice, we have to meet another and more serious objection to the claim of this assertion to be an article of the faith. No secondary or incorrect sense of the term "regenerate" is allowable in an assertion on the subject of regeneration, which is to rank as an article of the faith; nor, indeed, is any such sense pretended or asked for by those who claim this rank for this Patristic assertion; but, on the contrary, only the true and Scriptural sense. But if this sense is taken, this assertion is then untrue, and contrary to the facts of our experience. The term "regenerate" implies in its Scriptural sense actual goodness, and it is contrary to experience to say that all infants are endowed with this goodness in baptism. That they should be virtuous agents is indeed impossible, but neither are they all in baptism endowed with a seminal character of goodness, because, as we have shown in a preceding chapter, if they were, such an implanted character would come out in all of them with the growth of nature; whereas we see that this is

not the case. The Patristic assertion then is in this awkward predicament, with respect to its claim to be considered an article of the faith, viz. that to possess this rank the principal term in it must be used in its true sense; while at the same time, if this condition is fulfilled, the assertion itself is altogether untrue.

So far, then, as this question is concerned it does not much signify which of these two alternatives we adopt. Do the Fathers in this particular *dictum* use the term "regenerate" in its *true* sense, as implying actual goodness? In favour of this it may be said that this is the sense in which they do ordinarily use the term; that their language, though wanting in precision, is substantially to the purport that the regenerate state is a state of actual goodness and holiness.⁵ But if this is the sense in which they use the term in this *dictum*, they are thrust upon the Scholastic doctrine of the universal infusion of a habit of goodness into infants at baptism; a doctrine which, as has been shown,⁶ is involved in insuperable difficulties, and is directly at variance with facts.

Do the Fathers in this *dictum* use the term in a *secondary* sense? In favour of this it may be said that we have no trace of the Scholastic doctrine just mentioned in the Fathers.⁷ And when we consider the comparative ease with which words in large use slide out of one meaning into another, and contract in course of time

⁵ See Chapter vi.

⁶ Chapter vii.

⁷ This doctrine had not gained acceptance even in the days of Peter Lombard, who asks, as if it were an absurd supposition, — "*sed quis dixerit eos (infantes) accepisse fidem et charitatem?*" L. 4, dist. 4.

"Ubi tu ex veteribus certo edocebis habitus aut fidei aut spei aut charitatis in quibus potissimum sanctificatio consistit, infundi parvulis in baptismo?" Ward, *Disceptatio inter Gataker et Ward*, p. 203.

senses very different from their original ones, the supposition of a secondary sense involves nothing strange or improbable. The history of language is full of instances of this kind of change in the meaning of words; and though it might be objected with some appearance of reason that the Fathers do not *tell* us of any secondary sense in which they use the term here, it might be replied also, not unreasonably, that it is not necessary for the truth of the fact that they themselves should inform us of it; that when a difficulty occurs in a book, a letter, or any kind of document, which can only be explained by supposing that the writer uses a certain word in a different sense from its original one, we do not wait for the writer to tell us, before we give this explanation, but do it upon our own authority, because, as reasonable intelligent persons, we are judges of language, of its difficulties, and of the mode of explaining them. But then, if we adopt this alternative of a secondary sense, this statement of the Fathers becomes a totally different statement from that which is wanted for a dogmatic purpose. Ceasing to be the statement that all infants are regenerate in baptism in the *true* sense, it is deprived of the necessary condition of an article of the faith, as well as of all peculiar theological interest; for those who maintain the regeneration of all infants in baptism do not profess to be concerned with any other sense of the term than the true one.

4. On either then of the alternatives just mentioned, either that the term regenerate *is* used or is *not* used in its true sense in this Patristic statement, the claim of this statement to be an article of the faith is alike disposed of in the negative. But now another objection to this claim arises, in consequence of this very alternative of meaning under which we have been considering this statement. For why were we obliged to make use of an

alternative? Simply because the Fathers do not tell us distinctly in what sense they do use the term "regenerate" in this statement. Did they expressly assert, with the Schoolmen, that an actual habit of goodness is implanted in all infants in baptism; or did they expressly assert, with the Anglican divines, that only a faculty is implanted; in either case we should know what they meant, and should treat their assertion accordingly in one or the other of the two ways just mentioned. But the truth is, that the Fathers do not tell us in what sense they do use this term in this statement. It is evident that an explanation is wanted here; for how can it be said, consistently with plain facts, that all infants are made *good* in baptism? The Fathers do not give this explanation, and therefore leave us in doubt what they mean by this statement.

Two great schools of divines accordingly, each professing the character of zealous adherents and faithful exponents of the Fathers, have given totally different interpretations of this statement. The Schoolmen and the Anglican divines both alike base their baptismal doctrine upon the Fathers; both alike base their doctrine of infant regeneration upon this particular assertion of the Fathers; but the Schoolmen confidently interpret this assertion of the Fathers, viz. that all baptized infants are regenerate, as meaning that all infants have actual goodness implanted in them in baptism; the Anglican divines as confidently deny this interpretation of it, and maintain that it does not mean anything of the kind.⁸ The Schoolmen expound the baptismal regeneration of the Fathers, as meaning the infusion of the very habit of goodness, the very virtues of faith, hope, and charity themselves into every infant at baptism. The Anglicans

⁸ Chapters vii. xi.

expound it as only the endowment of the infant with a new *capacity* for goodness, or a special assisting grace. Bishop Bethell rejects the Scholastic interpretation as unsound, fantastic, untenable, and contrary to plain experience. He condemns as irrational the idea of "habits of faith and holiness being implanted in the soul by literal creation;"⁹ he rejects the doctrine, that "man when he is baptized is endowed with justifying grace, containing in it faith, hope, charity, and all the Christian virtues," as an unauthorized ambitious conceit; and contrasts with it, as representing the true meaning of the Fathers, the doctrine of the Anglican School, that "the grace conferred by baptism is a potential principle or latent power, which must be developed by a right use of the means of grace and by moral and religious discipline."¹ "We who maintain," he says, "that regeneration is the inward and spiritual grace of baptism, do not identify it with conversion, the renewal of the inward frame, an entire change of mind, or a radical change in all the parts and faculties of the soul;"² but only "consider it as a change of state and relative condition, carrying with it new privileges, capacities of action, and expectations."³ That is to say, he rests his defence and justification of the Patristic assertion of the regeneration of all infants in baptism, upon the very ground that it does *not* mean that which whole centuries of Schoolmen said it did mean. Such are the two expositions given of the same statement of antiquity by two great schools of divines, alike professing to adopt and defend this statement.⁴

⁹ P. 183.¹ P. 181.² Pref. p. 39.³ Pp. 222, 223.

⁴ We have indeed witnessed comparatively lately within our own Church the conflict of these two interpretations of this statement of the Fathers. Dr. Pusey, in his Tract on Baptism, charged the Anglican School, or a portion of it, with holding "a mere outward

And if those disagree about the meaning of this statement, who agree in accepting the statement itself, certainly those do not *less* differ as to the meaning, who separate as to the statement. We see one large school among ourselves disagreeing with the position that all infants are regenerate in baptism *because* they understand regeneration as implying actual goodness, and so understanding it, cannot acquiesce in this universal bestowal of it, in the face of plain facts. We see another large school agreeing with this statement because they *disown* this meaning which the other school attributes, declaring that the statement means something altogether different.

What is the natural conclusion, then, which is to be drawn from the ambiguity of the Patristic assertion of the regeneration of all infants in baptism, so forcibly and plainly witnessed to by the opposite meanings which schools even agreeing in the adoption of the statement itself attach to it? What but that a statement, of which

change of state or circumstances, or relation," as what constituted baptismal regeneration. Bp. Bethell, on the other hand, in defending the Anglican School, fastened upon Dr. Pusey a near approximation to the Scholastic definition of that gift. The descriptions which these two divines give of the nature of baptismal regeneration do indeed radically differ; and founded alike *upon* this assertion of the Fathers, these two treatises give totally different interpretations of it. With Dr. Pusey, regeneration distinctly "comprehends change of heart and affections," with Bp. Bethell it as distinctly does not. According to Dr. Pusey, we are in baptism "both accounted and *made* righteous;" according to Bp. Bethell, we are only endowed with "a potential principle," or the capacity of becoming righteous. We have then in these two treatises, which are the principal recent expositions of the baptismal language of the Fathers, and which aim alike at a faithful explanation of this particular statement of the Fathers, two interpretations of it so distinct, that the same person might accept it in one of these meanings and reject it in the other.

the meaning is not clear, is not in a fit state for dogmatic use? Do the Fathers mean by regeneration in this statement a gift which *does* imply actual goodness, or a gift which does *not* imply it? These are two fundamentally different meanings; they are contradictory meanings. If we do not know then whether this Patristic statement is to be understood in the one or the other, it is a statement to which we cannot be required to subscribe.

For if the Church wants to impose a truth she must first, both according to the law of reason and her own law, express the truth which she wants to impose. In the first place, this has been invariably the practice of the Church. She has never imposed particular articles of belief by means of dubious statements, which only included those articles within a wider area of meaning, and did not singly express them. Defective expression has, on the contrary, been amended, the indistinctness cleared up, and the particular truth been specified before it has been enforced. Thus when the term "God," which had undoubtedly been used in Scripture in a sense short of absolute Deity, was found insufficient to express the Divinity of our Lord, she added the term "consubstantial" to it; and when the Catholic statement of the Incarnation was found not sufficient to express our Lord's Unity of Person, she made the latter specific addition. Her practice has thus never been to impose unexpressed meanings, but always to express particularly the meaning which was intended, before she imposed it. She did this undoubtedly in the cases mentioned, not so much out of justice to subscribers as to protect herself; but without going into her reasons,—though we may remark, by the way, that the former is a duty as incumbent upon her as the latter,—it is sufficient to observe the fact of her uniform practice.

We receive indeed and subscribe to a whole class of doctrinal statements, of which the meaning is in this sense unknown, that we have no clear and distinct idea of the truths themselves which those statements declare. The doctrinal statements which declare the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, have no distinct meaning in the sense of a meaning which is clearly comprehensible by us, and for this reason, that the nature of the truths which they express is such that no distinct idea can be formed of them, such as can be subjected to our intellectual grasp. But this is altogether a different case from the one before us. Those statements are not *ambiguous*, though their meaning is in this sense indistinct; because this indistinctness does not arise from any defect of expression, but from the mysterious nature of the truths expressed; which *truths* being incomprehensible, the *statements* are still decisive, and not open to any double interpretation. But the statement with which we are here concerned, is an ambiguous statement admitting of two totally different intelligible and distinct meanings, according to the interpretation which is put upon it.

Formularies of faith, again, sometimes contain statements which are designedly made ambiguous, in order to include different senses of and modes of entertaining particular truths, so as to admit of the subscription of different schools. But statements which are *designedly* ambiguous, i. e. constructed so as to cover a certain area of meaning, not co-extensive with one sense of a truth, but including several, are ambiguous *relatively* to one or other of the particular senses they cover, but in themselves they are not at all ambiguous; for the inclusive area is as distinct and apparent as the specific one, the larger area is as express as the less, and speaks for itself to the subscriber. But statements which are ambiguous not from design but from the loose and undefined nature

of the terms employed in them, are ambiguous in themselves and ambiguous to subscribers.

The uniform practice of the Church, then, is against the imposition of statements as articles of faith, of which the meaning is ambiguous and undecided. But we need hardly appeal to precedent in such a case as this. The great court of the Church Catholic is originally bound by those plain elementary rules and principles to which all tribunals are tied, that impose confessions, oaths, or declarations upon men ; and especially by the rule which requires that in imposing any article of practice or belief, we should specify what the article which we impose *is*. No considerations can supersede the imperative law of justice and reason, that when we are required to subscribe a proposition, we should know what it is which we are subscribing to. This is one of those first principles, which are supposed in all compacts and agreements, bonds and engagements, civil and religious.

When the rank of an article of the faith, then, is claimed for this statement, I remark, as I have done already, first, that this is a special and subordinate statement of the Fathers, distinct from their principal baptismal statement, which is a general one ; secondly, that this statement cannot be proved by Scripture, a consideration which singly disposes of this claim ; thirdly, that it appears in no creed or declaration of any General Council ; fourthly, that it is untrue, and opposed to plain and certain facts, *if* the principal term in it is understood in its true sense, in which sense it *must* be understood in a statement pretending to be an article of the faith ; but fifthly and lastly, I remark that this statement is ambiguous, and that we do not know what it means, and what it intends to assert. Were there no other weak point in its case, against the *universality* of this Patristic statement we must set off its *ambiguity*, as a fundamental

constitutional defect in its position. We are unable to ascertain what we should be subscribing to in subscribing to this statement. We cannot obtain a satisfactory answer to this first question, which is in the nature of the case preliminary to all assent. On consulting authorities, we find contradictory interpretations. The ambiguity of this statement is indeed a thing generally observed, but the conclusion which follows unavoidably from it, should be observed also, that it is unfitted by such ambiguity for dogmatic use. Because to an article of the faith, in the legal eye of the Church, adequate expression is as necessary as universality ; it is as essential that it should be known in *what* there is general concurrence, as that there should *be* general concurrence.

CHAPTER XIII

AUGUSTINIANISM

THE difficulties relating to the doctrine of the regeneration of all infants in baptism, arise from two different sources. One is the meaning of the term "regenerate," the difficulties arising from which have been discussed in the preceding chapters. The other is the doctrine of predestination. These two sources of difficulty on this subject are distinct and independent of each other. Did no doctrine of predestination exist, the sense of the term "*regenerate*" would still create those difficulties which have been mentioned. But in addition to the sense of the term, another remarkable phenomenon must now be taken into account, and that is the toleration by antiquity of the doctrine just mentioned.

The doctrine of predestination no more conflicts with the doctrine of baptismal grace *generally* stated, than it does with the grace of the other sacrament; for the certainty of the end is not incompatible with the necessity of the means. And for this reason it does not disagree with the Scriptural doctrine of baptismal regeneration; for Scripture only refers generally to the grace of the sacrament, and lays down no fixed class of recipients. But when the doctrine of baptismal regeneration goes beyond Scripture, and pronounces all baptized infants to be recipients of this grace, the doctrine of predestination comes into collision with it, as we shall see by simply ascertaining what these two doctrines respectively mean.

For in confronting one of these doctrines with the other in order to ascertain whether they are compatible with each other or not, the first thing we have to do is to place the real *meanings* of the two properly before us. Any two sets of words as such may be held together, for verbal statements apart from their meanings are in no way opposed to each other, but doctrines cannot be embraced together, which are contradictory in meaning.

First, then, what do we mean by regeneration? Nobody pretends to say that the whole of that grace which is necessary for a man through life, is received in the single moment of baptism; by regeneration, however, we certainly mean admission to *a state* of grace enabling the individual to attain salvation. Some give the term a much higher meaning, including in the signification of it not only the power to attain holiness and salvation, but actual holiness itself; but all agree that regeneration in its true sense implies at the least that *power*. This is expressed in the common description of baptism as a covenant, in which God gives on His part all the grace that is necessary for the attainment of eternal life, leaving to the individual on his part the responsibility of availing himself of the power. "Baptism," says Hooker, "implieth a covenant or league between God and man, wherein as God doth bestow presently remission of sins, *binding also Himself to add in process of time what grace soever shall be further necessary* for the attainment of everlasting life; so every baptized soul,"¹ &c. "The regeneration of infants," says Thorndike, "consists in the habitual assistance of God's Spirit, the effects whereof are to appear in making them *able* to perform that which their Christianity requires at their hands."² "To all persons," says Barrow, "by the holy mystery of baptism

¹ Eccl. Pol. v. lxiv. 4.

² Laws of Church, b. iii. c. viii. § 25.

duly initiated into Christianity, the grace of the Holy Spirit is communicated, enabling them to perform the conditions of virtue and piety which they undertake, and continually watching over them for the accomplishment of these purposes. . . . A competency of grace and spiritual assistance is really imparted to every man, qualifying him to do what God requires.”³ Bishop Bethell defines regeneration as “a change of state and relative condition, accompanied with an earnest or first principle of new life, and a promise of such spiritual power as may enable the recipient to continue in this state of salvation, and to carry on that moral and practical change which this mystical change implies and requires.” But I need not quote authorities on a point universally agreed on, and always assumed rather than expressed in all allusions to regeneration.

This being one of the two doctrines, then, viz. that all infants are at baptism admitted into a state or condition of ability to attain salvation, and have the pledge given them that they will, as they grow up and throughout life, receive grace sufficient for this purpose,—this being one of the two doctrines, let us now turn our attention to the other, with which it is to be confronted.

The Augustinian doctrine of Predestination divides the world into two portions, one of which is from all eternity, and antecedently to all action of the individuals themselves, predestinated to eternal life; the other without exception is left to eternal damnation. Both of these are originally in the same state, they are *in massa perditionis*, as the Augustinian phrase is, *in massa peccati*; that is to say, they are both by birth in a condition of moral impotence, and utterly unable to lead that course of life which will secure their salvation; but one is

³ Sermon 72.

antecedently to all life and conduct rescued out of this state, the other is antecedently to all life and conduct left in it. The individuals who compose the *one* division are endowed with irresistible grace, and final perseverance, which not only enable but *cause* them to act aright, and to act aright up to the end of life; from the *other* these gifts which are absolutely necessary for salvation are withheld. This section, therefore, labours under a total inability from the very moment of birth to attain salvation. The uniformity of the result of failure in an arbitrarily constituted class proves of itself unequivocally the absence of power to succeed. But besides this, an issue which is certain antecedently to all the acts and behaviour of a man implies in its very idea the impossibility of being avoided by him. It is true that *some* certainty may be a certainty to the Divine Mind, and yet a contingency in itself; for if the Divine Mind foresees an event *as* contingent, and simply following upon certain conduct which might have been avoided, such an event is not the less contingent in itself because it is certain from all eternity to God. But if the certainty of an event exists prior to all conduct of the individual, the event is not only certain to God, but unavoidable by man; because existing as it does prior to all human conduct, it plainly is not caused by it.

One whole section of mankind, therefore, according to the Augustinian scheme, labours from the very moment of birth under a total inability to attain salvation. For those who compose this section are without such grace as is absolutely necessary for salvation; they are without this grace because they are not included within the decree of predestination; and the very corner-stone of the Augustinian doctrine is, that inclusion or non-inclusion within the decree of predestination is anterior to all acts of the individual. The inability, therefore, of those who

compose this section of mankind to attain salvation, is like any other case of natural deprivation, in which persons are, to begin with, without certain faculties or resources which are necessary to gain particular objects.

The question then is, whether those who labour under an absolute and perpetual inability to attain salvation, can at the same time possess the power from the moment of their baptism to attain salvation? It must be seen that this is a contradiction in terms, and therefore that the Augustinian scheme is inconsistent with the regeneration of all infants in baptism, if regeneration includes what it has been defined as at the very least including. Were the area of predestination coincident indeed with that of baptism, the two schemes would be consistent; but, inasmuch as the two areas intersect each other, the two schemes can only be made consistent by supposing that the same person can antecedently to all action of his own be excluded from eternal life, and at the same time be endowed with grace enabling him to attain it; that the same person can want a grace which is necessary for salvation, and at the same time have grace sufficient for salvation; that the same person can be left from birth in the old Adam, *in massa perditionis*, and *in massa peccati*, i. e. in his old corrupt nature, and at the same time endowed with the new nature.

If regeneration, therefore, implies according to Hooker the Divine pledge "to add in process of time what grace soever shall be necessary for the attainment of everlasting life," according to Thorndike, "the habitual assistance of God's Spirit making us able to perform all that Christianity requires at our hands," according to Barrow, "a competency of grace and spiritual assistance qualifying every man to do what God requires," then certainly *all* infants are not, in the Augustinian scheme, regenerate in baptism. Because in this scheme *all* infants certainly are

not admitted at baptism into a state to which this pledge and this promise attaches, and in which, as they grow up, they have this competent and sufficient Divine grace.

It must indeed be seen that these two schemes of saving grace are based upon directly contradictory assumptions, and, therefore, do not admit of being reconciled. The scheme of a general baptismal grace assumes what is commonly called the principle of free will;⁴ because such a generally bestowed grace, not being as the event shows irresistible, depends for its effect upon the use which is made of it by the original and independent will of the recipient. On the other hand, the Augustinian scheme of irresistible grace assumes the will of man to be of such a nature, as only to act upon being controlled, and made to act by another power; that is to say, this scheme is based on a denial of the principle of free will. These are two totally contradictory assumptions then, and the schemes of grace which are built upon them are, in accordance with the principles which they respectively assume, in total contradiction to each other. Upon the principle of free will a general bestowal of sufficient means for salvation is consistent with only a partial success in the result; and, therefore, this principle admits of a general bestowal of saving grace upon the baptized in consistency with facts. But upon the principle of the servitude of the will, the grace which leads to salvation being obliged to be irresistible, that grace must involve universally that happy *result in fact* wherever bestowed.

⁴ "The doctrine of the baptismal regeneration of all infants belongs to the Catholic system, which supposes a free, full, and sufficient grace to be offered unto all men: its rejection originated in that section of the Church which supposed a portion of mankind elected to life, the rest left to the damnation which their inherited corruption deserved." Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism. 1st Ed. p. 143.

And therefore this principle does not admit of an universal, but only of a partial bestowal of saving grace among the baptized in consistency with facts.

In the doctrine of the regeneration of all infants in baptism and in Augustinianism we have, in short, two fundamentally opposite schemes of saving grace; one of which annexes it to the body, the other to individuals; the one to the visible system, the other to the operation of a secret decree. One institutes a state of grace sufficient for salvation, into which all are alike admitted in and by baptism: the other institutes a grace necessary for salvation, which is extra-baptismal, and for which baptism is no security or guarantee.⁵ Any reconciliation of two such radically opposite systems must be illusory; but the name of St. Augustine being so prominent in antiquity, and his authority having been so much appealed to on the particular subject of baptism, this reconciliation has been attempted by means of some nice distinctions, which I proceed to notice because I might be charged with neglect if I passed them over, and because they stand in the way of and are urged to intercept the plain and straightforward view of the case which has been just given.

1. It is observed then that predestination is a deep mystery, and that in mysteries we may believe in contradictions; that therefore, on the same principle on which we can believe both in predestination and free will, we can hold both Augustinianism and also the admission of all infants in baptism to a state of sufficient grace. But the answer to this plea is obvious,—that though we can hold indefinite mysteries, and professedly unexpressed truths which take opposite directions, we cannot hold

⁵ For the proof of the above summary of Augustinianism, see "Treatise on Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination," Chapters v. vi. vii. viii.

together definite and expressed contradictories. We can believe in a Trinity in Unity, but not in Trinitarianism and Unitarianism together ; in an undefined predestination and free will, but not in Calvinism and Arminianism together ; in a self-contradictory infinity, but not that two and two make six. We cannot hold that some of the baptized are without a grace which is necessary, and, at the same time, that all the baptized have grace which is sufficient ; which is the Augustinian scheme on the one hand, and the doctrine of the regeneration of all infants in baptism on the other.

2. The doctrine of Irresistible Grace is sometimes represented as quite consistent with the truth that *all* have sufficient grace ; the explanation being that the former is the privilege of a few, the latter or lower gift the common property of all. But those who offer such a reconciling explanation as this miss the very point of the Augustinian doctrine, which is, that grace is not sufficient *unless* it is irresistible.⁶ For the wants of man after the fall are expressly defined in this doctrine as such, that they require irresistible grace as their necessary supplement ; in the absence of which the supply of grace is not adequate for the purpose wanted. Irresistible grace then, in the Augustinian scheme, is not the surplus of the individual, but the absolute want of the *state* of man : it does not figure as a fortunate superfluity in the absence of which there may still be sufficiency, but as a necessary of which the absence is positive and fatal incompetency.

3. The most common explanation given to reconcile Augustinianism with the doctrine of the regeneration of all infants in baptism, is that that scheme allows all the baptized all grace but that of final perseverance.⁷ But if this

⁶ Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination, p. 167.

⁷ Bethell, p. 144.

is true of Augustinianism, it is only half the truth, and—what is specially to be observed—just that half which is not to the purpose. For those who remind us that Augustine allows all the baptized all grace but that of final perseverance, omit to add that all grace short of the grace of final perseverance is absolutely useless, nugatory, and insufficient for the purpose of salvation. They forget that this grace, being a grace simply and an arbitrarily conferred grace in Augustinianism, is not, as its very name shows, a superfluity which a Christian can do without, but a necessary without which he is certain to be damned. They forget that the absence of the *grace* of perseverance is also, in that system, the absence of the *power* to persevere; and that to those to whom perseverance is not given in fact, it is not an accessible or an attainable state.

Final perseverance is upon any theological system necessary for salvation, for everybody admits that those only who persevere to the end can be saved, and that those who ultimately fall away lose all the benefit of their previous goodness. But all Christians have the power of attaining final perseverance according to the doctrine of free will; according to the Augustinian doctrine they have not all the power, because there it figures not only as a state of man, but as a free gift of God, conferred upon some and not upon others according to the secret eternal decree of predestination which has been mentioned. Final perseverance is therefore in this system both a necessary state—which all allow it to be—and also an arbitrarily granted state, not attainable as a state by any except those to whom it is positively given as a grace.

4. It is observed that Augustine allows even the non-elect temporary grace. But temporary grace, which is only temporary because the individual by his own mis-

conduct provokes God to withdraw it, is one thing; temporary grace, which is temporary because it was not designed in the Divine plan to be anything more, is another thing. Grace, intended to be withdrawn, in accordance with an arbitrary decree, before it becomes serviceable to the individual's eternal interests, is not sufficient grace, or therefore regenerating grace. Augustine does not indeed, as is often remarked, hold the doctrine of the indefectibility of grace; but defectible grace, which owes its failure to the Divine purpose and not to the human will, is not sufficient grace.

Does the Augustinian system, however, admit of the bestowal of even *temporary* grace upon the whole body of the baptized? It does not, if it adheres to facts. For the grace of the new dispensation is fundamentally defined by Augustine as necessarily effecting that goodness and holiness of life to produce which it is given. But can it be said of *all* the individuals of the baptized body that they exhibit as they grow up even a temporary character of holiness and goodness?

5. The analogy of natural birth is sometimes resorted to as a mode of reconciling these two conflicting schemes; and it is asked whether the spiritual life may not be, as the natural sometimes is, truly conferred, though the same Power that gave it intends it to be immediately taken away. But this is arguing from a metaphor, and metaphor should not be made the basis of reasoning. Natural birth is a fact complete in itself, which therefore no subsequent death, however immediate, can undo; but the birth spiritual has reference to an ulterior object, viz. eternal life, which it essentially gives the ability to attain. If it does not give this ability, then, the absence of what is essential to it undoes it at the very outset, and prevents it from being a true spiritual birth.

6. Attempts are made to distinguish between Calvin's

and Augustine's doctrine of predestination, but both assert the division of the baptized body into elect and non-elect; the first of whom are ordained to, and the second excluded from eternal life, antecedently to all difference of life and conduct; this assertion is Calvinism, whether made by Calvin or Augustine;⁸ and Calvinism, by whomever held, is in the same logical contradiction to the *universal* regeneration of infants in baptism.

The distinctions⁹ then which are drawn in order to prove, in opposition to the natural view of the case, that the Augustinian doctrine of predestination is consistent with the doctrine of the regeneration of all infants in baptism, are shown to be fallacious; and it only remains that the essential contradiction between these two schemes of grace should be confessed and admitted.

Such, however, being the doctrine of predestination, which we find maintained by St. Augustine, we are reminded that, when this doctrine has been duly recognized, there still remains another *side* of Augustine's language; viz. a whole mass of statement directly asserting the regeneration of all infants in baptism.¹ This fact then, if

⁸ "There may be some trifling deviations from his general views, and in some authors an attempt to make additions to their proportions, but we have every reason to believe in the truth of the assertion that between the Augustinian and Thomist doctrines of predestination and that of Calvin there is no substantial difference, and that those who suppose that St. Augustine differs from Calvin in his doctrine of predestination do not really know the doctrine which St. Augustine held on the subject, and suppose it to be different from what it was." Ecclesiastic, No. 33, p. 395.

"To draw any essential distinction between Calvinism and Austinism would argue small acquaintance with the writings of either divine." Faber's Doctrine of Election, p. 75.

⁹ Some others are noticed in Note 26.

¹ It is a mistake to suppose that this position is contained in St. Augustine's distinction between baptized and unbaptized infants *dying in infancy*; in which he is speaking only of *some*

true, is no refutation, because it does not blot out the other fact. The doctrine spoken of remains, its toleration by antiquity remains, and its inconsistency with the other position remains. When a doctrine is inculcated in the boldest, clearest, and most systematic way by an author, when it constitutes the most conspicuous phenomenon of his teaching, and when it is treated of so copiously that whole books are devoted to its exposition, it cannot be held that this doctrine is *not* taught by him, because the writer elsewhere says things apparently or really conflicting with it. Nor can it be held that this doctrine does not mean what it plainly does mean, because there is other language which is apparently of a contrary meaning. Nor can it be held that this doctrine is not in plain conflict and contradiction with a certain other position, because the same writer maintains that other position elsewhere in words. A writer may go on combining his own peculiar system with certain established language, but the circumstance of his combining them does not make them consistent. For, a great theory once laid down either in philosophy or theology, the author can no more dictate the consequences of it than other persons can; nor has he any more jurisdiction over his own system than any one of his readers.

As a question, however, relating to the language of this great Father, this alleged set-off in his writings to the doctrine of predestination deserves some notice, and is not without some interest.

1. Different explanations then have been offered by divines of the baptismal language of St. Augustine, in order to reconcile it with the conflicting doctrine of predestination, and save his theological consistency; of which the first that I will mention, Bishop Burnet's, is not

infants, not of all, and of those who are in his system elect infants, an early death after baptism being a sign of election.

so much an explanation as a simple *admission* of the difficulty. That writer interprets Augustine's assertion of the regeneration of all infants in baptism *as* to be understood in some way consistently with the other doctrine:—"He thought that regenerate persons, not being predestinated, were certainly to *fall from* that state and from the grace of regeneration."² The assertion in question is thus explained by a limitation and qualification of the term regenerate, so as to accommodate it to the other great characteristic doctrine,—a limitation and qualification, however, which issues, as it must do, in a totally inadequate and suicidal sense of that term. For a regeneration, which is "*certain to be fallen away from,*" is in the nature of the case not a true regeneration, as involving the want of power to persevere in that state to the end; i. e. a want of ability to attain salvation.

2. The Augustinian sense of the term, in this general application of it, has been explained by one writer of great authority on the baptismal question, as conventional and secondary. Wall sees that some explanation is wanted of the baptismal assertion as made by a rigid predestinarian, and gives the following:—"And whereas," he says, "some people have expressed a wonder at St. Austin, that he should hold that all the baptized are regenerate; no man living can read him without perceiving that he uses the word regenerate as another word for baptized; and that this with him would have been an identical proposition, as if one would say now-a-days, 'all that are baptized are christened.'"³ The term "regenerate" did undoubtedly contract in antiquity a secondary sense, in which it stood for the simple fact of baptism; and Augustine, as was observed in a former chapter,⁴ employs, though not the very term itself, *cognate*

² On Article XVII.

³ History of Infant Baptism, v. ii. p. 187.

⁴ Chapter xi.

terms, in an expressly secondary sense, to denote specially a *valid* baptism: "*Ecclesia omnes per baptismum parit.*"—" *Ecclesia generat filios, sive apud se, sive extra se.*" The birth or generation here mentioned is a wholly different thing from regeneration, being that effect of baptism which is not *grace*, but what was called in later theology the baptismal *character*⁵—an effect received in common by good and bad recipients, members of the Church and schismatics. It is, however, as we see, called by Augustine a *birth*,—" *Ecclesia generat,*" "*Ecclesia parit;*" and therefore Wall's explanation is not without language in antiquity, and special language in Augustine, favouring it.

3. Another explanation of the baptismal assertion as made by Augustine, is that given by Ward and Davenant. These divines, as was explained in a preceding chapter,⁶ retaining the substance of Elizabethan Calvinism, but wishing to combine with it the regeneration of all infants in baptism, constructed a particular sense of "*regenerate,*" to meet this double aim, and allowed even to the non-elect a regeneration which consisted in the remission of original sin only, specially excluding sufficient grace for the future, or power to attain salvation; for which end the arbitrary gift of perseverance, admitted to be withheld from them, was necessary. In this curtailed and artificial sense, then, accommodated to a particular system, they applied themselves the term "*regenerate*" to all baptized infants, and maintained it so to be applied by Augustine.

This interpretation, then, is so far favoured by the language of Augustine, that, as has been already remarked, the argument of the anti-Pelagian treatises, which supply the principal evidence of Augustine's doctrine of baptism,

⁵ Chapter xi.

⁶ P. 165.

is only concerned with the effect of baptism as remission of original sin. The Pelagians denying original sin, Augustine challenged them to explain the Catholic practice of admitting infants to baptism, which, as being remission of sin, supposed sin in the recipients of it, and therefore in infant recipients, personal sin being impossible, original sin. His argument thus naturally tended to create a particular exclusive aspect of the baptismal gift, as remission of original sin—pardon of the past without reference to grace for the future. “I willingly acknowledge,” says Burgess, “that Augustine’s own opinion is that, in some sense, all infants do receive remission of sin in baptism; but yet in such sense, as doth not suffice for their salvation, if they be not of the number of the elect.”⁷

It is true other phrases are used in these treatises besides that of “remission of sin.” Infants are said to “die to sin,” to be “rescued from the power of darkness,” and sometimes “to be illuminated” in baptism; but when these phrases are examined, we find that they refer to and mean remission of original sin; that it is original sin to which infants die in baptism, as being freed from the guilt of it; that it is the darkness of this guilt from which they are rescued; and the removal of this darkness which constitutes their illumination.

Indeed we cannot but observe a remarkable difference in the precision with which St. Augustine speaks when he has to do with the regeneration of infants as remission of original sin, and when he has to do with it as positive renovation. He asserts with exactness enough, that all are freed from original sin in baptism, but when he comes to the question what grace they receive from baptism to renovate and convert them in after life as they grow up,

⁷ Bapt. Reg. of Elect Infants, p. 135.

his language halts and gives way, and he leaves a manifest chasm in his baptismal scheme. Let us take the well-known passage in his chief work against the Donatists:—

“Sicut in Isaac qui octavo die nativitatis suæ circumciscus est præcessit signaculum justitiæ fidei; et quoniam patris fidem imitatus est, secuta est in crescente ipsa justitia, cujus signaculum in infante præcesserat; ita in baptizatis infantibus præcedit regenerationis sacramentum; et, *si Christianam tenuerint pietatem, sequetur etiam in corde conversio cujus mysterium præcessit in corpore.*”

In this passage we come to a further sense of regeneration, in which it advances beyond remission of sin, and becomes positive renewal. How is the connexion of regeneration in *this* sense then, with baptism, conducted? In the first place, the grace is not spoken of as simultaneous with the sacrament, but separated from it by an indefinite interval: the infant has the “sacrament of regeneration,” but the “*res sacramenti*” is obtained afterwards; the one “*precedes*,” the other “*follows*” upon certain conditions, viz. *si Christianam tenuerint pietatem*. In the second place, no grace is mentioned *by* which the infant, as he grows up, is *enabled* to fulfil this condition, and the scheme is left incomplete. There is an interval between the baptism of the infant, and his reception of the baptismal renewal, which is not filled up in this statement, and we are left in suspense—unless indeed we go to the general Augustinian scheme to bridge over this chasm, and supply the enabling grace wanted. But then with the reference to that scheme the *universality* of such enabling grace at once goes; inasmuch as that scheme only recognizes grace as *enabling*, when it is irresistible, and such grace is not given to all the baptized. In the third place, the nature itself of regeneration is represented as such, that, as a plain matter of fact, it is not attained by all baptized infants even as they grow up. For, inas-

much as baptism is called at the same time *regenerationis sacramentum*, and *conversionis mysterium*, regeneration is identified with conversion; and of this "conversion" again "Christian piety" is made the condition. But without staying to ask why that is made the condition, which is indeed the actual thing, it is enough to observe that certainly *all* baptized infants do not, even as they grow up, show either "conversion," which is the gift, or "Christian piety," which is the condition of the gift.

The above-quoted statement is the type of a class.

"Induunt homines Christum aliquando usque ad sacramenti perceptionem, aliquando et ad vitæ sanctificationem: atque illud primum et bonis et malis potest esse commune, hoc autem alterum proprium est bonorum et piorum."⁸

This statement exhibits the same chasm that the former did. We go at once, for there is nothing intermediate, from the visible sacrament to "sanctification of life." But how this sanctification is obtained is not said. *Proprium est bonorum*; but that is only to say that those who have it, have it. We are thrown back upon the general Augustinian scheme to supply the void, but that scheme only gives the grace for obtaining this sanctification to some, and not to all the baptized. Indeed if "sanctification of life" stands here, as "conversion" did in the former passage, for the *res sacramenti*, the latter becomes *ipso facto* not the universal effect of infant baptism.

"Proinde colligitur invisibilem sanctificationem quibusdam affuisse atque profuisse sine visibilibus sacramentis . . . visibilem vero sanctificationem, quæ fieret per visibilia sacramenta, sine ista invisibili posse adesse, non posse prodesse."⁹

Here again there is nothing between the simple re-

⁸ De Baptismo contra Donat. l. v. c. 24.

⁹ In Heptat. l. iii. c. 84.

ception of the sacrament or "visible sanctification," and actual conversion or "invisible sanctification." No instrument for gaining this "invisible sanctification" is supplied, no middle gift. To fill up this interval, and ascertain how invisible sanctification is gained, we must go to the Augustinian doctrine of grace.

"Horum itaque malorum præteritus omnis reatus sacro fonte diluitur. Remittuntur ergo in renascentibus, minuuntur in proficientibus. Ignorantia minuitur veritate magis magisque lucente: concupiscentia minuitur charitate magis magisque fervente."¹

Here is the same chasm. Baptism removes the guilt of original concupiscence, but how does it enable us to conquer the living strength of it? The answer is that concupiscence is diminished by love. But how is love got? We must go to the Augustinian doctrine of grace.

"Auctum est [bonum] quo bonus esse cœpit, minutum est quo malus esse cœpit; et hoc egit post baptismum, non peregit in baptismo."²

We are not told *whence* and how the baptized infant, as he grew up, *bonus esse cœpit*, and we must go, to answer this question, to the Augustinian doctrine of grace.

Though the baptismal statements of Augustine, then, are decided enough so far as relates to remission of original sin to all infants in baptism, an evident hiatus appears in them when the other part of regeneration has to be dealt with. The infant's hold upon this other part is not secure by baptism, but is left dependent upon conditions, the grace for fulfilling which is not mentioned in the statements, but is described elsewhere as arbitrarily given to some and not to others of the baptized. Regeneration in the case of *adults* always implies in Au-

¹ Contra Jul. Pel. l. vi. c. 16.

² Ibid. l. vi. c. 18.

gustine actual goodness, for however he may regard remission of original sin as constituting it in the case of infants, he never contemplates a grown-up man as regenerate, unless he is also leading at the time a good life.³ But how, as the infant grows into the adult, does he become *thus* regenerate? We are thrown back upon his theory of arbitrary grace. And thus the same infant in the Augustinian scheme *moritur peccato*, in the sense of being delivered from the guilt of original sin, who, as one of those not endowed with the irresistible grace necessary for attaining actual goodness, is still left *in massa peccati*, and *in massa perditionis*.⁴

³ “Appellamus ergo nos Dei filios, quia sic appellandi sunt quos regeneratos *pie vivere cernimus*.” De Corrept. et Grat. c. 9. “Nam isti *cum pie vivunt* dicuntur filii Dei, sed quoniam *victuri* sunt impie,” &c. Ibid. c. 9.

⁴ Lombard, who founds his baptismal language upon St. Augustine's, certainly distinguishes between the remission of original sin, which he assumes as the universal accompaniment of infant baptism, and the grace *qua ad majorem venientes aetatem, possint velle et operari bonum*, which he decides not to be bestowed upon infants (Note 14). And he interprets the Augustinian grant of the remission of original sin as made to non-elect infants with the salvo that it is not *ad salutem*. He appears to mean by this that Augustine does not give it in their case the supplement of the latter mentioned or positive part of the baptismal gift; and so to interpret that Father substantially in the same way in which Ward and Davenant explain him. “Sacramentum et rem simul suscipiunt omnes parvuli, qui in baptismo ab originali mundantur peccato; quamvis quidam diffiteantur illis qui perituri sint parvulis in baptismo dimitti peccata, innitentes illi verbo Aug. in lib. de baptism. parvul. *Sacramenta in solis electis efficiunt quod figurant*; non intelligentes illud ita esse accipiendum, quia cum in aliis efficiant sacramenta remissionem, non hoc eis faciunt ad salutem, sed solis electis.” (L. iv. dist. 4.) That the particular quotation here is not genuine, does not affect this as a general judgment upon the nature of Augustine's doctrine. “We may observe,” says Burgess, “in this answer to Lombard, 1. A distinction between that re-

The Augustinian application of the term “regenerate” to all baptized infants, has hitherto been explained as a literal application, in an inadequate sense: but secondly we observe an evident disposition in another portion of Augustine’s language, to fall back upon an hypothetical application of the term.

The Calvinists of the Reformation furnish an instance how theologians can combine the strong assertion of the grace of a sacrament *generally*, with a reserve as to who are the recipients of it. “God truly effects,” says Calvin himself, “through baptism what it represents”—“Baptism is God’s ordinary instrument to wash and renew us.” “The efficacy of the Spirit is present in baptism to cleanse and regenerate us.”⁵ But withal he reserves to himself the right of saying afterwards that baptism is all this only to the elect. Nor do I see that he is obnoxious on that account to the charge of “mental reservation” in a bad sense, brought against him by Archbishop Lawrence, as if he deceived the world by an apparent assertion of baptismal grace, which he explained away to himself. This form of statement is perfectly honest and is universally used, and indeed is necessary, for there must be some way of asserting the benefit of a sacrament considered in itself simply, and apart from the question who are the recipients of it.

The Calvinists of the Reformation again were willing, besides asserting the grace of the sacrament generally, to *call all* the baptized regenerate; they did so on principle, and urged the propriety and duty of such a general

mission of sin which is indifferently sealed unto all in baptism, and that grace which is necessary for them to obtain in it, that are undoubtedly saved by it. 2. A confession that this last, to wit, grace unto salvation, is peculiar only unto the elect.” Bapt. Reg. of Elect Infants, p. 134.

⁵ Tract. Theol. p. 683. Ibid. p. 258. Epist. p. 82.

application of the term ; but they did so of course upon the supposition that the person so called was one of the elect and would finally persevere ; and with the reservation of their right to withdraw the title, if this supposition was not verified in fact.

This liberty of language, and this principle of reserve have not been perhaps sufficiently taken into account in estimating the baptismal language of St. Augustine. In various passages he certainly apologizes for the universal application of the term “regenerate” to the baptized as having been only presumptive and hypothetical ; and though mixed with this hypothetical application he still leaves a literal application in some sense or other—*sacramento tenus*, say his Calvinistic interpreters⁶—the explanation certainly amounts to a retractation of the term either in the letter or the spirit, as thus universally applied.

In the following passage, for example, he tells us that though he *calls* all the baptized regenerate, it is with the understanding that if they do not persevere, the application of the term to them has been from the first incorrect, having been made only on the supposition of a future final perseverance.

“*Appellamus ergo nos et electos et Christi discipulos et Dei filios, quia sic appellandi sunt quos regeneratos pie vivere cernimus ; sed tunc vere appellantur, si manserint in eo propter quod sic appellantur. Si autem perseverantiam non habent, i. e. in eo quod cœperunt esse non manent, non vere appellantur quod appellantur et non sunt.*”⁷

For “child of God” here put the confessedly con-

⁶ “Augustine observeth,” says Bp. Carlton, “a great difference between them that are regenerate only *sacramento tenus*, and those that are regenerate and justified according to the purpose of God’s election.” *An Examination*, p. 193.

⁷ *De Corrept. et Grat.* c. 9.

vertible term “regenerate,” and how does this passage stand? “We call them regenerate because those are to be called so who have been regenerated and live piously; but if they have not perseverance they are not truly called so.” We observe then first of all a verbal contradiction in this passage, for the writer says of the same persons that they *are* regenerate, and they are *not* regenerate,—“quos regeneratos” asserting the former, and “non sunt” the latter. Are we then to dismiss this passage as being absolutely without meaning? No candid commentator would dismiss in such a way a statement, which in spite of a certain carelessness of expression suggests so very obvious a meaning as this does. We cannot suppose that St. Augustine applies the term to and withholds it from the same persons in the same sense; he applies it then in one sense, he withholds it in another. What are these two senses respectively then? The sense in which he withholds it is plainly the real genuine and true sense,—non *vere* appellantur; the sense in which he applies it then is not the true one. The natural meaning of the passage is that though in some secondary sense, or presumptively and hypothetically, we call *all* the baptized regenerate, only those are really so, who subsequently prove their title to the epithet by final perseverance.

Again; “Nec nos moveat quod filiis suis quibusdam Deus non dat istam perseverantiam . . . Nam isti cum pievivunt *dicuntur filii Dei*, sed quoniam victuri sunt impie et in eadem impietate morituri, non eos dicit filios Dei præscientia Dei.”⁸

Here is the same mode of testing the present by the future, the reality of the individual’s regeneration *now* by the issue of it *hereafter*. Those who will not in the event

⁸ De Corrept. et Grat. c. 9.

persevere "are called" the children of God or regenerate, but "the foreknowledge of God does not call them so." The foreknowledge of God sees that their so "called" regeneration will issue in nothing, and therefore decides against their so "called" regeneration as not real regeneration. The statement "*dicuntur filii Dei, sed non eos dicit filios Dei præscientia Dei*," answers to the "*appellantur et non sunt*" of the preceding passage.

Again; "*Cum ergo filii Dei dicunt de his qui perseverantiam non habuerunt, ex nobis exierunt sed non erant ex nobis, quid aliud dicunt nisi, Non erant filii etiam quando erant in professione et nomine filiorum? non quia justitiam simulaverunt, sed quia in ea non permanserunt. Erant itaque in bono, sed quia in eo non permanserunt, i. e. non usque in finem perseverarunt, non erant, inquit, ex nobis et quando erant nobiscum, hoc est, non erant ex numero filiorum, et quando erant in fide filiorum; quoniam qui vere filii sunt, præsciti et præordinati sunt conformes imaginis Filii ejus, et secundum propositum vocati sunt ut electi essent.*"⁹

This passage presents exactly the same test of the reality of regeneration that the preceding ones did, viz. the future issue of it. Those who are not about to persevere are allowed a temporary grace, but even at the time of receiving it they are deprived of real sonship, and pronounced, because they are not sons eventually, never to have been sons from the first. *Non erant filii etiam quando erant, &c.* The elect alone are really regenerate—*vere filii sunt*.

Again; "*Nonne postremo . . . per lavacrum regenerationis utrique renovati? Sed si hæc audiret ille, qui sciebat proculdubio quod dicebat, respondere posset et dicere: vera sunt hæc, secundum hæc omnia ex nobis*

⁹ De Corrept. et Grat. c. 9.

erant; veruntamen secundum aliam quandam discretionem *non erant ex nobis*; nam si fuissent ex nobis, mansissent ubique nobiscum. Quæ est tandem ista discretio? Patent libri Dei, non avertamus aspectum: clamat scriptura divina, adhibeamus auditum. Non erant ex nobis quia non erant secundum propositum vocati, non erant in Christo electi ante constitutionem mundi, non erant in eo sortem consecuti, non erant prædestinati secundum propositum ejus qui universa operatur.”¹

The phrase “ex nobis” in this passage means, as we know from the last passage, “ex numero filiorum.” It is asserted here then that the non-elect have been *per lavacrum regenerationis renovati*, but that they have never been regenerate or *fili*i. What can this mean but that they have been nominally regenerate, but not really? The term is evidently *withheld* in a true and real sense, and therefore only allowed in an incorrect or presumptive one. The result of the whole language of these passages, in short, is to establish a Church within a Church, an existing Church of the elect within the visible mixed Church; which inner body is alone the true Church of Christ. To this body reference is made in the expressions, “ex nobis,” “vere filii,” &c., and membership of this body given according to a secret arbitrary decree is declared to be alone real membership of Christ, real sonship, real regeneration.

No candid writer will, I think, deny that these passages, though written with fulness rather than precision, admit of a natural and obvious construction, and that St. Augustine in them throws some light upon his own meaning in calling all baptized infants, without distinction, regenerate; that having made the assertion he afterwards *explains* it, and that the explanation substantially amounts

¹ De Dono Perseverantiæ, c. 9.

to retracting the term in its true sense, where the event shows that the person to whom it was applied, on the mere strength of his baptism, did not finally persevere, and by so doing show himself to be one of the elect: that he makes election or predestination to life a condition of true regeneration; and that in the mean time he applies the term with a reserve, waiting for the issue to show whether those who are called so are really and truly so, or whether *non vere appellantur quod appellantur et non sunt*.

I have thus drawn attention to some explanations of St. Augustine's application of the term "regenerate" to all baptized infants, as made simultaneously with his predestinarian statements. But I must now again remind the reader, that whether such explanations are right or wrong, the result does not affect the argument of this chapter. The argument of this chapter turns simply upon the question whether Augustine's doctrine of Predestination is consistent with the doctrine of the regeneration of all infants in baptism. And this question has been decided. It was proved in the first part of this chapter that one of these doctrines is totally inconsistent with the other. Whatever may have been the results, therefore, which Augustine himself individually drew from his own doctrine of predestination, and whether he saw all the results or not, and in particular whether he saw fully the results upon the baptismal question or not,—all this has nothing to do with the real argument. The first systematic teacher of predestinarianism has no more right on that account than any other person to dictate the bearing which that doctrine has upon the baptismal question. Once out and formally promulgated, that doctrine is out of the promulgator's hands, and the question whether or not it is consistent with another given doctrine, must be decided by the plain rules of common sense, and not by

the arbitrary opinion of the author, who can no more check the argumentative consequences of his own system than any other person can.

Had antiquity, then, wished to impose and enforce the position that all baptized infants possessed a true regenerating grace, enabling them to attain salvation, as an *article of the faith*, there was one plain course which it ought to have taken; it ought to have condemned St. Augustine's doctrine of predestination. Whatever the language of St. Augustine individually as regards that baptismal position may have been, there was a doctrine laid down in his writings, which intrinsically contradicted it, which not only cut at the very root of a universal saving grace accompanying infant baptism, but in actual sense and meaning denied it; which denied that all baptized infants had as they grew up that grace which was necessary to attain salvation. The doctrine was clear, full, open, and decisive, it was proclaimed to the whole Church, it challenged criticism, it called aloud for judgment and condemnation, on the supposition that the other position was essential, and a part of the Catholic faith. But it was passed over by authority wholly and absolutely, and to this present hour not one word has the Church Catholic spoken in condemnation of this doctrine. The plain and necessary inference is, that the position which it contradicts is not an article of the faith, and that predestinarianism being a Catholic liberty, the denial of the regeneration of all infants in baptism is not heresy.

CHAPTER XIV

CONCLUSION

AN examination of the doctrine of "Baptismal Regeneration" issues in what is not an uncommon result of examination, viz. in our becoming aware that the truth on the subject is not contained within the compass of the single phrase or formula which is used, for the sake of shortness and convenience, to denote the doctrine. Persons who have not examined this question are accustomed to rest in the phrase itself—"Baptismal Regeneration"—as the sum total of the doctrine; for inasmuch as they are not conscious of the assumptions they make in their own mode of applying this general formula, everything is, as it were, in their eyes shut in a nutshell. But when they came to examine the matter, they would find that what they had supposed to be the whole doctrine was in fact not so much the doctrine as a heading to it; and that when they had got the phrase "Baptismal Regeneration," they were as yet only upon the threshold of the substantial contents of the subject which was denoted by that phrase. For what *is* regeneration? And what are the terms on which it is given in baptism? And how do those terms stand in the two cases of adults and infants? Is regeneration conditional in both, or only in one and not in the other? And what are the relations of time between the sign and the thing signified, the sacrament and the grace? Is the grace always given at the actual time of baptism, or may it be separated in time

from the rite, and be given before it, or not till after it? These are questions which are none of them settled by the mere phrase, "Baptismal Regeneration," which only states generally a connexion between the rite and the grace, leaving the particulars with respect to the conditions and the time for further decision. But it is of these particulars that the baptismal question substantially consists, and upon them that the whole controversy turns. And the way in which these questions have been dealt with in the Church—some having been decided with general agreement, others not—this actual history of the doctrine of baptismal regeneration constitutes the material of the doctrine; part of it being settled material, and part of it controversial. In the case of principles or maxims of law, we know that the substance of them lies in a number of applications of the general formula which expresses the principle, and in the growth of a variety of distinctions and modifications in such course of application. And in somewhat the same way the substance of the rule of baptismal regeneration lies in the way in which the rule has been applied, lies in the actual history of it, and in the growth of successive actual interpretations of it; in some of which there has been substantial agreement, in others not.

The doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration leaves Scripture unformed and incomplete. What is contained in Scripture is *a* connexion between the two, baptism and regeneration; a connexion, however, of which the particulars are not determined,¹ except as respects the conditions of faith and repentance in adults. The remainder of the doctrine which relates, first, to the conditions in the case of infants, and, secondly, to the relation of *time* between the sacrament and the grace, was handed over

¹ Chapter ii.

to the Church to be dealt with according to the best of her judgment, and subject to such differences of opinion as may legitimately arise upon questions which are left undetermined in Scripture.

1. With respect to the conditions of regeneration, a broad distinction was drawn by the doctors of antiquity between infants and adults; this grace being maintained to be conditional in the case of adults, unconditional in the case of infants. That is to say, it was decided that all infants were regenerate in baptism. In ruling a point left open in Scripture, however, in this way, the writers of antiquity did not explain how they reconciled their *dictum* with the plain sense of the term “regenerate,” or “born of God,” in Scripture. One great difficulty in this whole question would indeed be got rid of, if we could make the term “regenerate” or “born of God” mean what we pleased; but this word, like other words, has a meaning of its own, which it bears in Scripture,² and in theological use from the first;³ and this meaning implies more than a faculty or capacity, and more than remission of original sin,⁴ and admission to a covenant, viz. actual goodness. But even if it is allowed that infants can have actual goodness implanted in them in baptism, as a seminal character, as a character is said to be implanted in some persons at birth, which we call a *natural* character; yet it is contrary to plain facts to say that *all* baptized infants have such implanted goodness, because if they had they would all show it as they grow up, which is opposed to plain experience. If the Fathers, therefore, in the *dictum* that all infants are regenerate in baptism, use the word in its Scriptural sense, they say in this *dictum* what is contrary to plain experience; if they use the word in a sense short of its

² Chapter v.

³ Chapters vi. vii. viii.

⁴ Chapter iv.

Scriptural one, they say what is no part of revealed truth; if they use the word ambiguously, they say we do not know what. And the latter is the alternative to which the division among interpreters seems to point; the very divines who agree in accepting this dictum disagreeing totally as to what it means, and taking it in contradictory senses.⁵

It must be added that the doctrine of the regeneration of all infants in baptism, besides its collision with the meaning of the word "regenerate," also struck upon another rock, viz. the doctrine of Predestination; which, though in actual meaning contradictory to it, obtained full toleration from antiquity, and has met with no condemnation from the Church up to the present day.⁶

Such, however, being the strong line of demarcation drawn in antiquity between infants and adults in relation to baptism, the divines of the Reformation for the most part adopted a different position, and decided that the grace of baptism was given to infants upon the same principle on which it was given to adults, viz. conditionally; the condition being sometimes described as a future actual faith in them when grown up, sometimes as a present sure seed or root of faith implanted in them as infants. And this method of treating the two cases upon the same principle involved the same consequence in both cases, viz. that all infants were not regenerate in baptism any more than all adults were; for that all infants had not this seminal, any more than all adults had actual faith before baptism; or were all going to have actual faith any more than all adults had it already.

2. With respect to the relation of time between the sacrament and the grace, it has been ruled with complete consent that the connexion of the two—the sacrament

⁵ Chapter xii.

⁶ Chapter xiii.

and the grace—does not require that the grace should be given simultaneously with the sacrament. This is, indeed, but a natural adjunct of that fundamental law of the institution of baptism which makes it a sacrament to be administered once for all, and prohibits the repetition of it; from which law it would in all equity follow that the whole subsequent grace of the sacrament should not be dependent upon the particular state of mind in the individual at the time of admission to it. This result then of the law of non-repetition of baptism is sufficiently apparent in Scripture, and was assumed with entire consent by antiquity in its judgment in the case of the Fictus, in which it was laid down decisively that the rite of baptism could precede the first reception of the grace by an indefinite interval of time.⁷ So far, however, in ruling that the reception of the grace need not be simultaneous with the rite, it was only ruled that the rite could precede the grace. But it was also decided with entire consent that faithful adults who died *unbaptized* had the grace of baptism, on account of their faith and holiness, *without* the rite; and upon the basis of this judgment it was afterwards further ruled that the faithful adult who *was* baptized had the grace of baptism, by virtue of his faith and holiness, *before* the rite. That is to say, it was ruled that the grace could precede the rite by an indefinite interval.⁸ The necessity of the sign being simultaneous with the thing signified was thus relaxed at both ends, and the connexion of the grace and the rite was pronounced to be subject to this important modification, that the rite might be before the grace, or the grace before the rite. The Reformation divines took up the existing judgments of the Fathers and the Schools which had been formed in the case of adults, and applied them

⁷ Chapter iii.

⁸ Chapter ix.

to the case of infants ; who, upon their own scheme, had the grace of baptism on the same principle on which adults had, viz. conditionally upon faith, either a seminal before baptism, or actual after baptism.

1. Upon this general statement of the case there arises, first, the observation made above that the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, as existing in actual theology, is composed of a succession of judgments or applications of the general principle, or of a growth of distinctions and modifications, which arose according as the general principle of the connexion of the grace with the sacrament had to accommodate itself to *other* general principles of equity or of morals, or came across difficulties arising from other allowed doctrine, or from the meaning of the word "regenerate" itself. It was a principle of equity which obtained the judgment that in the case of the adult unbelieving at the time, but afterwards believing, the rite preceded the grace. It was a truth of morals which obtained the judgment that the faithful and repentant adult was justified before baptism, or that the grace could precede the rite. The allowed doctrine of predestination again contained in itself, by virtue of its actual meaning, an allowed limitation of the baptismal doctrine ; and the very Scriptural sense of regeneration contained the same. These limitations and modifications then of the baptismal doctrine, as held in antiquity and as developed and further extended by the Reformation divines, are what actually compose and form the material of the doctrine in the page of theology ; part of it consentient and part of it controverted material : and the short phrase, "Baptismal Regeneration," is the heading to that large and complex mass and formation of statement and distinction, of which I have endeavoured to give a summary in the preceding pages.

2. Another observation is, that what is called the

Sacramental System was found in actual application not to cover all the facts of Christianity, some of which were left outside of it, and those not mere isolated cases, but a class of facts, viz. the whole formation of Christian faith and holiness in adults, and their consequent justification, previous to the sacraments; showing a void in the sacramental system which requires a supplementary law, and reveals an opening into another counterbalancing system.

3. But though such observations as these, formed upon a general review of a large field of material, are not without their place in the consideration of this subject, they are all subordinate to one plain and simple distinction, viz. the distinction between that part of the doctrine of baptism which is in Scripture, and that which lies outside of Scripture. It must be admitted that Scripture is silent with respect to infants as recipients of the grace of baptism; and this being the case, it follows that, though the doctors of antiquity give one plan of this omitted ground, the divines of the Reformation another, neither plan can, according to the rule of faith adopted by our Church,⁹ compel our acceptance; and that therefore, according to the rule of our Church, the regeneration of all infants in baptism is not an article of the faith.

⁹ Chapter i.

PART II

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE question which the Gorham Judgment decided was a considerably narrower one than it was understood to be at the time. No question relating to the grace of baptism generally was decided by that judgment, nor was the opinion which that judgment pronounced to be permissible and consistent with our formularies, the opinion that no grace attaches to the Sacrament of Baptism. The judgment, on the contrary, supposed a certain grace attaching to that sacrament, and the opinion which it pronounced to be tenable within our Church was the opinion that that grace is never received without conditions; "that in no case is baptism unconditional."¹

¹ The statement of opinion decided by the Gorham Judgment *not* to be contrary to the doctrine of the Church of England is as follows: "That baptism is a sacrament generally necessary to salvation, but that the grace of regeneration does not so necessarily accompany the act of baptism that regeneration invariably takes place in baptism; that the grace may be granted before, in, or after baptism; that baptism is an effectual sign of grace by which God works invisibly in us, but only in such as worthily receive it—in them alone it has a wholesome effect; and that without reference to the qualification of the recipient it is not in itself an effectual sign of grace; that infants baptized and dying before actual sin are undoubtedly saved, *but that in no case is baptism unconditional.*"

The conditional character of the grace of baptism, confessed on both sides in the case of adults, was disputed in the case of infants as inconsistent with the formularies of our Church; and the point which was decided was that the opinion which *extended* its conditional character to the case of infants was *not* inconsistent with those formularies. The judgment was concerned then with the question, not of the grace of the sacrament, but of the recipients of that grace. For, the grace admitted and assumed,² it is a further question who are the recipients of it, or what constitutes the qualification for receiving it; and, in particular, whether the infantine state as such is a qualification and constitutes a worthy recipient. The formularies of the Church then were asserted on one side to decide this question in the affirmative, and to pronounce dogmatically that all infants were regenerate in baptism; while, on the other, it was maintained that our formularies did not assert this dogmatically, but left the question whether the regeneration of infants in baptism was conditional—i. e. whether all infants were regenerate in baptism or not—an open question; the view which was adopted by the Court, and formed what is called the Gorham Judgment.

The Gorham Judgment, in short, did not decide upon the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, but upon a particular application of the doctrine. For the doctrine of baptismal regeneration and the doctrine of the regeneration of all infants in baptism are not identical, though they have been often virtually treated as such in recent

² More notice ought to have been taken, than has been, of the plain and decided admission of the grace of the sacrament, as distinguished from the question of the conditions upon which it is received, made by the appellant side in the Gorham case: and I would call special attention to the strong and thoughtful language of the Dean of Ripon on this subject. Note 27.

controversy. The one is the assertion that baptism imparts regeneration to qualified persons; the other the further or particular assertion that certain persons are qualified. This latter question may, indeed, be decided correctly or incorrectly, and the doctrine may be held with this correct or incorrect adjunct; but the doctrine is the doctrine, as just stated, and not this adjunct.

The Gorham Judgment, however, as it has been guarded from being taken to mean too much, must also be guarded from being taken to mean too little. It is a curious instance of the ambiguity of human language that this judgment was no sooner out than its meaning was disputed, and that not on any collateral but on the fundamental point. The late Mr. Baron Alderson suggested, in a letter to the Bishop of Exeter, that the opinion "that the grace of baptism is in no case unconditional," being quite consistent with the opinion that infancy itself is an adequate condition, the judgment in allowing the former opinion gave no liberty to deny the latter, or therefore to deny the regeneration of all infants in baptism.³ But such an interpretation however ingenious, and dictated by however amiable a motive, is inadmissible, because, if we say that the grace of baptism is not even in the case of infants unconditional, we refer in the very form of speaking to some condition over and above the fact of their being infants. The judgment then must

³ Baron Alderson's "Letter to the Bishop of Exeter."—"Selections from the Charges and other Detached Papers of Baron Alderson," p. 230.

This interpretation appears to be indorsed by the Bishop of Exeter (Pastoral Letter, 1857, p. 5), who, however, is quite correct in saying that "the Gorham Judgment has not ruled that *the doctrine of spiritual regeneration in baptism is left in our Church an open question*;" the judgment not being concerned with the general question of the grace of the sacrament at all, but with another and a subordinate question exclusively.

be taken in the sense which general opinion attaches to it, and must be considered to permit as tenable the opinion that all infants are not regenerate in baptism ; while, on the other hand, to permit this opinion is by no means to permit a denial of the grace of the sacrament.

From defining what the point of doctrine was which was decided in the Gorham Judgment to be tenable within the English Church, I turn to the Church's *test* of doctrine. Nothing need have been said on this head were it not for a certain supposition which has been put forward, in connexion with this controversy, that the test of doctrine in our Church is *one particular construction* or sense of her formularies, called the Catholic—a sense not necessarily belonging to the words, but supplementary to them. This supposition if true alters the nature of the Church's test of doctrine, and supplants the formularies themselves as constituting this test. Are they consistent with a certain opinion themselves? Still this particular supposed construction of them may not be. The test of overt language is superseded by the test of an unexpressed sense.

But this supposition appears to be altogether without evidence or authority. The Church's test of doctrine is contained in the form of subscription ; and in the form of subscription no allusion is made to any such sense in which these formularies are to be understood. We are not required to assent to the documents in one particular sense, but to assent to the documents.

Nor, must it be observed, is this any proof that the Church does not aim at agreement with antiquity, but only that she expresses her estimate of antiquity *in* her formularies ; which formularies, therefore, must contain such estimate in their natural sense, without any need of recourse to a supplementary sense. The Church, in forming her exposition of Christian doctrine, had all the

data and sources of Christian truth before her; and, among the rest, she had, so far as she thought it necessary to avail herself of them, antiquity and the Fathers. When that exposition of doctrine then comes out in the shape of certain articles and formularies, it must be understood as expressing her interpretation of antiquity. And this being the case, to go back to antiquity again for the interpretation of these formularies, would be to reverse the natural order of things, and instead of using the interpretation to decide the meaning of the original document, to use the original document to decide the meaning of the interpretation.

The recommendation of our Church, in the Canons of 1571, to preachers, "that they do not teach anything in their sermons, save what is agreeable to the doctrine of the Old and New Testaments, and what the Catholic Fathers and Ancient Bishops have gathered from that doctrine," undoubtedly recommends what is in her judgment primitive doctrine as true. But it is one thing to recommend such doctrine as true, and another to append it as supplementary, i. e. as furnishing a supplementary sense to the formularies of the Church. Nothing can be more natural than that the Church, having constructed her formularies in agreement with primitive doctrine, as she understood it, should send her clergy to the same source of information which she had used herself; but such a recommendation does not at all show that she thinks her formularies defective in the expression of primitive doctrine, and wanting a supplementary sense from that quarter.

But are the formularies of the Church necessarily a perfectly adequate expression of her faith, or may they not omit points which the Church still intends to be believed? It is possible they may, but still the Church *imposes* no doctrine but what she expresses; and the remedy to such

an omission, if there is one, is a correction or addition to the formularies, and not an obligatory unexpressed sense of them.⁴

Nor is precedent, less than common sense, in favour of such a rule, and against the claim to judge men by an unexpressed sense, as distinguished from the language of creeds and formularies. The Church has always made language her test, nor, when her written creed was found an inadequate expression of the article of our Lord's Divinity, did she continue to use the imperfect document, and judge the Arians by the Catholic sense of it; but corrected the creed so as to express that sense, and then demanded subscription to the corrected creed.

The hypothesis, however, of inadequate expression is only applicable correctly to an earlier stage of doctrine, when those questions have not been mooted or those differences arisen which call for accuracy and fulness of definition. It is strangely out of place, as applied to our Church's statements on the baptismal question, constructed in a developed state of that question, when the differences connected with it had come out, and undergone great discussion. The very character of the Articles on this

⁴ Two points of belief have been noticed as omitted in our formularies, the inspiration of Scripture, and the personality of the devil. With respect to the former, the assertion of its omission appears to be a mistake. The Articles expressly refer to the Bible as the "Word of God," which is to assert its inspiration. Nor would it have been easy for the Church to say more on this point without going into distinctions which are fair subjects for latitude of opinion. The latter is certainly nowhere formally laid down, but it would be more reasonable to suppose in this case that the Church was satisfied with the general *de facto* belief in a point which she had not unnaturally passed over as uncontroverted, rather than that she enforced it by a supplementary unexpressed sense of her formularies.

subject, worded with the utmost caution and deliberation, evidently upon a survey of a variety of opinions and a large growth of controversy, through which they steer their way with the most jealous determination to say just as much as and no more than is considered necessary for sound faith, forbids such a supposition, and supplies, on the contrary, the strongest reason for reckoning our Church's statements on this subject to be an adequate expression of her faith upon it.

I cannot, indeed, but observe that the claim for a supplementary Catholic sense, in addition to the language of our formularies, comes not very consistently from those who appeal at the same time to the simple language of those formularies, as self-evidently decisive on this question: for why is a supplementary sense wanted if the language is proof positive by itself?

One of the ablest assailants of the Gorham Judgment falls unconsciously into this contradiction, and while asserting his conclusion as evident from the Church's express language, at the same time demands for this language the Catholic as distinguished from the "legal principle" of interpretation; and urges that there should be made, as soon as it shall be found practicable, "a public, formal, and authoritative declaration, that of all the various interpretations which by possible construction may be given to the formularies of the Reformation, that alone which has been from the first the doctrine of the Catholic Church shall henceforth be recognized as the doctrine of the Church of England."⁵ But if the language of our Church is open to "various constructions," some other construction besides the particular one for which this writer contends is admissible; and if a new doctrinal statement is wanted to enforce a doctrine, it is

⁵ Archdeacon Dodgson's *Controversy of Faith*, p. 101.

plain that our formularies do not enforce it as they stand.⁶

⁶ Though the imposition of a supplementary unexpressed sense which is more stringent than the language of our formularies is untenable, it is an entirely different question, whether the subscriber may not be allowed in certain cases a *relaxation* of the strictly literal sense. Such a liberty of divergence from the sense, being a concession to the subscriber and an accommodation for his benefit, because otherwise he could not accept the language, has at any rate no objection to meet with on the subscriber's part : but, if, when he *could* accept the language, he is stopped by a supposed sense which is more stringent than the language, he has a right to throw himself upon the form of subscription as excluding such a claim, by the simple fact of omitting all reference to such sense, and only requiring his assent to the document.

CHAPTER II

THE INFANT BAPTISMAL SERVICE

THE formularies of our Church may be divided broadly into Articles and Services ; though this is not an exact division. Under the head of Articles however we may place the Creeds to which the Articles demand assent, and also some dogmatic statements appended to the Services though not forming part of them. I reserve the Catechism, which does not come under either head, for another chapter.

The first division of our formularies then will not occupy us long, because it is obvious upon a slight examination, that there is nothing in their language at all definitive on the question before us. The clause in the Nicene Creed : " I believe in one baptism for the remission of sins," only mentions a particular benefit attaching to the sacrament as such, leaving open the further question who are the recipients of, or what are the conditions of, this benefit. The Twenty-seventh Article, and that part of the Twenty-fifth which relates to baptism, contain, it is admitted, nothing conclusive on the present question ; the statement that the sacraments " are effectual signs of grace," leaving the question open who are the recipients of that grace.¹ The dogmatic statement appended to the service for the Public Baptism of Infants, " It is certain by God's word that children which are

¹ " The Article leaves it doubtful what worthy reception is." Sir H. J. Fust's Judgment, p. 34.

baptized, dying before they commit actual sin, are undoubtedly saved," may be accepted and subscribed with perfect honesty by one who thinks it certain by God's word that *all* infants, even those who are unbaptized, dying before they commit actual sin are saved, because he regards it as inconsistent with the character of Goodness and Mercy assigned to God in Scripture, that He should exclude from salvation any beings who never committed actual sin. There is nothing in the terms of this statement, as they lie before us, to prevent the person just mentioned from subscribing to it; even without taking into consideration that, whereas the Articles of 1536, in asserting that "children dying in their infancy shall undoubtedly be saved," add, "*and else not*," this addition is pointedly omitted in the statement before us. It may be accepted and subscribed to again with perfect honesty by predestinarians, who regard the early death of Christian infants and their removal from the evil to come as the sign of their election, but who would justly observe that to hold that *some*, i. e. elect infants were saved was one thing, and to hold that *all* baptized infants were regenerate was another.² This statement speaks of a certain class of baptized infants, viz. those who "die before they commit actual sin," and what it asserts is limited to them: it does not speak of all baptized infants.³

² "Quos electione sua dignatus est Dominus, si, accepto regenerationis signo, presenti vita ante demigrent quam aboleverint, eos virtute sui Spiritus nobis incomprehensa renovat, quo modo expedit solus ipse providet." Calvin, *Instit.* l. 4, c. 16.

³ The translation of "renatis" in the Latin Article IX. by "baptized" in the English Article of 1552 and 1562, cannot imply that these two are equivalent terms, which would be by universal admission a gross error, involving even impenitent and unbelieving adults being regenerate by baptism: and not implying this, the translation proves nothing in regard to the present question.

From the dogmatic formularies of the Church then we turn to the services, and there we go at once to that statement upon which this whole controversy has mainly hinged—the statement in the Infant Baptismal Service, that “this child is regenerate.”

Here then we have undoubtedly a literal *statement*⁴ made by the Church, respecting every baptized infant, that it is regenerate; and the only question is, is it necessary to give it a literal *meaning*, or is an hypothetical meaning admissible?

I. Let us take first then the broad popular argument that this is a literal statement, and that *therefore* it must have a literal meaning, and that it is an obvious violation of language to give it any other. Is this argument correct then, and has this statement necessarily a literal meaning *because* it is a literal statement?

This argument is disposed of at once by a simple reference to the obvious and admitted fact that the Church does in her services make use of a form of statement which is literal in terms, but not in meaning. The instances of this kind of language in our Prayer Book are so familiar and well known, that it is hardly necessary to cite them here; it is enough to refer to this usage as one which is adopted by the Church and adopted upon principle. She frames her services upon the principle of charitable presumption—a rule which pervades the language of society and common life, and is largely used

The same answer may be made with respect to the conjunction in the Fifteenth Article,—“Sed nos reliqui etiam baptizati, et in Christo regenerati.”

⁴ By “literal statement,” I mean, of course, literal in form, literal as far as words go. The epithet literal may be used either of the *sense* of a term, to denote its true as distinguished from a secondary or incorrect sense; or of the *application* of a term, to denote its being predicated in matter of fact, not hypothetically.

in Scripture. Indeed a little reflection will show how difficult it would be to frame public services upon any other. We have no right to deprive the true members of the Church of the language which is due to them, and if we apply the language to any we must apply it to all, because we do not know which are the true, and which are the false members. Thus even the ordinary language of public prayer supposes all the congregation to be true worshippers of God, a supposition which issues in the kind of statement which we are now considering, literal in form, but not intended to be taken literally, such as that in the *Te Deum* "we," i.e. all here, "do put our trust in Thee." It is true that our Church services suppose what is but too certain in fact, that we are all sinners, but they also presume what is only true as a supposition, that we are all sincere and true penitents and worshippers.

The argument then that the statement in the Infant Baptismal Service has necessarily a literal meaning, *because* it is a literal statement, receives a plain refutation from the fact of a *class* of statements in the services, which are literal in form but *not* in meaning; and is rendered wholly untenable by an admitted and unquestionable usage of language in our Prayer Book. Indeed the very service in which this statement occurs contains on the face of it some peculiar statements, which cannot be understood literally. A person, who is called a sponsor, declares that he believes all the articles of the Christian faith, renounces the world and the flesh, and desires baptism, in the *name* of the child going to be baptized. In the first book of King Edward these statements were put into the infant's own mouth, which was altered into the present form in the second book; but the distinction is unimportant, for under either form a literal statement is made which is not intended to be understood literally;

for nobody imagines that a really vicarious act is performed in the sponsor's belief, renunciation, and desire for baptism, in the name of the child, inasmuch as no one person can really believe or desire in the stead of another. When, therefore, following this series of literal statements, which are not intended to be understood literally, and in obvious connexion with them, another statement comes, viz. the one now in question, it is evident that the latter does not stand on the same ground, with regard to the necessity of understanding it literally, on which it would if we met it in another situation. It is true these sponsorial statements are not essential to the rite, and do not occur in the private service; but they do occur in this service, and stamp the office in which they do occur as a kind of document which admits of statements which are literal in form, but not intended to be understood literally.

Again, this very service contains a verbally absolute statement of the future salvation of the infant. Nobody can be required to believe without doubt any particular fact, unless it is true; and, therefore, to tell us to "doubt not but earnestly believe that God will give unto him [this infant] the blessing of eternal life, and make him partaker of His everlasting kingdom," is to assert the fact of the future salvation of the infant. But this assertion cannot possibly be understood literally, and is therefore another proof contained within this very service of the character of a baptismal service, viz. that it admits of a class of statements which are literal in form, but hypothetical in meaning.

But we have only to turn over a page in the Prayer Book to see that this argument, from the simple literalness of the statement, is at any rate incorrect. We have the very same statement, which is used in the Infant Baptismal Service, used in the Adult Baptismal Service; and in the

latter service it is used by the confession of all parties in an hypothetical sense. We may certainly dismiss this ground then of the simple literalness of the statement as at once insufficient, because to the argument that a literal meaning must be given to the statement in the Infant Baptismal Service *because* it is a literal statement, it is at once a full and decisive reply to produce the very same literal statement as used in another service hypothetically.

It is alleged, indeed, on the strength of the expression, "truly repenting and coming unto Him by faith," which is applied to the adult who comes to be baptized, that the evidence of an hypothetical meaning in his case is *incorporated in the service*, which it is said not to be in the case of the infant. But, even if the meaning of this statement in the Adult Service is shown by evidence in the very service to be hypothetical, that cannot alter the fact that it *is* hypothetical, which is all that has been observed. *If* the above expressions, indeed, in the Adult Service are to be considered as such internal evidence of such a meaning in that service, the sponsorial statements might be appealed to as affording something like the same internal evidence in the Infant Service; for the infant is certainly supposed in these statements to believe and renounce the world in the person of his sponsor, as the adult is in the other statement supposed to repent and believe in his own person. But, without entering into any comparison of this kind, it is enough to say that the statement in the Adult Service, that the adult just baptized is regenerate, is undoubtedly a literal statement with an hypothetical meaning; and that this fact shows beyond dispute that the statement in the Infant Service that the infant is regenerate has not a literal meaning, *because* it is a literal statement.

It is an instance of the inaccuracy of the reasoning which has been employed on this question that some

writers have appealed to the posteriority of the *date* of the Adult Service, as an answer to the above argument, on the principle that nothing in a service of a later date can argumentatively affect a service of a prior date.⁵ As if the question of date were of any relevance in deciding the simple fact of the existence of a certain kind of statement in our Prayer Book! The Adult Baptismal Service is a part of our Prayer Book, whatever be the date of its insertion, and a statement in it is a statement in our Prayer Book; and this statement is by the confession of all parties a literal statement intended to be understood hypothetically. If it was not inserted in our Prayer Book before 1662, that only shows that, it devolving upon the Church at that time to construct a new baptismal service, she availed herself of the hypothetical principle in constructing it, and introduced an additional statement into our Prayer Book founded upon this principle. In doing which, indeed, she only followed ancient precedent; all the ancient baptismal offices making the same literal statement, intended to be understood hypothetically, over the baptized adult.

The Gorham Judgment drew attention to this characteristic of services as distinguished from dogmatic formularies or articles, and to its plain and immediate bearing upon the point in controversy. To the argument from the literalness of the statement in the baptismal office, the judges replied that, however correct it would have been had the statement been made in the Articles, literal statements were not necessarily to be interpreted literally in Church services. They said that we must take into consideration the *place* of the statement, the *class of document* in which it occurred, as well as the statement itself. The same distinction, indeed, holds good in ordi-

⁵ Mr. Harold Browne's "Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles," p. 668. "Revision of the Liturgy," by John C. Fisher, p. 436.

nary literature, for it would make all the difference often in the obligation to the literal interpretation of a statement, whether the latter occurred in an oration or in a history.

I will leave this first part of the argument then with two remarks. The first is, that if the Church intended this statement as a dogmatic statement to enforce the doctrine of the regeneration of all infants in baptism, she has made an unaccountable choice of the place where she has introduced it. Had this statement appeared in the Articles, or had it appeared as an independent and detached statement, it would have been necessarily interpreted according to the rules by which we interpret Articles, and by which we interpret independent and isolated statements; and in neither of these situations does the principle of hypothetical interpretation come in. But she has inserted it in a service, in the regular order of that service, and as part and parcel of it. She has therefore deliberately not introduced it in a situation in which literal construction is necessary, and just introduced it in a situation in which hypothetical construction is admissible. What reason can be assigned for such an arrangement as this? Why, when the whole subject of baptism is before her in the Twenty-seventh Article, does she not make the statement *then* instead of confining herself to the assertion, which is the only one she makes about infant baptism specially—that “the baptism of young children is in any wise to be retained in the Church?”

The other remark is, that though the argument from the Baptismal Service is not yet fully disposed of, a very important part of it is. It is not, I think, any misrepresentation to say, that though particular persons have gone more critically into the question, the popular argument of the side opposed to the Gorham Judgment has

been the broad, simple, and downright one that a literal statement *must* have a literal meaning; that this has been the great working argument in the whole controversy, the great instrument of persuasion, and basis of confidence. What I observe then is, that this argument is refuted not certainly by any subtle or elaborate explanation, but by the simple process of turning over a page in the Prayer Book, on the other side of which is seen this same literal statement, used by the confession of all parties in an hypotheticalal sense.

II. It is urged, however, that the argument does not rest here, because, though that kind of statement which is literal in form but not in meaning is *admitted* into Church services, we are not therefore at liberty to set down any statement that we meet with in a Church Service as a statement of this kind, and to give it an hypotheticalal construction; but that, in addition to the general fact of the admissibility of such a class of statements into Church services, some further reason is needed to justify this construction in the particular case.

This further reason then is asserted to be the *necessity* of such a construction—that the hypothetical interpretation is necessary in the particular case, and the literal one impossible.⁶ And on this principle a distinction is drawn between the same statement, as occurring in the Adult, and as occurring in the Infant Baptismal Service; because it is alleged that repentance and faith being by universal admission conditions of regeneration in the case of adults, and conditions of which we do not know whether they are fulfilled or not, this statement cannot be anything but hypothetical in the case of adults; whereas, the regeneration of infants being *without* conditions, the reason which justifies this construction in the

⁶ Davison's Remains, p. 294.

case of adults does not exist in the case of the infant to supply this justification.

When this distinction is made then between the statement as occurring in the Infant Baptismal Service, and the same statement as occurring in the Adult Service, viz. that there are conditions of unknown fulfilment in the case of adults which do not exist in the case of infants; I observe, first, that this is a very different ground, in respect of pretensions to be obvious, palpable, and self-evident, from the ground which has been popularly used in this controversy; for, in the place of an universal claim for the literal interpretation of literal statements, we have on this ground only a distinction between one case for hypothetical interpretation and another. But, what is much more important, I observe next that this distinction does not in truth at all meet the case; and for this simple reason, that it assumes to begin with the ultimate and fundamental point in dispute, viz. that the regeneration of infants *is* without conditions. One school indeed in the Church asserts this, but another denies it.⁷ It is true that the condition of faith and repentance *in act* is an impossible one in the case of infants; but there still remain conditions which are asserted by one whole section of the Church to attach to the regeneration of infants; and conditions of such a nature that we cannot tell at the time whether they are fulfilled or not. It is the doctrine of one school that the infant must like the adult have faith, as the condition of his receiving, while an infant, the grace of baptism; that is to say, that he must have had a seminal faith, or the seed of a future faith, implanted in him by Divine grace before his baptism, as the condition of his being regenerated at baptism. This is what is called the doctrine of

⁷ Part I. Chapter ii. and Note 28.

“prevenient grace,” which is the application to infant baptism of the law of adult baptism. It is admitted on all sides that prevenient grace is necessary for the adult’s regeneration at baptism, being necessary in order to enable him to have faith, which is the condition of his regeneration. One school maintains that the same prevenient grace is necessary for the regeneration of the infant at baptism as well, and for the same reason, viz. for the implanting faith in him. But this is a condition of unknown fulfilment, because we cannot tell whether an infant has had this seminal faith implanted in him or not. The Calvinist even adds to this condition, that the seminal faith thus implanted should be indefectible: he makes election the necessary condition of regeneration, and allows no one to be regenerate who will not finally persevere. He adds, therefore, another condition of unknown fulfilment, for we cannot tell whether the infant brought to the font is or is not one of the elect, and will or will not finally persevere. Such being the state of the case then, those who maintain that the regeneration of infants is accompanied by conditions of unknown fulfilment, say that the same reason which obliges them to understand this statement hypothetically as made respecting adults, obliges them to understand it hypothetically as made respecting infants.⁸

⁸ I have only taken in this argument one of two alternatives involved in the doctrine of the conditional regeneration of infants, viz. that of their conditional *present* regeneration, *while* infants. There is another alternative, viz. the *future* regeneration of the infant, upon conditions, when he is grown up; which I have omitted, because it might be objected that the principle of hypothetical construction requires at any rate a basis of *present* fact; that what we *now* suppose of *all*, is *now* literally true of *some*. “What I have always been struck with,” says Lord Lyttelton, “is, that whenever these reasoners give any definition whatever or statement of regeneration, it is one which by the nature of things is

What is there to be said then in answer to this claim? Can it be shown that the Church anywhere prohibits this doctrine of the conditional regeneration of infants? It cannot: she is neutral and silent upon this point. One baptismal scheme puts infants upon a different ground, with respect to baptism, from that of adults; another baptismal scheme puts both upon the same ground. One baptismal scheme makes the infantine state in the Infant equivalent to faith in the Adult; another requires a previous implantation of faith in the Infant, as in the Adult, in order to his being regenerate while an infant. One scheme, in short, is that of unconditional infant regeneration, the other of conditional. But our Church lays down nothing upon this question, and allows by her silence her ministers to adopt either of the two schemes which appears to them most reasonable. She leaves even the full Calvinistic conditions of regeneration untouched, maintaining at the very least a *neutral* ground upon the general Calvinistic question; and in particular nowhere saying that regeneration is *not* conditional upon election, or that it is *not* conditional upon

impossible and inapplicable to any infant; from which inevitably follows not the hypothetical doctrine, but the result that in *no* case can the words of the service be actually true; in no case can an infant be regenerate." (Tract on Infant Baptism, p. 11.) Without entering therefore into the question whether the basis of fact which is necessary in supposition may not be supplied by future fact, as well as by present, I have only here taken the case of present fact, and have argued upon the doctrine of those who hold a *present* regeneration of infants, while infants, but that only conditionally; which is a position which has been from the Reformation to the present day largely held in the school which maintains the conditional regeneration of infants (see Chapter vii.); and which was the most prominent side of that doctrine in the language of Mr. Gorham, and evoked the conspicuous and notable phrase of "prevenient grace."

final perseverance. The doctrine of the conditional regeneration of infants then is nowhere prohibited by the Church, but stands on a par with the other doctrine, as one of two alternatives between which the Church does not decide. And this being the case, the liberty to hold the doctrine carries with it the liberty to hold the concomitant interpretation of this statement. This statement, it must be remembered, is a statement in a Service, not in an Article; and as a statement in a Service it has to begin with a liability to an hypothetical interpretation which a statement in an Article has not. The Church then, in this state of the case, allows a doctrine which makes that interpretation here necessary: she therefore allows that interpretation.

But it will be asked, Is not the statement in the Infant Baptismal Service itself a prohibition of the doctrine of the conditional regeneration of infants? The answer is, Certainly not. Because to assert it to be such a prohibition would be to *assume*, to begin with, that the statement must necessarily be interpreted literally, which is the very point which has to be proved. Taken hypothetically, this statement is no prohibition at all of the doctrine of the conditional regeneration of infants, but can be accepted quite consistently with it. Unless we go back again then to the old disproved ground that a literal statement must have a literal meaning, we are debarred from adducing *this* statement as any prohibition of the doctrine of the conditional regeneration of infants. Indeed, the statement in the Infant Baptismal Service is no more of itself opposed to the doctrine of the conditional regeneration of infants, than the statement in the Adult Service is opposed to the doctrine of the conditional regeneration of adults.

The Church's admitted toleration of Calvinism again is met by saying that *all* Calvinists do not deny the uncon-

ditional regeneration of infants.⁹ But whether or not there exists an exceptional Calvinism (which I have nowhere come across) which admits this doctrine, the question is whether the Church does not tolerate that ordinary Calvinism which denies it. If any one maintains that she does not, will he point out the prohibitory passage in our formularies?

It is objected again that the hypothetical ground can only apply to adults and not to infants, because "*charitable supposition*" can only apply "to cases of *capable and responsible agents*; in relation to whom some gift or promise of God is referred to, which is known from Scripture to be conditional *upon some act of their own.*"¹ This objection, however, is met by simply dropping the word "*charitable*," the omission of which will not affect the argument. A Calvinist can plainly make the *supposition* that an infant is one of the elect; whether this is a *charitable* supposition or not is altogether immaterial, though it would be difficult to say that the supposition that an infant would finally persevere was not a charitable supposition.

The liberty then to hold the doctrine of the conditional regeneration of infants being clear and evident, in the order of reason upon *conditional* follows *hypothetical*; and the right to hold the doctrine includes the right to give the interpretation.

The argument is the same if, in the place of the *con-*

⁹ "It is a fact beyond dispute," says Archdeacon Dodgson, "that men holding the Calvinistic doctrine of absolute decrees, have also held the universality of regeneration in infant baptism." I have looked in vain for this fact. Ward and Davenant held a "*regeneratio sacramentalis*" of all infants in baptism, but not a true regeneration. They were very particular in saying that they did not use the word in this universal *application* in its true sense. See Chapter xi. Part I.

¹ Archdeacon Dodgson's "Controversy of Faith," p. 75.

ditions of regeneration, we put the sense of the term "regenerate." When we come to this statement in the Infant Baptismal Service, an immediate natural obstacle to the literal construction of it meets us in the very sense of the term "regenerate," or "born of God." For this term in its true and Scriptural sense implies actual goodness.² But are all infants made actually good in baptism? This is contrary to plain experience.³ Without assuming, however, this as the Scriptural sense of the term "regenerate," the *sense* of regeneration still stands on the same ground on which the *conditions* of regeneration stood just now, and with the same results. The Church nowhere *defines* the sense of this term: she therefore, at any rate, leaves it *open* to the sense of actual goodness. She even leaves it open to the Calvinistic sense of *indefectible* goodness, i. e. that cannot be fallen away from totally or finally; and leaving it open to that sense which involves the hypothetical construction of this statement, she allows that hypothetical construction.

One distinction must indeed be admitted between the Infant and Adult Services as cases for hypothetical interpretation, viz. that in the one case the interpretation is a universal one, in the other not. But this is not a relevant distinction here, because, in order to found a simple *right* or *liberty* to hold a particular interpretation, it is not necessary that that interpretation should be held by everybody. The whole Church interprets the statement of the Adult's regeneration hypothetically. Why? Because the whole Church holds that the regeneration of adults is conditional. A portion of the Church interprets the statement of the Infant's regeneration hypothetically. Why? Because a portion holds that the regeneration of

² Part I. Chapter v.³ Part I. Chapter x.

infants is conditional. If the doctrine of the conditional regeneration of infants then is not prohibited, those who hold it, whatever proportion of the Church they may be, have as much right to interpret the statement hypothetically in the case of infants, as the whole Church has to do so in the case of adults.⁴

The ground on which some cases of hypothetical interpretation rest is unquestionably a ground in which there is universal agreement; the literal interpretation being opposed to something which is universally admitted, whether fact of common sense or article of belief. The implicit statement in the Prayer Book, that the reigning sovereign is always a "religious and gracious" person, would, literally interpreted, contradict a fact of experience. The statement in every case of the regeneration of the adult would, literally interpreted, be opposed to a universally admitted doctrine, viz. that the regeneration of the adult is conditional upon faith and repentance. But it would be an arbitrary and untenable restriction of the right and use of hypothetical interpretation to confine it to cases in which there was universal agreement. Because, even if the necessity for such an interpretation arises not from any universally admitted fact or truth, but from the tenet or doctrine of a school; still, if the Church allows the doctrine in consequence of which the interpretation is necessary, she allows the interpretation.

The argument for the necessity of the interpretation of the statement in the Infant Baptismal Service has thus broken down in both of the two stages into which it is divided. As a broad and downright argument, that a literal statement must have a literal meaning, it was refuted by the obvious facts of the Prayer Book. As an argument which distinguishes between Infants and

⁴ Note 29.

Adults, on the ground of conditions, it has given way because it assumes, without any right, the important point that the regeneration of infants is without conditions.

The truth is then, this statement in the Infant Baptismal Service has not been properly understood with respect to its place in our formularies, and has been in consequence incorrectly estimated for argumentative purposes. Because it is in form literal, it has been taken simply as a dogmatic statement, and been relied upon as such; and exactly the same force has been given to it as if it had been made in one of the Thirty-nine Articles. No difference has been acknowledged between a situation in a service and a situation in a formulary of faith. It has been appealed to therefore as, without need of further inquiry, containing its own evidence of a necessarily literal meaning belonging to it. It has been consequently taken as of itself deciding the doctrine of our Church on this question. But this whole estimate of this statement is refuted by an appeal to the simplest liturgical facts. This statement, in the place in which it stands, is of itself open either to a literal or an hypothetical interpretation. This statement, therefore, does not interpret the general teaching of the Church, but, on the contrary, the general teaching of the Church must interpret this statement. Does the Church pronounce that infant regeneration in baptism is unconditional? Then she imposes the literal interpretation of this statement. Does she pronounce that it is conditional? Then she imposes the hypothetical interpretation of it. Does she allow us to hold either view? Then she allows us to interpret this statement either way.

CHAPTER III

THE CATECHISM

THE same argument which decides the interpretation of the Baptismal Service decides also the interpretation of the Catechism. The definition of the grace of baptism in the latter part of the Catechism does not determine anything as to the recipients of that grace, or therefore as to all infants receiving it. But in the first part of the Catechism, there is a statement, put into every child's mouth, that "he was made in baptism a child of God."¹ Here then is undoubtedly a literal *statement* that the child was regenerate in baptism, and the only question is whether a literal *meaning* is necessary.

To what class of documents then does the Catechism belong? Does it belong to the class which admits of hypothetical statements (i. e. in form literal, but with an

¹ With reference to another statement: "Who redeemed me and all mankind:" it must be observed that this *redemption* does not involve the bestowal of *grace*, inasmuch as *all* mankind are not even converted to Christianity, or brought within the Christian covenant. Calvinists thus admit the doctrine of universal redemption. "In the new law Christ hath truly given Himself with a conditional pardon, justification, and conditional rights of salvation to all men in the world without exception Elect and non-elect therefore have an equal right to Christ till believing difference them But though Christ died equally for all in the aforesaid *law sense*, as He satisfied the offended legislator, and as giving Himself to all alike in the conditional covenant, yet He never properly intended or purposed the actual justification or saving of all." Baxter on Universal Redemption, pp. 55, 58, 63.

hypothetical meaning) or not? If it does, then all the argument of the last chapter applies to this statement in it, and need not be repeated.

A distinction has been drawn then between a Catechism and a Service which would, if true, prevent the argument which was applied in the last chapter to the Service, from being applicable to the Catechism. For, it is said, "a Catechism is not at any rate, whatever a Service may be, a document which admits of statements to be taken in an hypothetical meaning. A Catechism is a formulary drawn up for the purpose of instruction, and for teaching the child what are the truths and doctrines of Christianity, and therefore *all* the statements made in a Catechism must be statements of actual truths, admitting in the nature of the case only of a literal meaning." If this account then of the nature and character of a Catechism as a Church formulary is correct, then that characteristic which formed the basis of the argument relating to the Baptismal Service, is wanting in the Catechism, and therefore the conclusion which was arrived at with respect to the Service, would not apply to the Catechism. But it will be found, I think, upon examination that this account of the character and nature of a Catechism, and the class of document to which it belongs, is not correct; but that on the contrary a Catechism is a kind of formulary which admits of presumptive statements, i. e. that are literal in form, but hypothetical in meaning.

It must be observed then that though a Catechism is a formulary of instruction, and is drawn up for the purpose of teaching doctrinal truth, it is a formulary of a particular structure, and is made upon a particular plan and arrangement, viz. that of question and answer. A dogmatic formulary is simply a series of statements, standing by themselves, without the introduction of any personages in the shape of catechist and child, or machinery in

the shape of question and answer to elicit these statements. But a Catechism is a departure from the structure of a dogmatic formulary, in this respect, that it introduces this personal machinery with the alternation of question and answer. And this being the plan of the formulary, we find in the next place that this plan leads to a result which bears immediately upon the question before us. The child, being introduced, is presumed to be in the spiritual condition in which a Christian child ought to be, and to have the wishes, aims, and resolutions proper to his calling. Thus when he is asked, "Dost thou not think that thou art bound to believe and to do as they [the godfathers and godmothers] have promised for thee?" he answers, "Yes, verily, and by God's help so I will; and I heartily thank our heavenly Father that He hath called me to this state of salvation, through Jesus Christ our Saviour. And I pray unto God to give me His grace, that I may continue in the same unto my life's end." Here is a set of statements put into the child's mouth, by which he is made to declare that he intends to believe and to do as his godfathers and godmothers have promised for him, that he thanks his heavenly Father for spiritual blessings already received, and prays to Him that those blessings may be continued. These are literal statements made in one of the child's answers in the Catechism, respecting the religious intentions, wishes, and heartfelt thankfulness of the child. But it cannot be supposed that they have a literal meaning, and are intended to assert categorically that every child who is catechized has these intentions, wishes, and feelings of thankfulness. They are obviously put into the child's mouth upon the presumptive principle, because it is assumed that he is in the spiritual condition of mind in which a Christian child ought to be, and they are intended to be and must be understood hypothetically.

And the same interpretation must be applied to another statement, not of a parenthetical kind like the last one, but relating to an important and fundamental doctrine, that of the sanctifying influence of the Holy Spirit. The answer in which the child asserts the sanctifying influence of the Holy Spirit, states that doctrinal truth in such a way, and in such a form, as to include the child himself in the number of those who are sanctified *by* this influence, that is to say, among the sanctified and the elect—"Who sanctifieth me and all the elect people of God." By saying this the child was made by the framers of our Catechism to include himself among the elect, who will finally be saved;—a statement which evidently could not be understood otherwise than hypothetically.

Considerable controversy has indeed arisen about the meaning of this statement, that is to say, about the meaning of the term "elect" in it; many maintaining that the term "elect" here does not mean elect to eternal life, but only chosen for admission into the Visible Church, elect to Christian privileges and means of grace.²

² When our Lord says that "God shall send His angels, and they shall gather together His elect from the four winds" (Matt. xxiv. 31); and when He asks whether "God shall not avenge His own elect" (Luke xviii. 7); and when He says again of a certain season of terrible trial, that "there shall arise false Christs and false prophets who, if it were possible, shall deceive the very elect," and that "except those days should be shortened there should no flesh be saved: but for the elect's sake those days shall be shortened" (Matt. xxiv. 24, 22); and when St. Paul asks "Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's elect" (Rom. viii. 33); and when St. Peter writes to the "elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father unto obedience" (1 Pet. i. 2); the elect who in these passages are avenged by God, and are guarded against the possibility of deception, and against whom the accuser is challenged to prove anything, and who are at the end of the world gathered by the holy angels from the four corners of the earth, are certainly God's saints. What would be the force of the expression that "if

But the object of this inquiry being simply to ascertain the nature of a Catechism as a formulary, and whether it admits of a certain class of statements or not, all that we are concerned with in the present case, is a question of fact; viz. what was the current and received meaning of the term “elect” at the time of the construction of our Catechism? We are not, for the purpose of this inquiry, at liberty to affix our own meaning to terms and statements in the Catechism, even though that meaning may be an allowed one, but we must take them in the meaning which they bore, according to general use and acceptance, at the time of their insertion in the Catechism. If this particular statement in our Catechism—“Who sanctifieth me and all the elect people of God,” had at the time of its insertion—in consequence of the received meaning of the term “elect” at that time—such a meaning, as that it could only *then* by possibility be understood hypothetically, that is at once a proof of the nature of a Catechism as a formulary, viz. that it admits of that kind of statement which is literal in form, but in meaning hypothetical.

What was the current and received meaning then of the term “elect” at the time of the construction of our Catechism? The answer is, that as understood by the whole Church of that day, and as employed by divines of

it were possible they should deceive the very elect,” if the elect only meant those who were chosen for admission to Christian privileges, i. e. all members of the Visible Church? Many of these are men whose deception need create no surprise at all, much less be an impossible supposition. It is true that whole Churches are addressed in the Epistles as elect, but this *application* of the term “elect” no more affects the *meaning* of the term “elect,” than the same application of the term “saint” affects the meaning of the term “saint:” “saint” being a holy man, and the “elect” meaning those who will be saved, although whole bodies are supposed to be “saints” and “elect,” and addressed on that supposition.

both sides, Protestant and Roman, it had but one meaning, viz. those who would out of the whole mass of mankind be ultimately saved. "Election" attended with an express qualification, such as "outward election," "temporal election," was indeed employed to express an election into the Visible Church, and to the participation of the visible means of grace. But the term, "the elect," simple and naked, in its general use and acceptance among divines, meant the elect to eternal life, those who would finally be saved. That was the sense of Melancthon,³ Luther, Erasmus, Calvin, Bellarmine, Cranmer, Ridley, Latimer, Nowell, Jewell, and Hooker.⁴

³ Note 30.

⁴ "Semper in hoc cœtu sunt *electi* aliqui, i. e. hæredes æternæ vitæ, etiamsi simul his admixti sunt multi non sancti et non electi." Melancthon, Op. iv. p. 158. "Omnes salvandi *electi* sunt, et ita sunt electi ut agnoscant Filium et ad eum confugiant." Ibid. p. 161. "In hac (visibili ecclesia) tantum sunt *electi*, propter quos et hic visibilis cœtus a Deo colligitur et conservatur." p. 159.

"Propter *electos* ista vulgantur, ut isto modo humiliati et in nihilum redacti salvi fiant." Luther, Op. t. ii. p. 431.

"Omnes *electi* certo salvantur." Bellarmine, De Grat. et Lib. Arb. l. ii. c. 10.

"The penitent must conceive certain hope and faith that God will forgive him his sins, and repute him justified and of the number of His *elect* children." "Institution of a Christian Man." "The book lately devised by me [Cranmer] and other Bishops of this realm." Strype's Cranmer, vol. i. p. 73.

"In all ages God hath had His own manner after His unsearchable wisdom to use His *elect*, sometimes to deliver them and to keep them safe, and sometimes to suffer them to drink of Christ's cup, that is, to feel the smart and to feel the whip Here He doth but respite them to another time, and leaveth them in danger to fall in like peril again: there He maketh them perfect, to be without pain or peril for evermore." Ridley, Parker Soc. Ed. p. 75.

"All the *elect* shall be gathered to Him, and there shall they see the judgment; but they themselves shall not be judged, but shall be like as judges with them No heart can comprehend the

It was the sense of the Thirty-nine Articles, and of the Confession of Trent.⁵ Nor even did Arminius and the great felicity that God hath prepared for His elect." Latimer, Serm. xlii.

"Τὶς ἐγκαλέσει κατὰ ἐκλεκτῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ; i. e. quis accusabit aut quis crimen intendet adversus electos Dei . . . Sensus Pauli manifestus est neminem ausurum criminari eos quos Deus non solum vocavit, sed etiam elegit." Erasmi Annotationes, p. 276.

"God's election is sure for ever. The Lord knoweth them who are His . . . you shall not fall for ever, you shall not perish . . . But how may we see this election? Or how may we feel it? The Apostle saith 'through sanctification and the faith of the truth.'" Jewell on 2 Thess. ii. 13.

"Cur Sanctus (Sanctus Spiritus) appellatur? Non tantum ob suam ipsius sanctitatem, sed quod per eum *electi* Dei et membra Christi sancta efficiuntur . . . Qui sunt in fide firmi, stabiles atque constantes, hi *electi* atque designati et prædestinati erant ad hanc tantam felicitatem ante posita mundi fundamenta." Nowell's Catechism, pp. 52, 53.

"Perpetuity of inward grace belongeth unto none but eternally foreseen elect . . . Such is that grace which *the elect* find." Hooker, vol. ii. p. 750.

"Certe nemo unquam dixerit (credo) fidem in *electis* finaliter excidere." Bp. Andrewes on Lambeth Articles.

"The reward of *the elect* and the punishment of the reprobate becomes the means of God's glory in regard that, God having proposed a law . . . the one have observed it, the others not." Thorndike, Covenant of Grace, b. ii. c. 26, § 3.

"And ever remain in the number of Thy faithful and *elect* children." Baptismal Service. "Shortly accomplish the number of Thine *elect*." Burial Service.

⁵ "Nemo quamdiu in hac mortalitate vivitur, præsumere debet ut certo statuatur se omnino esse in numero *prædestinatorum* . . . Nam nisi ex speciali revelatione sciri non potest quos Deus sibi *elegerit*." Conc. Trident. Sess. vi. c. 12. "(Deus) constanter decrevit eos, quos in Christo *elegit* ex hominum genere, a maledicto et exitio liberare atque, ut vasa in honorem ficta, per Christum ad æternam salutem adducere. Unde qui tam præclaro Dei beneficio sunt donati . . . pertingunt ad sempiternam felicitatem." Seventeenth Article. According to the grammatical construction of the Article, God has decreed to bring the elect—quos elegit—to eternal life: i. e. the

Remonstrants afterwards interfere with this sense; they differed from the Calvinists as to the *cause*, but they agreed with them as to the nature of election. Calvin said that the cause of election was the arbitrary will of God, Arminius, that it was the foreseen goodness of man; but both Calvin and Arminius meant by "the elect," those who were elected to eternal glory, those who would finally be saved. Calvinism and Arminianism concurred in one sense of the term "elect," although upon one theory man's righteousness preceded his election, on the other, man's election preceded and was the cause of his righteousness.

According to the correct and received meaning then of the term "elect" at the time of the construction of our Catechism, the statement—"Who sanctifieth me and all the elect people of God," could not have been understood then but as an hypothetical statement; and therefore the character of the Catechism as a formulary is ascertained in this respect, viz. that it admits of this kind of statement. We are met, however, now by a distinction which is drawn between "the elect" and the "elect people of God," which is the phrase used in the Catechism. It has been maintained that, though "the elect" means those who are elected to eternal life, the "elect people of God" means those who are elected to Christian privileges and means of grace. This distinction, however, has to begin with an arbitrary appearance; for certainly any plain man would say that "the elect" and "the elect people of God" meant the same thing: nor does it bear examination. The only reason which can be assigned why "the elect" should change its meaning when it becomes "the elect people of God" is, that "the elect will be saved. Nor does the Arminian deny this sense of the Article, but only assigns as the cause of this certain salvation of the elect, the foreseen goodness of the elect. Burnet on Art. XVII.

elect" figure in the first phrase as a number of persons, or a simple plural; in the second, as one body, or a people. But this is no reason for a change of the meaning of the word "elect." It has been always usual, and Scripture sets the example of this double point of view, to look upon the saints and servants of God in the world in two aspects, as a number of individuals, and as a holy body or community or people. There is a number of persons who are zealous of good works, and there is "a peculiar people zealous of good works." There is a rest laid up for every man of God, and "there remaineth a rest for the people of God." There are those "whom God did foreknow," and there is "His people whom He foreknew," and did "not cast away." The men who are zealous of good works, those for whom a rest remaineth, and those who are foreknown, do not become different but remain the same persons, regarded as individuals and regarded as a people. The saints are the same persons, with the same character, whether considered as a number of individuals, or as united in the "Communion of Saints."

Nor, in the same way, do the "elect" become different persons with different characteristics when they are regarded as "the elect people of God," but are the same persons with the same characteristics, only viewed as a number of single persons in the one phrase, as a people or body in the other. St. Paul calls the same persons both "the elect," which is plural, and "the election," ἡ ἐκλογή,⁶ which is singular, or a unity; and the "glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle, or any such thing, but holy and without blemish," must be the Church of the elect, or the elect considered as one body or Church. The "*Civitas Dei*" of Augustine is the society or body

⁶ Rom. xi. 7.

of the elect, who are even now to the Divine eye separated from the world and form one spiritual community. "I divide," he says, "the human race into two kinds; one of which lives according to man, the other according to God, and I mystically call them two cities—i.e. two human societies—of which one is predestined to reign eternally with God, the other to suffer eternal punishment with the devil."⁷

But the language of contemporary theology shows beyond dispute that "the elect" and the "elect people of God" meant exactly the same thing, and that the only difference was one of aspect, whether the same persons were regarded as a body or as a number of individuals. The theology of the Reformation is full of the aspect of "the elect," as one people, one society, one body in the eye of God; an aspect which was expressed by the "unum corpus electorum" of Calvin; the "congregatio Christianorum et sanctorum hominum" of Luther; the "Electa Ecclesia," the "Ecclesia sanctorum," the "Populus Spiritualis," the "Populus Dei Sanctus," the "Verus populus Dei renatus," of Melancthon; the "Body mystical collective" of Hooker; the "Invisible Church" of all Protestant divinity.

"There exists for ever in the world," says Luther, "this holy Christian multitude in which Christ is efficacious. . . . This holy Christian Church, and holy Christian people of God."⁸ "St. Paul," says Melancthon, "distinguishes the elect Church from the other multitude which has the title and boasts its carnal propagation or ordinary succession of external government. St. Paul distinguishes the true Church from the false . . . He gives the sweet consolation that there shall always be a certain elect Church, *Ecclesia Electa propter Filium*; and

⁷ De Civ. Dei, l. xv. c. 1.

⁸ Notæ Veræ Ecclesiæ. Op. tom. vii. pp. 148, 152.

that though the greater part will perish, a remnant or small part will be converted to God, . . . and this elect Church is justified, and shall be adorned with eternal glory.”⁹—“*This Church is alone called the body of Christ, which Christ renews, sanctifies, and rules by His Spirit, as Paul says, ‘And He gave Him to be head over all things to the Church, which is His body.’*”¹ “The Church of Christ,” says the Seventh Article of the Confession of Augsburg, “is properly (*proprie*) the congregation of the members of Christ, i. e. of holy men, who truly believe in and obey Christ, though in this life there are mixed with this congregation many evil men and hypocrites.” “After Christ,” says the Homily on the Nativity, “was once come down from heaven, and had taken our frail nature upon Him, He made all them that would believe Him truly and receive His word good trees and good ground, fruitful and pleasant branches, children of light, citizens of heaven, sheep of His fold, members of His body, heirs of His kingdom, His true friends and brethren, sweet and holy bread, the *elect and chosen people of God*.” “Let us trust,” says the Homily on the Passion, “that Christ may receive us into His heavenly kingdom, and place us in the number of *His elect and chosen people*.” “The Church of Christ,” says Hooker, “which we properly term His body mystical, can be but one; neither can that one be sensibly discerned by any man, inasmuch as the parts thereof are some in heaven already with Christ, and the rest that are on earth (albeit their natural persons be visible) we do not discern under this property whereby they are truly and infallibly of that body. Only our minds by intellectual conceit are able to apprehend that such a real body there is; a body collective, because it containeth a huge multitude—a body mystical, because the mystery of their conjunction is

⁹ Op. tom. iv. pp. 162, 163, 154.

¹ Op. tom. i. p. 80.

removed from our sense. Whatsoever we read in Scripture concerning the endless love and the saving mercy which God showeth towards His Church, the very proper subject thereof is this Church. Concerning this flock it is that our Lord and Saviour hath promised:—‘I give unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish; neither shall any pluck them out of my hands.’ They who are of this society have such marks and notes of distinction from all others, as are not object unto our sense; only unto God who seeth their hearts and understandeth all their secret cogitations, unto Him they are clear and manifest.”² “The Church of the elect,” says Laud, “is *in* the Church of them that are called, and the invisible Church in the visible. That the invisible Church of the elect is in the visible is manifest out of St. Augustine: ‘*Ipsa est Ecclesia quæ intra sagenam Dominicam cum malis piscibus natat.*’”³ “The general or outward Church of God is visible,” says Jewell, “but the very true Church of God’s elect is invisible, and cannot be seen or discerned by man, but is only known to God alone.”⁴ “The Church may be called holy,” says Bishop Pearson, “in regard the end of constituting a Church in God was for the purchasing a holy and precious *people*.”⁵

We find this aspect of “the elect”—viz. as one people and one society—dominant in the Catechisms and Expositions of belief of that day. In the “Institution of a Christian Man,” which was an exposition of the Christian faith, published by the authority of the Bishops in 1536, was called the Bishops’ Book, and was composed by a commission, of which Cranmer was the head; the person who makes the confession of his belief in the articles of the Christian faith is made to say: “I believe assuredly in my heart, and with my mouth I do profess and acknow-

² Eccl. Pol. b. iii. c. 1, § 2. ³ Conference with Fisher, sect. xxi.

⁴ Defence of Apology, c. iv. div. 2.

⁵ On Article IX.

ledge that there is and hath been, even from the beginning of the world, and so shall endure and continue for ever, one certain number, society, communion of *the elect and faithful people of God*; of which number our Saviour Jesus Christ is the only Head and Governor; and the members of the same be all those holy saints which be now in heaven, and also all the faithful people of God which be now on life, or that ever heretofore have lived, or shall live here in this world, from the beginning to the end of the same, and be ordained for their true faith and obedience unto the will of God, to be saved and to enjoy everlasting life in heaven. And I believe assuredly that this congregation according as it is called in Scripture, so it is in very deed the city of heavenly Jerusalem, the mother of all *the elect people of God*, the only dove, and the only beloved of God, in perfect and everlasting charity, the holy Catholic Church. . . . And I believe and trust assuredly that I am one of the members of this Catholic Church, and that God of His own mercy hath not only chosen and called me thereunto by His Holy Spirit, and by the efficacy of His Word and Sacraments, and hath inserted and united me into this universal body or flock, and hath made me His son and inheritor of His kingdom; but also that He shall, of His like goodness and by the operation of the Holy Ghost, justify me here in this world, and finally glorify me in heaven.”⁶

In this declaration, which is indeed only the short declaration of the child in our own Catechism, “Who sanctifieth me and all the elect people of God,” rhetorically drawn out and expanded; the phrase, “the elect people of God,” means exactly the same thing as the phrase, “the elect;” i. e. they are those who will finally be saved. The phrase denotes the same number of individuals, only regarded as a society. We have the same aspect of “the

⁶ Formularies of Faith. Ed. by Bishop Lloyd, pp. 52, 56.

elect " in Nowell's Catechism : " Before the heaven and the earth were made God foreordained a most lovely kingdom and a most holy commonwealth, which the Apostles call the Church, or congregation. Into this commonwealth hath God enrolled an infinite multitude of men, who all follow Christ as their King; all obey His word, and commend themselves to His guardianship. To this commonwealth belong as many as truly fear, honour, and worship God, applying their minds to holy and pious living, placing all their hope and confidence in God, and expecting most certainly a blessed eternity. Whosoever are firm, stable, and constant in this faith, these are the *elect* and the sealed, predestined to this felicity before the foundation of the world, and having the Spirit of Christ for an inward witness to this election." " And," proceeds the child, " I do most certainly assure myself that I myself am, by the free gift of God in Christ, made a member of this blessed commonwealth." In the Heidelberg Catechism, the child, in answer to the question, " What dost thou believe concerning the Holy Catholic Church of Christ ? " says,— " I believe that the Son of God doth, from the beginning to the end of this world, gather, defend, and preserve unto Himself, by His word and Spirit, out of the whole race of mankind, *a company elected* unto eternal life, and that I am a living member of that company, and shall so remain for ever."⁷ The child is made to assert the same assurance in the Cologne Catechism, Bucer's composition:—" I believe that through His word and sacraments God will confirm and increase the same [sanctification] in me, so that I shall study continually to sanctify His name, and to serve His congregation with all manner of good works, till He take me out of this world unto heavenly joys and the blessed

⁷ Sylloge Confess. p. 373.

Resurrection.”⁸ And the declaration respecting himself, and his own sanctification, and final salvation, is repeated by the professor of the Christian faith in the “Institution of a Christian Man”:—“I do believe that I am so clearly rid of all the guilt of my said offences, and from the everlasting pain due to the same, that neither sin, nor death, nor hell shall be able or have any power to hurt me or to let me, but that after this transitory life I shall ascend into heaven, there to reign with my Saviour Christ perpetually in glory and felicity.”⁹

It must be observed that the aspect of the elect as one body, which prevails in these extracts, does not supersede the existence of another body, viz. the mixed or visible Church. There were divines, indeed, who refused the title or name of *Church* to any body but the Church of the elect; but this was no necessary consequence of the aspect of the elect as a body, which, *though* a body and a society, was still planted by the general judgment of divines *within* another body, viz. the visible Church. The full recognition of the Church, as a visible body, was thus perfectly consistent with regarding the elect who were within that Church as a body; an inner society within an outward one, an invisible commonwealth within a visible one, a pure communion within a mixed one. Melancthon recognized a visible Church, which he called a “vera Ecclesia,” and a “populus Dei,” but added, “*in quo Deus vere colligit cœtum cui dat remissionem peccatorum, et justitiam, et salutem æternam.*”¹

We have then full evidence that “the elect” meant, in the general use and acceptation of the term at the time of the construction of our Catechism, those who would finally be saved; and we have also very full evidence that the “elect people of God” meant the same as “the elect.”

⁸ Offices, published by Hermann, Archbp. of Cologne, fol. 80.

⁹ Formularies of Faith, p. 35.

¹ Tom. i. p. 319.

But in this state of the case the conclusion is inevitable that the statement, "Who sanctifieth me and all the elect people of God," must, at the date of our Catechism, have been understood hypothetically.

It is to be admitted, indeed, that, the term "elect" being applied in the Epistles on the hypothetical principle to all the members of Christian Churches, this presumptive *application* of the term has been converted into another *sense* of the term by one section of divines, with whom it means those elected to Christian privileges and a place in the visible Church; that the use of this latter as a *secondary* meaning of the term is to be seen occasionally in earlier writers of our Church; and that a later school adopted and defended it as the true meaning of the term; Bishop Tomline defining "the predestinated and elect" as "those to whom the Gospel was made known according to the foreseen purpose of God."² It must be admitted, I say, that the term "the elect" has contracted this gloss, and that this gloss has obtained a wide reception and a sanctioned place in our theology; but when we are engaged in ascertaining the meaning of a particular statement in the Catechism, as a criterion of the kind of formulary a Catechism is, and the sort of statements it admits of; and when the meaning of that statement depends on the meaning of a particular term in it; in this case, we are not at liberty to take a gloss upon that term, but we must take the term in its general use and acceptation at the time of the construction of the Catechism. And there is full evidence of what this general use and acceptation was; and that the term meant those who would finally be saved.

The objection is raised indeed that, with this meaning of "elect," this assertion of the child in the Catechism becomes a most rash and presumptuous one, and the

² On Article XVII.

authority of Jackson is cited, who says :—" Can any man be persuaded that it was any part of our Church's meaning to teach children, when they first make profession of their faith, to believe that they are of the number of the elect ; that is, of such as cannot finally perish ? This were to teach them their faith backwards, and to seek the kingdom of heaven, not *ascendendo* but *descendendo* from it." ³ Without wishing to detract, however, from the merits of Jackson, I must be allowed to say that, as a one-sided writer, he is not always a safe guide to trust to. It was open to him, as it is open to every one now, to criticize the propriety of putting such a statement into the mouth of a child, but such criticism cannot alter the facts of the case. It cannot alter the fact of what was the regular and received meaning of the term "elect" and "the elect people of God" at the time of the construction of our Catechism ; or the fact that, with this meaning, a statement, which included the speaker among the elect people of God, was put into the mouth of the child in the Catechism ; or the fact, which has appeared in the citations above made, that this statement of the child respecting himself runs through the Catechisms and similar formularies of that day. It is, however, not only a too rigid, but a wholly untrue interpretation of this statement to convert it, as Jackson does, into the serious and literal assertion of a fact. It was presumed in all these formularies that the child was a true Christian, and had all that appertains to one, sanctification and election included ; and, in accordance with this presumption, he was made to declare that he was thus sanctified and thus elect.

We have then before us, first, a whole class of Protestant Catechisms, or formularies of that class, of about the same date as our own, and we are able to ascertain

³ Commentary on Creed, b. xi. c. 17.

clearly enough from them what sort of a formulary a Catechism is, with respect to the particular point now under consideration. Because we find that these Catechisms contain statements which cannot possibly be understood otherwise than hypothetically; viz. the child's assertion of his own sanctification, future perseverance, and final salvation. And, secondly, with this general evidence before us of the character of a Catechism in this respect, we come to *our own* Catechism, and find that our own is of this character too from plain internal evidence—the child's assertion of his own pious resolutions, wishes, thankful feelings, sanctification, and lastly election.

The character of our Catechism on this head then being decided, viz. that it admits of statements literal in form but hypothetical in meaning, we come to the particular statement in it with which this treatise is concerned: "Wherein I was made a child of God," &c. This statement then, after the above proof of the character of a Catechism as a formulary, comes legitimately under the argument of the last chapter. Our Church lays down no specific doctrine of infant regeneration, and nowhere defines the meaning of the term, "child of God." But if the Church allows conditions of infant regeneration and the sense of actual goodness, and the sense of indefectible goodness for this term, she allows the hypothetical construction of this statement, because the allowance of *conditions* and of the *sense* is, *ipso facto*, the allowance of the *construction*.

Can it be denied that the Church, at any rate, allows the statement, "Who sanctifieth me and all the elect people of God," to be construed hypothetically? To deny this would be to deny to persons now the bare and simple right to understand the phrase, "the elect people of God," in that sense which was, as a matter of fact, its

regular and received sense at the date of the construction of our Catechism. But if *this* statement may be understood hypothetically, what valid reason can be given why the other also may not be ?⁴

* In the "Institution of a Christian Man," "child of God" is synonymous with one of the elect. "I believe that I am *God's own son by adoption and grace*, and the right inheritor of His kingdom . . . one of the members of His Catholic Church." "Which Church," he adds, "is the society of the elect people of God, the saints which are now in heaven, and also be now on life." Formularies, pp. 31, 52, 56.

Dr. John Mayer's Exposition of the Church Catechism "published by command" in the earlier part of the seventeenth century, while it allows every baptized child to be a "member of Christ and a child of God," literally in a "sacramental" sense, yet in "the real and true sense" of those terms explains this whole statement hypothetically. "If it be further demanded, how can it be said of all baptized that they are members of Christ, I answer that our Church doth not usurp the gift of prophecy, to take upon her to discern which of her children belong to God's unsearchable election, but in the judgment of charity embraceth them all, as God's inheritance; and hereby teacheth every one of us so to believe of ourselves by faith, and of others by charity. St. Paul in his salutations styleth the whole visible Churches to whom he writes by the title of saints, and yet it is likely that by his extraordinary discerning spirit he could have differenced the goats of his flock from the sheep. How much more ought we, with our blessed mother the Church of England, at all christenings to *presume* that sacramental grace doth like a soul enquicken the body of the outward element, and receive those for our true fellow-members of Christ, who have been made partakers of the same laver of regeneration." Dr. John Mayer's Exposition of the Catechism, pp. 5—7.

CHAPTER IV

RULE OF LITERAL INTERPRETATION CONSIDERED

THE case which was proved in the two last chapters was that of a statement which had literally interpreted one meaning, but which turned out upon examination to be susceptible of another.

It is, of course, to be admitted on one side that the literal meaning of this statement is its *prima facie* meaning:¹ indeed this is a truism; for by a *prima facie* meaning we understand that meaning which a statement has by the plain force of its grammatical construction, and which it carries to any person who has no other data beyond that for knowing its meaning. But while this admission must be made on the one side, the error on the other side lies in vastly overrating the weight of a *prima facie* meaning. For for a *prima facie* meaning, known and acknowledged, to be corrected upon examination, is one of the commonest occurrences in language. Indeed, what is the *prima facie* meaning of the statement in the Adult Baptismal Service? To any one who had only its literal and grammatical sense to go by without a previous acquaintance with the doctrine of adult baptism,² this statement would mean simply what it says,

¹ Lord Macaulay's expression (Hist. iii. p. 472) that "the words [of the statement in the Infant Baptismal Service] to all minds unsophisticated *appear* to assert," &c., only affirms what everybody would allow, a *prima facie* meaning.

² It is alleged that the evidence of the hypothetical meaning of the statement in the Adult Service is *incorporated in* the service,

i. e. state a positive fact. But we all set aside that literal meaning for an hypothetical.

Generally speaking the literal meanings of statements are their *true* meanings, and are also the only meanings which they legitimately bear, because this clearness and unity is the general aim of language, and an aim in which it succeeds in the majority of cases. But there are large exceptions, and there are few things with which we are more familiar than the supplanting of a *prima facie* meaning by another which has the advantage of more knowledge and acquaintance with the facts of the case, whether the style of a writer, or the phraseology of a particular department of science or learning, or the construction of language generally. For there are over and above the former special class of reasons, reasons of a deeper kind, lying in the very nature and construction of human language as an instrument of expression, which often issue in *prima facie* meanings which have afterwards to be corrected; for instance, there is the necessity of compression, which produces the summary form of statement made without the mention of proper conditions, which are left to be supplied by the reader.

In such revision and correction then of the sense of language it sometimes happens that the literal meaning of a statement is *wholly* set aside, and that another meaning which is not the literal one is substituted as the only true meaning. It would be tedious to quote exam-

by virtue of the expressions in the exhortation—"truly repenting and coming unto Him by faith." But if such an inference is to be drawn from these expressions in the Adult Service, might not a like inference be drawn from the sponsorial statements in the Infant Service? The truth is, it is the *doctrine* of Adult Baptism which definitively settles the meaning of the statement in the Adult Service, and not any expressions in the service itself.

ples, but persons who are conversant with the usages of language will be able to recall many forms of expression and modes of statement which no rational man can understand in their literal and grammatical sense. There are other cases again in which the literal meaning is not wholly set aside, but another meaning besides the literal one is found to be admissible. We arrive at a class of statements which admit of both interpretations, one being the best in one man's opinion, the other in another's, but both admitting of being held by reasonable and intelligent men. Thus the precepts in Scripture, "Resist not evil," and "Swear not at all," admit both of a literal and a non-literal interpretation. Christians are at liberty to take such precepts in their literal sense, and many intelligent Christians do so interpret them; but the great majority still set aside this literal sense and adopt the other.

It is impossible to deny that the meaning in which the Nonjurors understood the Oath of Allegiance, abandoning all their offices in Church and State, and submitting themselves to the greatest sacrifices for it, was the literal and *prima facie* meaning of that oath, and that the oath certainly admitted of being taken in that meaning. The terms of it were plain and direct, viz. that the person taking it "would be true and faithful to the king and his heirs, and not know or hear of any ill or damage intended him, without defending him therefrom." But although the literal meaning of this oath was so obvious, an immense majority, both in Church and State, including men who were as conscientious as the Nonjurors, did not so understand it. They admitted what was unquestionable, that this *was* its literal meaning, but they denied that its literal meaning was the true one; urging that there was an unexpressed condition in the oath, viz. that the allegiance sworn in it only applied to the king so long

as he *was* king, so long as he was *de facto* the ruler and sovereign of the country.³

Let us apply then this corrective principle, of such constant use in language generally, to the interpretation of the Prayer Book. In the first place, we find there cases of the former, or total kind of correction, in which the literal meaning is altogether set aside, and another or non-literal meaning put in its place as the true one. In the prayer for Parliament the literal meaning of the statement, implicitly made, that the reigning monarch is always "a religious and gracious person" is wholly set aside, and an hypothetical meaning put in its place. In the Burial Service, the statement that "it hath pleased Almighty God to take unto Himself the soul of our dear brother,"⁴ undergoes the same total correction. In the form of Absolution for the Sick, the statement, "I absolve thee from all thy sins," undergoes the same: in the Adult Baptismal Service, the statement, "These persons are regenerate," undergoes the same. In all these cases what is *prima facie* a categorical assertion is determined not to be one. The literal meaning is a false meaning, the meaning which is not literal is the true one.

From these cases of total correction then we come to

³ Mr. Pitt insisted upon the literal meaning of the proviso attached to certain public stocks, that the interest due upon them "shall not be charged or chargeable with any rates, duties, or impositions whatever." This literal meaning, however, has been set aside by the legislature, and a non-literal meaning has been declared to be the true one, viz. that the stockholder is only secured from special taxes, not from taxes laid upon him in common with the whole community.

⁴ It is plainly incorrect to interpret this as being only the neutral statement that God has taken the soul of the departed from one world into another. It would be a shock to the common sense and religious feeling of anybody to suppose that a wicked man or an atheist could be our dear brother in Christ whose soul God had taken to Himself.

a case of partial correction ; that is, to a case in which the literal meaning is not wholly set aside as untenable, but in which another meaning besides the literal is found to be admissible. This is the characteristic of the statement in the Infant Baptismal Service. Some persons have no impediment in the way of understanding this statement literally, and therefore they do so understand it ; others, however, have an impediment arising from the sense of the word “regenerate,” which appearing to them to imply quite plainly in its Scriptural sense actual goodness, they cannot in consistency with facts adopt the literal meaning, which, upon their idea of regeneration, would be to say that all baptized infants had actual goodness implanted in them. Calvinists have the still greater impediment that regeneration in their sense implies *indefectible* goodness, or ultimate salvation. In this state of the case then that statement contracts, in accordance with this basis of opinion in the Church, a divided interpretation ; that is to say, its literal meaning not being supplanted, another or hypothetical meaning is found to be admissible. The interpretation of it depends upon the sense of the word *regenerate*, which in the one case does, in the other does not, allow of the acceptance of the *statement* in its literal sense ; but the Church is neutral upon this question of the sense of the term, nowhere defining regeneration. These two senses of the term therefore stand, in this silence of the Church, upon an equal footing ; and, the sense of the term being open, the construction of the statement becomes open.

When then the charge of dishonesty is brought against the hypothetical interpretation of this statement—for though the interpreter is through the improved tone of controversy excused personally, the *interpretation* is still set down by many as dishonest,—I remark as follows :—

1. It is not enough to support the charge that this

interpretation is dishonest, to say simply and solely that it is not literal. So far all who are acquainted with the nature of language, its forms, usages, and constructions, must agree. All must see that this simple and summary ground is at any rate untenable ; because to maintain such a ground would be in truth to assert that in language the literal was always the true meaning, and the only true meaning ; and that there was no such case as that of a *prima facie* sense, which had to be corrected and supplanted by another sense. But such a position as this would be in the teeth of the plainest facts. It is one thing then to guard against a dishonest and evasive interpretation, and another to impose an exorbitant and inordinate rule of *literal* interpretation. It is evident that in language the *prima facie* meaning is not the permanent and fixed property of the statement to which it belongs, but that it is a *provisionary* meaning, exposed to appeal and subject to revocation, upon proper grounds appearing : that when no such grounds appear it is of course not only the *prima facie* meaning, but also the true one ; but that, when such grounds do arise, then it is set aside and the correction fixed in its place.

Such being the state of the case upon the field of language generally, if controversy should have happened to have fastened upon some minds the idea that in the particular instance of the statement in the Infant Baptismal Service the *prima facie* meaning is "as *such final*, and that it is not amenable to examination or open to revision, it must be said that this is not a natural but an *artificial* enforcement of literal interpretation. The natural rule is a qualified and limited one, in agreement with common sense and in accordance with the facts of language ; but this would be an arbitrary and fictitious assumption—the creation of that pertinacity which is engendered by strife, and no fruit of common sense and

nature. This would be to give a supremacy to the literal principle in excess of its real rights. This statement is amenable to the same ordeal to which all other statements are subject, viz. that of examination, to see if the literal meaning of it is the true or the only true one. Do we not observe indeed, in the interpretation of ordinary books or documents, how weak a thing a *prima facie* meaning is, and how easily set aside? The particular use then, the extreme advantage taken of the *prima facie* meaning of the statement now in question, as if that one consideration settled everything, is plainly untenable; and the pure and simple recurrence to that meaning, the repetition of the appeal to it, may give it a fanciful and a counterfeit strength in people's minds, but is no answer to the claim which must be met at last; that this literal meaning admitted and confessed is still open to correction; and that upon examination we may find, as we frequently do in ordinary reading, that another meaning of the statement is admissible.

The criterion of an honest interpretation then is not the acceptance of the *prima facie* meaning of a statement as such,—a test which would be opposed to the whole existing structure of language; implying, as it would, that language is a perfect instrument and a transparent medium of expression; whereas it is a very complicated structure, which has accumulated all kinds of usages and artificial forms of construction in its growth. But the criterion of an honest interpretation is whether it is upon examination *admissible*. We cannot touch bottom short of this, or farther narrow the ethics of interpretation. However, on abstract grounds, we might stand up for literal interpretation alone; we find, as a matter of fact, that language assumes such forms as that we must apply another key to it; that to insist on the literal principle exclusively would be to confine ourselves to an instrument too narrow

to deal with language as a whole, large portions of which it would ignore ; and that our definition of honesty in the interpretation of statements must square with the facts of language, which often compel a mode of construction, which is honest and yet not literal.

Nor, if this general principle is conceded, can it be maintained that there is any *special* dishonesty in the principle of *hypothetical* interpretation. This is sometimes spoken of indeed as if it were, in a special and peculiar way, opposed to plain dealing, and self-convicted of insincerity ; as if nobody could adopt it without tampering with his conscience and inward sense of truth ; as if it converted the statement in the Baptismal Service into a manifestly dishonest one, and lowered irremediably the character of the compilers of our Prayer Book, by converting them into hypocrites whose words and meanings did not coincide. But the plain answer to this is that hypothetical construction is a known form and usage, incorporated in language, and standing on exactly the same ground in respect of honesty on which other usages and forms of language, which require not to be interpreted literally, stand ; that, as a matter of fact, and by the confession of all parties, it is used in Scripture, and admitted into and adopted in our Prayer Book ; and that therefore it is too late to doubt its honesty as a usage, the only question to consider being whether it is correctly applied in the particular case. Indeed, this point is conceded by reflecting reasoners on both sides, none of whom object to the *principle* of hypothetical interpretation ; the only question being as to its application, whether it is admissible in the particular case before us.

2. We come then to the particular case of the statement before us ; and there meets us at the very outset an obstacle to the literal interpretation of it—an obstacle certainly which is not of our own making, because it lies

upon the very surface of Scripture, and consists in the meaning itself of the word "regenerate," or "born of God," as employed in Scripture. In its apparent Scriptural meaning this term implies actual goodness; but can we say, in consistency with simple facts, that *all* infants are made actually good, or have a pious and virtuous character implanted in them in baptism? Here then is not a gratuitous but a natural obstacle to the literal interpretation of this statement.

But, without assuming this sense of the word as the true one, however conspicuous in Scripture and supported by the obvious and natural sense of the language of Scripture, the issue is still the same. The Church nowhere defines the sense of the term "regenerate:" she leaves it open then to any one to understand the word in the sense just mentioned, implying actual goodness: she leaves it open even to any one to understand it in the Calvinistic sense, as implying indefectible goodness. But the liberty to hold these senses is the liberty to hold that construction of this statement which inevitably goes along with them.

Those who make the charge of dishonesty against the hypothetical interpretation of this statement do not put before themselves the *grounds* on which this interpretation is given by those who do adopt it. They imagine the interpreter coming to this conclusion, simply upon the ground of the statement itself, and with nothing else before him; in which case his conclusion justly appears altogether untenable and gratuitous: whereas the interpreter, when he comes to this conclusion, is in possession of other data besides the statement itself: he has the advantage of the admitted fact of hypothetical construction as a usage in Church Services: he has the advantage of the fact that the very statement in question is, by the admission of all parties, used hypothetically in the Adult

Baptismal Service; and he has the advantage of the fact that the Church allows a specific doctrine and sense of a term, which necessitate this construction in this particular instance. These are facts or data *beyond* the statement itself, which plainly affect its force and character as a statement; but if a person confines his attention to the statement itself, as if that were the one and sole fact in the case, and does not recognize these further data, he necessarily judges as a person does who has not the true state of the case before him; and he sets down an interpretation for which he does not *see* the reasons as simply unreasonable.

Those who urge this general objection of insincerity forget the important point, that some persons come to this statement in the Baptismal Service with a totally different sense of the word "regenerate" from their own. *They* understand the word in a sense quite harmonizing with the literal construction of this statement; they then say how gratuitous is any other construction. But *other* persons come to this statement who have habitually and all their lives understood the word "regenerate" to imply actual goodness and holiness, and who appeal to this as the obvious sense of Scripture. These then say that the simple meaning of the word *obliges* them to understand this statement hypothetically, and that they have grown up in the Church with this sense of the word in their minds, and with the right allowed them to consider it the only true sense; and more than this, even to attach indefectibility to that sense, inasmuch as the Church nowhere prohibits this addition to the sense of the word.

Any interpretation of a statement which is not the literal one lies of course under the disadvantage that it requires explanation; and this has made many shrink from the defence of the hypothetical interpretation of this

statement. There is a disposition in controversy to take undue advantage of all admissions, and that the case requires explanation is an admission. But those who have every day they live to hear explanations, and who find it a daily occurrence that explanation brings out truth; who have constantly to alter their impressions of facts in consequence of explanation, and to correct their understandings of terms and statements in consequence of explanation, ought not to think it much of a presumption against an interpretation that it requires explanation. They must know that explanation very often is true explanation; consonant with the facts of the case, and necessary to the simple end that those facts should be seen and noticed. They must know that explanation is constantly but the supplement of *omission*, bringing within our sight those further facts of which a *prima facie* view does not take cognizance; that, therefore, a *prima facie* view has by no means so great a presumption in its favour as compared with the result of explanation.

The mere fear of explanation then, i. e. of a collision and encounter with a *prima facie* impression, ought not to deter us from stating how a matter really lies; nor should we affect obviousness and simplicity of ground at the cost of truth; nor should we aim at forming such a judgment as will correspond with the first-sight opinion of other persons, but such as will correspond to the facts of the case itself.

The consciousness of this need of explanation has indeed been felt as a weight by some of the defenders of hypothetical interpretation, who have confessed in consequence an objection in the abstract to the use of such forms of language in services as require explanation. I cannot coincide in this regret, because there is no reason why the language of a Prayer Book should be more simple, direct, and categorical than human language generally;

and human language has adopted these forms. The rule of supposition pervades the language of society; it enters into poetry, into oratory, into social intercourse. It has, because it has been incorporated in human language, been adopted by Scripture. A Prayer Book would not be improved by being divested of forms which are a part of human and a part of sacred language. Why should such a book aim at being more accurate than the natural language of mankind, and more accurate than the Bible? Such language requires explanation in the Prayer Book, and it requires explanation in Scripture too. And it is better that a Prayer Book should follow established types, and be moulded upon an ancient popular and sacred model, than that it should adopt the nudity and stiffness of a new devotional language. But when I differ from this regret, I must remark that the advantage which has been taken of this confession of regret is unfair. It has been interpreted as a confession of error, but persons admit nothing against the truth of a particular explanation of certain language, by objecting to the use of language which *requires* explanation.

But another and important defence of explanation has still to be added, and that is, that on the question before us neither side can do without it. Either interpretation here entails the need of explanation: if you get rid of it in one quarter, it meets you in another. If you interpret the statement that the infant is regenerate literally, you are clear of explanation for that one step, but another places you opposite the sense of the word "regenerate" in Scripture, and then you have to explain. The regenerate state implies actual goodness, if we interpret Scripture literally. Have all infants actual goodness implanted in them in baptism? If you affirm this, you apparently contradict facts, and have to *explain* how you do not. If you deny that regeneration means this, you

apparently contradict Scripture, and have to explain how you do not. And you will find either of these explanations impracticable,⁵ while the one which is given on the other side is only an appeal to a known and familiar usage of language.

⁵ Chapters v. and x. Part I.

CHAPTER V

ARTICLES AND PRAYER BOOK CONSIDERED IN CONNEXION

THE relation of the Articles to the Prayer Book is sometimes stated as being this, that the former exhibits the *doctrinal* teaching of the Church, while the latter does not contain any doctrinal teaching, but only her forms of devotion. But this mode of describing the two is not wholly correct, because devotional offices may contain and teach doctrine, as being founded and constructed upon it. And accordingly the Fifty-seventh Canon declares, that “the doctrine both of Baptism and the Lord’s Supper is so sufficiently set down in the Book of Common Prayer to be used at the administration of the said sacraments, as nothing can be added unto it that is material and necessary.”

But while devotional services, as well as Articles, may contain and teach doctrine, they can only do so *as* services; according to the capacity which services have for doctrinal teaching, and subject to the construction and interpretation which the admitted liberties and usages of language in services entail. In estimating the doctrinal result of such services, we are bound to make allowance for these usages and liberties of language, and cannot fasten upon particular statements in them a tighter meaning than the rules of language, as it is employed in services, require.

What is the doctrine of Baptism then set down, as the Fifty-seventh Canon says, in the Baptismal Services?

Certainly these offices teach a connexion between regeneration and baptism, because they are founded upon such a connexion, and would indeed be entirely unmeaning without it. But it does not follow that the particular statement—"This infant is regenerate,"—teaches the doctrine that all infants are regenerate in baptism; because there is a liberty and usage of language in Church Services which allows of statements being made in them literal in form, but yet hypothetical in meaning. The Fifty-seventh Canon, while it says that the service teaches a doctrine of baptism, does not say that it teaches it in the manner and style of a dogmatic formulary, all the statements of which must be interpreted literally; nor therefore does it assert that this particular statement is a dogmatic statement. The Adult Baptismal Service contains the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, but the statement in it, "These persons are regenerate," does not therefore teach that all adults are regenerate in baptism. And the same distinction is applicable to the Infant Baptismal Service.

But while the Articles do not monopolize the doctrinal teaching of the Church, they may still in a particular case throw an interpretative light upon the services, in this way; that we may upon examination find that the Articles are manifestly constructed with a certain design, and that it is wholly inconsistent with the evident design of the Articles that a decisive dogma on a certain point should be laid down in the Prayer Book. Such an argument, if made out, could not but be confirmatory of the interpretation of the Baptismal Service, which has been arrived at upon formulistic grounds. For the Articles and the Prayer Book being public documents of the same Church, owning the same authorship; it would indeed be unaccountable, if a certain doctrinal design was quite apparent in the Articles, which was yet

positively contradicted and frustrated in the Prayer Book.

The Articles then are, by the admission of all parties, constructed with an inclusive and comprehensive aim. It is universally considered that they use a cautiously indefinite and a designedly ambiguous language on controverted questions, for the very purpose that the same statements in them may be subscribed by different schools, which, though disagreeing with each other, are both embraced within the limits of a general formula. By some this is thought a fault in the Articles, by others a merit, but all agree to the fact. Let us turn to the Twenty-seventh Article on Baptism. This article too is obviously constructed, in accordance with the design of the whole, with a deliberately inclusive aim; carefully confining itself to such general statements of the nature of baptism as a sacrament and the grace attaching to it, as all recognized parties in the Church could then agree in, and accept in common. It is evidently with this design that it leaves out all mention of the effect of baptism upon infants; because it could not lay down any precise or definite doctrine on this subject, but at the imminent peril of offending one or other existing school, whereas by omitting the subject and confining itself to the assertion of the duty of admitting the infant to the rite itself, it avoids this danger, and the whole Article becomes a general formula of the kind just mentioned, to which different schools may subscribe.

It is contrary then to the plain design of the Church as manifested in the Article on Baptism, that a dogmatic statement upon a strongly controverted point relating to the subject of that Article, should be inserted in any other portion of our formularies. For the obvious reason why the Article on Baptism is made so comprehensive as it is, and cautiously confined to neutral and inclusive

statements, is that the basis of the Church may be inclusive on this subject. But this object is not attained if a testing dogmatic statement is only omitted in the Articles in order to be inserted in some other section of our formularies; that is to say, if all that is gained by the omission of it in one place, is that it is shifted to another. For the particular place in which a dogmatic statement appears makes no difference, so long as it is a dogmatic statement; and it is as testing, occurring in one portion of our formularies, as occurring in another. The Articles then, so far as they treat of baptism, being palpably constructed with the design of inclusion, and of avoiding any statement to which one or other party in the Church could not assent; it is as total a contradiction as can be conceived to the design of the Articles, that a statement which, on account of the opposition it would create, is avoided in an article, should be inserted as a dogmatic statement in one of the services of the Church.

It must be observed that the ground upon which this argument rests is not the simple omission of the statement in question in the Articles; for, so far as this is concerned, the Church is not confined to one place for the situation of a doctrinal statement, but may make it in another if it suits her convenience; and it is admitted that doctrinal statements are made by her in places outside of the Articles. But the ground on which this argument rests is not omission in the Articles simply, but omission with *design*. It is agreed on all sides that it is not by accident or without a purpose that the Articles make neutral statements on many subjects, which can be accepted by different parties in the Church, and are as comprehensive and inclusive as they are; but that this is done with design, and with the aim of including different parties in the Church within the limits of the Church's formularies.

It is admitted that the Article on Baptism is thus neutral and inclusive designedly.¹ But if the comprehensiveness of the Articles in general, and of this Article along with the rest, is designed; and if the Church abstains from making a statement upon a controverted point in this Article because the insertion would be unacceptable to one portion of the Church; it is then altogether contrary to such a design that the statement in question should be made as a dogmatic statement in another place. And to attribute such an arrangement to the Church is to attribute to her a mode of proceeding which is wholly incomprehensible and irrational.

Two answers, however, may be made to this appeal to the unity and consistency of design in the Articles and the Prayer Book. One is a denial of the inconsistency in the present instance, upon the ground that, the publication of the Prayer Book having *preceded* that of the Articles, the omission in the Articles of the statement of the regeneration of all infants in baptism was not owing to a design to make the Article comprehensive, but only to the fact that the statement had been already made in the service, and that therefore there was no need to make it again in the Articles. But this is obviously an insufficient explanation of such an omission. The Prayer Book throughout contains and is founded upon various doctrines; but this does not prevent those doctrines from being formally stated in the Articles, which is the proper place for the formal statement of them. Nor therefore, were a certain doctrine contained in the Baptismal

¹ Mr. Fisher admits "the palpable ambiguity of the Article on Baptism in particular." Revision of the Liturgy, p. 213. Professor Harold Browne admits the designed ambiguity of the Article, though he attributes it to the king's "leaning to the Swiss Reformers," as well as to the desire of the compilers "to satisfy some foreign divines." Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles, p. 667.

Services, would that be any reason why that doctrine should not be stated in the Article on Baptism, which was the proper place for the formal statement of it. But the truth is, no conclusion can be drawn from any minute difference in the date of the publication of the Articles and the Prayer Book; because, though in the reconstruction of the formulariës of a Church, everything cannot be done at once, and therefore one part comes out before another, the publication of these two sets of formularies is practically simultaneous if they come out as near one another as convenience permits. Though it may be mentioned, if the fact is of any importance, that the construction of the second book, i. e. our present Book of Common Prayer and the construction of the Articles, were going on in the same year.² Indeed, this argument is undermined by the very admission which is made on all sides that the Article on Baptism is *designedly* ambiguous and neutral.

The more common answer, however, is the broad and frank acceptance of the conclusion, which has been urged above as a *reductio ad absurdum*. It is considered by some that the design of the Articles and that of the Prayer Book *are* contradictory, and conflict with each other. It is a common statement that the theology of the Articles is contrary to the theology of the Prayer Book, which latter is alleged to be inconsistent with Calvinism. If this is the case then, I observe first that

² "In 1551 the king and the Privy Council ordered the Archbishop to frame a book of Articles of Religion." Archbishop Wake, quoted by Cardwell, *Synodalia*, vol. i. p. 2. "The Commissioners appear to have completed their revision of the Book of Common Prayer before the end of the year 1551." Cardwell, *Preface to the Two Liturgies*, p. 29. "The new service book was put forth in 1552 . . . The same year saw the publication of the Forty-two Articles of Religion." Professor H. Browne's *Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles*, Introduction, p. 6.

the contradiction is inexplicable, because the two sets of formularies issued from the hands of the same responsible compilers at the same time, to supply two concordant objects of faith and worship for the same Church. It may be said that our Reformers intended a compromise, and that this compromise was effected by constructing two sets of formularies in contradiction to each other; the Articles to please the Calvinists, and the Prayer Book to please the older school. But a compromise, if it is carried to the extent of contradiction, is suicidal, and defeats its own object; because one side then cannot accept the set of formularies made *for* the other side and *against* itself. The Reformers, therefore, could not have intended a contradiction between the Articles and the Prayer Book, and the whole history of the *reception* of the Prayer Book disagrees with such a notion; for the Prayer Book was accepted by the most rigid Calvinists, who indeed became the stout and zealous defenders of it against the Puritans.

That the Articles and the Prayer Book, therefore, should be in contradiction to each other is inexplicable, but it is much more important to observe, as I do in the next place, that on comparing the two sets of formularies together we do not, as a matter of fact, see any such contradiction as is here alleged. The notion of a contradiction between the Articles and the Prayer Book appears to have arisen, in the first place, from the circumstance that the Prayer Book was taken from ancient documentary sources, being a compilation from the old rituals hitherto in use; whereas the Articles were a new document of the day. It is inferred from this that the doctrine of the Prayer Book is the old doctrine, and that of the Articles the new, and that the two sets of formularies are thus in conflict with each other. But a little reflection is enough to show the incorrectness of such an

inference as this; because a compiler is in no way bound or committed to an adhesion to all the *doctrine* of the ancient formularies from which he compiles, or obliged to adopt it at all further than agrees with the doctrinal basis, whatever that may be, of his own Church.³ And therefore if, in the construction of a new Prayer Book, he prefers remodelling old material to making a fresh book altogether, not only for convenience sake, but from a respect to antiquity, and because *cæteris paribus* he prefers ancient language and forms to new; that is no reason why the compilation should contain any doctrine different from what the book would have contained had it been a fresh composition altogether. Nor is that a circumstance which at all affects the theological basis of our Prayer Book.

This ground then for supposing a contradiction between the Articles and the Prayer Book being wholly insufficient, we come next to the actual language of the Prayer Book, and we find that the language of the Prayer Book is the natural language of mankind, implying voluntary action and moral responsibility. But the Calvinistic hypothesis is no *more* inconsistent with this language as used in the Prayer Book than it is with the same language as used in the ordinary intercourse of man with man. And therefore if the right is conceded, as it is, to the Calvinist to use this mode of speaking on ordinary occasions and in the business of life, it must be conceded to him also in his devotions, private or public. Indeed, there is

³ Archbishop Laurence excludes the Calvinist from the use of the prayer in the Burial Service: "Suffer us not at our last hour for any fear of death to *fall from thee*:" and upon the Calvinist explaining that he admits the phenomenon of fall from goodness, only denying that goodness which is finally fallen away from can be true and real, tells him that "the original" of the prayer does not admit of that meaning. B. L. p. 381.

nothing in this language, as used either in common life or a Prayer Book, which is inconsistent with the Calvinistic hypothesis; for all that is necessarily implied in this language is the existence of the will in man; the mode in which this will is moved, whether by itself or by an external cause, not being decided by it, but left open. Thus, if I say, "I will do so and so," or "I will endeavour, or have endeavoured to do so and so," that phrase implies a motion of the will, but is consistent with either hypothesis of the cause of that motion; the Calvinistic, that it is external to the will, or the Arminian, that it is the will itself. And, for the same reason, the phrases which are used in human language to express the idea of moral responsibility are common to the Calvinistic and Arminian hypothesis, because they only imply, as the condition of moral responsibility, voluntary action, which is admitted on both sides. Both theories hold human language as their common ground. There is, indeed, involved in the case of the Prayer Book the *special* act of prayer; but the act of prayer is not inconsistent with the Calvinistic hypothesis, because the circumstance of the end being foreordained is not inconsistent with the necessity of the means, of which means prayer may be one. Nor, if the Calvinistic hypothesis is consistent with prayer in general, is there anything in the forms of prayer in the Prayer Book to prevent a Calvinist from using them in particular.

We come then to another, and the only remaining ground upon which the notion that the Calvinistic hypothesis is inconsistent with the language of the Prayer Book has arisen, viz. the Sacramental language of the Prayer Book. But there is nothing in the general doctrine of sacramental grace which is inconsistent with the Calvinistic hypothesis, because, as has been just said, the circumstance that the end is foreordained does not

supersede the necessity of means; and if means are necessary, there is no reason why the Sacraments should not be among those means; nor is it the doctrine of Calvinism that the Sacraments have not grace, but only that the elect alone are partakers of that grace. The whole proof of the assertion that Calvinism is inconsistent with the language of the Prayer Book thus falls back upon the single statement in the Infant Baptismal Service, made over the child baptized, that it is regenerate; but this ground assumes the necessity of the literal interpretation of that statement, which has been shown to be an incorrect assumption.

The statement, therefore, that the Calvinistic hypothesis is inconsistent with the language of the Prayer Book is an ill-considered statement, reflecting only a rough off-hand impression, which proper reflection would correct. It has obtained currency because it has appealed to this off-hand impression, but an act of thought at once reveals its groundlessness. For if we admit that a Calvinist can be a religious man, can pray, wish, resolve, aspire, love, fear, reverence, and worship as religious men do, why should he not do all this in the language of the Prayer Book? What is there in that language that he cannot use? Let a man only ask himself that question, and this dictum at once falls to the ground. The Prayer Book was submitted to the criticism of Calvinists after it was compiled; it was afterwards protected by Calvinists when it was attacked; it has been used quite naturally by thousands of pious and devout Calvinists of every generation from the Reformation to the present day. The great battle of the sixteenth century, in defence of the Prayer Book, was conducted by two Calvinists; for Whitgift was the author of the "Lambeth Articles," and Hooker held the doctrine of the indefectibility of grace. Even if it be denied that Hooker was himself a

Calvinist, the "Ecclesiastical Polity" is throughout a defence of the Prayer Book, upon the argumentative assumption of the truth of the Calvinistic hypothesis. Hooker then, at any rate, saw no opposition between the Prayer Book and the Calvinistic hypothesis, even if Lord Chatham did.⁴ Indeed, this notion has arisen principally from persons not knowing what the Calvinistic hypothesis is, and going to their own imaginations for their conception of it.

The very construction and evident design of our Articles thus constitute a standing witness to the particular value of the statement in the Baptismal Service, viz. to the fact that, as occurring in a service, it is not a dogmatic statement, but admits of an hypothetical construction; because, upon any other supposition, we have a contradiction between the design of the Prayer Book and the evident design of the Articles, which is altogether unaccountable. We should have to believe that, upon a controverted point, the Reformers laid down a decisive position as framers of a service, which they designedly omitted as framers of an article; but as we cannot suppose this, the only alternative is that the statement in the Infant Baptismal Service is not dogmatic, but admits of being construed hypothetically.

⁴ The great currency of the not very wise saying, that "the Church of England has Calvinistic Articles, a Popish Liturgy, and a Latitudinarian Clergy," is a good instance of the popular habit of resting in the general fame of the author of a remark, without the slightest consideration of the only relevant point, viz. whether he was acquainted with the subject-matter of remark.

CHAPTER VI

DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

IN the controversy about the interpretation of the Infant Baptismal Service great stress has been laid upon the *documentary sources* from which the service is derived, viz. the Lutheran baptismal offices, and, through them, the Ancient baptismal offices; the *principle* being first assumed that the derived formulary must be interpreted by the formulary from which it is derived; the *fact* being assumed next, that both in the Lutheran and Ancient Offices the statement that the baptized infant is regenerate is dogmatic; and then the conclusion being drawn that it is equally a dogmatic statement in our own. Even supposing then the state of fact with regard to the original formularies, Lutheran and Ancient, to be as is here described, we have still to consider the claim and pretension of this documentary principle of interpretation. But, first of all, what is the state of the fact with regard to the Lutheran and Ancient Offices? and first, with regard to the Lutheran?

It is admitted, then, that at the date of the construction of the Lutheran offices, containing this statement, the theology of the Lutheran Church was rigidly Calvinistic. I say Calvinistic, because, though the use of that term in the present case is an anachronism, it is correct for the purpose of describing the actual doctrine of the Lutherans at that time. The first Lutheran Baptismal office came out in 1523, and a revised form of it

followed in 1524; while Luther's treatise, *De Servo Arbitrio*, bears the date of 1525, and the first edition of Melancthon's *Loci Theologici* that of 1521. The above formularies then, and the above works, may be regarded as contemporaries, while the latter, as the productions of such authors, must be allowed to represent the theology of the Lutheran communion at that time; the author of the *De Servo Arbitrio* being also himself the compiler of the Baptismal offices. What are the doctrines then of the *De Servo Arbitrio*, and of the *Loci Theologici*? The book, *De Servo Arbitrio*, is an unqualified exposition of the doctrine of irresistible grace, teaching that the human will is after the fall incapable of moving itself in whole or in part to good, and that all good action is the pure effect of an irresistible motion communicated to it by a Sovereign power, in whose hands it is as clay in the hands of the potter. "The human will is like a beast of burden; if God sits on it, it wills and goes where God wills; if Satan sits on it, it wills and goes where Satan wills; nor is it in its power to choose which sitter to run to, but the very sitters contend for the possession of it."¹ "In the things pertaining to salvation or damnation, man has not free will, but is a captive subject and slave either of the will of God or of the will of Satan."² "Our salvation depends entirely on the work of God, in the absence of which work all that we do is evil, and we do this necessarily; necessarily, I say, though not by force or violence, as if we were dragged by the neck."³ "The human will does what it does, whether good or ill, *as if* it were truly free; but yet the immutable will of God governs our mutable will. The mind of the reader must supply what the term itself does not of itself express; and understand by *necessity*, the immutability of the will

¹ Op. tom. ii. p. 431.² Ibid. p. 432.³ Ibid. p. 431.

of God, and the impotence of our own evil will.”⁴ “If God works in us, the will wills and acts, not as if by force, but willingly and spontaneously, so that no opposition can change, or the very gates of hell conquer it; but it goes on willing, liking, and loving good—*pergit volendo amando et lubendo bonum*—as before it willed, liked, and loved evil; so that there is no free will or liberty of turning elsewhere or willing anything else, so long as the Spirit and grace of God remain in man.”⁵ “If free will had any power, John would not have rejected the ‘will of man,’ and sent man to faith and regeneration alone. . . . I would have all the defenders of free will know that while they assert free will they deny Christ. . . . Whatsoever is not Christ is not the way but error, not the truth but a lie, not life but death, but free will is not Christ or in Christ: it comes, therefore, under the head of error, falsehood, and death. Where then and whence is had that middle and neutral thing called the power of free will?”⁶ The *Loci Theologici* of Melancthon contain the same doctrine:—“Quandoquidem omnia quæ eveniunt juxta divinam prædestinationem eveniunt, nulla est voluntatis nostræ libertas.” Archbishop Laurence admits, that “at the commencement of the Reformation both Melancthon and Luther held the harsh doctrine of a philosophical necessity;”⁷ and that “the idea of a pure passivity in conversion, the idea that the human will, though not idle, contributed nothing toward the formation of the act itself,” was the original doctrine of the Lutherans, to which, he says, after a change of opinion in the body as a whole, some divines “reverted.”⁸

But the doctrine of the regeneration of all infants in baptism is based upon the principle of free will; and the

⁴ Tom. ii. p. 426.⁵ Ibid. p. 431.⁶ Ibid. pp. 478, 479.⁷ Bampton Lectures, p. 248.⁸ Ibid. p. 292.

event itself shows that irresistible grace—the *only* grace recognized hitherto in Lutheran divinity—for producing holiness and goodness, is not given to *all* infants in baptism. The *doctrine* of the Lutherans then was in total contradiction to this statement in the Baptismal Services of the Lutherans, at the very time of its insertion, on the supposition that this statement was *dogmatic*. And this is strong evidence for concluding that this statement was not intended to be dogmatic. As a statement in a service it does not necessarily bear that character, because the same statement is applied to adults; and there is the reason just given for concluding that it did not.

It is urged, indeed, that both Luther and Melancthon subsequently recanted this extreme doctrine. Of Melancthon this assertion is true; of Luther it cannot be proved. Luther's subsequent works contain strong protests against the *abuse* of this doctrine of grace which had been great among some sectaries, who had perverted it into a licence for immorality, using the well-known fallacy, that if the end was preordained, the means were not necessary, and therefore that it did not signify in the interim whether they lived in holiness or sin. But these protests against the abuse of the doctrine do not imply any abandonment of the doctrine itself; these warnings and cautions are what the most rigid Calvinist would not object to, but would himself use in dealing with Antinomianism and with vulgar mistakes about, and false inferences from, the Calvinistic doctrine. Luther is denouncing those who argued thus: "Quos Deus eligit necessario salvantur, e contra vero quos non eligit, quicquid etiam fecerint, qualecunque pietatis studium præsent, tamen exitium declinare non poterunt, neque salutem consequentur. Proinde ergo me necessitati non opponam. Si ita destinatum est ut salver, salvabor; sin minus, irritum erit quicquid conatus

fuero.”⁹ But such a doctrine as this is plainly not the doctrine of Predestination, but a gross perversion of it, the coarse mistake of vulgar minds confounding a pre-ordained with an unconditional issue, and inferring that if God created man’s goodness, He did not require or insist upon such goodness. And therefore when Archbishop Laurence quotes Luther’s protests against such opinions as evidence that Luther had given up the doctrine of the *De Servo Arbitrio*, he is quoting what is plainly not to the purpose.¹

It is true also that Luther in his subsequent writings draws a strong distinction between God as He is revealed to us, and God as He exists in Himself and in His own inscrutable essence, between the *Deus Revelatus* and the *Deus Absconditus*; urging that we have to do with God only as a revealed, and not as an unknown God. And this distinction is drawn for a practical purpose, to take men away from curious inquiries into the Divine predestination, and fix them upon action and duty. But this distinction is no abandonment of the doctrine of grace taught in the *De Servo Arbitrio*, because the doctrine taught there is plainly taught as a part of *revelation*, and not as a part of the hidden and unknown truth of the Divine nature. It is proclaimed as the certain and conspicuous doctrine of Scripture, which cannot be denied without denying the plain sense of Scripture, and tampering with the express word of God. The *reasons* why God dispenses this irresistible grace in the way He does, imparting it only to a few and leaving the rest of mankind, in the absence of it, to perish in their sins,—these reasons are unknown, and belong to the *Deus Absconditus*: but the *fact* that His grace is irresistible is known from Scripture, and that belongs to the *Deus Revelatus*. It

⁹ Postilla Domestica, p. 57, quoted by Laurence, B. L. 160.

¹ Note 31.

would, indeed, have been very inconsistent in a writer to have been setting forth throughout a whole treatise a truth which he himself at the same time declared to be unknown; but Luther does no such thing; he insists upon the doctrine of irresistible grace as a published and revealed doctrine. *Why* it has been published and revealed we are not presumptuously to inquire: “Deus voluit ea *vulgari*, voluntatis vero Divinæ rationem quærendam non esse.”² He gives this as a sufficient answer to Erasmus, who thinks that there was no use in *revealing* a doctrine, even if true, which must so inevitably be made bad use of. But he adds that we may see good reasons for the revelation of it. One is to provide a testing truth, the acceptance or rejection of which will distinguish the elect from the reprobate,—“Propter Electos ista *vulgantur*, ut isto modo humiliati et in nihilum redacti salvi fiant. Cæteri resistent humiliationi huic.”³ Another reason is a kindred one, to give room for the exercise of faith,—“Hic est fidei summus gradus credere illum esse clementem qui tam paucos salvat, tam multos damnat; credere justum qui sua voluntate nos necessario damnabiles facit.”⁴

It is true that Luther draws men away from *speculations* upon grace to those conditions and means of grace which are revealed in Scripture; and to the idle objection,—“Oportet fieri quod Deus præfinivit, igitur incerta et inanis est omnis cura de religione aut de salute animarum,” replies, “Atqui tibi non est commissum ut feras sententiam quæ est impervestigabilis. Quorsum enim attinebat mittere Filium ut pateretur et crucifigeretur pro nobis? Quid proderat instituere sacramenta, si incerta sunt aut irrita prorsus ad nostram salutem? Alioqui enim si quis fuerit prædestinatus, absque fide et absque

² De Servo Arbitrio. Op. tom. ii. p. 431.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

sacramentis aut Scriptura sacra esset salvatus⁶ Deus revelat nobis voluntatem suam per Christum et Evangelium.”⁶ But to draw men from *speculations* upon grace was not to retract his teaching as to the fact of it. Calvin makes the same distinction :—“ Multa scripsi et in variis disputationum generibus me Dominus exercuit. Si ex meis lucubrationibus syllabam proferat, ubi doceam a Prædestinatione *exordium fieri* debere ad petendam salutis certitudinem, obmutescere non recuso. Arcanæ electionis mentio obiter a me facta est, fateor, sed quorsum? An ut pias mentes vel a promissionis auditu, vel a signorum intuitu abducerem? Atqui nihil mihi majori curæ fuit, quam eas prorsus in verbo retinere. Quid? dum toties inculco sacramentis offerri gratiam, an non ad petendam inde salutis suæ obsignationem eos invito? ”⁷

Indeed, the chief and most prominent reason which Luther gives against curious inquiries into Predestination is that speculations upon election tend immediately to disturb the assurance of the individual that he is one of the elect. In the mere exercise of curiosity the soul fastened upon nothing, but was carried into a region of darkness and a whirl of endless questions, in the midst of which it lost its hold upon the truth of its own election. The inevitable issue of mere speculation was uncertainty, because unknown truth could not be grasped, and the whole search must end in a void and a blank; whereas, if the revealed truth itself of God's election and sovereign grace was laid hold of, by fastening upon that, the individual appropriated that election to himself, and attained the assurance of his own salvation. Of these attempts then, *penetrare profunditatem divinitatis*, he says, “ Sunt hæ prestigie diaboli, quibus conatur nos *dubios et incertos* reddere, cum Christus ideo venerit in mundum ut faceret

⁶ Op. tom. vi. p. 353.⁶ Ibid. p. 355.⁷ Tract. Theol. p. 684.

nos certissimos.”^s These kind of thoughts issue in mere emptiness and perplexity. “Ejusmodi cogitationes quæ aut supra aut extra revelationem Dei sublimius aliquid rimantur, prorsus diabolicæ sunt, quibus nihil amplius proficitur quam ut nos ipsos in exitium præcipitemus, quia obijciunt objectum impervestigabile, videlicet Deum non revelatum. . . . Ibi nulla fides, nullum verbum, neque ulla cognitio est, quia est invisibilis Deus, quem tu non facies visibilem.” But was this the design of God? “Promulgando legem et Evangelium, mittendis Apostolis hoc voluit tantum, *ut essemus incerti et dubitaremus, utrum simus salvandi an vero damnandi?*” That was not His purpose, but the very contrary: “Initio quidem statim voluit Deus occurrere huic curiositati: sic enim suam voluntatem et consilium proposuit: Ego tibi præscientiam et prædestinationem egregie manifestabo, sed non ista via rationis et sapientiæ carnalis sicut tu imaginaris. Sic faciam: ex Deo non revelato fiam revelatus, et tamen idem Deus manebo. Ego incarnabor vel mittam Filium meum. Hic morietur pro tuis peccatis, et resurget a mortuis. Atque ita implebo desiderium tuum *ut possis scire an sis prædestinatus an non.* . . . Deus enim non de cælo descendit ut faceret *te incertum de prædestinatione*, ut doceret te contemnere sacramenta, absolutionem et reliquas ordinationes divinas. Imo ideo instituit *ut redderet te certissimum, et auferret morbum dubitationis ex animo tuo.*” Cease speculating then, he says: “Omitte speculationem de Deo Abscondito, et desine frustra contendere ad videndam faciem Dei. Alioqui perpetuo tibi in incredulitate et damnatione hærendum, quia qui dubitat non credit. . . . Intuere vulnera Christi, et sanguinem pro te profusum. Ex istis fulgebit prædestinatio. Audiendus est Filius Dei, qui missus est in carnem et ideo apparuit

^s Op. tom. vi. p. 354.

ut hoc opus diabolicum dissolvat, et certum te faciat de prædestinatione.”⁹

Luther's distinction, then, between the *Deus Revelatus* and *Deus Absconditus* involves no recantation of the doctrine of the *De Servo Arbitrio*; indeed, he expressly presents this distinction, when he does present it, in his subsequent writings, not as a new one, but as the very distinction which he had drawn in the *De Servo Arbitrio* itself. “Hæc studiose et accurate sic monere et tradere volui. Quia post meam mortem multi meos libros proferent in medium, et inde omnis generis errores et deliria sua confirmabunt. Scripsi autem inter reliqua, esse omnia absoluta et necessaria; *sed simul addidi quod aspiciendus sit Deus revelatus*. Sed istos locos omnes transibunt, et eos tantum accipient de Deo Abscondito.”¹ Archbishop Laurence, indeed, quotes this passage as an implicit retractation of the *De Servo Arbitrio*,² but Luther, on the contrary, expressly identifies himself here with that book, referring to it as containing the same doctrine of grace, with the same practical cautions to go along with it, which he holds now.

There is no proof then that Luther ever abandoned the doctrine of the *De Servo Arbitrio*. He never retracted the book: he referred to it even with satisfaction in his latest writings as a work which would be made a wrong use of by some, but which contained its own protest against such wrong use, and he inserted it at the close of his life in the collection of his works. But, for the purpose of the present argument, it must be observed that the question of a recantation is irrelevant. For no subsequent change of mind can undo the fact of what the doctrine of Luther was, when he constructed the Lutheran Baptismal Office; or alter the contradiction of

⁹ Op. tom. vi. p. 354.

¹ Ibid. p. 355.

² Bampton Lectures, p. 250.

that doctrine to that office, if the latter's assertion of the infant's regeneration was dogmatic. We find that at the time of the construction of this office the whole theology of the Lutheran Church was Calvinistic; but, the principle being acknowledged that a statement in a service is not necessarily doctrinal, such a contemporary state of doctrine in the communion must interpret a statement in a service of that communion, as not being doctrinal in the contrary direction.

But the doctrine with which this statement in the Lutheran baptismal offices must be mainly taken in connexion, is the great Lutheran doctrine of justification by faith. The doctrine of justification by faith, as asserted in all the Lutheran formularies and expounded by Luther himself and all the Lutheran divines, is the doctrine that faith is in all cases, without exception, the instrument and the necessary condition of justification; that the principle of *ex opere operato* is in no case true, but that the grace of the Sacraments always depends on something in the recipient to apprehend it, which apprehensive faculty is faith: that faith is therefore the condition of justification and regeneration in baptism in infants as well as adults.³ It was explained indeed, after controversy, that faith in their case was a rudimental and seminal faith, implanted by the Holy Spirit in the infantine soul before it was even conscious of it. This rudimental faith, however, was laid down as the condition of infant justification, just as faith in act was laid down as the condition of adult justification.

The regeneration of infants in baptism thus depended, in Lutheran theology, upon the existence of something in the infant which did not belong to the infant as such, which did not naturally exist in him and formed no part

³ Chapter ii. Part I., and Notes 4 and 32.

of his state as an infant, but was a supernatural, a spiritual, and a later implanted gift. The regeneration of infants was, in short, in Lutheranism *conditional*, and there is only one reasonable supplement to conditional infant regeneration. A faith, which, though it is seminal, is the actual spiritual virtue itself, and only does not act, on account of the immaturity of nature, is not implanted in *all* infants before baptism; because, if it was, it would come out and show itself in all as they grew up. A *conditional* infant regeneration is therefore a *limited* infant regeneration.

And accordingly the Lutheran doctrine of infant baptismal regeneration was attacked by Bellarmine as a total departure from the doctrine of the Fathers.⁴ The denial of the *ex opere operato* in the case of infants, and the substitution in its stead of faith as the condition of infant justification—in a word, the reduction of infant baptism to the same law as that of adult, was denounced by the Roman writer as a complete revolution in doctrine; and the Lutherans were charged with the invention of a new rationale of infant baptism hitherto unknown to the Church. The Fathers, it was said, had uniformly maintained that the Sacrament of Baptism did produce its effect, *ex opere operato*, in infants, who, as being incapable of fulfilling the condition of faith, came under a special law; a doctrine which was now subverted, and made to give place to a doctrine of conditional infant regeneration.

There were, indeed, Lutheran divines who gave this doctrine the contrary supplement to that which has been mentioned as the only rational one; who admitting the necessity of faith for infants, used language also implying that this faith was by a special act of the Holy Spirit

⁴ Tom. iii. p. 252.

implanted in every infant before baptism ; accounting for its non-appearance in the majority, as they grew up, by the supposition that it had been suppressed by the sins of childhood and by bad education before it had been able to manifest itself.⁵ But this is evidently an artificial and absurd explanatory structure to engraft upon the Lutheran doctrine of conditional infant regeneration, of which the only rational complement is the further assertion of a limited infant regeneration.

But whatever turn some later and more obscure Lutheran divines may have given to the Lutheran doctrine, the earlier, best known, and most recognized representatives of that doctrine gave it a different interpretation. Melancthon only acknowledges a partial regeneration of the members of the visible Church. He inserts this limitation in his definition of the visible Church in the *Loci Theologici* : “*Ecclesia visibilis est cœtus amplectentium Evangelium Christi, et recte utentium Sacramentis, in quo Deus per ministerium Evangelii est efficax, et multos ad æternam vitam regenerat, in quo cœtu tamen multi sunt non renati.*”⁶ He repeats the definition in the *Examen Theologicum*, with the same limitation—“in quo cœtu Filius *multos* regenerat.”⁷ He repeats it in the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans with the same—“in quo cœtu *multos* regenerat

⁵ The absurdity of Jacob Andrea’s doctrine is transparent. This Lutheran divine in his conference with Beza rejects the idea of faith being only seminal in infants—*semen fidei quod non sit fides*. Christ says “faith,” “aperte fidem appellat,” and therefore faith it must be—“etsi nos non videmus quo modo credant.” Having thus endowed all infants about to be baptized with literal faith, he explains that it often disappears as they grow up “negligentia parentum aut propria petulantia.” *Acta Colloquii Montisbelligartensis*, pp. 392—407.

⁶ *Loc. Theol. Postr. Ed.* Op. tom. i. p. 228.

⁷ *Examen Theol.* Op. tom. i. p. 319.

dato Spiritu Sancto.”⁸ He repeats it in the Disputations with the same: “Suntque in eodem cœtu in hac vita *multi non renati*.”⁹ He repeats it in the Saxon Confession with the same: “*Multos ad æternam vitam regenerat*.”¹ Melancthon’s sense of regeneration indeed is conversion: “*Acceptio per fidem Spiritus Sancti vocatur regeneratio seu conversio*.”² which regeneration or conversion is a change which follows upon justification: “*Cum Spiritus Sanctus in illa consolatione novos motus et novam vitam afferat, dicitur hæc conversio regeneratio*.”³ Again: “*Hac fide petente et accipiente remissionem peccatorum (i. e. justification having taken place) accipitur Spiritus Sanctus et fit regeneratio, et corda in pavoribus erecta incipiunt se subicere Deo, invocare et diligere eum*.”⁴ A good life is the test of regeneration: “*In homine renato per fidem Spiritus Sanctus inchoat obedientiam*.”⁵ “*In renatis necesse est esse inchoatam obedientiam, et justitiam bonæ conscientiæ . . . renati nondum satisfaciunt legi, tamen sunt justi et placent Deo*.”⁶ The “*Ecclesia proprie dicta*,” the “*Ecclesia Electa*,” the “*congregatio sanctorum*,” is also the “*renatorum Ecclesia*,”⁷ the “*populus Dei renatus*.”⁸ On the other hand, the “*non renati*” are the wicked and the unconverted: “*Lex est injustis posita, i. e. ad coer-cendos non renatos*.”⁹ “*Mens in non renatis plena est dubitationum de Deo, corda sunt sine vero timore Dei, sine vera fiducia, et habent impetus ingentes contra legem Dei*.”¹

Melancthon does not indeed, in thus identifying regeneration with conversion, restrict the term to adults.

⁸ Tom. iv. p. 159.

¹ Syll. Confess. p. 273.

⁴ Tom. iv. p. 561.

⁶ Tom. i. pp. 207, 208.

⁹ Ibid. p. 164.

² Tom. i. p. 23.

⁷ Tom. iv. p. 636.

⁹ Ibid. p. 558.

³ Ibid. p. 204.

⁶ Ibid.

⁸ Tom. i. p. 81.

¹ Ibid. p. 166.

He asserts the sanctification and regeneration of infants, "*pro eorum captu*,"² and the Augsburg Confession lays it down, "*quod infantes per baptismum Deo commendati recipiantur in gratiam Dei, et fiant filii Dei.*" But his own *sense* of the term as conversion, and his own express limitation of the term to *some* members of the visible Church, show that, though he opens the state to infants as a *class*, and allows them to be *capable* of such an inward change—i. e. of the implantation of a holy disposition and character in them—he does not extend the inward change to all the individuals of this class, which would be practically making the whole visible Church regenerate. The indefinite plural "infants" was indeed by no means identical in Reformation theology with the universal "*all* infants," but was used even by the Calvinistic divines³ to denote the admission of the class to the privilege of regeneration, as distinct from all the individuals of the class, which would have been in express contradiction to the doctrine of election.

Such is Melancthon's interpretation of the Lutheran doctrine of conditional infant regeneration. The interpretation of Bucer, who ranks in Mosheim as a Lutheran divine, was expressly Calvinistic, limiting regeneration to the elect.⁴ The particular Lutheran service therefore which served as the chief model for our own—the Cologne Baptismal Office, being the compilation of Bucer, comes to us with a Calvinistic interpretation upon it derived from the known doctrine of the compiler. And the statement in that service, that the infant is regenerate, comes to us with an hypothetical sense stamped upon it as the sense of the compiler, who would have condemned himself by the literal sense.

But as we pursue the examination of Lutheran lan-

² Tom. i. p. 320.

³ Chapter vii. Part II.

⁴ Note 35.

guage further, and obtain a nearer view of the position of the sacraments in Lutheran theology, we find that the idea of them as channels and instruments disappears and is supplanted by the idea of them as *signs* and *witnesses* of reconciliation and acceptance with God. The sacraments are defined by Melancthon as more indeed than "*signa professionis*," which is only a *human* act—as signs of the *Divine* act of justification, but no more than signs. His later language on this subject is substantially the same with his earlier; and both editions of the *Loci Theologici* give the same office to the sacraments, though they differ in their theory of grace. In the earlier works the sacraments are signs only: "*nihil signa sunt nisi fidei exercendæ μνημόσυνα*,"—"baptismus fidem excitat nempe signum divinæ gratiæ"—"non justificabat neque Johannis neque Christi Baptismus, de signis loquor, sed certificabat Johannis lavacrum de prædicanda adhuc gratia, Christi baptismus testabatur jam collatam esse gratiam. *In utroque justificabat fides.*"⁵

In the later work the sacraments are still only signs—"signa voluntatis Dei erga nos"—"*testimonia addita promissioni gratiæ.*"⁶ The sacraments, he says, in the Apology for the Confession of Augsburgh, are "*signa promissionum*," certain witnesses to God's willingness to pardon—"sentiat hæc testimonia non esse fallacia, sed tam certa quam si Deus novo miraculo de cœlo promitteret se velle ignoscere."⁷ In the Disputations published in the maturity of his life, baptism is "*signum promissæ gratiæ: vere justificat baptismus cum eo signo excitati credimus nobis propter Christum remitti peccata.*"⁸ There is the same substantial account of baptism in the later *Loci Theologici*,—"Baptismus proprie sacramentum dicitur, quia promissioni additus est ut testetur promissio-

⁵ *Loci Theologici*, Ed. 1521, pp. 247, 248, 251.

⁶ Tom. i. p. 233.

⁷ Tom. i. p. 96.

⁸ Tom. iv. p. 512.

nem gratiæ vere ad hunc pertinere qui baptizatur.”⁹ The language of Luther is well known,—“Omnia sacramenta ad fidem alendam sunt instituta.”¹ “Baptismus neminem justificat, nec ulli prodest, sed fides in verbum promissionis, hæc enim justificat et implet id quod baptismus significat. . . . Nec verum esse potest sacramentis inesse vim efficacem justificationis, seu esse ea signa efficacia gratiæ.”² Baptism in Lutheran theology, then, is the visible sign of the Divine pardon, but faith is the *instrument* by which that pardon is communicated to us, faith is the channel and medium of justification.

But now we come to another remarkable element in the Lutheran doctrine of baptism, viz. the peculiarity of the Lutheran *definition* of faith. Faith was defined as faith in the certainty of our own individual salvation. The language of Luther on this head is so well known that it need not be cited here, and Melancthon, though in gentler terms, follows him: “When the Apostle says ‘we are justified by faith,’ he wishes thee to decide that thy sins are remitted, that thou art justified, that thou art accepted,—‘statuere quod *tibi* remittantur peccata, quod justus, i. e. acceptus reputeris.’”³ “Terrified by the voice of the law, let the soul hear the promise in the Gospel and decide that its own sins are remitted—*statuat sibi remitti peccata gratis*. . . . Why doth this voice sound in the Church—‘Propter Filium Dei remittuntur *tibi* peccata,’ if thou do not assent to it?”⁴ “This doubt manifestly fights with the doctrine of Paul; ‘Being justified by faith, we have peace with God.’ Doubt brings despair and hatred of God. What is the difference between Paul and Atticus if both alike doubt that they are in favour with God?”⁵ “This is the

⁹ Postrem. Ed. tom. i. p. 236.

¹ Op. tom. ii. p. 75.

² Op. tom. ii. p. 76.

³ Loc. Theol. Postrem. Ed. Op. tom. i. p. 197.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Tom. i. p. 203.

difference between Jeremiah and Cicero. Jeremiah is certain that he is pleasing to God, *statuit se Deo placere*: Cicero was plunged by calamity into doubt and darkness.”⁶ “Yet some reclaim because they do not understand what faith is, and imagine that doubt whether we are heard and accepted by God is not sin. . . . They bid us doubt concerning our pardon; and they bid us doubt whether we are in grace⁷—*jubent dubitare an simus in gratia.*”

Such being then the Lutheran definition of faith, Luther incorporated the sacrament of baptism *in* this doctrine of faith, and converted baptism into a seal of assurance, the outward token of the individual's own acceptance with God and pledge of his actual salvation. The doctrine of assurance *simply* was this: God has revealed pardon and forgiveness in Scripture; I by an act of faith appropriate that pardon to myself, and am certain that *I myself* am accepted and justified. The doctrine of assurance, with the sacrament of baptism inserted in it, was this: God has revealed pardon and forgiveness in Scripture: baptism is the appointed visible *sign* of this pardon: I therefore by an act of faith appropriate *this sign* to myself, and I am certain that baptism is the sign of *my own* pardon and acceptance, that it is the token given me by God, that He accounts *me* in particular just and righteous, and will finally save me. Both the simple and the baptismal doctrine of assurance rested, indeed, upon a bare and arbitrary act of appropriation on the part of the individual. The declaration of forgiveness of sin in Scripture was not the declaration that *he* was accepted, but he chose to regard it as such: that baptism was the visible *sign* of forgiveness, did not imply that it was the sign of his special acceptance, but he chose to give it this special meaning. Both doctrines of assurance then rested

⁶ Tom. i. p. 205.

⁷ Ibid. pp. 199, 196.

upon an arbitrary connexion in the mind of the assured person; a conveyance to himself absolutely of a gift offered to mankind at large, and a conversion of a general declaration and a general sign of pardon into a declaration and sign of his own pardon in particular. But the appropriation by the individual to himself of the visible sign was no more arbitrary than his appropriation to himself of the declaration: and if, by an act of the will, he could resolve that the gift of remission of sin announced in Scripture was a special gift of absolute pardon to him, he could by the same act of the will resolve that baptism was a special sign of that pardon; a token communicated to him, that he in particular was accepted and would be saved.

Accordingly Luther engrafts the sacrament of baptism upon the stock of the doctrine of assurance. "Then doth baptism obtain its virtue, and my sins are certainly remitted to me, when I believe the word of God saying that He does remit them to me."⁸ "Then is baptism fruitful, and as often as I am overwhelmed by the consciousness of sin, I say, I am baptized; but if I am baptized, certain it is that these are promises made to myself that I shall enjoy a blessed immortality,—Ego tamen baptizatus sum, quod si baptizatus, certum est ea promissa mihi data esse, me beatum fore ac vitam immortalem anima et corpore possessurum."⁹ "In baptism must be observed, first of all, the Divine promise, 'He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved: ' for on this depends all our safety. But we must so observe as to exercise our faith in it, not doubting that we are saved after we are baptized—*prorsus non dubitantes nos esse salvos postquam sumus baptizati.*"¹ Such doubt of the certainty of our salvation wholly neutralized baptism, and

⁸ Op. tom. i. p. 75.⁹ Tom. v. p. 638.¹ Tom. ii. p. 74.

defeated the very object for which the sacrament was designed. "Unless this faith that we are saved is present, baptism profiteth not, yea harmeth, and that not only at the time it is received, but for the whole of life after. For unbelief accuses the Divine promise of falsehood, which is the greatest of all sins.² . . . Believe only the truth of God, and that will preserve thee: though all else fails, it will not leave thee. Thou hast in this what can quell the insults of the adversary, the force of temptation, the horror of death and judgment, and thou canst say, 'God's promise is true, the seal of which I have received in baptism.' . . . Thou seest how rich is the baptized Christian, who cannot, if he will, lose his salvation for any so great sins unless he doubts. No sins can condemn him, but disbelief can."³ "We must learn that God is not uncertain, ambiguous, equivocal, feeble, but true and certain, Who saith, 'I baptize thee, in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; I absolve thee from all thy sins.' In that word the Father, Son, and Spirit do not err, and are not shaken as the wind, but are as a rock and Sela, as God is often called in the Psalms, because He is a most firm God, upon whom thou mayest rely and say—I am saved; I am a son of God, and an heir of God, because I am baptized—*Sum factus salvus, sum filius Dei et hæres Dei, quia sum baptizatus.*"⁴

Baptism was according to Luther, then, the guarantee to the believer, the visible token given him of his own individual acceptance with God; and for this reason Luther insists upon the duty of a perpetual inward recurrence to our baptism: "Semper repetendus baptismus, assidue recantanda promissio, jugiter excitanda foven-daque fides. . . . The divine promise once pronounced over us in baptism, its truth abides till death, and faith

² Tom. ii. p. 74.³ Ibid. ii. p. 75.⁴ Tom. vi. p. 553.

in that promise must be nourished by the perpetual memory of that promise. . . . For no sins can condemn us, but unbelief alone. Let faith but return to the Divine promise made to the baptized, and all the rest will be absorbed in a moment through that faith.”⁵ It was this recurrence to the baptismal token of the sinner’s own individual acceptance with God that constituted the strength of the priestly absolution, which was only valid by virtue of the revival of the sinner’s assurance of total pardon, of which baptism was the seal. “Penitence recalls and renews the Sacrament of Baptism; as if the priest said, when he absolved the penitent, ‘Behold, God hath forgiven thee all thy sins, *as He promised before in Baptism.*’ . . . Which if we believe, without doubt we shall *have* remission of sins: if we believe not, we shall be damned. Thus we see that remission of sin is sometimes impeded by sins, but is wholly prevented by unbelief, and faith alone repairs and renews the interrupted work of baptism, and all things depend on faith. . . . Tunc enim vim suam baptismus obtinet, et certo mihi remissa sunt peccata cum credo Deo promittenti quod nolit *mihi* peccata imputare, quamvis maxima eorum pars adhuc in carne remaneat. Illam autem fidem *sequitur* peccatorum mortificatio.”⁶ Luther thus sent the believer throughout his earthly course to the commencing Sacrament of Baptism, as the outward visible sign and token of his own individual acceptance with God. According to the general doctrine of assurance the faithful believed in their own acceptance with God, and that was the evidence that they were accepted; according to the baptismal doctrine of assurance the faithful believed that baptism was the *sign* of their own acceptance with God, and that belief was the evidence that baptism *was* the sign of it, and *did*

⁵ Tom. vi. pp. 74, 75.

⁶ Tom. i. p. 75.

represent this special and particular fact. And Luther tells them to go back to this token of their own acceptance, as often as they found their assurance wavering and their hearts trembling. But this doctrine of baptism was only the doctrine of assurance, with an immaterial addition; for it made no real difference whether the believer said simply, "I am assured of my own particular salvation," or whether he said, "I am assured that baptism is the token of my own particular salvation." Baptism had no virtue of its own in this whole use and employment of it, but only that office which the believer himself gave to it by arbitrarily connecting it with his own assurance, and making it stand for the token of his own individual acceptance.

Such was the baptismal doctrine of Luther, which Archbishop Laurence mistook for the Patristic doctrine, quoting the "*Salvus sum, quia baptizatus sum*,"⁷ as if it meant, "I have received in baptism grace enabling me to be saved;" whereas it really meant, "I have received in baptism a pledge and token of my own individual salvation." He was thus misled by a delusive resemblance of language into praising, as orthodox and Patristic, statements which really contained the full doctrine of assurance. The true explanation shows how different in meaning similar verbal statements may be, according as they arise upon one basis of doctrine or another.

The baptismal doctrine of Melancthon is a mild copy of that of Luther. "Baptism is called a Sacrament because it is added to the promise, so as to witness that the promise of grace truly pertains to him who is baptized; and we must think of this witness as if God testified by a voice from heaven that *He accepted this person*. And the

⁷ Bampton Lectures, p. 151.

baptized person must, when he understands, exert this faith: he must believe that he is truly accepted by God for Christ's sake, and is sanctified by the Holy Spirit. Thus must baptism be used in after life; it must every day remind us: 'Behold, God has testified by this sign that thou art received into grace.' He will not have this testimony scorned. Wherefore believe that thou art verily accepted—*credas te vere receptum esse*—and invoke Him with this belief. . . . God declares that He accepts us; that declaration the believing conscience embraces."⁸

Upon an examination then of the Lutheran baptismal language, we find, first, that the grace of baptism is, according to the Lutheran doctrine, conditional upon faith even in the case of infants, and that this condition issues, in the language of Melancthon, in a limitation of regeneration to some members of the visible Church; and, secondly, we find that baptism is not an instrument of grace in Lutheran doctrine, but only the sign of it; and, lastly, that baptism is in Luther's scheme incorporated and absorbed in the doctrine of Assurance, which assurance simply uses it as its own seal, arbitrarily converting it into the sign of the particular salvation of the baptized person.

To go back then to the argument from documentary sources. We have been dealing with the first question which arises in that argument, viz. the question of fact. Was the assertion of the regeneration of the infant dogmatic in the Lutheran baptismal services? The whole baptismal doctrine of the Lutherans seems to testify to the contrary, and to show that it was not understood as such by the Lutherans themselves. It must be admitted, that side by side with the *service*, even at the very date of its construction, the Lutheran *doctrine* of baptism ex-

⁸ Tom. i. p. 236.

patiates most freely, and does not consider itself as committed or shackled. Nor perhaps would some of those who use the argument—"Our Baptismal Service is borrowed from the Lutherans: the Lutherans held a certain doctrine of baptism, therefore we hold the same;" choose themselves, after an inspection of the Lutheran doctrine of baptismal assurance, to acknowledge its validity.

I would indeed, with all deference to many respectable writers, demur to the judgment which has given the Lutheran such an advantage over the Calvinistic School, as a witness to the efficacy of the sacraments. It is true that the doctrine of election, in the writings of the latter school, limits the *recipients* of the grace of the sacraments; but the sacraments themselves are still largely recognized as *instruments*, and the Calvinistic language would appear, upon comparison, to be more *sacramental* than the Lutheran, which is more purely committed to the obnoxious view. The moderation of Melancthon and his retraction of extreme predestinarianism have naturally recommended him to the writers to whom I allude, but his representation of the sacraments as *signa* and *testimonia*, cannot itself be acceptable to those who elevate the sacraments and follow the teaching of the Fathers. Nor, upon this question, is Lutheranism a source from which a stricter interpretation of our formularies can be derived.

We now leave the Lutheran and come to the Ancient baptismal offices; and first of all, as in the case of the Lutheran, what is the state of the fact with respect to the Ancient offices? It must be admitted then that the statement of the regeneration of the baptized infant in the Ancient offices was understood in the Ancient Church literally. But here an important distinction must be drawn. This statement, though understood literally, was not so understood *because* it was a literal statement in a service, but because the current doctrine of that period

gave it that literal meaning; for it must be remembered that the very same statement was made in the Ancient offices over every baptized *Adult*, in whose case it was understood by the whole Church as hypothetical. The statement therefore was not *in itself* literal in meaning, but derived that meaning where it had it from current contemporary doctrine. And therefore this statement was not in the Ancient Baptismal Offices a *dogmatic* statement, as this very alternative of meanings shows: for had it been dogmatic it would not in any case have borne an hypothetical meaning, but must in every case have borne a literal one. But this statement does not come down to us from the Ancient Church stamped with the literal sense only; because, as being no statement special and appropriate to infants, but one common to infants and adults, it had in truth either meaning, hypothetical or literal, according to the case in which it was used.⁹

But now the state of the fact with respect to the meaning of this statement in the Lutheran and Ancient offices being ascertained, another question still remains. For whatever may be the state of fact with respect to the original documents from which, mediately or immediately, our own service is derived, we have still to consider the conclusion which is to be drawn from the fact, or the solidity and justice of the general argument from documentary sources. Are compiled services necessarily to be interpreted by the services from which they are compiled? Does a service, because it is constructed upon

⁹ Though it makes no difference in the argument, the statement being the same, even if the services were distinct, it may be mentioned that the ancient baptismal offices were not distinct generally, but that there was one service in common for adults and infants; and that both came under the same statement *in the same service*—the “*Qui te regeneravit.*”

the model of another anterior service, necessarily borrow the meaning of the latter in every case, and use all its phrases and its statements in the very sense in which they are used in the older formulary? No; because it is quite open to a Church in constructing a new service to avail itself of old liturgical material without binding itself to the exact sense in which this language in its original was used. Our Communion Service would supply an indisputable instance of a principle, which would apply to the other service as well, viz. that the Church in adopting the language of an older formulary may adopt it with the accommodation which a new doctrinal ground requires. The meaning then of this or that phrase, or piece of language in a compiled service does not depend absolutely upon the meaning which it had in the original document from which it was borrowed, but it depends upon the *doctrine of the Church* which has compiled that service and borrowed that liturgical language. In the Ancient offices the baptismal statement, as made over an infant, had a literal meaning, because the baptismal regeneration of all infants was laid down positively then in the current theology of the Church. But in our service this statement wants this doctrinal support and interpretation from without, and stands simply upon its own ground as a statement in a service, in which capacity it has not necessarily a literal meaning.

When the remark is made then that in none of the Ancient offices is the statement of the regeneration of the infant more positive than it is in our own, the truth of it may be admitted, but the fact is not to the purpose. It by no means follows from it that our Church uses this statement in the same exclusively literal meaning in which it was used in the Ancient offices; because she is not bound to the sense which accompanied it in the original document, but only to her own sense as indicated by

her own doctrine. Contemporary baptismal doctrine gave a literal sense to this statement as made over the infant in the Ancient offices; but her own baptismal doctrine does not give it that exclusive sense in her own service, but leaves it open to an hypothetical one. The statement in the service reflects the doctrine of the Communion. The doctrine of the Roman Church is that of unconditional infant regeneration in baptism, and therefore this statement in the Roman service has a literal meaning. The doctrine of the Irish Church, as laid down in the Irish Articles, was that the regeneration of infants in baptism was conditional;¹ and therefore in the Irish service this statement was hypothetical. The doctrine of the English Church is open and neutral on this point, and therefore allows of either interpretation. In each of these cases the doctrine of the Church decides the sense of the statement in the service. One who has subscribed to it in a doctrinal formulary must attach a doctrinal meaning to it in a service: one who has contradicted it in a doctrinal formulary cannot attach a doctrinal meaning to it in a service: one who has subscribed to no doctrinal proposition either way is free to adopt either aspect of it.

¹ Upon final perseverance. "A true lively justifying faith and the sanctifying Spirit of God is not extinguished, or vanisheth away in the regenerate, either finally or totally." Irish Art. 37.

CHAPTER VII

BAPTISMAL LANGUAGE OF CALVINISM

THOUGH the question before us is one which must be decided by the language of our formularies, a certain weight is still due to current and established opinion, backed by the best authorities. An opinion of this kind is embodied in the *dictum*, with which we are all of us so familiar, that "the Church of England tolerates Calvinism." "I know not," says Bishop Horsley, "what hinders but that the highest supralapsarian Calvinist may be as good a churchman as an Arminian; and if the Church of England in her moderation opens her arms to both, neither can with a very good grace desire that the other should be excluded."¹ This is a *dictum* then which I may venture to argue upon, as, though an informal, a generally admitted premiss; and therefore before entering upon the regular argument of precedent, which is reserved for another chapter, let us examine what this current saying amounts to, and to what it commits those who agree with it.

The current *dictum* then that "the Church of England tolerates Calvinism" concedes the whole claim which we

¹ Primary Charge, 1806.—The statement in Art. 16, that "we may depart from grace given, may be subscribed by the Calvinist who admits the fact of falls from grace, only denying the *totality* of them in the elect, in whom there is asserted to remain throughout a 'radix occulta quæ deinde pullulat.'" Calvin, on 1 John iii. 9.

have been discussing, the claim, viz. of the liberty to interpret the statement in the Infant Baptismal Service hypothetically. The Calvinistic School maintains that the elect alone, or those who will finally persevere, can be regenerate;² nor is this a doctrine of subordinate rank in the teaching of this school, but it occupies the very front of its doctrinal language. This is the Calvinistic School's *sense* of the term "regenerate," without which sense the word has no place in its theology.

But this being the doctrine of the Calvinistic School, it is evident that this school cannot possibly accept the statement in the baptismal service literally, which would be simply to say that every baptized infant was one of the elect and would finally persevere; and that therefore the alternative lies between the admissibility of the hypothetical interpretation of it, and the total exclusion of this school from the Church of England. If the hypothetical interpretation is not admitted, it is untrue to say that the Calvinistic School *is*, because in that case this statement of itself absolutely and directly excludes this school. On the other hand, if the Calvinistic School is admitted, it is untrue to say that the literal interpretation of this statement is imposed, which it *ipso facto* is not. We cannot therefore consistently go on using this current *dictum* about the "Church tolerating Calvinism," and at the same time stand up for the necessity of the literal

² On the strength of *two* Calvinistic divines, Ward and Davenant, having, for a particular purpose, maintained a *kind* of regeneration which did not imply indefectibility, it has been sometimes assumed that the indefectibility of regenerating grace is not a regular tenet of the Calvinistic School. But in the first place the opinion of two individual writers does not affect the doctrine of the *school*, which is quite clear on this point. In the next place, though these two divines held a *kind* of regeneration, which did not imply indefectibility, they expressly said that they did not by that kind of regeneration mean *true* regeneration. See p. 165.

interpretation of this statement; but we must face the alternative of excluding the Calvinist, if we enforce this interpretation, or giving up the necessity of this interpretation, if we admit the Calvinist.

Few, I think, will venture upon the former alternative; should any however be disposed to do so, I will put before them in few words the baptismal position of the Calvinist—the position, I mean, which a Calvinist may hold with respect to baptism, and yet hold in its integrity all that is essential to Calvinism.

The Calvinistic School then holds, in the first place, that regeneration is a change of which infants are, in the very state of infancy, capable. Bishop Bethell has exceeded the truth in laying it down, as part of Calvinism, that regeneration dates from the moment of the “effectual call,” or the conscious conversion of the man as an adult. That may have been the practical tendency of Calvinism as a popular system, but the great divines of the Calvinistic School have always assigned an earlier ordinary date to regeneration. They have uniformly, and without any hesitation, laid down the principle that infants *as infants* were capable of regeneration; that they were susceptible of a real and *bonâ fide* spiritual change, wrought in them by the Holy Spirit, and admitted of having implanted in them a *present* principle or root of spiritual life, though the manifestation of it was deferred to a subsequent age, when either the natural growth of reason or a particular act of Divine Providence elicited and developed it. “We deny,” says Calvin, “that *infants* cannot be regenerated by the power of God, in a way as easy and ready to Him as it is incomprehensible and wonderful to us. . . . Why cannot they receive that grace in part now which they will enjoy in such plenitude hereafter? . . . It is true that faith and repentance are not as yet formed in them, but they have implanted within

them, by the secret operation of the Spirit, the latent seed of both.”³ “It is true,” says Peter Martyr, “that infants cannot actually believe, but they have infused into them the Holy Spirit, which is *the root of faith*, hope, charity, and all those virtues which are afterwards called forth and manifested in the children of God when their age allows. Infants, therefore, can in a certain sense be called faithful, just as they can be called rational. They cannot actually *reason*, but they have a soul which *will* reason and exert itself in the various sciences, faculties, and arts when they grow up. In the same way, they can have the Holy Spirit, even while they are infants.”⁴ . . . Wherefore in adults we require faith expressed and in acts; in infants we maintain an inchoate faith, existing in its principle and root, which is the Holy Spirit, the source of faith and all the virtues.”⁵ “We believe and teach,” says Bucer, “a real regeneration and a true adoption of infants, and an actual operation of the Holy Spirit in them, according to their measure and capacity.”⁶ Whitaker, the star of Elizabethan Calvinism, adopts Peter Martyr’s position of an inchoate faith in infants, “who have both the act and the habit of faith in the seed, i. e. the Holy Spirit;” and denies on this ground the charge of Bellarmine, “that we baptize infants only to be members of the visible Church; because, though they are baptized as infants, they will not always be infants, but will, if life is granted them, feel when grown up the virtue of that baptism which they received as infants.”⁷ “Infants,” says Zanchius, “are not, because

³ Inst. iv. 16. 18—20.⁴ Loc. Comm. iv. 8, 14.⁵ Ibid. p. 15.⁶ Script. Angl. p. 655.⁷ “Pueri habent tum *actum*, tum *habitus* fidei in suo semine, i. e. in Spiritu Sancto . . . Petrus Martyr satis esse indicat ut dicamus eos qui servantur, cum sint de peculio Domini per parentes et ecclesiam, Sancto Spiritu perfundi, qui radix sit fidei, spei et chari-

they cannot believe on account of their immaturity, therefore destitute of the Spirit of faith by which they are regenerated, any more than they are without reason, simply because they have not come to the use of reason.”⁸ “Regeneration,” says Junius, “is to be considered in one way, as in its foundation, i.e. Christ, or in habit; in another way, in ourselves, or in act. The first regeneration, which is as it were the cause of which the second is the effect, takes place in infants.”⁹ Burgess proves the infant’s capacity for “initial regeneration” by the same argument that the writers above quoted use. “This ought not to seem strange to any, for just so it is in the course of nature. So soon as the reasonable soul is infused there is in some sense a rational life. But how? The soul is there, and in that soul are included all the principles of reason; but the soul doth not send forth those principles into action (unless in some insensible manner by little and little preparing the infant unto human action) till afterwards that the senses begin to act; yet, forasmuch as the infant hath not at that time the actual use of reason, for this cause we call the further perfection of his natural principles, by tract of time attained, when reason puts itself into act, *actual rational life*; and we term the same life, in respect of the first degree and principles thereof, which together with the reasonable soul, in the first infusion thereof, it received—*initial life*.”¹ “Christian infants,” says Aynsworth,

tatis et omnium virtutum, quas postea exerit et declarat in filiis Dei, cum per ætatem licet.” Whitaker, *Prælect. de Sac.* p. 284. The Calvinistic divines objected to the actual “infused *habit*” of the Schoolmen, and preferred the “*radix habitus*,” though the two are substantially the same.

■ Explic. Epist. ad Eph. p. 222.

⁹ Quoted by Burgess, p. 178.

¹ Baptismal Regeneration of Elect Infants, p. 242.

“have the graces they speak of, though not actually or by way of declaration to others; yet they have, through the work of the Spirit, the seed and beginning of faith, virtually and by way of inclination; so that they be not wholly destitute of faith, regeneration, &c., though it be a thing hid and unknown to us after what manner the Lord worketh these in them.”²

The regeneration then of infants, while infants, being maintained by the Calvinistic School, *how* and by what means does this regeneration take place according to the teaching of this school? The Calvinistic divines then made, in the first place, the general statement that regeneration was by baptism. “Baptism is God’s ordinary instrument to wash and renew us,” says Calvin. “The efficacy of the Holy Spirit is present in baptism to cleanse and regenerate us.”³ All the leading Calvinistic divines of the Reformation make the same fundamental statement, and we find the position formally laid down in the Confessions of the Calvinistic Churches.⁴

It is true that when we enter into the particulars of the language of these divines, and examine their explanation of this general statement, when they are expounding their

² Censure, p. 48.

³ “*Baptismum ordinarium Dei instrumentum asserimus ad nos lavandos et renovandos.*” Tract. Theol. 258. “*Convenit non inanes esse figuras [sacramenta] sed re ipsa præstari quicquid figurant. In baptismo adesse Spiritus efficaciam, ut nos abluat et regeneret.*” Epist. p. 82. “*Quia mortua non sunt Spiritus Sancti organa, vere per baptismum efficit ac præstat Deus quod figurat.*” Tract. Theol. p. 683. “*Quærit rursum, si sacramenta sunt organa, quibus efficaciter agit Deus, suamque nobis gratiam testatur et obsignat, cur negamus per baptismi lavacrum renasci homines:—qua i hoc a nobis negari non ipse confingat.*” Ibid. “*Quod Baptismo nos ablui docet Paulus, ideo est, quod illic nobis ablutionem nostram testatur Deus, et simul efficit quod figurat.*” In Eph. v. 26.

⁴ Note 33.

doctrine at large, we find that baptism is more generally considered rather the seal of regeneration than the actual instrument of it. The root of faith and holiness which is maintained to be previously implanted in the infant, as the *condition* of his regeneration in baptism is contemplated as being itself his regeneration really; of which subsequent baptism is rather regarded as the seal. But though they incline to the obnoxious view, the instrumental has still a large place in the language of the Calvinistic divines, who alternate indeed from one to the other, as if unconscious of any particular difference between the two. "Baptism," says Calvin, as just quoted, "is God's ordinary *instrument* to change and regenerate us." "God uses such means and instruments as He thinks fit, and as He feeds our bodies by bodily nourishment, so He feeds our faith by the sacraments."⁵ "God really gives in the sign what He figures by it, nor is it a sign without an effect. These instruments do not work by any intrinsic virtue, nor does God resign His place to external symbols, or give up at all His own primary operation; the cause of justification is not held within the sacraments, as if they were vessels, but God performs inwardly what they figure outwardly."⁶ "The sacraments are to be esteemed as nothing but instrumental causes of grace . . . if there are any who deny that there is contained in the sacraments the grace which they figure, we condemn them." "We take away nothing from the efficacy of the sacraments on the part of God."⁷ "For unless the truth of the thing, or, what is the same, the offer, were conjoined with the sign, this phrase would be improper, 'Baptism is the washing of the soul, *Baptismus est lavacrum animæ*' . . . Some labour to diminish the force of this eulogium of baptism ('That He might

⁵ Instit. iv. 14. 12.⁶ Ibid. 16, 17.⁷ Tract. Theol. pp. 256, 257.

cleanse it with the washing of water,' Eph. v. 26), lest too much be given to the sign; but they do wrongly. For first the Apostle does not teach that it is the sign which cleanses, but declares that it is God's work. It is God, therefore, who cleanses, nor is it right that this honour should be transposed to the sign, or shared by the sign. But it is not absurd that God should use the sign as an instrument, *signo Deum tanquam organo uti*. Not that the virtue of God is shut up in the sign, *inclusa sit in signo*: but that He imparts it to us, in accommodation to our weakness, by such a stay. Some think that this is taking away from the Holy Spirit that which belongs to Him, and which Scripture everywhere vindicates. But they are mistaken. For God so acts through the sign, as that the whole efficacy of the sign still depends on the Holy Spirit. Thus nothing more is attributed to the sign than that it is a subordinate instrument, useless indeed in itself, and only useful in so far as it borrows its force from without,—*aliunde vim suam mutuatur*.”⁸ “The sacraments,” says Beza, “are not naked signs. In baptism are not only signified, but offered and presented, remission of sin and regeneration, though these are not received by all the baptized.”⁹ “The sacraments,” says Chamier, “are not only signs, but pledges and instruments. A pledge is a kind of sign indeed, but it is the most powerful kind of sign, because it signifies a thing to which the receiver has a right. . . . And yet inasmuch as some pledges do nothing but *affect the mind* of the giver and receiver, we add that the sacraments are *instruments* by which that which is signified is effected, as when Christ breathed on the Apostles, and that breath both signified the Spirit and gave Him . . . Inward sanctification is the influence of the Holy Spirit upon the mind of him who

⁸ In Eph. v. 26.⁹ Acta Coll. Mont. p. 372.

receives the sacrament, producing a secret change of his will and understanding¹ . . . We both (Protestants and Roman Catholics) agree that the sacraments are signs, but efficacious signs . . . though this efficacy is not primary but instrumental, as the Gallic Confession hath it, 'God works *through them* by the virtue of the Holy Spirit:' if God works through the sacraments, the sacraments are God's instruments, not physical indeed, but moral, not operating in the soul by virtue inserted in the thing itself, and yet efficacious instruments, and causes of grace in a certain way."² "By baptism, as by an *instrument*," says Zanchius, "is communicated remission, regeneration, and admission to covenant with God . . . Baptism was instituted to be the instrument for this purpose."³ "The sacraments," says Whitaker, "are instruments and means by which the Holy Spirit works grace in us . . . though this virtue is not in the sacraments themselves, but in the Holy Spirit acting and working through them . . . The sacraments effect grace as means and instruments in their way . . . We say that by sacraments, as by means and instruments appointed by God, are applied to us the merits of the death and passion of Christ."⁴ "As in human agency," says Junius, "the internal act of the mind and the external act of the body is one human operation; so in baptism the inward washing and the outward are one Divine operation."⁵

But while the Calvinistic divines called baptism the

¹ De Sacram. in Gen. p. 13.

² Ibid. pp. 25, 27, 28.

³ Explic. in Ep. ad Eph. pp. 217, 221.

⁴ Prælect. de Sacr. pp. 6, 7, 54.

⁵ Quoted by Burgess, p. 176. Ward's general remark deserves notice.—"Quidni igitur dicamus hoc fieri virtute baptismi *instrumentaliter et organice*. Siquidem Calvinus Bucerus et alii ex nostris theologis in hunc modum sæpe loquuntur." Ward ap. Gataker, De Bapt. Infant. vi et efficacia, p. 163.

instrument of regeneration, and regarded infants as capable of being regenerated, they differed widely from other divines when it came to the question whether all infants or only some were regenerate in baptism. The doctrine of Election necessarily confined this benefit to the elect; and this condition is always understood, and this reserve is always made in the statements which the Calvinistic divines give of the general doctrine, or of the grace of the sacrament as such. Nor does Calvin on this account justly incur the charge brought against him by Archbishop Laurence, who attributes his general statement of the grace of the sacrament to a political motive, the wish, viz. to "promote unity and concord among the Reformation divines." "No man perhaps," he says, "was ever less scrupulous in the adoption of general expressions, but perhaps no man adopted them with more mental reservations than Calvin."⁶ A general acknowledgment, however, of the grace of the sacrament, leaving open the condition upon which it is received, whether that of Election or any other, is no fallacious form of statement, but a strictly sound and legitimate one, and one that we cannot do without in laying down the doctrine of the sacraments.⁷

What is the position then in which a Calvinist, holding

⁶ Bampton L. p. 375.

⁷ *Sacramentum enim definitur ex legitimo usu et fine et baptismus λουτρὸν παλιγγενεσίας*, i. e. lavacrum regenerationis dicitur; non tamen regenerantur omnes qui aqua baptismal lavantur, sed ex parte Dei offerenti sic vocatur." Whitaker, *Prælect. de Sacr.* p. 10.

"Effectum Baptismi a me in dubium revocari dicit quia a Prædestinatione eum suspendo . . . Tantum dixi non promiscue in omnibus operari Dei Spiritum, sed quemadmodum solos electos in fidem illuminat, sic etiam efficere ne frustra utantur sacramentis . . . Cavillari desinat me dubium facere Baptismi effectum, ubi ex fonte electionis manare ostendo, quod in sacramentis proficiunt, quibus peculiariter datum est." Calvin, *Tractatus Theol.* p. 684.

the doctrine of baptismal regeneration as thus stated, stands with respect to the statement pronounced over every baptized infant in the Baptismal Service, that "this child is regenerate"? His position is this. He believes that some of the infants over whom this is pronounced really are regenerate, but not that *all* are. He acknowledges a basis of actual fact upon which this statement is made, but he does not allow the fact to be co-extensive with the statement; and therefore as a statement made of *all* baptized infants he understands this statement hypothetically, while he does not at the same time regard the regeneration of infants as hypothetical altogether, but as true *in fact* of *some*. According as he inclines, indeed, to the obsignatory or the instrumental view of baptism, he considers this regeneration to have preceded baptism and been sealed in the sacrament, or to have been consequent upon baptism; but in either case he admits a basis of fact for the statement over every child that it "is regenerate;" some infants, of the whole number of which this is asserted, being believed by him to be at that time regenerate in fact.

But for the purpose of testing the relations of Calvinism to this statement in the Infant Baptismal Service, it is only legitimate and just to take that form of Calvinism which is, to use a well-understood epithet, most sacramental; which attributes most efficacy to the Sacrament, maintaining at the same time the complete integrity of the Calvinistic doctrine. The instrumental efficacy of baptism was, as has been shown, extensively asserted by the main body of Calvinistic divines, who however combined that language with another which was in larger use with them, viz. the obsignatory representation of the sacrament. But there was a school of Calvinists who did not divide their language, but held exclusively the instrumental view of baptism. They dif-

ferred from the main body of the Reformation divines in one particular. The main body of Reformation divines held that rationale of infant baptism which applied to the infant the adult condition of regeneration, viz. that of a previously implanted faith; and, as the next step, proceeded to regard this previously implanted faith as itself the regeneration of the infant, of which baptism was the seal. But the school of Calvinists, to which I have referred, discarded this whole machinery of accommodated *adult* qualification, and admitted the infant to the grace of baptism upon his own basis as an infant. Upon this simpler plan then, there was no prevenient grace required for the infant, and baptism was the very first entrance into grace, before which there was nothing but pure nature. But while this school of Calvinists maintained that baptism was, in Hooker's language, "to our sanctification here a step that hath not any before it," they also held that baptism was this only to the elect; and regarding the sacrament as the instrument of regeneration, wherever regeneration took place, they yet limited the *reception* of this grace by the doctrine of Predestination. "This school," says Dr. Pusey, "made the indefectibility of grace the rule by which they measured the declarations of God. As many as held that none could fall finally from grace given, were obliged to hold that none but those who should finally be saved were regenerated in baptism. Nor did they wish to conceal that this was their only ground. Being fully persuaded of the truth of their first principles, they held unhesitatingly that the general declarations of Holy Scripture [they added also of the Fathers] must be limited by this known truth. As they expressed it, all 'elect children' received the gifts of the Holy Spirit; the rest were washed with water only. These in some respects retained the honour of the sacrament of Baptism; in

another began to derogate from it. They retained it, in that they held *that all whoever received regeneration ordinarily, received it through the sacrament of Baptism. . . . they imagined no other entrance into the Lord's house than the door which He had appointed. They derogated from that sacrament in that they could no longer consistently hold that the benefits imparted were by virtue of our Saviour's institution. . . . but they were obliged to ascribe it to the secret counsel of God, giving effect to the outward ordinance when and to whom He willed.*"⁸ Dr. Pusey ranks as belonging to this school Daneau and Chamier among the reformed divines; and Archbishop Usher, Bishop White, Taylor, Burgess, and others among our own. "All elect infants," says Burgess, "do ordinarily receive from Christ *in baptism* the spirit of regeneration, as the soul and the first principle of spiritual life, for *the first* solemn initiation unto Christ, and for their future actual renovation in God's good time. . . . Even *in the moment of baptism* all orthodox divines do allow of some present efficacy of baptism upon infants."⁹

The list of divines who held this specially sacramental form of Calvinism would not, in my own judgment, be

⁸ Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism, 1st ed. p. 144. The writer continues: "Most of these however *were still able to use our formularies*, although not in their original sense, since our baptismal formulary was immediately derived from the Lutheran Church, and this with the Fathers held the universal regeneration of baptized infants. Yet since man could not tell who of these infants were elect and who not, they held that these words could be used by a sort of charity to each infant. And this excuse Hooker seems to suggest . . . 'We speak of infants as the rule of piety alloweth, &c.'" If the statement here that these divines "*were still able to use our formularies*," means that they were able to do so by a fair liberty, not by an unfair licence; the writer is an authority in favour of the Gorham Judgment.

⁹ Bapt. Reg. of Elect Infants, pp. 231, 169.

incorrectly extended by the addition of the name of Hooker, who expressly holds indeed that baptism is "to our sanctification here a step that hath not any before it," but as clearly assumes as the condition of this sanctification in baptism, not a previous inward grace indeed, but a previous *act of election* on God's part. For the truth that Predestination is the original condition of life, is assumed in the very qualification and caution that "Predestination bringeth not to life *without* the grace of external vocation wherein our baptism is implied;" and that election precedes sanctification in baptism is assumed in the very doubt whether baptism is not the *seal* of election.¹ The doctrine of the school of Calvinists to which I have been referring was that nothing except *election* preceded the baptismal grace—no previous inward grace or operation of the Spirit, but only an antecedent *decree* of God. The language of Hooker is to the same effect, and, though vindicating the grace of baptism as the *first inward grace*, before which no operation of the Spirit has passed upon the soul, still assumes, as the condition of the reception of this grace, the Divine Predestination and election of the person to eternal life.

What is the position, then, in which the Calvinist of the School to which I am now referring, i. e. who regards baptism as the instrument of regeneration, but the instrument of it only to the elect, stands with respect to the statement in the Infant Baptismal Service? It is evident that, though he declines accepting that state-

¹ Eccl. Pol. v. lx. 3. "A seal perhaps to the grace of election before received, but to our sanctification here a step that hath not any before it." Burgess remarks, "He makes no 'perhaps' of this, that such as partake of the grace of baptism are elected; but only of this, that they do 'perhaps' receive baptism as a *seal* of grace of election." Bapt. Reg. of Elect Infants p. 61. See Note 38.

ment literally, the reason which prevents him from doing so is no want of belief in the grace of the sacrament itself, because he believes that it is the instrument of regeneration to the elect, just as much as *others* believe that it is the instrument of regeneration to all. The reason which prevents him from accepting this statement literally, is his doctrine of election alone which limits the reception of that grace to *some*, who are yet as truly regenerated in baptism according to his doctrine, as *all* are according to another doctrine. The hypothetical interpretation has a basis of fact in his mind both with regard to the regeneration of infants, and with regard to baptism as the instrument of it: and he only supposes of all what he believes to be true of some, in consequence of a limit, inherent in another doctrine held by him, which prohibits the *universal* reception as a fact, and only allows it as a supposition.

Ought then such a person as this to be excluded from the ministry of the Church, on account of such hypothetical interpretation of the statement in the Infant Baptismal Service? I have shown in a former chapter that the Formularies of the Church do not require such exclusion, and I have brought forward in this an informal but still generally received and current dictum in our Church, which confirms that conclusion. I have appealed in this chapter to the practical consent of Churchmen as seconding the conclusion built upon purely formulistic grounds. I have appealed to an established standard of orthodoxy, to a certain outline of comprehensiveness which is in everybody's mind, expressed in the saying of Bishop Horsley; according to which standard and outline the Calvinistic School is not excluded from the pale of our Church, or its ministry. Especially would it be contrary to that standard that such a Calvinist as I have been describing, should be excluded. Yet it must

be seen that nothing *short* of a full and complete recognition of the hypothetical interpretation of the statement in the Infant Baptismal Service, can effect his *inclusion*: for outside he must stand so long as the literal sense of this statement is enforced. Let him believe as strongly as he may that baptism is the instrument of regeneration, he cannot possibly assert that it is this to *all* infants, because this assertion would be in contradiction to a fundamental tenet of Calvinism. There is no option, therefore, if we hold the current dictum which has been appealed to in this chapter, but that of opening the sense of the statement in the Infant Baptismal Service, and allowing the hypothetical interpretation of it.

CHAPTER VIII

ARGUMENT OF PRECEDENT

THE weight due to precedent, i. e. to what individual divines or schools of divines have publicly and in writing maintained within the Church, without legal censure,—the weight, I say, due to a Church's *de facto* toleration, which may be called part of her practical tradition, when it contradicts and comes into collision with a *documentary* test, is an important question, into which I need not enter in the present treatise. I only appeal to precedent as confirming a conclusion drawn from our actual formularies. Because it unquestionably adds to the weight of a result drawn from the Formularies of the Church, to see it embodied in the uninterrupted *practice* of the Church, which is a living authoritative comment upon the formularies.

The argument of precedent divides itself into two heads. The first is the evidence of what was the actual force and value of the statement in the Baptismal Service, as a piece of *language*, at the time of the construction of that Service. And this is not the argument of precedent properly, though it figures under this general head for convenience sake, so much as an inquiry into a question of language. The second is the argument of precedent properly, i. e. that a certain construction of this statement has *de facto* been permitted in the Church from the date of the compilation of our Prayer Book to the present day.

1. First we have the evidence of the actual value of the statement in the Baptismal Service at the time of the construction of that service. By value, I mean the force of the statement, in the situation in which it occurs, as a piece of *language* at the time; and a received and recognized mode of understanding it which was contemporary with its adoption. We have the evidence of this fact first in the obvious animus and design of the very compilers of our Prayer Book.

The argument of the "sense of the compiler" must be distinguished from the argument of the "sense of the imposer." The argument of the *animus imponentis* is a futile and nugatory argument; because, in order to arrive at any conclusion by means of it, we must first find out who the *imponens* is; and the *imponens*, when we search for him, vanishes into space. We cannot fix upon any *imponens* but the Church herself, and the only evidences of the *animus* of the Church, are her formularies. The argument of the *animus imponentis* thus brings us round immediately to the letter of the formularies, and there leaves us.

But the argument of the sense of the compiler is a solid and valid argument if used with a proper distinction. The sense of the compiler is of no authority *in itself*, nor can it of itself affect the meaning of a statement in a formulary; because as soon as the formulary is made, we must then interpret it according to the authorized rules of language, and the constructor has no more right than any other person to give his own meaning to it. But though the sense of the compiler is of no authority in itself, it is valid evidence to the fact of the force of a particular statement as a piece of language in the compiler's day. For if it can be shown that the compiler either held himself or allowed as tenable, a certain doctrine which is inconsistent with the literal construction of a

particular statement, inserted by him in a formulary, that is good evidence that the statement admitted in the compiler's day of a different construction from the literal one; because that otherwise he would not for the most obvious reasons have inserted it. Thus, to make the supposition, had the compilers of the Prayer Book been Calvinists, and held that the elect only could be regenerate, it would then follow directly that the statement in the Baptismal Service—"this infant is regenerate," could not have borne a necessarily literal meaning at that time, because, if it had, they would not have inserted it in condemnation of themselves. Or, to make another less strong supposition, if it could be shown that the compilers of our Prayer Book considered Calvinism *tenable*, and acquiesced in it as held by others, even that would be valid evidence to the same point; because they would not have inserted the statement in question had it necessarily borne a construction condemnatory of a doctrine which they allowed.

The value, force and acceptation of a statement at a particular time, like the meaning of a word, is thus a point determinable by evidence; and the sense of the compiler, or the construction which the compiler considered admissible, where it can be ascertained, is good evidence to this point.

To apply then this principle of evidence to the case before us. Whatever may have been the personal belief of our Reformers, and whether or not they held Calvinistic doctrine themselves, it is very certain that they acquiesced in it as held by others; that they were on intimate religious terms with leading divines of this School, admitted them to their counsels, and asked their advice and criticism upon the very construction of this Prayer Book itself. The position that the elect alone could be regenerate, was a well-known and conspicuous tenet in theology

at the date of the construction of our Prayer Book, and the maxim *Sacramenta in solis electis efficiunt quod figurant*, was the maxim at that time of a large and prominent School of Reformers. The Institutes of Calvin had been published then fifteen years, and this doctrine was known by the advocacy of, among others, Peter Martyr and Bucer. But the doctrine being thus known, the compilers of our Prayer Book put themselves in intimate relation with the maintainers of this doctrine, and Cranmer, in 1549, seated Peter Martyr at Oxford, and Bucer at Cambridge, as Regius Professors of Divinity, and laid the new Prayer Book before them for the benefit of their criticism, previous to its revision. He also invited, in 1552, Calvin, with Bullinger and Melancthon, to a conference in England for the preparation of a general confession of faith for the Protestant Churches.

But such being the relations in which the compilers of our Prayer Book stood to the Calvinistic School, this fact has a plain bearing upon the question before us, because, as has been said, it is not only the doctrine which the compiler himself holds, but the doctrine which he considers tenable, and in which he acquiesces as held by others, which is a witness to the value of a statement in the compiler's day. It is unreasonable to suppose that, standing in these relations to this school, they would have inserted in the first, and retained in the amended Prayer Book, a statement which contradicted a known fundamental tenet of that school, and would have excluded that school from the use of the Prayer Book. But if they would not have inserted any statement which contradicted a fundamental tenet of these divines, it follows that any statement which they *did* insert, must have been capable of being understood at that time in a sense consistent with that tenet; and we thus have evidence to the force and value of the statement in the Baptismal Service, as a

piece of language at that time, that it admitted of an hypothetical construction, and had not the character of a dogmatic statement.

To the evidence drawn from the relations of our Reformers to the Calvinistic School, succeeds the evidence which consists in the tacit acquiescence of the Calvinists themselves in this statement in the Baptismal Service: for if it can be shown that the Calvinistic School holding the regeneration of the elect alone, acquiesced without complaint or objection in this statement, that again is valid evidence at least to the latitude of construction attaching to this statement at that time; inasmuch as had it had the force of a dogmatic statement, they could not possibly have acquiesced in it.

On this head, then, we have the tacit testimony just mentioned of Peter Martyr and Bucer, two of the most distinguished foreign Reformers, who distinctly holding the tenet that only the elect could be regenerate,¹ passed over without even a hint of disapprobation this statement in the Baptismal Service, in their judgment upon the new Prayer Book, which had been placed before them for the benefit of their criticism. Calvin himself regretted *tolerabiles ineptiæ* in the Prayer Book, but discovered no doctrinal error in it. And Bucer actually inserted this very statement in the new Cologne Service, which he had the task of constructing.² But it stands to reason that this statement must have been objected to by such critics, had it had the force of a dogmatic statement at that time, and admitted only of a literal construction. Nor would the constructor of a new Service have inserted a statement in

¹ Notes 34, 35.

² The date of the new Cologne Service Book is 1543. A second edition of Bucer's Commentary on the four Gospels, which contained indisputably the Calvinistic doctrine of baptism, was published in 1536.

it, which he could not himself hold; which is what we must suppose Bucer doing, if this statement had at that time the force of a dogmatic statement.

Again, the Convocation of 1562 was in the main a Calvinistic body.³ Of the Upper House almost all the members, of whom we know anything, were in close correspondence with the Continental Reformers of the Calvinistic School, with whom they professed the most entire doctrinal sympathy and agreement. Of the Lower House only a majority of one rejected the Genevan model with respect to church-vestments and other points of external ritual;—the Genevan party in respect of *externals* being, it is important to observe, only one portion of the whole *doctrinal* Calvinistic party, which included the strongest defenders of our ritual as well as its assailants.⁴ This Convocation, then, which is made up of Calvinists either doctrinal or Puritan, and the leading members of which are fresh from Marian exile and persecution, and from the focus of the Continental Reformation, revises our ritual, and the party for change suggests and all but carries various Genevan alterations; but neither the doctrinal Calvinists, nor even the Genevan party.

³ Strype gives a curious petition (Elizabeth, vol. i. p. 495) from a minority of modified predestinarians, deprecating the persecution of the majority. "Please it your gracious fatherhoods therefore that it may be provided and enacted that none of these corrections, punishments, and executions, which the Clergy have in their authority already, and hereafter by authority of this present parliament from henceforth shall have in their authority to exercise upon any of the aforesaid errors and sects, or any other, shall in nowise extend to be executed upon any manner of person or persons as do hold of predestination as above declared."

⁴ Bp. Carleton says, "It is confessed on both sides that Protestants and Puritans have held *the same doctrines* without variance. The *discipline* varied in England, Scotland, Geneva, and elsewhere; yet the doctrine hath been hitherto held the same." An Examination, p. 121.

raise any objection to the statement in the Baptismal Service.

Again, it is a remarkable fact that for a century succeeding the Reformation, this statement was not objected to by the most rigid Puritans, though criticizing most stringently the ritual of the Church, and complaining bitterly of some parts even of this very Baptismal Service. In no one of the great protests of the Puritan School against the Prayer Book, does this statement appear as matter of complaint; not in the "Admonition to Parliament," not in the "Declaration of Ecclesiastical Discipline," not in the "Millennarian Petition." It is wholly omitted in the great liturgical controversies of that day, not once met with in the whole of Whitgift, not once met with in the whole of Hooker, not once alluded to in the Conference at Hampton Court. We take up the "Defence of the Answer to the Admonition." This work contains distributed in paragraphs the Admonition itself, Whitgift's reply to it, Cartwright's answer to him, and his rejoinder. All this controversy relates to the Church's government and services. At Tract xvi. we come to "matters touching baptism," and we find objections made to sponsors, the sign of the cross, and other points in the Service. We look for some objection from Cartwright to the assertion of the infant's regeneration, but the most eager Puritan and fiercest Calvinist of the day passes it over in silence. In the same way we take up the "Ecclesiastical Polity." Here is a standard work devoted to the task of answering all the objections which the Puritans of the time advanced against our Church Government and Services. We come to the objections made to the Baptismal Service, and find sponsors, the sign of the cross, and other points complained of, but no complaint made about this statement. In the Conference at Hampton Court the same class of complaints comes up again,

and with exactly the same omission. How is this? Had this statement been understood then as requiring a literal interpretation, it must have been objected to by such rigid Calvinists as the Puritans of the School of Cartwright and Travers. If, then, it was not objected to, but passed *sub silentio*, the only conclusion we can draw is, that it could not have been understood then as requiring a literal interpretation.⁶

2. The whole of the foregoing then is evidence to an admissible construction of the statement in the Baptismal Service at the time of the compilation of that service. It is the evidence of contemporary interpretation, which has more than the weight of mere precedent, because it establishes an actual sense of this statement coeval with its adoption: it proves its acceptance, and determines its actual force and value, as a piece of language, at that time. But now we come to the simple ground of precedent, i.e. to the *de facto* liberty of holding a particular construction of that statement, which has been enjoyed from the date of its insertion in the Prayer Book to the present day.

And, first of all, it is to be observed that the hypothetical interpretation of this statement, having been largely openly and without disguise held in our Church throughout the whole time that this service has been in use, was never legally called in question till the other day, in the case of Mr. Gorham. This long silence of ecclesiastical law is significant; for that an open denial on so large a scale, of a plain and important dogmatic

⁶ Those two notorious Puritans and "severe Calvinists," as Anthony Wood calls them, Sampson and Laurence Humphrey, exhibit in a joint letter to Bullinger a list of "blemishes," still attaching to the services of the Church. At number 3 come the blemishes in the baptismal service, and the sponsors, the sign of the cross, &c., are objected to, but not this statement, which is passed over altogether. Zurich Letters, 1558—1579, p. 157.

statement, should have been carried on in a Church for three centuries, without one challenge or appeal to the authorized tribunals of the Church, is without a parallel in the history of Christendom.

It is admitted again, that for the better part of a century after the Reformation Calvinism was dominant in our Church; that it had possession of the Episcopacy, Universities, Theological Faculties, the ecclesiastical posts of eminence and dignity, and the great majority of the names of learning and ability. Here was a doctrinal system then not only permitted but reigning in the Church, and actually suppressing and punishing other manifestations of doctrine as heterodox, which was absolutely inconsistent with the literal interpretation of the Baptismal Service: the hypothetical interpretation of which service was therefore plainly throughout this period the *dominant* interpretation, the *authoritative* interpretation; the interpretation, that is, that had the voice of the practical and living authorities of the Church on its side.

Two important sets of Articles—the Lambeth and the Irish—embodied this dominant doctrine; the former having, though not a legal position, the weight of an authoritative statement of doctrine proceeding from head-quarters; the latter having the formal and legal position of the Articles of a Church. There can hardly be clearer evidence of the general acceptation at that time of the statement in the Baptismal Service, as not being dogmatic, but admitting of an hypothetical construction, than the fact that the Irish *Articles* contained the dogmatic statement that the regenerate cannot fall finally away;⁶ while the Irish *Prayer Book*, being the

⁶ “A true justifying faith and the sanctifying grace of the Spirit of God is not extinguished or vanisheth away in the regenerate totally or finally.”—Thirty-seventh Irish Article. It is worth

same as the English, contained the statement, made over every baptized infant, that it "is regenerate." No Irish clergyman could, in the nature of the case, hold both statements, except by giving an hypothetical construction to the latter of the two. The received English exposition again of the Thirty-nine Articles, which condemned the position "that the regenerate may fall from the grace of God," was inconsistent with any other than an hypothetical interpretation of this statement.⁷

We have indeed laid down by the divines of this period, definitely and expressly, the rule of charitable presumption; that the elect alone were really regenerate, but that inasmuch as we do not know who are elect and who are not, we must *call all* regenerate. There is something, which at first sight requires accounting for, in the fact that the early guides and directors of a Church, so moderately balanced and tolerant in temper as our own,—those men who re-erected the standard of the Reformation after its suppression, and into whose hand the destinies of our Church were so long entrusted, were rigid Calvinists; and we naturally inquire what it was which regulated and controlled this doctrinal bias, which prevented it from operating mischievously, and subordinated it to the practical wants and objects of the Church. Various reasons then may be assigned for the moderate and practical temper of the Anglican Calvinistic School; but one was the clear perception of the following important distinction.

Everybody must see the wide distinction there is between holding the doctrine that some are from all eternity predestinated by God to eternal life, and pretending to see

mentioning that these Articles never have been formally repealed, though subscription to them dropped at the Restoration.

⁷ Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles by Thomas Rogers, Chaplain to Archbishop Bancroft. Ed. Parker Soc., p. 147.

who these persons are, and to distinguish them from the rest. And yet, practically, Calvinists have been often apt to forget this distinction, and from the doctrine that *some* are, to proceed to point out *who* are the elect. Where men have nominally disclaimed this power, and insisted much on the secrecy of the Divine decree, the belief that there was such a decree, has yet practically put it into their heads to be constantly trying to discover the subjects of it, and to fix on some persons in distinction to others as being the elect; and various notes of sanctity, and those sometimes more or less technical, have been laid down to assist the believer in forming this judgment. An indisposition has been thus apparent in many Calvinists to recognize the visible Church as distinct from the invisible: they have shrunk from the admission of a mixed Church, and, though knowing that it never could be realized in fact, have been haunted by the idea of a pure society of saints upon earth.

The Anglican Calvinistic divines then were totally free from this error. They embraced thoroughly and practically the distinction which has been mentioned, and treated the Divine decree not nominally only, but really as a secret thing. And this being the case, Calvinism, in their hands, without losing one of its characteristic doctrines, ceased to be in any collision with the practical system of the Church. It dealt with men and things as it found them, and recognized no difference between one man and another; for though it was held undoubtingly that such a difference did exist from all eternity, it was also seen as a plain fact that God had not revealed the persons between whom it lay; and therefore the old proverb, "*de non existentibus et non apparentibus*," was followed as a rule of action. These divines accordingly accepted fully the idea of the visible or earthly Church, as a mixed body; a result with which they were taunted

by the Puritans, who were for a premature winnowing of the tares from the wheat. A reader will see this difference in the standard of the earthly Church pervading the controversies of that day between the ecclesiastical and the sectarian Calvinists; the permanent idea of the one being to extend the Church and of the other to confine it, of the one to include and of the other to exclude.

The rule then which was adopted by the Anglican Calvinists was, as has been said, the rule of charitable presumption. "Who can tell," says Abp. Whitgift, "whether he be holy or unholy, good or evil, *elect* or *reprobate*, that is baptized, be he *infant* or at years of discretion?" "Whoever are baptized," says Abp. Abbot, "are *to us* and the Church regenerated, justified, sanctified; nor to be looked upon in any other light until they manifest themselves not to be so." "All that receive baptism," says Bishop Carlton, "are *called* the children of God, regenerate, justified, for to us they must be taken for such in charity until they show themselves other." "What thou art invisibly," says Benefield, "and in the sight of God, God alone knoweth: He alone is *καρδιογνώστης*, and sees and knows thy heart. But since thou hast given thy name to Christ, and hast had the washing of the new birth, the Church in charity must judge of thee as of one truly grafted into Christ and truly regenerate." "We are," says Bishop Downame, "to distinguish between the judgment of charity and the judgment of certainty. For although in general we know not that every one that is baptized is justified or shall be saved, yet, when we come to speak of particulars, we are to judge of them that are baptized that they are regenerated and justified, and that they shall be saved, until they shall discover themselves not to be such. And so our Book of Common Prayer speaketh of them, as the Scrip-

tures also teach us to speak of them that are baptized, that they are regenerated and engrafted into the body of Christ; though perhaps they be only regenerated *sacramento tenus*, and engrafted only into the body of the visible Church. But this judgment of charity is no matter of certainty, or of faith, but may be deceived."

"Our Church," says Burgess, a zealous champion of the principle of sacramental grace, though as a strict Calvinist he limited its operation by the other and secret principle of the Divine election,—“our Church excludes none from participation of the inward grace of the Sacrament [of baptism]; but knowing for certain that all the elect do partake of it, and not knowing at all that this or that particular infant is not elected, suffers not any of her children to speak or judge of any particular infant that he doth not receive the inward grace; no more than she permits him to say that such a particular is not elected. For ‘who hath known the mind of the Lord?’ and, ‘who art thou that judgest another man’s servant?’ Howbeit, our Church knows very well, and presumes that all her children know also, that in respect of election, known only to God, they are not all Israel that are of Israel; and that of those many that be called but a few be chosen. But who those few be, she will not determine, yet thus much she doth determine, that any particular infant rightly baptized is to be taken and held in the judgment of charity for a member of the true invisible elected, sanctified Church of Christ, and that he is regenerated.”

The name of Hooker stands by itself and has always a reserved place in theological surveys, as appearing to occupy a middle ground between two systems, where Calvinism just verges upon the later or Anglican view. His doctrinal language in this department, which is a great battle-field of interpretation, consists of two parts, a part

agreed upon and a disputed part. It is agreed that he held the doctrine of the Indefectibility of grace, and that this doctrine is incompatible with the Baptismal Service literally interpreted.⁸ It is disputed whether his *baptismal* statements are consistent with the statements of the doctrine of Indefectibility or contradictory to them. The matter then lies thus; that, if the baptismal statements are pronounced to chime in with the statements of the Indefectibility of grace, Hooker's doctrine of baptism was undividedly Calvinistic; if the two are inconsistent, Hooker is neutral, self-contradictory, and not an authority either way. The two sets of statements do not appear to me to be inconsistent; but upon either view the fact remains that Hooker throughout his works makes statements which are inconsistent with the literal interpretation of the Baptismal Service.⁹

Without basing the admissibility of a particular interpretation then upon such a body of precedent as this, I may yet call attention to a difficulty which this Calvinistic period of our Church throws upon the prohibition of it. "May I by the law of the Church hold the doctrine of the Lambeth Articles, and the Irish Articles—the doctrine which was dominant in the Church for a century after the Reformation, and the interpretation of the statement in the Baptismal Service which was dominant with it throughout this period?" is a question which a clergyman of the present day has a right to ask. If he may, the whole point is conceded. If he may not, then what is illegal in him was illegal in Archbishop Whitgift, in Archbishop Abbot, and in the great majority of the Bishops, theological professors, and principal dignitaries of the Church for nearly a century, who were therefore all holding their preferments contrary to Church law. This

⁸ Preface to Keble's Edition, p. 102.

⁹ Note 38.

may not settle the question, but in proportion as we feel reluctant to say that Archbishop Whitgift and the rest officiated in the Church illegally, in that proportion we admit that such an interpretation is legal.

But now we enter upon another era. A totally opposite school succeeded the Calvinistic in power; but the reign of this school did not in the least interfere with this interpretation. The Caroline divines manifested not the slightest wish to impose the literal construction of the statement in the Baptismal Service; though perfectly aware, the fact being so patent and notorious, that this was not the sense in which a large section of the Church accepted the statement. The rule of the Laudian School on this question was conformity to language combined with latitude of sense, the use of the service as it stood joined with liberty in the interpretation of it. There was a great deal of dispute with the Puritans about this service, but from first to last the point of that dispute was not the interpretation of the service, but simply the use of it. The use of it was insisted on, alterations of it were refused, but if the Puritans would only take it as it stood and use it, no question was asked, and no objection was made, as to any sense in which it was understood. The divines of the Savoy Conference, as divines, defended the statement of the regeneration of the infant, as a literal one, but they did not impose that sense of it on their opponents. It was no liberty of interpretation which was denied to the Puritans, but only the alteration of the actual form of the service.

Up to this time the Puritans had made no objection to the statement in the Infant Baptismal Service, that "this child is regenerate," because they had hitherto entertained no general objection to the rule of presumption, i.e. to the use of statements in form literal but in meaning hypothetical, as a usage in Services; and though they

had objected to it in a special case,¹ *this* was not the case. But at the Savoy Conference the Puritans, having found perhaps that a statement which required an explanation, however familiar and recognized, gave a doctrinal advantage to their opponents, alter their tactics on this subject, and raise a general objection against the use of this class of statements in services: "Whereas through the several offices the phrase is such as presumes all persons within the communion of the Church to be regenerated, converted, and in an actual state of grace . . . it cannot be rationally admitted in the utmost latitude of charity: we desire that this may be reformed."² Having raised this general objection, then, against this class of statement, when they come to the particular statement in the Infant Baptismal Service, they object to that statement in particular, not because they had not the liberty to interpret it hypothetically, but because they objected to the use of language which required this liberty. "We cannot *in faith* say that every child that is baptized is 'regenerated by God's Holy Spirit,' at least it is a disputable point; and therefore we desire it may be otherwise expressed."³ It must be remarked that they do not say that they could not make the statement, but that they could not make it "*in faith*," i.e. with the belief that the fact was so in the case of every infant. The objection is not upon the ground, then, that the statement is dogmatic, in which case they would have absolutely rejected it; but that *as* a presumptive statement it is inadvisable.

¹ The infant's answer "I believe," was objected to by Cartwright on this ground. Hooker, Eccl. Pol., v. lxiv. 3. As the service then stood this was the *infant's* answer, instead of the sponsors' in the name of the infant, though the difference between the two forms is immaterial.

² Cardwell's History of Conferences, p. 308.

³ Ibid. p. 325.

Nor do they deny the *fact* of the usage in Church Services, according to which this statement is so interpretable, but the *expediency* of it, taking the ground that the Church should make matter-of-fact statements and those only.

The Puritans, then, in the Savoy Conference demanding an actual alteration of the service, and the removal of this statement, the divines of the Church refused to grant this request, but the refusal to alter the statement was not to prohibit a particular interpretation of it. The Savoy divines indeed accepted this statement themselves in the literal sense, and defended it in that sense, but they did not impose that sense on their opponents; while they allow and defend the rule of presumption generally as used by the Church. "The Church in her services useth no more offensive phrase than St. Paul uses, when he writes to the Corinthians, Galatians, and others, calling them in general the Churches of God, sanctified in Christ Jesus, by vocation saints."⁴

Nor indeed was this interpretation of the statement in the Baptismal Service one which this school of divines only tolerated in opponents; for distinguished members of this very school held it themselves. "God's supernatural agency," says Hammond, "interposes sometimes in the mother's womb, as in John the Baptist springing in Elizabeth at Mary's salutation, and perhaps in Jeremiah, 'Before thou camest out of the womb, I sanctified thee,' and in Isaiah, 'The Lord that formed me in the womb to be His servant.' But this divine address attends most ordinarily till the time of our baptism, when the Spirit accompanying the outward sign infuses itself into their hearts, and there seats and plants itself, and grows up with the reasonable soul, keeping even their

⁴ Cardwell's History of Conferences, p. 342.

most luxuriant years within bounds ; and as they come to a use of their reason, more and more multiplying this habit of grace into holy spiritual acts of faith and obedience ; from which it is ordinarily said that infants baptized have habitual faith, and they may be said also to have habitual repentance and the habits of all other graces, because they have the root and seed of those beauteous healthful flowers which will actually flourish in them, when they come to years. And this, I say, is so frequent to be performed at baptism, that ordinarily it is not wrought without that means, and in those means we may expect it, as our Church doth in our Liturgies, where she *presumes* at every baptism that ‘it hath pleased God to regenerate the infant by His Holy Spirit.’”⁵ Durel, Dean of Windsor, is thus described by Anthony Wood :—“He was a person of unbiassed and fixed principles, untainted and steady loyalty, as constantly adhering to the sinking cause and interest of his sovereign in the worst of times ; who dared with an unshaken and undaunted resolution to stand up and maintain the honour and dignity of the English Church. He was very well versed also in all the controversies on foot between the Church and the disciplinarian party. The justness and reasonableness of the established constitutions of the former no one of late years hath more plainly manifested, or with greater learning hath more successfully defended.” From a divine promoted then under the very meridian of Caroline ascendancy, and a prominent and admired champion of the Church in his day, we have this interpretation of the Infant Baptismal Service.

“As to what he says, ‘that no man can be a minister of the Reformed Church of England who is not certainly

⁵ Sermon xxvii.

persuaded of the regeneration of every infant baptized,' *neither also is that true.* The minister truly gives thanks to God after each infant has been baptized, that it hath pleased God to regenerate him with His Holy Spirit. But it does not thence follow that he ought to be certain of the regeneration of every infant baptized. For it is sufficient if he be persuaded of the regeneration of some only, for instance of elect infants, or if you like of some only of that number, that on that account he may be able, nay ought, to give God thanks for each and all baptized. Since who is elected he knows not, and since it is but just that he should, *by the judgment of charity, presume* that as many as he baptizes are elect, and, if any are regenerated in baptism (which none but a Socinian or Catabaptist will deny), regenerated. . . . Since the Church is ignorant who they are to whom God vouchsafes that grace, and *ought to presume it in the judgment of charity of every one baptized*, I ask what just fault can be found with that prayer in which he gives thanks to God for the regeneration of infants baptized? ”⁶

We have then in the facts appealed to in this chapter the comment of an actual course of things upon the statement in the Baptismal Service; the truth being that this statement was inserted in the Prayer Book by men in intimate relations with divines of the Calvinistic School who distinctly held that only the elect were regenerate; that it was acquiesced in by the most rigid Calvinists of that period without a word of complaint; that the hypothetical interpretation of this statement was the dominant interpretation for a century after the Reformation; that the Laudian School in its full power and highest ascendancy never thought of interfering with it; and that lastly an interpretation which was thus coeval with the very service

⁶ Eccl. Angl. Vindiciæ, p. 291.

itself was never legally called in question till the other day. We have in this state of facts two things proved; first, that this statement has not as a *piece of language* the force of a dogmatic statement, having been accompanied by another construction at and from the time of its insertion in the Prayer Book; secondly, that the liberty to hold the hypothetical construction of this statement, has been enjoyed from the date of the compilation of the Prayer Book to the present moment.

In this state of the case the movement, just referred to, to procure the condemnation of this construction of the statement in the Baptismal Service, was an attempt to alter, upon one point, the received doctrinal standard of the English Church; it was a departure from the doctrinal standard even of the Laudian School, as being an endeavour to withdraw a liberty in the open and undisguised use of which that school had uniformly acquiesced; *it* was in short the innovation, and the Judgment represented the practical tradition and rule of the Church.

CHAPTER IX

RELATIONS OF TIME BETWEEN THE GRACE AND THE SACRAMENT

I HAVE assumed in the foregoing pages that the ground of objection to the Gorham Judgment is the decision on the side of *conditional* infant regeneration, as being a doctrine consistent with our formularies, and that this was the question at issue in that case. It would appear, however, to have been intimated by some that the objection to that judgment was not so much on the ground of what it *contained*, as of what it *omitted*, i. e. certain statements of the accused which it passed over, and of which it took no cognizance ; and this ground of objection has a claim upon our attention.

Mr. Gorham in his examination made two distinct sets of statements, one relating to the *conditions* of regeneration, to the effect that it was even in the case of infants conditional ; the other to the *time* of regeneration, *when* it took place in those in whom it *did* take place. With respect to this latter point then it was urged that whereas his declared opinion was that “ in no case was regeneration *in* baptism,” the Judgment represented his statement as being that regeneration “ may be granted before, in, or after baptism ;” and therefore the charge was made that the judges understated his position, and passed over an important part of the evidence which was laid before them. But the truth is that there were two conflicting sets of statements of the accused on this point. One was

that "the new nature must have been possessed by those who receive baptism rightly, and therefore possessed before baptism,"—that the filial state was given to the worthy recipient before baptism, and not in baptism."¹ The other was "that the Holy Ghost may impart the new nature before baptism, in baptism, or after baptism," and that "justification may take place before, in, or after that sacrament."² These two sets of statements are in contradiction to each other, and cannot be reconciled;—the one excluding the actual time of baptism as a time of regeneration, the other including it together with other times. The court under these circumstances, only made the accused responsible for the less obnoxious one of the two, and represented his opinion as being that regeneration "may be granted before, in, or after baptism."

Such a representation, however, of the opinion of the accused, was not a sufficient ground for the charge that the court falsified the evidence laid before it, and misstated the facts of the case. It could not avail itself of, and use for the purpose of a judgment, *both* of two contradictory statements; and not being able to do this, it had no alternative but to take that one which was most to the advantage of the accused party. A court must deal with conflicting data, where the data are such, in some way or other; and the acknowledged rule of dealing with them is to give the accused the benefit of the more favourable side of them. This is a principle of equity which is universally accepted, and it is the more obligatory where the statements, of which the estimate is to be formed, relate to a confessedly intricate and complicated subject like the present.

1. Such being the state of the case, I would remark first that the objection to this judgment on the ground

¹ Examination, pp. 88, 113.

² Ibid. pp. 71, 198.

of what it *omits*, is not a tenable one. Indeed it is obviously not the ground upon which, as a matter of fact, the objection to this judgment has been raised. This judgment has been objected to as a decision upon a doctrinal point, and a decision which committed the Church, so far as the court could do this, to an erroneous doctrine. But a judgment cannot possibly be a decision upon any point which it omits ; it can only be a decision upon such points as it takes cognizance of. It can only sanction what it admits to be under its consideration ; it cannot authorize any opinion, right or wrong, the existence of which it does not recognize. As a decision upon a matter of doctrine, this judgment cannot commit the Church to any matter of doctrine except that which it expressly notices, and upon which it *is* a decision. Inasmuch then as this judgment has, as a matter of fact, been regarded as a decision upon a point of doctrine, the objection to it has been, as a matter of fact, on the ground of what it *contains*.

2. With respect to this whole question of the relation in point of time of the grace to the sacrament, it must be observed that after the argument of the preceding chapters, relating to the statement of the *fact* of regeneration in the Baptismal Service, the ground is gone upon which it could be maintained that the Service imposed and laid down the *time* of regeneration. Because this is a question which depends upon the principle of interpretation, which is to be applied to the Baptismal Service,³ and it has been decided in the foregoing chapters what this principle is, and that it does not compel a literal interpretation. It

³ The phrase "efficax signum" in the Articles does not involve simultaneity of time in the sacrament and the grace. It was in common use in the writings of the Calvinistic divines, in combination with the obnoxious view of baptism, as the seal of a grace which was ante-baptismal.

is true the assumption pervades the whole form of the Baptismal Service, that the baptized person is *unregenerate* up to the moment of baptism, and regenerate immediately upon it; but if the Baptismal Service is not dogmatic when it asserts in every case the *fact* of regeneration, as it has been shown not to be, still less can it be considered dogmatic when it assumes the *time* of regeneration. The same construction of the service which proves the literal statement of the fact not to be a doctrinal statement, proves the formal assumption of the time not to be doctrinal either. The question of the time of regeneration, then, is not one which can be brought forward and insisted upon as an independent ground of objection against this judgment, supposing we have proved and made good its interpretation of the Baptismal Service upon the question of fact. Because, both questions being decided by the same evidence, the decision of the one question is contained in the decision upon the other; which latter decision has been made, and the proof of it given in the foregoing chapters.

Indeed the baptismal offices of the Church have never been regarded as dogmatic upon the point of time, though formally assuming the instant of baptism to be the time of regeneration. That regeneration may be before or after baptism is a very old and received admission in theology, Peter Lombard himself, the father of the Schoolmen, the first systematic exponent of the Fathers, and the founder of formal and scientific theology, having said,—“*Nec mireris rem aliquando præcedere sacramentum, cum aliquando etiam longe post sequatur.*”⁴ Nor was this an admission only of irregular and extraordinary cases, but of one regular mode of proceeding in the Divine dispensation; for it included the whole class of baptized adults, who were pronounced, if believing, to

⁴ L. iv. dist. iv.

have the grace of baptism before baptism ; if unbelieving, not to have it till afterwards upon belief. Yet side by side with this general admission, the baptismal offices of the Church assumed all along the time of the adult's regeneration as the very instant of baptism only : which assumption was therefore liturgical, not doctrinal.⁵ It is true that in the statements of the accused this arrangement of an antecedent and subsequent regeneration was applied to infants as well as to adults : but this was an extension of the arrangement for which the great body of the Reformation divines was responsible.⁶ Such an extension was indeed the result of their application to infants of the law of adult baptism, and was allowable if that application was allowable, which it has been shown, in the silence of Scripture, to be.⁷ The Schoolmen regarded the faith, which is the condition of justification or regeneration in adults, as itself constituting their justification antecedently to baptism. The Reformation divines, making faith the condition for infants as well, gave the same antecedently justifying and regenerating office to a seminal faith in infants. This was when faith was supposed to be ante-baptismal, and the analogy was the same upon the other alternative. The Schoolmen and Fathers made regeneration in the adult post-baptismal, when his faith was post-baptismal : and the Reformation divines gave regeneration the same subsequence in the infant, when they regarded the infant's faith as subsequent to baptism, and the result of a riper age.

⁵ Supr. p. 143.

⁶ " It has been contended that the opinions held by Mr. Gorham are not the opinions which were held by the divines of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but opinions almost peculiar to himself. But this is a mistake." Bishop Kaye's Charges, p. 449. Mr. Gorham's language only indeed expressed the *obsignatory* view of baptism which pervades the theology of the Reformation. Note 36.

⁷ Part I. chapter ii.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

UPON the delivery of the Judgment of the Court of Appeal, in 1850, a solemn and public Protest¹ appeared against it, signed by large bodies of clergy, as well as by many distinguished and influential laymen. It was a Protest which excited remarkable attention at the time, and appeared to threaten almost a convulsion of the Church. It embodied strong feelings of indignation and the deepest apprehensions for the doctrinal safety of the Church on the part of those who joined in it. This state of feeling has, as might have been anticipated, calmed down in course of years ; nevertheless, the Protest then made still goes on and maintains its ground as a standing Protest in the Church, and continual expression is given to it in the language and religious writings of a large and important section of the Church. Nor can it be doubted that this Judgment is still felt by a considerable portion of the Church as a serious grievance ; that it is regarded as a decision made in the teeth of the Church's formularies, and an instance of truth and justice having been overlooked in deference to a supposed expediency.

Such a standing Protest, upon so large a scale, against a public doctrinal judgment of a Court, professing to be the Church's supreme Court, and certainly able to give practical effect to its decisions within the Church, cannot

¹ Note 37.

be considered as unimportant, accompanied, as it must be, by a considerable amount of serious dissatisfaction with the doctrinal position of the Church, and tending to keep up that dissatisfaction. And therefore, on the part of those who maintain such a Protest, a certain responsibility is incurred; such a responsibility as may induce them, from time to time, not to object to reconsidering the ground of their Protest, and reviewing the facts of the case.

For it should be borne in mind that such a standing Protest as this is a serious disadvantage to the Church in this respect, that it represents the Church as unable to prevent a particular doctrine, opposed to the letter of her formularies, from being publicly taught by her ministers; and being therefore so far in a state of doctrinal slavery and subjugation to an external and heterodox power; and that, representing the Church in this character, it lays her under a stigma which is injurious to her, and affects her credit.

The preceding pages then have adduced evidence to show that a Protest against this Judgment, as being in contradiction to the formularies of the Church, has not adequate grounds to rest upon. And, first, it is to be observed that, whereas it was a formal estimate of the doctrine in dispute, viz. the regeneration of all infants in baptism, as being an *article of the faith*, which gave this controversy its deep interest, and which was the reason of that extraordinary and unprecedented commotion which arose in the Church upon the occasion of the Judgment referred to; it was shown, in the former part of this treatise, that this doctrine is not an article of the faith, not being read in or proved by Scripture; a conclusion which we of the Church of England have always in practice adopted; opposing parties among us having never treated the most open difference on this particular

point as a bar to communion; but having always united with each other in Christian offices, religious works, and labours of love, and accepted each other as brethren in Christ in all ecclesiastical respects. Particular reasons may perhaps justify a junction with heretics, admitted to be such, as an exceptional and extraordinary act; but a regular and systematic union with them in one visible Church is untenable upon any principles of orthodoxy: and, therefore, whoever do thus systematically unite with others disagreeing with them, must admit, in order to their own justification, that such a disagreement is not upon a fundamental point, and do by their conduct implicitly admit this.

With this ascertained then, we came to the examination of our own formularies in the second part of this treatise in a calmer spirit, as knowing that whatever might be the result of such examination, the question involved no matter of fundamental orthodoxy. Indeed, with this ascertained, there was little ground left upon which it could be thought particularly desirable that our Church *should* impose the doctrine in question. It is open to a Church doubtless, upon grounds of general expediency, to impose on her clergy points which are not essential; but still, the security of the faith being the main ground for the imposition of doctrine, the presumption is, that a particular doctrine being ascertained not to be an article of the faith, the formularies of our Church will not be found to impose it; more especially if such doctrine was a controverted one at the time of the construction of those formularies; it being admitted that our Church is disposed to latitude on subordinate points, and aims at comprehension.

But though a preliminary weight attaches to general theological considerations, still a question which relates to a particular Judgment, interpretative of particular

formularies, must be decided by the language of those formularies alone. Because, even if a given doctrine is not an article of the faith, still, if our formularies impose it, persons have the right to protest publicly against a Judgment which falsely affirms that they do not; and therefore the question is ultimately one relating entirely to our own formularies.

The considerations, then, to which I have called attention in the preceding chapters show that our formularies do not supply an adequate ground for this Protest; because nothing can justify a Protest in behalf of a particular doctrine, as a doctrine imposed by the formularies of our Church, except such a statement of the doctrine in those formularies as only admits of being considered as a positive and dogmatic statement of it. But no such statement of the doctrine, that all infants are regenerate in baptism, can be found in the whole of our formularies from beginning to end. We find, indeed, a statement in the Infant Baptismal Service, made over every infant after baptism, that it is regenerate, and we find the statement put into the child's mouth in the Catechism,—that in baptism he was made a child of God. But when we examine the principles upon which Church services and Catechisms are constructed, we find that they admit of a class of statements which are literal in form, but hypothetical in meaning. We find this as a known and established usage of language in these classes of formularies. The statements then now referred to, occurring as they do in formularies of this character, have not the force of positive and dogmatic statements. Were there an assertion indeed in the Church's Articles of Religion that all infants are regenerate in baptism, there could be no doubt that this assertion in the Articles was dogmatic; and in that case these statements in the Service and Catechism, though not dogmatic of themselves, would

receive a dogmatic sense from such assertion in the Articles. But in the absence of any such assertion elsewhere in our formularies, an assertion pronounced over the child in a service, or put into the child's mouth in a Catechism, does not possess this force.

The Prayer Book is thus proved to be inclusive in its basis by the simple application of those rules of interpretation which have been shown to apply to devotional and catechetical formularies. And this conclusion is confirmed by the whole weight of precedent, and embodied in the uninterrupted practice of the Church, from the Reformation to the present day. It is evident in the first place from history, that the liberty of construction claimed in this case is coeval with the Prayer Book; that the statement of the infant's regeneration was inserted in the Baptismal Service, at its compilation, with this liberty of construction then attaching and belonging to it, and that as a piece of language it was understood naturally and as a matter of course among divines as bearing such a construction. And in the next place we have from that date to the present an uninterrupted acquiescence of the Church in this liberty of construction, which was not legally called in question till the year 1849;—which is to say, that the whole practical tradition of the English Church is on its side.

This whole evidence viewed collectively appears to me conclusive in favour of the judgment of the Court of Appeal, viz. that our formularies do not impose the doctrine that all infants are regenerate in baptism. But it is not necessary that this evidence should be absolutely conclusive for the purpose of invalidating the grounds for a Protest against that judgment: it is enough if it is sufficiently strong to make the grounds for that Protest doubtful and uncertain; if it is sufficiently strong to shake the Protestor's conviction of the correctness of his own

assertion, which he makes in opposition to the decision of the Court.

For it must be remembered that a public Protest is a special and definite act, requiring for its justification a clear and undoubting conviction of the truth of the position for which the Protest is made. An undecided judgment upon the evidence is consistent with a bias and preference for one particular conclusion, but not with a formal and solemn assertion of that conclusion, in the face of the whole Church, and with the attribution of positive error to the Court for deciding in favour of the opposite one. It is evident that a person is not in a condition to take these two steps, which are involved in the solemn act of a Public Protest, unless he is fully assured and convinced in his own mind of the truth of the conclusion in defence of which he adopts this course of proceeding. A Public Protest does not admit of a divided judgment as the ground of it. It declares that the mind of the person protesting is made up definitively, and that he takes upon himself the responsibility of a positive assertion in opposition to the assertion of the Court.

Does any person then, upon an estimate of the whole bearing of our formularies on this subject, and of the weight, whatever it may be, which is due to precedent and the uninterrupted practice of three centuries, decide with certainty that the Church of England imposes the doctrine of the regeneration of all infants in baptism, and that there is no proper room for doubt upon this question? He is a person qualified to protest against the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Does he admit that there is proper room for doubt? He is disqualified for adopting or continuing such a step.

NOTES.

NOTE 1, p. 18.

“ WE make three kinds of interpretation ; the first private, and so every one may interpret the Scripture, i. e. privately with himself conceive or deliver to other what he thinketh the meaning of it to be : the second of public direction, and so the pastors of the Church may publicly propose what they conceive of it : and the third of jurisdiction, and so they that have supreme power, i. e. the Bishops assembled in a general council, may interpret the Scripture, and by their authority suppress all them that shall gainsay such interpretations, and subject every man that shall disobey such determinations as they consent upon to excommunication and censures of a like nature.

“ *But for authentical interpretation of Scripture, which every man's conscience is bound to yield unto, it is of a higher nature ; neither do we think any of these to be such.*” Field on the Church, p. 367.

“ Here be two obligations which sometimes may contradict one another . . . The use of the means to determine the meaning of the Scriptures, *produceth an obligation of holding that which followeth from it ;* which obligation no man can have or ought to imagine he hath, before the due use of such means, whether his estate in the Church oblige him to use them or not. But the visible determination of the Church obliges all that are of the Church not to scandalize the unity thereof by professing contrary to the same. And to both these obligations the same man may be subject, as the matter may be, to wit, as one that hath resolved the question upon true principles, not to believe the contrary ; and as one of the Church, that believes the Church faileth in that for which he is bound not to break the unity thereof, not to profess against what the Church determineth . . . *I say not that this holds always and in matters of whatsoever concernment,* nor do I take upon me generally to resolve this, no more than what is the matter of the rule of faith, which he that believes may be saved, he that posi-

tively believes it not all cannot." Thorndike, *Principles of Christian Truth*, Book i. c. 24.

NOTE 2, p. 22.

The conclusion of the second Pædobaptist Controversy is thus stated by Wall,—“Now to apply what has been said to the Pædobaptists and Anti-pædobaptists: the main inquiry is whether the point in debate between them be a fundamental article of the Christian faith; for if it be, they must indeed separate in this communion, and the guilt will lie on those who are in error. But if it be not, there is not by the rules laid down any sufficient reason for their separating or renouncing one another, which party soever be in the wrong. Now I think that such a question about the age or time of one's receiving baptism does not look like a fundamental, nor is so reputed in the general sense of Christians. . . .

“It is a general rule that all fundamental points are in Scripture so plainly and fairly delivered, that any man of tolerable sincerity cannot but perceive the meaning of the holy writers to be that we should believe them. Now baptism itself, viz. that all that enter into Christ's Church should be baptized, is indeed plainly delivered in Scripture; so that we are amazed at the Quakers and Socinians, the one for refusing it, the other for counting it indifferent. But at what age the children of Christians should be baptized, whether in infancy or to stay till the age of reason, is not so clearly delivered, but that it admits of a dispute that has considerable perplexities in it . . . This, therefore, being not set down so very plain, does not seem by Scripture to be such a fundamental, as that we should be bound to renounce communion with every one that is not of the same opinion as we are about it . . . The ancient and primitive Christians for certain did not reckon this point among the fundamentals . . . For the sense of modern Christians; first, the Papists of modern times do confidently maintain that there is no proof at all, direct or consequential, from the Scripture for infant baptism. And it is certain they do not pretend there is anything against it . . . It follows then from their pretence that Scripture is silent in the case. If so, then it is a thing that no Protestant will account a fundamental, and consequently will not deviate from it. So these men's arguments will make us both friends, at least so far as to live in communion with one another.” . . .

“ But to leave these,—the most serious and judicious, both of the Pædobaptists and Anti-pædobaptists (even those of them that have been most engaged against each other in polemical writings, which do commonly abate people’s charity), do agree that this difference is not in the essentials of religion. Here I might recite, if I had not been too long already, the words of Bishop Taylor, Dr. Hammond, Mr. Baxter, Mr. Wills, &c., on the one side, and of Mr. Tombes, Mr. Stennet, &c., on the other. . . .

“ To speak of the case of England in particular. They know themselves that it is a separation begun less than eighty years ago. Any very ancient man may remember when there was no Society or Church of them of that persuasion. They at first held the opinion without separating for it . . . Mr. Tombes, who continued an Anti-pædobaptist to his dying day, yet, as I am told, wrote against separation for it, and for communion with the parish churches . . . He continued in communion in the Church of Salisbury all the latter part of his life. Nor has that Church ever been blamed for receiving him. On the contrary, the example has been spoken of with commendation.” *History of Infant Baptism*, vol. ii. p. 547 et seq.

“ Some of them do still continue to hold communion with the established Church in the public prayers, and in the other sacrament; and in this too, as far as is consistent with their opinion, i. e. when their children are *adult* and desire baptism, they advise them to receive it in the Church at the hands of their lawful minister.” Vol. iv. p. 471.

The modified *non*-pædobaptism of the ancients involved the necessity of pædobaptism in case of extremity. “ I acknowledge it is the opinion of Tertullian, for which there is no mark upon him as ever a whit the less Catholic, that it was not expedient to baptize infants . . . But I deny that this was because he or anybody then believed that they could go out of the world unbaptized and yet be saved.” (Thorndike, *Principles of Christian Truth*, B. i. c. 23, § 37.) Wall’s comprehensive basis, however, includes the full doctrine of *anti*-pædobaptism, which is a prohibition of pædobaptism altogether, as tenable within the Church.

NOTE 3, p. 31.

Lord Lyttelton, in his very thoughtful tract on Infant Baptism, in which however the writer is rather feeling his way than profess-

ing to arrive at any positive conclusion, says, "This withdrawal of the question from the region of fixed dogma I am slow to acquiesce in, if it were only for the text in the Epistle to the Hebrews, in which the 'doctrine of baptisms' is recited among the fundamentals of the Christian faith." But what *is* the "doctrine of baptisms" contained in Scripture? Is it not a general one, which is not affected by withdrawing from the region of fixed dogma a particular which lies beyond it? Wall thus refers to the "doctrine of baptisms" mentioned in this Epistle:—"The Epistle to the Hebrews, ch. vi. v. 2, speaking of some things which are styled 'principles of the Oracles of God,' reckons amongst them the 'doctrine of baptisms and of laying on of hands.' Now whether the meaning of that place be to reckon both these as things that must be believed and owned by all that shall be saved, is a question that needs not to be discussed here. For suppose it be; both these parties do own baptism; they differ only about the time or manner of receiving it." History of Infant Baptism, vol. ii. p. 549.

NOTE 4, p. 32.

"Dicimus ad baptismum infantes *credere per vim verbi*, quo exorcizabantur, et per fidem Ecclesiæ eos offerentis et *eis fidem orationibus suis impetrantis*. Alioqui mera et intolerabilia essent mendacia, quando baptizans a parvulo quærit an credat, non baptizaturus, nisi vice ejus respondeatur Credo. Ut quid interrogat an credat, si certum est eos non credere? Ut Cochlæus contendit. Esto Augustinus sic aliquando dicat; sed Cochlæo satis sit esse sic ab homine dictum: nos volumus hoc dictum divinis testimoniis probari. Quin asserimus parvulos prorsus non esse baptizandos, *si verum est, in baptismo non credere*, ne illudatur majestatis Sacramentum et verbum." Lutherus contra Cochlæum, apud Bellarm., t. iii. p. 252. "Lutherus volebat fidem in parvulis esse ante baptismum ut posset vere responderi ministro baptizaturus parvulum credere." Bellarmine, *ibid.* p. 256.

Bellarmino himself witnesses to the difficulty of justification without faith:—"Infantes non justificantur sine ulla fide, quia Scriptura affirmat fidem esse medium ad salutem necessarium . . . Item Rom. 3, 'Arbitramur hominem justificari per fidem.' quod passim repetit, et inculcat Paulus. Quomodo igitur sine ulla fide justificari et placere Deo possunt infantes? . . . Apostolus in

eadem epistola capit. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, et 10, nihil aliud contendit nisi justificationem non contingere sine fide. Quare tribuere parvulis justificationem sine fide . . . quid est aliud nisi contra verbum Dei fingere novam justificationem? " Ibid. p. 256 et seq. He decides that infants have actual faith by *proxy* and by profession made in the external rite:—"Parvuli actu credunt partim reipsa dum baptizantur, partim aliena fide"—and habitual faith *really* by infusion in the Sacrament—"recipiunt infantes habitum fidei."

"Can the *res sacramenti*, the full and justifying effect, be possessed by infants without any grace of faith in them? The doctors of the Church felt the difficulty of so concluding, and therefore (just as they attributed a moral nature to a child, though incapable of moral action) they perceived and defined that the regenerated child had the 'Habit^{us} fidei,' as a gift from God from the first; which habitual faith being a heavenly gift is perfect and capable of spiritual action in future life. The consequences of any contrary conclusion might, if closely pressed, be fatal to the whole doctrine of the new birth in baptism. Baptized infants would be 'membra Christi,' justified *without faith*, and baptized adults 'membra Christi, *fide justificati*.' It would be impossible even to conceive of two such classes of members, as pertaining to one spiritual body." A Discourse on Heresy and Open Questions, by W. J. Irons, B.D.

While the Schoolmen, however, acknowledged the difficulty of justification without faith, their scheme of infant justification in baptism was no solution of it, because in Scripture faith *precedes* justification, as the *condition* of it; whereas in the Scholastic scheme the faith of the infant is the Divine gift *in* justification, and does not precede but is implanted *in* baptism. The Divines of the Reformation professed to solve the difficulty by the doctrine of "prevenient grace," which implanted faith in the infant before baptism.

NOTE 5, p. 33.

St. Augustine treats the want of faith in the infant and the want of baptism in the adult as analogous wants. "Sicut in latrone quia per necessitatem corporaliter defuit [sanctificatio Sacramenti] perfecta salus est quia per pietatem spiritualiter adfuit: sic et cum ipsa præsto est, si per necessitatem desit quod latroni adfuit, perficitur salus. Quod traditum tenet universitas Ecclesiæ cum

parvuli infantes baptizantur, qui certe nondum possunt corde credere ad justitiam, et ore confiteri ad salutem quod latro potuit." Aug. de Bapt. contra Donat. l. iv. c. 23.

Dr. Pusey, in assuming that the passages in which "St. Paul is speaking of justification," are passages "in which Holy Scripture is *not* speaking of baptism" (though I do not see how this can be said if justification is *by* baptism), witnesses to a certain difficulty in applying justification, with its Scriptural conditions, to baptized infants. Scriptural Views, p. 68.

NOTE 6, p. 49.

The distinction between the *grace* of baptism and the "*character*," or "*baptismus*," which in the Augustinian use of the word has the same force as character, meaning a valid baptism, or one which may be subsequently of beneficial effect, even when received at the time without it, pervades the Anti-Donatist treatises. ". . . Sicut perditī Catholici, quos tamen *Baptismus sine remissione peccatorum* et habere et dare manifestum est." (De Bapt. contra Donat. l. vii. c. 44.) "Qui in ipsa unitate perversi sunt et perditē vivunt apparet remissionem peccatorum nec dare posse nec habere; habere tamen et dare et accipere baptismi sacramentum." (Ibid. l. vi. c. 1.) "Characterem multi et lupi et lupis infigunt." (Ibid.) "Quo et ego sentio baptismum quidem Christi hæreticos posse habere, sed remissionem peccatorum non habere." (Ibid. l. vii. c. 3.) "Consentimus hæreticos remissionem dare non posse, baptismum autem dare posse." (Ibid. l. v. c. 22.) "Sub eodem baptismo quod acceperat, ejus peccata dimittuntur propter vinculum charitatis, sub quo baptismo peccata ejus *tenebantur* propter sacrilegium divisionis." (Ibid. l. vi. c. 5.)

The Schoolmen invariably distinguish between the baptismal *character* and the *grace* of baptism, deciding that the grace is not received by adults without faith and repentance, whereas the character is.

Lombard.—"His aliisque testimoniis aperte ostenditur, adultis sine fide et poenitentia vera in baptismo non conferri gratiam remissionis. . . . Si quis ergo fide accedit non habens veram cordis contritionem, sacramentum sine re accipit." L. iv. Dist. 4, s. 2.

Aquinas.—"Fictio impedit effectum baptismi . . . ad hoc quod

aliquis justificetur per baptismum, requiritur quod voluntas hominis amplectatur baptismum et baptismi effectum. . . . Baptizari in Christo potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo in Christo, i. e. in Christi conformitate; et sic quicumque baptizantur in Christo, conformati ei per fidem et charitatem, induunt Christum per *gratiam*: alio modo dicuntur aliqui baptizari in Christo, in quantum accipiunt Sacramentum Christi; et sic omnes induunt per configurationem characteris, non autem per conformitatem gratiæ." Summ. Theol. P. 3. Q. 69. A. 9.

"Duo efficiuntur in anima per baptismum, scilicet character et gratia," the grace being the "principalis effectus," the character the "effectus secundarius." S. T. P. 3. Q. 68. A. 7, and Q. 62. The baptismal character, "cum quadam consecratione datur;" it is "dispositio quædam ad gratiam," which does not act "quamdiu in homine apparet voluntas peccandi;" but does when the person repents: it is an indelible effect of baptism, while grace is defectible. "Character permanet indelebiter, justificatio autem permanet sed amissibiliter." Vid. S. T. P. 3. Q. 66. A. 9. Q. 63. A. 2. Q. 68. A. 4. Q. 66. A. 1.

Bonaventure.—"Ficte accedens recipit Sacramentum et non rem." Tom. v. p. 55. "Multi habent characterem qui nec habent nec habuerunt, nec habebunt gratiam." Ibid. p. 76.

Ricardus de Mediavilla.—"Ficti non gratiam sed characterem duntaxat recipiunt. . . . Fictus est qui verbo vel signo simulat se esse dispositum interius ad Sacramenti susceptionem, et tamen indispositus est." In Lomb. iv. p. 50.

Bellarmino.—"Baptismus ex communi sententia aliquid sacramentale confert etiamsi detur et percipiatur sine fide: igitur aliquem effectum Sacramentalem habet baptismus præter gratiam." "Manet igitur ex baptismo effectus aliquis sacramentalis qui non est gratia, cum gratia sine fide non detur." De Effectu Sacram. l. ii. c. 22. "Qui sine fide baptizantur revera non regenerantur, tamen rebaptizari non possunt." Ibid.

NOTE 7, p. 50.

Calvin.—"Utilitas quam ex sacramentis percipimus ad tempus quo ea nobis administrantur, minime restringi debet . . . Nam qui in prima infantia baptizati sunt, eos in pueritia, vel ineunte adolescentia, interdum etiam in senectute regenerat Deus . . . In quo si quis nobis dissentit tum regenerationis gratiam in multis acce-

leret necesse est, tum in reliquum vitæ cursum fabricet innumeros Baptismos. Effectum baptismi qui ad tempus nullus fuit videmus tamen emergere." Tractatus Theologici, pp. 649, 657.

Beza.—"Neque enim baptismi efficacia ad id momentum astringenda est, quo homo baptizatur, sed ipsa Christi in eo oblata regenerationis et renovationis beneficia interdum illum præcedere ut in Cornelio, interdum vero subsequi dicimus, in iis videlicet qui fidem non habent, sed suo tempore habebunt, quam ore profitentur cum baptizantur." Acta Colloquii Montisbelligartensis, p. 372.

"Manet tamen verus baptismus, etiamsi regeneratio in reprobis et ad vitam æternam non electis, minime sequatur . . . Effectum tantum in electis suis exerit : non autem statim eo tempore quo baptizantur, sed interdum in senectute demum eum Spiritus Sanctus operatur." Ibid. p. 385.

"Vis et fructus baptismi non ad certum tempus referri debet quo homo aqua baptizatur. Non enim credibile est omnes interne baptizari Spiritu qui externe aqua baptizantur. Sed tempus docet quando aliquis sit regeneratus, nunc, quando videlicet homo adoleverit." Ibid. p. 397.

Peter Martyr.—"In eis [parvulis] per baptismum communicatio hæc et promissio consignatur. Perverso quidem ordine quandoque fit ut res collationem sacramenti sequatur, atque tunc promissio vel promissionis donum quod reipsa absit, non signatur; ut in his patet qui sunt increduli, et ficto animo ad baptismum accedunt." Loc. Com. p. 583.

Davenant.—"Non necesse est ut sacramenta eo ipso momento quo administrantur efficiant illa omnia quæ figurant; imo, concedentibus ipsis scholasticis, *Pactio dilatoria locum habet, cum in ipsa susceptione obex ponitur*. Jam vero in infantibus ipse defectus rationis quoad actum est impedimentum quo minus habere possint actualem fidem, vel actuale studium mortificationis." Expositio Ep. ad Coloss. p. 209.

Gataker.—"Id quod de futuro beneficio ac sub conditione certa promisso parvulo cuivis fieri potest; etiamsi parvulo ipsi usus esse non possit donec adoleverit . . . Etiam adultis non credentibus . . . sigilla fœderis divini sunt sacramenta, atque illis quidem promissiones obsignant tum demum ubi crediderint efficaces futuras." Disceptatio, p. 38.

"The effect of baptism . . . is not to be restrained to the time when baptism is administered, but to be extended to the whole course of man's life, whensoever he shall believe and repent." Bishop Downname, Treatise on Perseverance, p. 393.

Bishop Bedell.—“All that come to the sacrament, elect or non-elect, receive the pardon of sin original and actual, sacramentally; and whosoever performs the condition of the covenant hath the fruition of that whereof before he had the grant under the seal. So that the sacraments are not *nuda et inefficacia signa* on God's part to the one or to the other . . . Have they (infants) then that obsignation? Yes, doubtless, according to the form of the covenant. How is that? That, repenting and believing, their sins are washed away. Then because they do not repent and believe, nothing passes. Yes, this passes,—the confirmation which this sacrament gives upon repentance and belief, the same thing which passes to him *qui fictus accedit*; who when afterward he doth indeed repent of his fiction, and receives Christ by faith, hath also the actual enjoying of the thing so confirmed to him . . . Questionless they are partakers of the actual obsignation of ablution from original and actual guilt. Suppose they understand not this obsignation, nor receive this ablution otherwise than sacramentally? As I said before, the counterfeit convert also doth; though he put a bar to his present ablution of his sins, and consequently his own certification thereof.” Letter of Bishop Bedell to Dr. Ward. Parr's Life of Usher, p. 442.

NOTE 8, p. 51.

Waterland half adopts this mode of speaking. “Regeneration in the *stricter* sense may admit of the distinction of salutary and not salutary; whereas justification admits not of that distinction at all, being salutary in the very notion of it.” (Summary View of the Doctrine of Justification, vol. vi. p. 8.) But what authority can Waterland give for this “stricter” sense of regeneration in which it may be *not* salutary? Regeneration is unquestionably the grace of baptism, and the grace of baptism is essentially salutary, because it includes that which is essentially salutary, viz. remission of sin. Any sense therefore of regeneration in which it is “not salutary,” is not a “stricter,” but an incorrect sense of that term. Waterland, in order to get a regeneration which is “not salutary,” has to *separate* regeneration from justification, which latter he admits to be “salutary in the very notion of it.” But regeneration or the grace of baptism is, according to Scripture and the doctrine of the whole Church from the first, inseparable from justification, as necessarily including and containing it.

Waterland explains the case of the “*Fictus*” by this separation

of regeneration into two parts, one of which may be had without the other. Speaking of persons baptized in unbelief and impenitence, but subsequently believing and repenting, he says,—“ Their regeneration is not a salutary nor a complete regeneration . . . their regeneration begun in baptism and left unfinished (like an indenture executed on one side only, or like a part without a counterpart) comes at last to be complete, i. e. actually salutary; not by a formal regeneration, as if nothing had been done, but by the repentance of the man.” (Vol. iv. pp. 437, 444.) But there is no authority for cutting regeneration into two parts, and giving the “ Fictus ” one half of it while he is wicked, and the other half when he becomes good. Regeneration is indeed a complex thing, and consists of parts, but these parts are not in actual possession separable, nor can regeneration be had in any other way than as a whole. Either a man is regenerate or he is not. If he is, he has the whole of regeneration; if he is not, he has neither part of it, either the negative part, or remission of sin, or the positive part, which is actual renovation. Both these parts are tied indissolubly together in actual possession, and make one whole. What Waterland really means by his non-salutary regeneration, or the first half, is the baptismal character, which though wholly outside of regeneration, is that in consequence of which the *fictus* becomes regenerate afterwards, upon fulfilling the conditions.

NOTE 9, p. 51.

St. Augustine in his controversy with the Donatists, once or twice makes the supposition of the momentary remission of sin to the baptized impenitent adult, at the instant of the baptismal rite; of which sin however the guilt returns again as soon as ever the rite is over, on account of the recipient's state of impenitence. But this absurd supposition is not St. Augustine's own, but only one which, with the redundant fertility of a disputator, he puts into the mouth of his opponent, in order to stop up every loop-hole of objection. St. Augustine defends the validity of heretical baptism by the parallel case of baptism without faith and repentance, which, like heretical, does not remit sin, but is still a valid baptism, i. e. gives a title to remission of sin upon the recipient's subsequent repentance. Not content, however, to let the argument stop here, he imagines the Donatist objecting that the parallel is erroneous because baptism without faith and repentance *does* remit sin, though

only momentarily: an objection which he meets with the reply that, if this is true, the same evanescent remission going the next moment and returning upon admission to the true Church, will attach to heretical baptism. The supposition, however, is only an argumentative one, which he puts into the mouth of his opponent, and not one to which he attaches any truth himself. As Peter Lombard says,—“Hoc non asserendo dicit . . . sed quærendo et aliorum opinionem referendo.” (L. iv. Dist. 4, § 2.) St. Augustine’s supposition of a regeneration or a birth of the Spirit which is not to the man’s benefit but injury (“nascuntur de Spiritu quamvis ad perniciem, non ad salutem.” De Bapt. contra Donat. l. v. c. 24, l. vi. c. 12) is in the same way a supposition which he offers as an alternative to his opponent; ¹ not one to which he at all pledges himself. The Donatist argument was, baptism in schism is not valid baptism, because it does not make a man to be born of the Spirit. St. Augustine replies,—Baptism without faith or repentance is a valid baptism, and yet does not make a man to be born of the Spirit: *or if* you choose to say that baptism without faith and repentance *does* make a man to be born of the Spirit, though not to his benefit, then I say that exactly the same effect takes place in schismatical baptism.

When St. Augustine makes statements of his own on this subject, they are in simple accordance with the doctrine of Scripture and the Universal Church, that regeneration implies remission of sin, and therefore cannot be conferred upon adults without faith and repentance. “Quid est enim *renasci* per baptismum, nisi a vetustate renovari? Quomodo autem renovatur a vetustate cui peccata præterita non dimittuntur . . . Regenerationem fatemur; quod si ita est, et peccata dimissa sunt.” (De Bapt. contra Donat. l. i. c. 11.)

NOTE 10, p. 54.

The Scholastic dictum that the divine love *causes* good in the creature, as distinguished from human love which *presupposes* it, implies that the divine love of the creature is prior to the moral goodness of the creature. “Differentia attendenda est circa gratiam Dei et gratiam hominis. Quia enim bonum creaturæ provenit

¹ “Necesse est enim ut unum de duobus concedatur: aut illi qui fallaciter sæculo renuntiant nascuntur de Spiritu quamvis ad perniciem, non ad salutem; atque ita possunt hæretici; aut . . . potest quis baptizari aqua et non nasci de Spiritu.” De Bapt. contra Donat. l. vi. c. 12.

ex voluntate divina, ideo ex dilectione Dei, qua vult creaturæ bonum, profluit aliquod bonum in creatura. Voluntas autem hominis movetur ex bono præexistente in rebus; et inde est quod dilectio hominis non causat totaliter rei bonitatem, sed præsupponit ipsam vel in parte vel in toto. Patet igitur quod quamlibet Dei dilectionem sequitur aliquod bonum in creatura causatum quandoque, non tamen dilectioni æternæ coæternum. Et secundum hujusmodi boni differentiam differens consideratur dilectio Dei ad creaturam: una quidem communis, secundum quam diligit omnia quæ sunt; alia autem dilectio est specialis, secundum quam trahit creaturam rationalem supra conditionem naturæ ad participationem divini boni. Et secundum hanc dilectionem dicitur aliquem diligere simpliciter, quia secundum hanc dilectionem vult Deus simpliciter creaturæ bonum æternum, quod est ipse." Aquinas, S. T. 1ma. 2da. Q. 110. A. 1.

NOTE 11, p. 83.

I see no reason for abandoning the meaning I put in a former work upon some passages in Clement of Alexandria:—

1. Ὁ πατὴρ ἀναγεννήσας πνεύματι εἰς νιοθεσίαν ἡπίους οἶδεν καὶ φιλεῖ τούτους μόνους. Pæd. l. i. c. 5.

2. Οὕτως οὖν ἐπιστραφέντας ἡμᾶς αὐθις ὡς τὰ παῖδια γενέσθαι βούλεται, τὸν ὄντως πατέρα ἐπιγνόντας δι' ὕδατος ἀναγεννηθέντας. Strom. l. iii. c. 12.

"St. Clement," says the Reviewer, "distinguishes between regeneration itself and these dispositions which are its *results*." But whether he does or not, he plainly mentions these dispositions as implied *in* regeneration.

3. Δεῖ γὰρ οὐ τὰ εἶδωλα μόνον καταλιπεῖν, ἀ πρότερον ἐξεθείαςεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἔργα τοῦ προτέρου βίου τὸν ἐν πνεύματι ἀναγεννώμενον. Strom. l. ii. c. 13.

I remarked, "The δεῖ here means that the regenerate man *must* act so in consistency, and to verify his name and profession as regenerate." To this the reviewer replies, "We do not see any ground for this observation: δεῖ seems to mean 'ought' in the sense of 'it is right;' what we are bound to do, what is our duty." I still maintain that mine is the natural explanation of the passage, i. e. that it means more than that a man having been endowed with a *faculty*, should use it in action, viz. that being an actually

holy person by the new birth of the Spirit, he should act throughout in accordance with this character. The appeal of Clement appears to be the appeal of St. Paul,—“How shall we that are dead to sin live any longer therein?” we who by regeneration are in a state of actual holiness, must not go back to our former carnal life.

4. Ἦκετε, ἦκετε, ὦ νεολαία ἡ ἐμή· ἦν γὰρ μὴ αὖθις ὡς τὰ παιδία γενήσεσθε καὶ ἀναγεννηθῆτε, ὡς φησὶν ἡ γραφή, τὸν ὄντως ὄντα πατέρα οὐ μὴ ἀπολάβητε, οὐδ’ οὐ μὴ εἰσελεύσεσθέ ποτε εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν. Ad Gentes, c. 9.

I assumed that this passage referred to Matt. xviii. 3, Ἐὰν μὴ στραφῇτε καὶ γένησθε ὡς τὰ παιδία, οὐ μὴ εἰσέλθῃτε εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν, and that Clement used ἀναγεννηθῆτε as a synonym for στραφῇτε. Some reference to Matt. xviii. 3 is not questioned by my reviewer, but that ἀναγεννηθῆτε is used by Clement as a synonym for στραφῇτε, is disputed and denied, and the term ἀναγεννηθῆτε made to refer rather to John iii. 5: the argument being that Clement quotes this Matt. xviii. 3 in another passage, with the special caution that it did *not* refer to “the regeneration,”—οὐ τὴν ἀναγέννησιν ἐνταῦθα ἀλληγορῶν (Pædag. l. i. c. 5). But “the regeneration” which is meant in this caution, is, as the reviewer himself would be the first to assert, the regeneration which was specially connected with and indeed used as synonymous with baptism. This is only a caution then against understanding *baptismal* regeneration, not against understanding regeneration, in the natural and antecedent sense of the word, to be referred to in Matt. xviii. 3. It is admitted that Clement does use the term “regeneration” in this general sense, or sense of conversion; why should it not be used, then, in this sense in the above extract, which has all the appearance of referring to Matt. xviii. 3? But however this question may be decided, the term ἀναγεννηθῆτε in the above extract (even if supposed to refer to regeneration in baptism specially) is still identified with certain actually holy dispositions, and is only regarded as existing in company with that childlike temper which Clement puts forward as the Christian ἦθος.

NOTE 12, p. 86.

1. Chrysostom.—“Benedictus Deus qui fecit mirabilia solus, qui fecit universa, et convertit universa. Ecce libertatis serenitate fruuntur qui tenebantur paullo ante captivi, et cives Ecclesiæ sunt

qui fuerant in peregrinationis errore, et justitiæ in sorte versantur qui fuerant in confusione peccati. Non enim tantum sunt liberi sed et justî; non tantum sancti sed et justî; non solum justî sed et filii; non solum filii sed et hæredes; non solum hæredes sed et fratres Christi; nec tantum fratres Christi, sed et cohæredes; non solum cohæredes, sed et membra; non tantum membra, sed et templum; non tantum templum, sed et organa Spiritus. Vides quot sunt baptismatis largitates, et nonnulli deputant cœlestem gratiam in peccatorum tantum remissione consistere; nos autem honores computavimus decem." Homilia ad Neophytos quoted by Augustine contra Jul. Pel. l. i. c. 6.

2. Gregory Nazianzen, p. 81 :—

Τὸ φῶτισμα λαμπρότης ἐστὶ ψυχῶν, βίου μετάθεσις, ἐπερώτημα τῆς εἰς Θεὸν συνειδήσεως. Τὸ φῶτισμα βοήθεια τῆς ἀσθενείας τῆς ἡμετέρας. Τὸ φῶτισμα σακρὸς ἀπόθεσις, Πνεύματος ἀκολουθήσις, Λόγου κοινωνία, πλάσματος ἐπανόρθωσις, κατακλυσμὸς ἀμαρτίας, φωτὸς μετουσία, σκότους κατάλυσις. Τὸ φῶτισμα ὄχημα πρὸς Θεὸν, συνεκδημία Χριστοῦ, ἔρεισμα πίστεως, νοῦ τελειώσις, κλεῖς οὐρανῶν βασιλείας, ζωῆς ἀμειψις, δουλίας ἀναίρεσις, δεσμῶν ἔκλυσις, συνθέσεως μεταποίησις. Oratio 40, tom i. p. 692.

3. Hippolytus, p. 82 :—

Δεῦρο τοίνυν, ἀναγεννήθητι, ἄνθρωπε, εἰς υἰοθεσίαν Θεοῦ. Κα πῶς φησιν; 'Εὰν μηκέτι μοιχεύσης μηδὲ φονεύσης μηδὲ εἰδωλολατρεύσης, ἐὰν μὴ κρατηθῇς ὑφ' ἡδονῆς, ἐὰν μὴ πάθος ὑπερηφανίας κυριεύῃ σου, ἐὰν ἀποξέσης τὸν ῥύπον τῆς ἀκαθαρσίας, καὶ ἀπορρίψῃς τὸ φορτίον τῆς ἀμαρτίας, ἐὰν ἀποδύσῃ τὴν πανοπλίαν τοῦ διαβόλου καὶ ἐνδύσῃ τὸν θώρακα τῆς πίστεως, καθὼς φησιν 'Ησαίας—λούσασθε καὶ ζητήσατε κρίσιν, ῥύσασθε ἀδικούμενον, κρίνατε ὀρφανῶ καὶ δικαιώσατε χήραν' καὶ δεῦτε καὶ διαλεχθῶμεν, λέγει Κύριος, καὶ ἐὰν ᾧσιν αἱ ἀμαρτίαι ὑμῶν ὡς φοινικοῦν, ὡς χιόνα λευκανῶ, ἐὰν δὲ ᾧσιν ὡς κόκκινον, ὥσεϊ ἔριον λευκανῶ' καὶ ἐὰν θέλητε καὶ τῆς φωνῆς μου ἀκούσητε τὰ ἀγαθὰ τῆς γῆς φάγεσθε. "Ἴδες, ἀγαπητέ, πῶς προεῖπεν ὁ Προφήτης τὸ τοῦ βαπτίσματος καθάρσιον; ὁ γὰρ καταβαίνων μετὰ πίστεως εἰς τὸ τῆς ἀναγεννήσεως λουτρὸν, διατάσσεται τῷ πονηρῷ, συντάσσεται δὲ τῷ Χριστῷ· ἀπαρνείται τὸν ἐχθρὸν, ὁμολογεῖ δὲ τὸ Θεὸν εἶναι τὸν Χριστὸν, ἀποδύεται τὴν δουλείαν, ἐνδύεται δὲ τὴν υἰοθεσίαν, ἀνέρχεται ἀπὸ τοῦ βαπτίσματος λαμπρὸς ὡς ὁ ἥλιος, ἀπαστρέπτων τὰς τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἀκτῖνας. Homil. in Theophania, § 10.

4. Gregory Nyssen, p. 83 :—

'Υμεῖς δὲ πάντες ὅσοι τῷ δώρῳ τῆς παλιγγενεσίας ἐγκαλλωπίζεσθε καὶ καύχημα φέρετε ἀνακαινισμὸν τὸν σωτήριον, δείξατέ μοι μετὰ τὴν μυσ-

τικὴν χάριν τὴν τῶν τρόπων ἐναλλαγὴν, καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον μετακοσμήσεως τὴν διαφορὰν τῇ καθαρότητι τῆς πολιτείας γνωρίσατε. Τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑποπιπτόντων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς οὐδὲν ἀλλοιοῦται, οἱ δὲ τοῦ σώματος χαρακτῆρες μένουσιν ἀμετάβλητοι, καὶ ἡ τῆς ὀρωμένης φύσεως διάπλασις οὐκ ἀμείβεται. Χρεῖα δὲ πάντως τινὸς ἐναργοῦς ἐπιδείξεως δι' ἧς ἐπιγνωσόμεθα τὸν ἀρχίτοκον ἄνθρωπον, συμβόλοις τισὶ φανεροῖς τὸν νέον ἀπὸ τοῦ παλαιοῦ διακρίνοντας. Ταῦτα δὲ οἶμαι τυγχάνειν τὰ κατὰ πρόθεσιν τῆς ψυχῆς κινήματα, ἀφ' ὧν ἑαυτὴν χωρίζουσα τῆς παλαιᾶς συνηθείας νεωτέρα δὲ τέμνουσα τῆς πολιτείας ὁδὸν, διδάξει σαφῶς τοὺς γνωρίμους ὡς ἄλλη τις ἐξ ἄλλης γεγένηται, οὐδὲν τῆς παλαιᾶς ἐφελκομένη γνώρισμα.

Ἐστὶ δὲ οὗτος τῆς μεταποιήσεως ὁ τρόπος, ἃν μοι πεισθέντες τὸν λόγον ὡς νόμον φυλάξητε. Ἦν ὁ πρὸ τοῦ βαπτίσματος ἄνθρωπος ἀκόλαστος, πλεονέκτης, ἄρπαξ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, λοῖδορος, ψεύστης, συκοφάντης, καὶ εἴ τι τούτοις ὅμοιον καὶ ἀκόλουθον· γενέσθω νῦν κόσμιος, σώφρων, ἀρκούμενος τοῖς ἰδίοις, καὶ ἐκ τούτων τοῖς ἐν πενία μεταδιδούς, φιλαλήθης, τίμητικὸς, εὐπροσήγορος, πᾶσαν ἀπλῶς ἐπαινουμένην πρᾶξιν ἀσκῶν. . . . Τοιαύτην προσήκεν εἶναι τὴν ἀναγέννησιν, οὕτως ἐξαλείφειν τὴν πρὸς τὴν ἁμαρτίαν συνηθειαν, οὕτως πολιτεύεσθαι τοὺς υἱοὺς τοῦ Θεοῦ. Τέκνα γὰρ ἐκείνου μετὰ τὴν χάριν ἀκούομεν. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο προσήκεν ἀκριβῶς ἐπισκοπῆσαι τὰ τοῦ γενήτορος ἡμῶν ἰδιώματα, ἵνα πρὸς ὁμοιότητα τοῦ πατρὸς ἑαυτοὺς μορφοῦντες καὶ σχηματίζοντες, γνήσιοι φαινώμεθα παῖδες τοῦ πρὸς τὴν εἰσποίησιν τὴν κατὰ χάριν καλεσάμενος· φαῦλον γὰρ κατηγορήμα ὁ νόθος καὶ ὑποβολιμαῖος, τὴν πατρικὴν εὐγένειαν ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων ψευδόμενος. Διό μοι δοκεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Κύριος ἐν εὐαγγελίοις τοὺς τοῦ βίου κανόνας διατάττων ἡμῖν, ἐκείνοις χρῆσθαι πρὸς τοὺς μαθητευομένους τοῖς λόγοις, καλῶς ποιεῖτε τοῖς μισοῦσιν ὑμᾶς, προσεύχεσθε ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐπηρεαζόντων ὑμᾶς καὶ διωκόντων, ὅπως γένησθε υἱοὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἡμῶν τοῦ ἐν οὐρανοῖς· ὅτι τὸν ἥλιον αὐτοῦ ἀνατέλλει ἐπὶ πονηροῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς, καὶ βρέχει ἐπὶ δικαίοις καὶ ἀδίκοις· υἱοὺς γὰρ πότε γενέσθαι λέγει, ὅταν τῆς πατρικῆς ἀγαθότητος τὴν ὁμοίωσιν ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοφύλους φιλανθρωπίᾳ τοῖς οἰκείοις λογισμοῖς ἐντυπώσωνται. *Oratio in Baptismum Christi*, tom. iii. pp. 378, 379.

5. Clement of Alexandria, p. 84:—

Ἀναγεννηθέντες γοῦν εὐθέως τὸ τέλειον ἀπειλήφαμεν οὗ ἕνεκεν ἐσπεύδομεν. Ἐφωτίσθημεν γὰρ, τὸ δὲ ἐστὶν ἐπιγνώσκειν τὸν Θεόν . . . βαπτίζομενοι φωτιζόμεθα, φωτιζόμενοι υἱοποιοῦμεθα, υἱοποιοῦμενοι τελειούμεθα, τελειούμενοι ἀπαθανατιζόμεθα. Ἐγὼ, φησὶν, εἶπα θεοὶ ἐστε, καὶ υἱοὶ Ὑψίστου πάντες. Καλεῖται δὲ πολλαχῶς τὸ ἔργον τοῦτο χάρισμα, καὶ φῶτισμα, καὶ τέλειον, καὶ λουτρόν. Λουτρόν μὲν δι' οὗ τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἀπορρίπτόμεθα· χάρισμα δὲ, ᾧ τὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασιν ἐπιτίμια ἀνείναι· φῶτισμα δὲ δι' οὗ τὸ ἅγιον ἐκείνο φῶς τὸ σωτήριον ἐποπτεύεται, τούτεσ-

τιν δι' οὐδ τὸ θεῖον ὀξυωποῦμεν· τέλειον δὲ τὸ ἀπροσδεές φαμέν. . . . Καὶ ὁ μόνον ἀναγεννηθεὶς, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ τοῦνομα ἔχει, καὶ φωτισθεὶς ἀπῆλλακται μὲν παραχρῆμα τοῦ σκότους, ἀπειληφε δὲ αὐτόθεν τὸ φῶς. Ὡσπερ οὖν οἱ τὸν ἵπνον ἀποσεισάμενοι εὐθέως ἔνδοθεν ἐγρηγόρασιν· μᾶλλον δὲ καθάπερ οἱ τὸ ὑπόχυμα τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν κατάγειν πειρώμενοι, οὐ τὸ φῶς αὐτοῖς ἔξωθεν χορηγοῦσιν, ὁ οὐκ ἔχουσιν· τὸ δὲ ἐμπόδιον ταῖς ὄψεσι καταβιβάζοντες ἐλευθέραν ἀπολείπουσι τὴν κόρην· οὕτως καὶ οἱ βαπτιζόμενοι τὰς ἐπισκοτούσας ἁμαρτίας τῷ θεῷ πνεύματι ἀχλύος δίκην ἀποτριψάμενοι, ἐλεύθερον καὶ ἀνεμπόδιστον καὶ φωτεινὸν ὄμμα τοῦ πνεύματος ἴσχομεν. . . . Καθύσον μὲν οὖν δυνατὸν ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ τελείους ἡμᾶς γενέσθαι πιστεύομεν. Πίστις γὰρ μαθήσεως τελειότης· διὰ τοῦτο φησὶν, ὁ πιστεύων εἰς τὸν Υἱὸν ἔχει ζωὴν αἰώνιον. Εἰ τοῖνυν οἱ πιστεύσαντες ἔχομεν τὴν ζωὴν, τί περαιτέρω τοῦ κεκτηῖσθαι ζωὴν αἰδίου ἐπολείπεται. . . ; Ἄ γὰρ ἡ ἄγνοια συνέδησε κακῶς, ταῦτα διὰ τῆς ἐπιγνώσεως ἀναλύεται καλῶς· τὰ δὲ δεσμὰ ταῦτα, ἥ τάχος, ἀνίεται, πίστει μὲν ἀνθρωπίνῃ, θεϊκῇ δὲ τῇ χάριτι· ἀφιεμένων τῶν πλημμελημάτων ἐν Παιωνίᾳ φαρμάκῳ, λογικῷ βαπτίσματι. Πάντα μὲν οὖν ἀπολυνόμεθα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, οὐκέτι δὲ ἐσμέν παρὰ πύδας κακοί. Μία χάρις αὕτη τοῦ φωτισματος τὸ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ πρὶν ἢ λούσασθαι τὸν τρόπον.

Ὅτι δὲ ἡ γνῶσις συνανατέλλει τῷ φωτισμῷ περιαστράπτουσα τὸν νοῦν, καὶ εὐθέως ἀκούομεν μαθηταὶ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς, πότερὸν ποτε τῆς μαθήσεως ἐκείνης προσγενομένης; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔχοις εἰπεῖν τὸν χρόνον· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κατήχησις εἰς πίστιν περιάγει· πίστις δὲ ἅμα βαπτίσματι ἀγίῳ παιδεύεται πνεύματι. . . . Πάντες γὰρ υἱοὶ ἐστε διὰ πίστεως Θεοῦ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. . . . Οὐκ ἄρα οἱ μὲν γνωστικοί, οἱ δὲ ψυχικοὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ Λόγῳ, ἀλλ' οἱ πάντες ἀποθέμενοι τὰς σαρκικὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἴσοι καὶ πνευματικοὶ παρὰ τῷ Κυρίῳ. . . .

Τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἡμαρτημένοις μετανοηκότες, ἀποταξάμενοι τοῖς ἐλαττώμασιν αὐτῶν, διυλιζόμενοι βαπτίσματι, καὶ πρὸς τὸ αἰδίου ἀνατρέχομεν φῶς, οἱ παῖδες πρὸς τὸν πατέρα. . . . Ἄρα εἰκότως οἱ παῖδες τοῦ Θεοῦ, οἱ τὸν μὲν παλαῖον ἀποθέμενοι ἀνθρωπον, καὶ τῆς κακίας ἀπεκδυσάμενοι τὸν χιτῶνα, ἐπενδυσάμενοι δὲ τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἵνα καινὸς γενόμενος λαὸς ἅγιος ἀναγεννηθέντες, ἀμίαντον φυλάξωμεν τὸν ἀνθρωπον. Pædag. L. i. c. 6, pp. 113—117.

6. Leo, p. 86.—“Quæ hoc sacramentum mens comprehendere, quæ hanc gratiam valeat lingua narrare? Redit in innocentiam iniquitas, et in novitatem vetustas; in adoptionem veniunt alieni, et in hæreditatem ingrediuntur extranei. De impiis iusti, de avaris benigni, de incontinentibus casti, de terrenis incipiunt esse cœlestes. Quæ autem est ista mutatio, nisi dextræ excelsi?” Sermo 26 (in Nativ. Dom. 7).

“ Ipse enim est, cui non solum gloriosa Martyrum fortitudo, sed etiam omnium renascentium fides in ipsa regeneratione compatitur ; dum enim renunciatur diabolo, et creditur Deo, dum in novitatem a vetustate transitur, dum terreni hominis imago deponitur et cœlestis forma suscipitur, quædam species mortis et quædam similitudo resurrectionis intervenit ; ut susceptus a Christo Christumque suscipiens non idem sit post lavacrum, qui ante baptismum fuit, sed corpus regenerati fiat caro Christi.” Sermo 63.

“ Ipsa est enim novæ conditio creaturæ, quæ in baptismo non indumento veræ carnis sed contagio damnatæ vetustatis exuitur, ut efficiatur homo corpus Christi, quia et Christus corpus est hominis.” Ep. 47.

“ Manifestum est omnes in Adam damnationi obnoxios esse nascendo, nisi in Christo liberati fuerint renascendo. Unde vigilanter nobis considerandum est in ipso regenerationis munere quid generatur. Quamvis in unum concurrunt omnes ejusdem mysterii portiones, aliud tamen est quod visibiliter agitur, aliud quod invisibiliter celebratur ; nec idem est in sacramento forma quod virtus : cum forma humani ministerii adhibeatur obsequio, virtus autem per divini operis præstatur effectum : ad cujus utique potentiam referendum est, quod dum homo exterior abluitur mutatur interior ; et fit nova creatura de veteri, vasa iræ in vasa misericordiæ transferuntur, et in corpus Christi commutatur caro peccati, de impiis justi, de captivis liberi, de filiis hominum fiunt filii Dei.” Epist. ad Demetriadem, c. 11.

7. Chrysostom, p. 88 :—

Οἷτινες ἀπεθάνομεν, φησι, τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, πῶς ἔτι ζήσομεν ἐν αὐτῇ ; τί ἐστίν, ἀπεθάνομεν ; . . . ὅτι νεκροὶ γεγόναμεν αὐτῇ, πιστεύσαντες καὶ φωτισθέντες . . . τί δέ ἐστιν νεκροὺς αὐτῇ γεγονέναι ; τὸ πρὸς μηδὲν ὑπακούειν αὐτῇ λοιπόν. Τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ μὲν βάπτισμα ἐποίησεν ἅπαξ, ἐνέκρωσεν ἡμᾶς αὐτῇ. Δεῖ δὲ λοιπὸν παρὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας σπουδῆς κατορθοῦσθαι αὐτὸ διηνεκῶς· ὥστε, κἂν μυρία ἐπιτάτῃ, μηκέτι ὑπακούειν, ἀλλὰ μένειν ἀκίνητον ὥσπερ τὸν νεκρόν. Ὅπερ οὖν ὁ σταυρὸς τῷ Χριστῷ καὶ ὁ τάφος, τοῦτ' ἡμῖν τὸ βάπτισμα γέγονεν, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. Αὐτὸς μὲν γὰρ σαρκὶ καὶ ἀπέθανε καὶ ἐτάφη, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἁμαρτία ἀμφότερα. . . Ὁ μὲν σαρκὸς, ὁ τοῦ Χριστοῦ· ὁ δὲ ἁμαρτίας, ὁ ἡμέτερος. Ὡςπερ οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἀληθὴς, οὕτω καὶ οὗτος. . . Ἀλλὰ γὰρ δακρῦσαι μοι λοιπὸν ἔπεισι, καὶ στενάξαι μέγα, ὅταν ἐννοήσω πόσῃ μὲν ἡμᾶς ἀπαιτεῖ φιλοσοφίαν ὁ Παῦλος, πόσῃ δὲ ἑαυτοὺς ἐξεδῶκαμεν ῥαθυμία, μετὰ τὸ βάπτισμα ἐπὶ τὸ πρότερον ἐπανιόντες γῆρας, καὶ εἰς τὴν Αἴγυπτον ἀνακάμπτοντες, καὶ σκοροδῶν μεμνημένοι μετὰ τὸ μάννα· δέκα γὰρ καὶ ἑκοσιν ἡμέρας παρ'

αὐτὸ τὸ βάπτισμα μεταβαλλόμενοι τοῖς προτέροις πάλιν ἐπιχειροῦμεν. Hom. x. in Rom., tom. ix. pp. 525, 526.

8. Chrysostom, p. 89 :—

Ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀνέστη τὴν ἀνάστασιν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπλοῦ θανάτου· ἡμεῖς δὲ διπλοῦν ἀποθανόντες θάνατον διπλὴν καὶ τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἀνιστάμεθα. Μίαν μὲν ἀνέστημεν τέως τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας. Συνετάφημεν γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βαπτίσματι, καὶ συνηγέρθημεν αὐτῷ διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος· μία αὕτη ἀνάστασις ἀπαλλαγὴ ἁμαρτημάτων· δευτέρα δὲ ἀνάστασις ἡ τοῦ σώματος· ἔδωκε τὴν μείζονα, προσδόκα καὶ τὴν ἐλάττονα· αὕτη γὰρ πολὺ μείζων ἐκείνης. Πολὺ γὰρ μείζων ἁμαρτιῶν ἀπαλλαγῆναι ἢ σῶμα ἰδεῖν ἀνιστάμενον. Διὰ τοῦτο ἔπεσε τὸ σῶμα, ἐπειδὴ ἥμαρτεν· οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀρχὴ τοῦ πεσεῖν ἡ ἁμαρτία, ἀρχὴ τοῦ ἀναστῆναι τὸ ἀπαλλαγῆναι τῆς ἁμαρτίας. Ἀνέστημεν λοιπὸν τὴν μείζονα ἀνάστασιν τὸν χαλεπὸν θάνατον τῆς ἁμαρτίας ῥίψαντες, καὶ ἀποδυσάμενοι τὸ παλαιὸν ἱμάτιον, μὴ τοίνυν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἀπαγορεύσωμεν. Ταύτην καὶ ἡμεῖς πάλαι τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἀνέστημεν, ὅτε ἐβαπτίσθημεν· καὶ οἱ τὴν τοῦ βαπτίσματος δὲ νῦν ἐσπέραν καταξιώθεντες, τὰ καλὰ ταῦτα ἄρνια. Hom. contra Ebriosos et de Resurrectione, tom. ii. p. 443.

9. Chrysostom, p. 89 :—

Οὐ γὰρ χεῖρ ἐπάγει καθὼς ἐκεῖ τὴν περιτομὴν ταύτην, ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα. Οὐ μέρος ἀλλ' ὅλον ἄνθρωπον περιτέμνει· σῶμα καὶ τοῦτο, σῶμα κακείμενον· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν σαρκί, τὸ δὲ πνευματικῶς περιτέμνεται· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς Ἰουδαῖοι· οὐ γὰρ σάρκα, ἀλλὰ ἁμαρτήματα ἀπεξεδύσασθε. Πότε καὶ ποῦ; ἐν τῷ βαπτίσματι. Hom. vi. in Ep. Coloss., tom. xi. p. 367.

10. Theodoret, p. 89 :—

Διδάσκει πάλιν τῆς περιτομῆς τὴν διαφορὰν. Οὐ γὰρ ἐστί, φησι, σαρκικὴ ἀλλὰ πνευματικὴ, οὐδὲ χειροποίητος ἀλλὰ θεία, οὐδὲ σμικροῦ σώματος ἀφαίρεσις, ἀλλὰ πάσης ἀπαλλαγὴ τῆς φθορᾶς. In Col. 2. 11.

11. Chrysostom, p. 90 :—

Ὁ γὰρ ἀποθανών, φησι, δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας. Περὶ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου τοῦτό φησιν, ὅτι ὥσπερ ὁ ἀποθανὼν ἀπὴλλακται τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν, νεκρὸς κείμενος, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἀναβὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ βαπτίσματος. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἅπαξ ἀπέθανεν ἐκεῖ, νεκρὸν δεῖ μένειν διὰ παντὸς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ. Εἰ τοίνυν ἀπέθανες ἐν τῷ βαπτίσματι, μένε νεκρός· καὶ γὰρ ἕκαστος ἀποθανὼν οὐκέτι ἁμαρτάνειν δύναται· ἄν. Hom. xi. in Rom., tom. ix. p. 531.

12. Chrysostom, p. 90 :—

Ὁ φιλάνθρωπος Θεὸς οἰκονομῶν τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν ἐχαρίσατο ἡμῖν τὴν διὰ τοῦ λουτροῦ τῆς παλιγγενεσίας ἀνακαίνισιν, ἵνα ἀποθέμενοι τὸν παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον τουτέστι τὰς πράξεις τὰς πονηρὰς καὶ ἐνδυσάμενοι τὸν νέον, ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς ὁδὸν βαδίζωμεν. Hom. xl. in Gen., tom. iv. p. 409.

13. P. 91 :—

Μὴ τοίνυν ἔτι πρὸς τὰ βιωτικά μείνωμεν κεχηνότες, μὴ περὶ τρυφήν τραπεζῆς, μηδὲ περὶ πολυτέλειαν ἱματίων· καὶ γὰρ ἔχεις ἱμάτιον μέγιστον, ἔχεις τράπεζαν πνευματικὴν, ἔχεις τὴν δόξαν τὴν ἄνω, καὶ πάντα σοι ὁ Χριστὸς γίνεται, καὶ τράπεζα καὶ ἱμάτιον, καὶ οἶκος καὶ κεφαλὴ, καὶ ῥίζα. Ὅσοι γὰρ εἰς Χριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε Χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε. *Ad Illuminatos Catechesis*, 2, tom. ii. p. 236.

14. P. 91 :—

Τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι παλιγγενεσία. Καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ οἰκίας σαθρῶς διακειμένης οὐδεὶς ὑποστήρισμα τίθησιν οὐδὲ συνῥάπτει ταῖς παλαιαῖς οἰκοδομαῖς, ἀλλὰ μέχρι τῶν θεμελίων αὐτὴν καταλύσας οὕτως ἄνωθεν ἀνίστησι καὶ ἀνακαινίζει, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ἐποίησεν· οὐκ ἐπεσκεύασεν ἡμᾶς ἀλλ' ἄνωθεν κατεσκεύασε. Τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι—“καὶ ἀνακαινώσεως Πνεύματος ἁγίου.” Ἄνωθεν ἐποίησε καινοῦς. *Hom. iii. in Ep. ad Tit.*, tom. xi. p. 761.

15. P. 91. Theodoret, *Ep. Rom.* 6. 3 :—

Ἡρνήθης, φησὶ, τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, καὶ νεκρὸς αὐτῇ γέγονας, καὶ τῷ Χριστῷ συνετάφης· πῶς τοίνυν οἷόν τέ σε τὴν ἐκείνην ἁμαρτίαν δέξασθαι ;

NOTE 13, p. 101.

Peter Lombard.—“*Gratia* præparatur hominis voluntas ut sit bona, bonumque efficaciter velit . . . Et si diligenter intendas, monstratur quæ sit ipsa *gratia* voluntatem præveniens et præparans, scilicet *fides cum dilectione*.” *L. ii. Dist. 26, § 1. 4.* Grace is characterized as effective or securing that for which it is given, according to the Augustinian definition, *De Præd. c. 5*, “*Posse habere fidem sicut posse habere charitatem naturæ est hominum; habere autem fidem sicut habere charitatem gratiæ est fidelium.*”

Aquinas.—“*Gratia* aliquid ponit in eo qui *gratiam* accipit . . . Quamlibet Dei dilectionem sequitur aliquod bonum in creatura causatum. Et secundum hujusmodi boni differentiam differens consideratur dilectio Dei ad creaturam: una quidem communis secundum quam esse naturale rebus creatis largitur, alia specialis secundum quam trahit creaturam ad participationem divini boni . . . Causatur ex dilectione divina quod est in homine Deo gratum.” *S. T. 1ma. 2dæ. Q. 110. A. 1.* “*Gratia* comparatur ad voluntatem, ut movens ad motum.” *Ibid. A. 4.* “*Gratia* est nitor animæ sanctum concilians amorem, sed nitor animæ est quædam qualitas sicut et pulchritudo corporis. Ergo *gratia* est quædam qualitas.” *Ibid.*

A. 2. "Gratia dicitur facere gratum formaliter, scilicet quia per hanc homo justificatur, et dignus efficitur vocari Deo gratus." Ibid. Q. 111. A. 1. "Deus non sine nobis nos justificat, quia per motum liberi arbitrii, dum justificamur, Dei justitiæ consentimus. Ille tamen motus non est causa gratiæ sed effectus, unde tota operatio pertinet ad gratiam." Ibid. A. 2.

"Virtutes dicuntur theologicæ, tum quia habent Deum pro objecto, tum quia a solo Deo nobis infunduntur . . . Istæ virtutes non dicuntur divinæ sicut quibus Deus sit virtuosus, sed sicut quibus nos efficimur virtuosus a Deo." Ibid. Q. 62. A. 1. "Virtutes acquisitiæ per actus humanos sunt dispositiones quibus homo convenienter disponitur in ordine ad naturam. Virtutes autem infusæ disponunt homines altiori modo et ad altiorem finem. Et secundum acceptionem hujusmodi dicimur regenerari in filios Dei." Ibid. Q. 110. A. 3. "Deus movet omnia secundum modum uniuscujusque . . . Et ideo in eo qui habet usum liberi arbitrii non fit motio a Deo ad justitiam absque motu liberi arbitrii; sed ita infundit donum gratiæ justificantis, quod etiam simul cum hoc movet liberum arbitrium ad donum acceptandum." Ibid. Q. 113. A. 3. "Deus movet voluntatem hominis sicut universalis motor ad universale objectum voluntatis, quod est bonum . . . Specialiter Deus movet aliquos ad aliquid determinate volendum quod est bonum, sicut in his quos movet per gratiam." Ibid. Q. 9. A. 6. See Chapters ix. and x., on the Scholastic Doctrines of Necessity and Predestination, in the "Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination."

Alexander Alensis.—"Gratia qua aliquis dicitur esse gratus Deo necessario ponit aliquid bonum in gratificato, quo est gratus Deo: illud autem quo est gratus Deo est illud quo est Deiformis vel assimilatus Deo . . . ponit aliquid in ipso quo dicitur assimilatus Deo, per quam assimilationem est dignus vitæ æternæ." Sum. Theol. t. iii. p. 460.

NOTE 14, p. 104.

"Solet etiam quæri si parvulis in baptismo datur gratia qua, cum tempus habuerint utendi libero arbitrio, possint bene velle et operari. De adultis enim qui digne recipiunt sacramentum non ambigitur quin gratiam operantem et cooperantem perceperint; quæ in vacuum eis reddit, si per liberum arbitrium post mortaliter deliquerint, qui merito peccati gratiam appositam perdunt. Unde

dicuntur contumeliam Spiritui Sancto facere, et ipsum a se fugare. De parvulis autem qui nondum ratione utuntur quæstio est an in baptismo receperint gratiam, qua ad majorem venientes ætatem possint velle et operari bonum. Videtur quod non receperint, quia gratia illa charitas est et fides quæ voluntatem preparat et adjuvat. Sed quis dixerit eos accepisse fidem et charitatem? Si vero gratiam non receperint, qua bene operari possint cum fuerint adulti, non ergo sufficit eis in hoc statu gratia in baptismo data, nec per illam possunt modo boni esse, nisi alia addatur; quæ si non additur, non est ex eorum culpa, quia justificati sunt a peccato. Quidam putant gratiam operantem et cooperantem cunctis parvulis dari in munere non in usu; ut cum ad majorem venerint ætatem, ex munere sortiantur usum, nisi per liberum arbitrium usum muneris extinguant peccando; et ita ex eorum culpa est non ex defectu gratiæ quod mali fiunt, qui ex Dei munere valentes habere usum bonum, per liberum arbitrium renuerunt, et usum pravum elegerunt." L. iv. Dist. 4.

Having previously decided the general question what constitutes the grace of baptism, Lombard comes in this passage to a point of detail, who are the recipients of this grace; and that part of the baptismal gift which consists in remission of sin being supposed to be the common benefit of all in baptism, he raises the question whether the other or positive part, which he has just called the "apposition of virtues," and now calls "the grace by which we are able to will and do aright," is so also. He assumes that adults receive it, but moots it as a question which is still undecided, whether infants do,—*an parvuli in baptismo receperint gratiam*; and decides it in the negative,—*videtur quod non receperint*; on the ground that this grace consists of the virtues of faith and love, and that infants cannot, by reason of the immaturity of nature, possess these virtues, *Sed quis dixerit eos accepisse fidem et charitatem?* He declines deciding even that this grace will certainly be given them when they grow up, only saying that "it will not be owing to their fault if it is not, because they are justified from sin."² This is an awkward conclusion, and not very intelligible, but it is no decision. Some think, "*quidam putant*," that grace is given to infants *in munere*, not *in usu*, to be converted to use subsequently as they grow up; but he quotes the opinion without endorsing it.

² The term "justified," it must be observed, is not used here in the scholastic sense of the word, but in the simpler sense of acquittal, or deliverance from guilt, as, indeed, besides the general context, the limitation of the adjunct—"a peccato"—shows.

The natural conclusion, then, from this passage is, that Lombard declines to assert that infants receive in baptism that whole grace which he identifies with the grace of baptism or regeneration, and only commits himself to a particular part of that grace as the benefit of the infant recipient, and that part, it must be added, not a distinctive gift of the new dispensation, but common to old and new. The distinctive grace of baptism was, in Lombard's scheme, the "apposition of virtues:" it was that which admitted a man to the new dispensation, and made him a new creature, a true member of Christ. The remission of sin was a negative gift, which had no peculiar Gospel rank, but belonged to the initiatory sacrament of the new dispensation, in common with the initiatory sacrament of the old; for circumcision conferred remission of sin, both original and actual, according to Lombard, before this office was transferred to baptism. (See Note 19.) While infants then had the gift common to baptism and circumcision secured to them, the Gospel supplement of this negative gift, or the infusion of positive virtue, does not attach for certain to infant baptism, according to Lombard.

One thing is remarkable in the passage, that the writer does not seem even to recognize the idea of baptismal grace as a mere power and faculty. He *includes* power in it, *gratia qua possint bene velle et operari*, but he only sees this power in the form of a *habit*, an implanted habit of faith and love,—*gratia illa charitas est et fides*. This habit is indeed not only implanted virtue, but also *assisting* grace, *quæ voluntatem præparat et adjuvat*; it being of the very nature of a habit to *assist* the will to do what is right on each particular occasion; but the assistance is contemplated in the form of habit, not of a faculty only. The Anglican reader accustomed to the latter idea of baptismal grace, expects in reply to the question, "Whether infants receive in baptism that grace by which they *will* be able, when they grow up, to will and do good?" the answer that infants are capable of having a faculty implanted in them, which as they grow up they can improve into a habit; but Lombard disappoints him with a negative, on the ground that this grace is the virtue of faith and love *itself*,—*quia illa gratia est charitas et fides*, which infants cannot have on account of the immaturity of nature.

The late Archdeacon Wilberforce explains this passage of Lombard as only meaning to assert that grace was a Divine *influence* as distinguished from an infused habit. "The doctrine of Peter Lombard differed in one very essential point from that of the later

Schoolmen. For whereas they separated those gifts which grace bestows upon men from their Divine Giver, speaking of them as habits infused into the mind . . . he identified 'the love of God which is shed abroad in our hearts,' with the Spirit which sheds it." *Doctrine of Baptism*, p. 198. But this is first to make a mistake as to a fact. Lombard does represent grace as an infused habit. "*Illa gratia virtus non incongrue nominatur.*" "*Homo per gratiam baptismi renovatur, quod fit collatione virtutum.*" "*Gratia illa charitas est et fides.*" "Virtues" are habits, and "love and faith" are habits. In the next place it is totally to overlook the point of the passage, which distinguishes between two parts of the baptismal gift, not between two aspects of the whole of it. Lombard has in his mind infants as distinguished from adults, but two modes of representing the baptismal gift would have had nothing to do with infants as distinguished from adults, as it would have applied in common to both.

NOTE 15, p. 107.

Whitaker's answer to the Schoolmen would have been better if he had left out the extreme case of an education among Turks and Pagans, which would provoke the reply that a habit might be implanted and yet not developed on account of unfavourable circumstances. The difficulty of the Scholastic hypothesis is that, under the favourable circumstances of Christian education and society, this supposed universally implanted habit does not come out in all or even the majority of baptized infants. "*Author hujus insulsæ distinctionis fuit Thomas, qui ait causam cur pueri, cum habeant habitus, tamen inhabiles sint ad actus, esse impedimentum corporale, ut dormientes, licet habitus virtutum habeant, tamen propter somnum non operantur. Sed hanc esse fictam causam patet. Nam dormientes sublato impedimento possunt actus exercere: at si puer baptizatus transferretur ad Turcas aut Paganos, ubi de Christo nihil audiret, non crederet actu, etiam remoto ætatis impedimento; quod indicat illum nullum talem fidei habitum habuisse; nam si habuisset ætate jam provectus sciret aliquid eorum quæ fidei sunt, et posset aliquem fidei actum ex illo habitu elicere.*" Whitaker, *Prælect. de Sacr.* p. 287.

NOTE 16, p. 109.

"Creaturis naturalibus sic providet ut non solum moveat eas ad

actus naturales, sed etiam largiatur eis formas et *virtutes quasdam*, quæ sunt principia actuum, ut secundum seipsas inclinentur ad hujusmodi motus; et sic motus quibus a Deo moventur fiunt creaturis connaturales et faciles, secundum illud Sap. 8. 1: *Et disponit omnia suaviter*. Multo igitur magis illis quos movet ad consequendum bonum supernaturale æternum, *infundit aliquas formas seu qualitates naturales secundum quas suaviter et prompte ab ipso moveantur* ad bonum æternum consequendum." S. T. 1ma. 2dæ. Q. 110. A. 2. "Manifestum est quod omne quod movetur necesse est proportionatum esse motori; et hæc est perfectio mobilis, in quantum est mobile, dispositio qua disponitur ad hoc quod bene moveatur a suo motore. Quanto igitur movens est altior, tanto necesse est quod mobile perfectiori dispositione ei proportionetur, sicut videmus quod perfectius oportet esse discipulum dispositum ad hoc quod altiores doctrinam capiat a doctore. Manifestum autem est quod virtutes humanæ perficiunt hominem, secundum quod homo natus est moveri per rationem in his quæ interius vel exterius agit. Oportet igitur inesse homini altiores perfectiones, secundum quas *sit dispositus ad hoc quod divinitus moveatur*; et istæ perfectiones vocantur dona, non solum quia infunduntur a Deo, sed quia secundum ea homo disponitur, ut efficiatur *prompte mobilis* ab inspiratione divina." Ibid. Q. 68. A. 1.

NOTE 17, p. 113.

Dr. Pusey testifies, in his well-known tract, to the sense of regeneration, which has been maintained in these three chapters as the true one. "Regeneration," according to him, "comprehends change of heart and affections, repentance, faith, life, and love" (Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism, p. 47); "sin not only remitted," but "slain and crucified, so that we must henceforth watch that it live not again in us, that we serve it not again" (p. 97); "the putting on of Christ, and the being conformed to Christ" (p. 122); "the true circumcision, being disencumbered of the sinful mass with which we were naturally encumbered, the body of the sins of the flesh" (p. 126). It is "the state in which Christians were persuaded to abide, the fulness which they had received from Him by whom they had been filled, and in whom dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily" (p. 126); it "places again upon us the Creator's image, renewing us after His likeness,

and impressing His cast, and to speak the high truth, His features upon our souls, as a seal gives its stamp to the body whereon it is impressed" (p. 137): it had "cleansed the hearts of the Christians, addressed by St. Paul, from an evil conscience, joined them to Christ, made them partakers of His holiness, and fitted them to appear before Him: after which cleansing they were to remain clean" (186). "The modern interpretation, which finds a description of *conversion* in the putting off the old and putting on of the new man"—one of the Apostolic phrases for regeneration—is, he maintains, "true as far as it goes," though "it loses sight of baptism" as the channel of such conversion (178).

In the opinion also of a learned critic and devoted disciple of the Fathers, regeneration "implies more than a mere capacity for goodness and holiness; viz. the actual imparting of those graces in a manner and degree proportioned to the capacity of the subject, with a tendency as well as power for their growth and future development; involves actual imparted grace and the gradual development of the fruits of grace, although that grace or goodness be not necessarily either permanent or final." "The view," he adds, "has been pretty universally held by Catholics, that regeneration does imply the gift of real and actual goodness, according to the spiritual capacities of the subject." *Christian Remembrancer*, No. 93, pp. 222, 235.

NOTE 18, p. 113.

"Unica formalis causa [justificationis] est justitia Dei, non qua ipse justus est, sed qua nos justos facit, qua videlicet ab eo donati renovamur spiritu mentis nostræ, et non modo reputamur sed vere justi nominamur et sumus . . . Caritas Dei diffunditur in cordibus eorum qui justificantur, atque ipsis inhæret, unde in ipsa justificatione cum remissione peccatorum hæc simul omnia infusa accipit homo per Jesum Christum, cui inseritur, fidem, spem, et caritatem . . . Hujus justificationis causæ sunt, finalis quidem gloria Dei . . . instrumentalis sacramentum baptismi." Sess. 6, c. 7.

"Gratia [quæ baptismo homini præstatur] est non solum per quam peccatorum fit remissio, sed divina qualitas in animo inhærens, ac veluti splendor quidam et lux, quæ animarum nostrarum maculas omnes delet, ipsasque animas pulchriores et splendidiore reddit . . . Huic autem additur nobilissimus *omnium virtutum* comitatus quæ in animam cum gratia divinitus infunduntur." *Catechism of Trent*, P. 2. C. 2. Q. 49, 50.

NOTE 19, p. 116.

"Ut sciamus etiam antiquos justos non nisi per eandem fidem liberatos per quam liberamur et nos; fidem scilicet Incarnationis Christi, quæ illis prænuntiabatur, sicut nobis facta annuntiabatur." Aug. Ep. 157, § 14. "Ante tempus Legis et tempore ipso Legis justos Patres . . . Dei gratia per fidem justificabat; et nunc *eadem* in apertum jam veniens revelata justificat." Ep. 177, § 15. "Sacramentum porro regenerationis nostræ manifestum esse voluit manifestatus Mediator. Erat autem antiquis justis aliquod occultum, cum tamen et illi eadem fide salvi fierent quæ fuerat suo tempore revelanda." Ep. 187, § 34. "Imo vero, ut sic loquar, quemadmodum se veritas habet, non nominum consuetudo, Christianus etiam ille tunc populus fuit." Serm. 300.

Circumcision is described in some of the following passages as the sacramental channel, in others as the sign, of true justifying grace conferred upon the Ancient Fathers.

Augustine.—"Ex quo instituta est circumcisio in populo Dei, quæ erat tunc signaculum justitiæ fidei, ita ad significationem purgationis valebat et in parvulis originalis veterisque peccati, sicut et baptismus ex illo valere cœpit ad inovationem hominis ex quo institutus est. Non quod ante circumcisionem justitia fidei nulla erat . . . sed superioribus temporibus latuit sacramentum justificationis ex fide." De Nupt. et Conc. l. ii. c. 11. The passage as quoted by Lombard has "purgationem" instead of "significationem purgationis."

Lombard.—"Fuit inter illa sacramenta sacramentum quoddam, scilicet circumcisionis, idem conferens remedium contra peccatum, quod nunc baptismus præstat." L. iv. Dist. 1.

Bede.—"Idem salutiferæ curationis auxilium in lege circumcisio contra originale vulnus peccati agebat, quod baptismus agere revelatæ tempore gratiæ consuevit; excepto quod regni cœlestis januam intrare non poterat." Hom. in Circum. t. iv. p. 187.

Bonaventure.—"Circumcisio congrue fuit instituta tempore legis scriptæ ad deletionem originalis culpæ." Tom. v. p. 19.

Hugo de St. Victor.—"Idem salutiferæ curationis auxilium circumcisio contra originale peccatum in lege cooperabatur, quod nunc baptismus; excepto quod regni cœlestis januam primi patres intrare non poterant, propter quod necessaria fuit mors Christi, quæ aditum vitæ patefecit." Tom. iii. p. 261.

Alexander Alensis.—"Circumcisione tollebatur originale peccatum." "Quicquid arbitrati sunt nonnulli, circumcisione veteri

nedum peccatum originale tollebat, sed et gratia etiam præstatur." "Revera ex vi circumcisionis tollebat originale in parvulis et tam originale quam actuale in adultis digne suscipientibus. Virtus tamen circumcisionis per se et primo fuit ordinata ad deletionem originalis; sed quia gratia gratificans non compatitur suum mortale aliquod, neque mors spiritualis tollitur nisi per introductionem vitæ spiritualis, cum hoc quod gratia sive virtus circumcisionis tollebat originale, ad quod per se ordinata erat, tollebat et actuale." Summ. Theol. t. iv. pp. 74, 75.

"Ex sacramento circumcisionis datur gratia tollens originale peccatum, et diminuens superfluitatem concupiscentiæ, et debitum tollens concupiscendi, et virtutem præstans resistendi concupiscentiæ." Ibid. p. 76.

Durandus.—"Circumcisio quæ auferebat culpam conferebat gratiam." P. 293.

Aquinas decides against the sacraments of the old law "confering justifying grace" "per seipsa," even as anticipatory applications of the benefit of Christ's passion,—"*Sed nec potest dici quod ex passione Christi virtutem haberent conferendi gratiam justificantem;*" arguing with his usual subtlety that, though a cause can operate before its own existence as a motive to the mind or a final cause, it cannot as producing an outward effect or as an efficient cause; and therefore that the Passion of Christ could not act as the efficient cause of the virtue of sacraments which preceded that Passion. "*Nihil prohibet id quod est posterius tempore, antequam sit, movere, secundum quod præcedit in actu animæ, sicut finis, qui est posterior tempore, movet agentem secundum quod est apprehensus et desideratus ab ipso; sed illud quod nondum est in rerum natura non movet secundum usum exteriorum rerum.* Sic ergo manifestum est quod a passione Christi, quæ est causa humanæ justificationis, convenienter derivatur virtus justificativa ad sacramenta novæ legis, non autem ad sacramenta veteris legis." The sacraments of the old law, however, are still pronounced to confer grace as *signs* of faith,—that faith which had, even before the new law, the power or office of justifying, "*per fidem passionis Christi justificabantur antiqui patres sicut et nos.*" In this sense, then, circumcision conferred grace,—"*In circumcisione conferebatur gratia in quantum erat signum passionis Christi futuræ.*" S. T. P. 3. Q. 62. A. 6.

Bull on the other hand maintains that the "Old covenant laboured under a want of pardoning grace, or the remission of sins." Harm. Diss. 2, c. 7, § 5.

NOTE 20, p. 124.

"Hence I distinguish life into initial and actual. Not as if the Spirit were not actually communicated and did not actually work, or actually begin from the very first instant to prepare the soul to future actual newness of life, by infusing some potential and seminal grace: but my meaning is that the Spirit doth not at that time ordinarily so plenary change—renew the whole man,—as to work in him either faith, hope, or love, or so much as the habits of these and other graces. . . . Therefore we call that first work, *Initial*, thereby understanding the first disposition to or degree of actual regeneration, but forasmuch as that first work doth not (for aught we know) extend to a present actual change of the whole man in the same manner and degree, that afterwards is wrought in him at his effectual calling; therefore, we call that latter work *Actual* regeneration.

"This ought not to seem strange to any, for just so it is in the course of nature. So soon as the reasonable soul is infused, there is in some sense (not every way in respect of degrees) a rational life. But how? The soul is there, and in that soul are included all the principles of reason; but the soul doth not send forth those principles into action (unless in some insensible manner by little and little preparing the infant unto human action), till afterwards that the senses begin to act. Before that time the reasonable life cannot wholly be denied to be in an infant, yet forasmuch as the infant hath not by this time the actual use of reason, for this cause we call the further perfection of his natural principles by tract of time attained, when reason puts itself into act, *actual rational life*; and we term the same life, in respect of the first degree and principles thereof, which together with the reasonable soul in the first infusion thereof it received, *initial life*." Burgess (p. 241), Calvin, Zanchius, Chamier, Daneau, Whitaker, White, Ainsworth, and others, are quoted in defence of this position.

NOTE 21, p. 133.

"Quid autem valeat et quid agat in homine corporaliter adhibita sanctificatio sacramenti . . . difficile est dicere. Nisi tamen plurimum valeret, non servi baptismum Dominus accepisset. . . . Usque adeo nemo debet in quolibet propectu interioris hominis, si

forte ante baptismum usque ad spiritualement intellectum pio corde profecerit, contemnere sacramentum, quod ministrorum opere corporaliter adhibetur, sed per hoc Deus hominis consecrationem spiritualiter operatur. Nec ob aliud existimo munus baptizandi Johanni fuisse attributum, nisi ut Dominus ipse qui dederat, cum servi baptismum non sprevisset accipere, dedicaret humilitatis viam, et quanti pendendum esset suum baptisma quo ipse baptizaturus erat, tali facto apertissime declararet. Videbat enim tanquam peritissimus medicus salutis æternæ, quorundam non defuturum tumorem, qui cum intellectu veritatis et probabilibus moribus ita profecissent ut multis baptizatis vita atque doctrina se præponere minime dubitarent, supervacaneum sibi esse crederent baptizari, quando ad illum mentis habitum se pervenisse sentirent, ad quem multi baptizati adhuc ascendere conarentur." De Bapt. contra Donat. l. iv. c. 23.

"Et quare oportebat ut Dominus baptizaretur? Quia multi contempturi erant baptismum, eo quod jam majore gratia præditi viderentur, quam viderent alios fideles. Verbi gratia jam continenter vivens catechumenus contemneret conjugatum, et diceret se meliorem quam ille sit fidelis. Ille catechumenus posset dicere in corde suo: Quid mihi opus est baptismum accipere; ut hoc habeam quod et iste, quo jam melior sum? Ne ergo cervix ista præcipitaret quosdam de meritis justitiæ suæ plurimum elatos, baptizari voluit Dominus a servo; tanquam alloquens filios capitales: Quid vos extollitis? Quid erigitis, quia habetis, ille prudentiam, ille doctrinam, ille castitatem, ille fortitudinem patientiæ? Numquid tantum habere potestis, quantum ego qui dedi? Et tamen ego baptizatus sum a servo, vos dedignamini a Domino. Hoc est ut impleatur omnis justitia." In Joan. Evang. Tract. 13, § 6.

NOTE 22, p. 138.

"Negari enim non potest adultos credentes justificationem habere etiam antequam baptizentur. . . . Quin et Deus existimandus est, ut est bonus, dum consignantur suæ promissiones et sua dona, ex sua mera misericordia reddere illa auctiora." Peter Martyr, Loci Comm. pp. 580, 584.

"Baptismus Cornelio fuit lavacrum regenerationis, qui tamen jam Spiritu Sancto donatus erat. . . . Fides requiritur antequam ad Sacramentum accedant. Atqui fides non est sine Christo; sed,

quatenus Sacramentis confirmatur et *augescet* fides, confirmantur in nobis Dei dona, adeoque quodammodo *augescit* Christus in nobis." Consensus Tigurinus, c. 19.

"Sacramenta, ipsam nobis obsignando, fidem nostram hoc modo *sustinent, alunt, confirmant, adaugent.*" Calvin, Inst. l. iv. c. 14, § 7.

"Si Catechumeni vere credant, habent testante Domino vitam æternam, et sunt vere jam membra Christi et Ecclesiæ, vereque justificati faciunt necessario bona opera. Nec enim his baptis-mate confertur primum justificatio, sed obsignatur eis, confirma-tur, et *augetur.*" Bucer, Script. Ang. p. 730.

"This marvellous conjunction and incorporation is first begun and wrought by faith, as saith Paulinus unto St. Augustine :—'*Per fidem nostram incorporamur in Christo Jesu Domino nostro.*' Afterwards the same incorporation is assured unto us, and *increased* in our baptism." Jewell, Controversy with Harding, Art. 1.

Our Twenty-seventh Article on Baptism is very much in the language of Lombard. Contemplating the case of faithful adults, it describes the gift conferred in the actual administration of the rite as one rather of an outward kind, "being grafted into the Church." Lombard says, "Qui ante erat iudicio Dei, sed nunc etiam iudicio ecclesiæ intus est." While the inner grace is only the *increase* of one already had, "faith is confirmed and grace *increased.*" Lombard says, "Adjutrix gratia omnisque virtus *augetur.*" The principle applies to our baptismal service for adults. The faithful adult is by the literal terms of this service *unre-generate* before the act of baptism, and becomes regenerate for the first time by it. But the Scholastic view modifies the rigour and bareness of this line of division, and antedates his regeneration and justification.

NOTE 23, p. 159.

Hammond in one passage maintains the infusion of a habit in the act of regeneration, but the position compels him to give up the assertion of the regeneration of *all* infants in baptism, and to fall back on the presumptive principle, "That makes a man to be truly regenerate, when the seed is sown in the heart, when *the habit is infused*; and this is done sometimes discernibly, sometimes not discernibly . . . Undiscernibly God's supernatural agency interposes sometimes in the mother's womb . . . but this divine address attends

most ordinarily till the time of our baptism, when the Spirit accompanying the outward sign infuses itself into their hearts, and there seats and plants itself, and grows up with the reasonable soul, keeping even their most luxuriant years within bounds; and as they come to an use of their reason, to a more and more multiplying *this habit of grace* into holy spiritual *acts* of faith and obedience; from which it is ordinarily said that infants baptized have *habitual faith*, as they may be also said to have habitual repentance, and the habits of all other graces, because they have the root and seed of those beauteous healthful flowers, which will actually flourish there when they come to years. And this, I say, is so *frequent* to be performed at baptism, that ordinarily it is not wrought without that means, and in those means we may expect it, as our Church doth in our Liturgies, where she presumes at every baptism that 'it hath pleased God to regenerate the infant by His Holy Spirit.'" Sermon xxvii.

Here is the position maintained that in regeneration there is implanted a habit of faith and obedience which naturally produces "multiplied acts," when the infant grows up. But in what proportion of the baptized does this criterion of "acts" show this habit to be implanted? Hammond is in a difficulty here. He cannot consistently with plain facts say that it is implanted in *all* infants in baptism; and therefore he interprets the statement in the Baptismal Service as hypothetical,—“Our Church *presumes* at every baptism that it hath pleased God to regenerate the infant.” At the same time he wants the bestowal of the habit to be considered as *almost* universal,—“It is so *frequent* to be performed in baptism, that we may *expect* it.” Upon this question of proportion, experience unhappily decides against Hammond. This is however a subordinate question, when the main point of universality has been given up.

Bishop Kaye, in his Charge in 1852, adopts the position of the *habituale principium gratiæ*, and maintains that “in baptism the infant receives the habit of faith and obedience” (Charges, p. 452), without however appearing to see the consequences of such a position; for he supposes himself, and quotes Hammond as supposing, that the habit “is *ordinarily* infused into the hearts of *all* infants at baptism.” What Bishop Kaye means by something being *ordinarily* given *always* is not very clear; but it is evident that he is under the general impression that an implanted habit of goodness may be the universal accompaniment of infant baptism, which has been shown to be untenable.

NOTE 24, p. 182.

Those who maintain that the consent of antiquity of itself establishes an article of the faith, will have to decide some points that they had rather leave in suspense. There is certainly a concurrence of antiquity in the belief that unbaptized infants cannot go to heaven. So completely indeed was this taken for granted in the early Church, that the Pelagians themselves allowed the conclusion, though disowning the premiss for it, and dared not, in defiance of the whole Church, admit them to heaven, but assigned them a middle state,—an alternative which Augustine in the name of the whole Church emphatically rejected. “Respondemus cum Augustino Dei judicia esse occulta, cur tot parvulos perire sinat, interim tamen esse iustissima. Nam etiamsi parvuli sine sua culpa non baptizantur, non tamen sine sua culpa pereunt, cum habeant originale peccatum. Qui autem fingunt aliud remedium præter baptismum, apertissime pugnant cum Evangelio, Conciliis, Patribus atque Ecclesiæ universæ consensu.” Bellarmine, De Sacr. Bapt. l. i. c. 4.

“Sane infantes, quia hanc, prohibente ætate, non possunt habere fidem, hoc est cordis ad Deum conversionem, consequentur nec salutem, si absque Baptismi perceptione moriuntur.” St. Bernard, De Bapt. c. 9.

Gataker.—“Adversus antiquos qui hic adducuntur exceptio duplex occurrit 1. quod sine tinctione discedentes flammis infernalibus adjudicarunt. . . .” Ward.—“*Esto quod in uno dogmate vel in altero errarint, non sequitur illico in aliis dogmatibus non recte sentire.*” Disceptatio inter Ward et Gataker, p. 194.

NOTE 25, p. 182.

It is not easy to see how the condemnation of the Pelagian Celestius by the Council of Ephesus, is even the implicit assertion by that Council of the regeneration of all infants in baptism. In the silence of the Council we can assume no other reason for the condemnation of Celestius, than that as a Pelagian he held the Pelagian heresy, or the denial of original sin. The Council then by implication asserts original sin. But the assertion of original sin is not the assertion of the remission of original sin to all infants in baptism, which is a totally distinct proposition; still less is it the assertion of the regeneration of all infants in baptism. Indeed

Pelagius (though he would not include in regeneration the remission of what he did not believe in—original sin) happened himself to assert the regeneration of all infants in baptism (Augustine, *De Hær.* c. 88. *Contra Jul. Pel.* l. iii. c. 3. 5); and therefore that assertion cannot be extracted out of the simple *denial* of Pelagianism.

The same remark may be made upon the First Canon of the Fourth Council of Carthage, which, among many points on which a Bishop elect is to be examined, inserts this—"Si in baptismo omnia peccata, id est, tam illud originale contractum, quam illa quæ voluntaria admissa sunt, dimittantur;" and upon the Second Canon of the Council of Milevi—"Quicumque dicit in remissionem quidem peccatorum eos (parvulos) baptizari, sed nihil ex Adam trahere originalis peccati, quod regenerationis lavacro expietur, unde fit consequens, ut in eis forma baptismatis, in remissionem peccatorum, non vere sed false intelligatur—anathema sit." Whether all baptized infants are recipients of the remission of original sin is not the question before these Councils; the point which they assert is, that infants have original sin to be remitted. We want the express statement directly by a General Council that "all infants are regenerate in baptism," and we are presented instead with the adoption by a General Council (Chalcedon) of the canons of another, a Provincial Council, one of which latter asserts the doctrine of *original sin*, its remission in baptism, and its remission to infants; all which three assertions were made by the Calvinists of the Reformation. The only relevant point,—the remission to all infants,—is not stated. A formal condition of an Article of the faith, which the assertion by a General Council is, must be fulfilled with formal correctness. No General Council has imposed in terms the position that "all infants are regenerate in baptism."

The Bishop of Exeter says (Letter to Archbishop of Canterbury, p. 52) that by declaring original sin to be a hindrance to the benefit of baptism, he (Mr. Gorham) denied the Article of the Creed, "One baptism for the remission of sins." But the statement that "baptism is for the remission of sin," does not exclude hindrances to such remission. A state of actual sin is, we know, "a hindrance to the benefit of baptism:" whether original sin is, is a further and disputed question; but it is not excluded as such an hindrance by this clause.

In the statement of the Council of Orange (a small Council, A.D. 529, attended by fourteen Bishops) "quod accepta per baptismum gratia omnes baptizati Christo auxiliante et co-operante, quæ ad salutem animæ pertinent, possint et debeant, si fideliter laborare

voluerint, adimplere" (Harduin, v. ii. p. 1101)—the assertion that all who receive baptismal grace can fulfil, &c., has nothing to do with the question who *do* receive that grace.

NOTE 26, p. 204.

1. In order to make Augustinianism consistent with sufficient grace for all, "sufficient" has been defined as such a measure of grace as suffices to put a person in such a state, that "*if he died in that state he would be saved.*"³ But this is an inadequate criterion of sufficient grace, which must be sufficient not only up to a particular time, but for the whole of life. Is grace which accompanies a man up to the age of twenty, because it would have been sufficient for him had he lived to be no older than twenty, therefore sufficient for him if he lives to be eighty? It must be remembered that upon every theory of grace, the man is spiritually dead as soon as ever the grace of God leaves him. Is strength, then, to swim fifty yards *and no more* of the slightest service to a man who has to cross a river a mile wide? Not of the least, because when he has swum his fifty yards he sinks immediately, and no more reaches the opposite bank than a man who could not swim a foot. In the same way a soul that has had the benefit of Divine grace up to a certain age, as certainly perishes when that grace finally leaves it, and as certainly misses salvation, as a soul that never had grace at all. And, therefore, grace is not grace sufficient for salvation, if (for any other cause but one which is not the cause here supposed, viz. habitual and obstinate neglect and contempt of it) it stops short of the final stage of life, because whenever it stops short it delivers the man over to the power of sin, under which continuing till he dies, he perishes finally.

For this reason the regeneration *pro statu infantis*, which is appealed to as a universal accompaniment of infant baptism, even on the Augustinian scheme, is no proof that that scheme is consistent with the real regeneration of all infants in baptism. It is true that Augustinianism is consistent with every baptized infant being rege-

³ "As regards the doctrine of sufficient grace, suppose the matter were stated thus, that grace may be given such as that men may believe, shall live religiously, shall love God, be holy, be such *that if they died they should be saved*—who yet through their life being lengthened do fall away; can it be denied that grace sufficient for salvation was given to them?" Christian Remembrancer, No. 93, p. 248.

nerate *pro statu infantis*, i. e. being in that state that *if* he died as an infant he would be saved; but this is not enough to constitute the baptized person regenerate absolutely, for which purpose it is essential that he should be admitted into a state of grace sufficient for the needs of whatever age or circumstances of life he may actually attain to, and that he should be placed in a condition of spiritual competency generally, and not only with reference to one particular contingency. An infant who is about to grow up to years of discretion is not regenerate in baptism, unless he is guaranteed in baptism such grace as is wanted for the needs of that maturer age. But Augustinianism does not admit of this state of sufficient grace being universally entered into at baptism.

And this suggests the proper mode of treating the difficulty which is sometimes raised upon the supposition of an infant being after baptism immediately carried away by Turks or heathens and brought up in a false religion; in which case it is alleged that he is regenerate as being baptized, but that he has not subsequently grace sufficient for salvation; not having even the knowledge of the truth or the opportunity of belief given him. But it is a mistaken notion of regeneration that it is something done like a piece of magic in a moment, after which moment, nothing can interfere with the truth and reality of it. Regeneration is admission to a *state*, and a state of indefinite continuance, in which there is afforded grace sufficient for salvation. This state, therefore, implies in its very nature the outward advantages of the Christian calling; it assumes that the person is brought up as a Christian; in the absence of which outward means of grace, the state itself of regeneration does not exist, though the baptismal character may be received.

2. The subtle distinction that it is the same *grace* in both cases, but that the elect have the power to *use* their baptismal grace profitably, the rest have not, is hardly worth meeting, because such subtleties are in fact mere words without meaning. How can we distinguish between the grace and the power to use it? The power to use the grace is part of the grace, nor should we get into a way of speaking of a new nature as if it were a material insertion in the man, which could be separated from all relation to his inward will and moral power.

It is true that a man may have an *inward* faculty implanted in him by God, and be placed by God's natural providence under such *outward* circumstances, that he cannot practically use it. A ploughman may be born an orator, and yet the total want of education

hinder all development of his gift. And again it is true that a man may have *one* particular faculty implanted in him, and yet that the development and use of it may be prevented by the absence of *other* faculties, as in the case of a general who has a first-rate strategical head without the nerve to execute his plans. But it is absurd to say that a man can have a general inward power which he has not the general inward power to use,—the general inward power to lead a good life conferred by baptism, which he has not the general inward power to use in consequence of his exclusion from the decree of predestination.

NOTE 27, p. 228.

“Our Reformers from first to last agreed with the majority of the most distinguished Continental Reformers in maintaining that baptism (when spoken of in the abstract with reference to its true nature, intent, and purpose) is a rite divinely appointed as the instrument in the use of which a certain spiritual blessing is conveyed by God to the recipient; and the consequence was that both, when speaking of baptism *in the abstract*, used the strongest expressions as to the value of the blessings conferred in it by God; and they did this both for the purpose of upholding the truth and counteracting the opposite error.

“But it is palpably a misinterpretation of this language to infer from it that this Sacrament is represented thereby as having this effect upon all who partake of it; because such general statements refer to the case of *adults*, as well as *infants*; and in the former case it is admitted that faith and repentance are necessary to a salutary reception of the Sacrament. Therefore some qualification may have been held necessary in the latter case.” *Effects of Infant Baptism*, p. 190.

“In baptism, as Nowell says, regeneration ‘*effigiem suam tenet*,’ or in the corresponding words of Calvin, ‘*Spiritualis regeneratio figuratur*,’ but, as both say, it is a figure or representation of *such* a kind ‘*ut annexa sit veritas*,’ because God does not deal with His servants by empty signs. No; wherever the party is such as He accepts (for whom alone the Sacraments were ordained at all) God works with His Sacraments, and they not merely seal but give grace.” *Ibid.* p. 261.

“A conclusive argument no doubt may be derived from these

passages (in the Catechism) against those who affirm that the Sacrament of Baptism is a bare empty sign, to which even in the case of the worthy recipient, no special grace is attached by Divine promise. But the question as to the character and qualifications necessary in those who receive the inward grace as well as the outward sign in baptism, both as it respects adults and infants, is not touched by the statements here made as to the nature and effects of baptism." P. 458.

The same assertion of the grace of the Sacrament, as distinct from the conditions of receiving it, was made in court by the counsel for Mr. Gorham,—“The acknowledgment of the blessings attached to baptism is common to both sides ; but this leaves unresolved the real question between us, viz. whether these are or are not received in all cases. It is admitted by the other side that no one detracts from the grace of the sacrament by saying that such expressions do not necessarily apply to every individual adult who is baptized ; and it must also be admitted that when Mr. Gorham affirms, in respect of infants, that such expressions do not necessarily and in every case apply to them, he is not detracting from the grace belonging to the Sacrament of Baptism.” Dr. Bayford’s Speech, p. 102.

NOTE 28, p. 244.

The application of the law of adult baptism to infant baptism so entirely pervades the theology of the Reformation, that it is unnecessary to cite passages. The Lutheran statements are given in Notes 4 and 32. The statements of the other division of the Reformation are as express. “Baptizantur in futuram pœnitentiam et fidem : quæ etsi nondum in illis formatæ sunt, arcana tamen Spiritus operatione utriusque semen in illis latet.” (Calvin, Instit. l. iv. c. 16, § 20.) “Objici consuevit aliam esse rationem infantium, et aliam adultorum. Quoniam illi qui propectæ sunt ætatis fidem habere possunt, qua pertineant ad gregem Dei, quæ infantibus non est tribuenda . . . Respondemus quod fidem expressam et actu requirimus, quoad illos qui sunt adulti ; in parvulis vero Christianorum qui baptizandi offeruntur, eam esse dicimus inchoatam, in suo, inquam, principio et radice . . . Quamobrem parvuli qui vere ad electionem Dei pertinent, antequam baptizentur, Spiritu Dei sunt instructi.” Peter Martyr, Loc. Comm. pp. 583, 584. “Si loquantur de fide actuali, illa Scripturæ loca quæ hæc requirunt in baptizatis ad adultos esse restringenda dicimus : ad infantes

autem quod attinet, quia peccatores sunt non proprio actu sed hæreditario habitu, sufficit quod peccati mortificationem *et fidem habeant* non proprio actu sese exerentem, *sed in habituali principio gratiæ inclusam*. Spiritum autem Christi principium hoc habituale gratiæ in illis efficere posse et solere nemo sanus negaverit." Davenant, in Coloss. c. 2, v. 12. " Baptismus etiam in infante, non ut tu autumas, ex opere operato, sed ex fide solum recipientis gratiam operatur . . . 'Parvulus,' inquit Lutherus, 'fide infusa mutatur et renovatur.' 'Eos virtute sui spiritus vobis incomprehensa renovat Deus,' ait Calvinus . . . Credat necne infans, Ecclesiæ incertum est, sed nisi credere infantem iudicio charitatis Ecclesia judicaret, nec sponsores infantis nomine sic respondere mandaret, nec infantem, *nisi* sic responderet, baptizari vetaret." Crakanthorp, Defens. Eccl. Angl. Anglo-Catholic Library, p. 224. See Whitaker, Prælect. de Sacram. pp. 15, 285. Zanchius, Explic. Ep. ad Eph. p. 222. Chamier, De Sacram. p. 128. Nowell's Catechism.

NOTE 29, p. 250.

"An hypothetical sense," says Mr. Davison, "seems admissible, only when the Liturgy is speaking first of individuals, and, secondly, when their individual state is impossible to be known in those respects in which it bears upon the tenor of the special service relating to them; and when also, thirdly, there can be no ambiguity whether it be an hypothetical sense or not."⁴ Of which three conditions, the two latter, he says, are not fulfilled in the case of infant baptism.

But when Mr. Davison laid down these conditions of hypothetical interpretation, he did not take into consideration that upon the doctrinal ground of one school in the Church, his second condition of admissibility *is* unquestionably fulfilled in the case of infant baptism. On the Calvinistic ground the state of the infant "in those respects in which it bears upon the tenor of the special service relating to them is impossible to be known." It is not known whether the infant is one of the elect or not, and upon his election depends his regeneration. Mr. Davison says indeed,—"The Church is in this instance fully aware of the present state and condition of the subject to whom the rite is to be applied. The infant is born in a state of sin, and it is incapable of believing and repenting. This state *is*

⁴ Remains, p. 294.

not unknown to the Church, nor, since it pertains at the same time to the application of the office to be administered, can it be disregarded by the Church in that office." But upon the Calvinistic ground this is not a correct or sufficient description of the state of the infant in relation to baptism, because in addition to these *known* circumstances, he is also regarded as the subject of an *unknown* Divine decree upon which his exception of the grace of baptism depends. The Calvinist, therefore, cannot admit Mr. Davison's conclusion, "that the possible reasons of exception which might exist in other cases can have no place here, and that, since the actual subject is *so definitely and universally known*, the language of the service cannot have a concealed reserve in regard to any such cases of exception."⁵

Mr. Davison's third condition, that there must be "no ambiguity whether it be an hypothetical sense or not," falls under one or other of the two following alternatives. If by "no ambiguity" Mr. Davison means no ambiguity to the *interpreter himself*,—that he must not apply the hypothetical sense to a statement, unless it is the only sense in which he himself can accept it; the condition is sound, but the case of the Calvinist fulfils it, because this *is* the only sense in which *he* can accept this statement, and there is no ambiguity about this point to *him*. If by the condition of "no ambiguity" Mr. Davison means that it must be the only sense in which *any person whatever* can accept the statement, the condition is not fulfilled in the present case, but then the condition itself is an arbitrary and untrue one. There can be no reason why a statement in a service should not admit of two interpretations, a literal and an hypothetical one, according to different doctrinal grounds taken by two persons, any more than why the language of an article should not admit of two different meanings. A person ought not to give an hypothetical sense to a statement unless it is the only sense in which *he* can accept it; but he is not debarred from giving it because *another* person can take it in the literal sense.

When Mr. Davison's canons of hypothetical interpretation are analyzed, they will be found to come to this, that the interpretation in order to be *admissible* must be *necessary*. But necessary in whose opinion? Mr. Davison assumes—in the opinion of everybody. But for an allowable interpretation an unanimous ground is not needed. It is enough if the doctrine upon which the necessity arises is held by some, and if those, whether few or many, are

⁵ Pp. 295, 296.

allowed by the Church to hold it. The whole Christian body interprets the statement of the adult's regeneration hypothetically. Why? Because the whole Christian body holds that the regeneration of the adult is conditional. Some of this body interpret the statement of the infant's regeneration hypothetically. Why? Because some hold that the regeneration of infants is conditional. If the conditional rationale, then, of infant regeneration is not prohibited, those who hold it, whatever proportion of the Church they may be, have as much right to interpret this statement hypothetically in the case of infants, as the whole collective Church has to do so in the case of adults. Mr. Davison's canons, while they allow for cases of unanimous hypothetical interpretation, the necessity for which arises from plain facts or universally admitted truths, do not provide for this latter case of an hypothetical interpretation, the necessity for which arises from a doctrine which is simply allowed and held with consent of the Church. But this latter case ought to be provided for, and its omission shows not that the case itself is unsound, but that Mr. Davison's canons are inadequate.

NOTE 30, p. 257.

Mr. Faber (*Primitive Doctrine of Election*, p. 374) has mistaken the language of Melancthon. Melancthon, commenting on the text of St. Paul,—“*Quos elegit, hos et vocavit*,” says, “*Mox igitur monet ubi electi quærendi sint, scilicet in cœtu vocatorum*.” (T. i. p. 154.) Mr. Faber understands this as meaning that the “elect” coincide with the “cœtus vocatorum,” or the visible Church, and fixes upon Melancthon the interpretation of the phrase “the elect” as meaning those who are elected to admission into the Visible Church. But Melancthon does not mean by the above that “the elect” coincide with the “cœtus vocatorum,” but only that they are *in* that “cœtus,” along with others who are not the elect. “*In hoc sunt electi omnes . . . nec fingamus electos esse quærendos extra cœtum vocatorum*.” (Ibid.) “*Semper in hoc cœtu sunt electi aliqui, i. e. hæredes æternæ vitæ, etiamsi simul his admixti sunt multi non sancti et non electi*,” p. 158. Mr. Faber mistakes again Melancthon's assertion of an “*electa Ecclesia*,” for the assertion that the Visible Church is the body of the elect, and quotes “*Scitote esse ecclesiam electam propter Filium* ;” whereas Melancthon himself immediately adds, “*Et hæc electa Ecclesia prædicatione colli-*

gitur, et fit justa, et ornabitur æterna gloria." Ibid. The "electa Ecclesia" of Melancthon is *in* the visible Church, but as one body within another body; being indeed that inner invisible body, *for the sake of which* the outward visible body exists,—“De Ecclesia visibili scire necesse est, quia in hac tantum sunt electi, *propter quos* et hic visibilis cœtus a Deo colligitur et conservatur.” Ibid. p. 159.

NOTE 31, p. 299.

Archbishop Laurence quotes as an anti-Calvinistic statement of Luther:—“Deus non est crudelis et immitis tyrannus; non odit, non abjicit homines, sed amat;” but does a Calvinist say that God *is* a cruel and harsh tyrant, and that He does not love but reject mankind? (B. L. p. 159.) Again Luther says, “Prædicatio Evangelii universalis et publica est, omnibus patens quicunque suscipere volunt. Ac Dei voluntas hæc est, cum eam sic invulgat, ut omnes credant et salventur” (B. L. p. 165). But no Calvinist denies that “God will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth,” which is a simple text of Scripture, though he accepts it with a reserve, which he thinks other statements in Scripture render necessary. And he will agree with Luther that to reject this statement of Scripture is both presumptuous and dangerous:—“Qui sentiunt Dei voluntatem non esse ut omnes salventur, aut in desperationem ruunt, aut in securissimam impietatem dissolvuntur” (Postilla Dom. quoted B. L. p. 165). Calvin says, “*Cum utrisque* [piis et impiis] *Dei misericordia per Evangelium offeratur, fides est, hoc est, Dei illuminatio, quæ inter pios et impios distinguit. . . . Impii autem non causentur sibi deesse asylum, quo se a peccati servitute recipiant, dum oblatum sibi ingratitude sua respuunt*” (Institut. l. iii. c. 24, § 17).—“In exitialem abyssum se ingurgitant qui ut de sua electione fiant certiores, æternum Dei consilium *sine verbo* percontantur” (Ibid. § 4).

Nor again does a writer recant necessarianism, because he attributes a real existence and a true motion to the human will. Archbishop Laurence finds some passages in which Luther attributes *consent* and *co-operation* to the human will. “*Permittamus duntaxat Deum in nobis operari*” (Op. vol. v. p. 592). “*Sinasque Deum in te operari*” (vol. iii. p. 172). “*Sed non operatur in nobis sine nobis, ut quos ad hoc creavit et servavit, ut in nobis operaretur, et nos ei cooperaremur*” (vol. ii. p. 470, quoted B. L. 284). But

consent and co-operation belong to the will as such, without which it would cease to be a will: nor therefore does a Calvinist deny such functions of the will:—"Fateor ergo expectandam esse fidelibus hanc Dei benedictionem, quo melius usi fuerint superioribus gratiis, ut eo majoribus posthac augeantur. . . . Hac quidem [distinctione operantis gratiæ et cooperantis] usus est Augustinus sed commoda definitione leniens, Deum cooperando efficere quod operando incipit. . . . Quod dicere solent, postquam primæ gratiæ locum dedimus, jam conatus nostros subsequenti gratiæ cooperari, respondeo: Si intelligunt nos, ex quo semel Domini virtute in justitiæ obsequium adornati sumus, ultro pergere et propensos esse ad sequendam gratiæ actionem, nihil reclamo" (Calvin, Instit. l. ii. c. 3, § 11). "Quis enim ita desipit ut hominis motionem a jactu lapidis nihil differre autumet? Neque vero quicquam simile consequitur ex nostra doctrina. In naturales hominis facultates referimus, approbare, respicere; velle, nolle; eniti, resistere; . . . Ubi regnum in illis suum (Deus) erigit, voluntatem, . . . quo in sanctitatem et justitiam propendeat flectit. . . . Admonet (Augustinus) actionem hominis non tolli Spiritus Sancti motu . . . non destrui gratia voluntatem sed magis reparari. . . . Nihil jam obstat quominus rite agere dicamur, quod agit Spiritus Dei in nobis" (Ibid. c. 5, § 14, 15).

In one instance indeed a statement gives offence to Luther which would not offend a Calvinist:—"Alii sunt qui hæc verba sic interpretantur: Multi sunt vocati, i. e. Deus multis suam gratiam offert; pauci vero electi, i. e. cum paucis suam gratiam communicat, nam pauci salvantur. Valde impia hæc sententia est. Nam quis non Deum summe oderit, si de Deo non aliter sentiat, quam ejus voluntatis culpa fieri, ut non salvemur?" (Postilla Domestica, p. 57, quoted B. L. p. 161.) But before we draw an inference from an insulated case, we should take into account the character of the work in which this case occurs. The "Postilla Domestica" is not a theological treatise, it is not even a work which was *written* by Luther. It is a collection of "Home Sermons," published by two disciples from notes taken down at the time, and published with Luther's sanction and under his eye, but still not his written composition. Nothing could be more natural than that Luther should in a course of practical discourses protest against the abuse of the doctrine of the *De Servo Arbitrio*, which had been great among some sectaries, who had perverted it to license immorality. But the statements of such a work have not the theological weight of the written statements of a doctrinal treatise.

NOTE 32, p. 304.

The Augsburg Confession lays down the universal proposition, *fidem in usu sacramentorum requiri*, and condemns the *ex opere operato*, without allowance for any exception in the case of infants, Art. XIII. Luther says, "Nisi adsit aut paretur fides nihil prodest baptismus:" and to the objection of infant baptism replies, "Parvulus fide infusa mutatur, mundatur, et renovatur." Op. t. ii. p. 78. See Note 4, and p. 32.

"Deinde ejusdem farinæ est quod sentit infantibus, qui sunt ut ipse loquitur incapaces fidei, non esse necessariam fidem. Quasi vero ullus sit hominum qui cum sit capax imaginis Dei, non etiam sit capax fidei: aut quasi infantes sine sua quadam proprie divinitus collata fide, salutem consequi possent. Fieri enim non potest, ut *sive infans* sive adultus placeat Deo absque Christo et fide in Christum, eaque propria et divinitus donata. Non videmus infantes credere, sed Deus qui suos in omnibus creaturis gemitus quos ipse in eis exciverat et quos hæc pro liberatione filiorum Dei, ut Paulus testatur, emittunt, videt et audit, tam acutos habet sensus, ut et infantium fidem, qua eos pro sua clementia, et quodam singulari modo ornat, intueatur et agnoscat." Brentius, Apol. Confess. Wirtemberg. tom. viii. p. 386.

"Baptismus fidei signaculum est, et, cum sit fidei signaculum etiam in infantibus baptizatis, necesse est infantes credere." Major, tom. iii. p. 345.

I must remark here upon a mistake of Bellarmine in the interpretation of some later works of Luther, in which, he says, Luther gives another scheme of infant baptism, and contradicts his former statements as to the necessity of faith in infants. "Altera sententia infantibus nullam fidem in baptismo esse necessariam. Hanc videtur etiam Lutherus docuisse. Nam licet antequam Anabaptistæ exorirentur, illa scripserit quæ supra citavimus; tamen posteaquam illi apparuerant, scripsit librum contra eos anno MDXXVIII., et ubi ad hoc argumentum venisset de fide infantium, dixit nihil interesse sive credant sive non credant. Baptismum enim non fundari super fidem dantis aut recipientis quæ incertissima est, sed super Dei mandatum et institutionem. Et similia habet in homiliis de baptismo anno xxxvii. et xl. habitis." (Tom. iii. p. 253.) That which Luther, in these Homilies and elsewhere, asserts to be founded upon the Divine institution, and not upon faith, is not the *grace* of baptism or justification, but the *validity* of

baptism; which even when received without faith, he asserts to be operative subsequently upon faith existing. He says, indeed, "Baptismus rectus habendus est etiam non accedente fide" (Catechism. Major, Op. v. p. 639); and condemns the Anabaptists because they found baptism "non super Dei mandatum et institutionem, sed, ut aliud quoddam opus humanum, super fidem et dignitatem nostram, quasi non sat esset, Deum sic distribuisse et mandasse, sed necesse esset primum per nos eum confirmari; nec ante baptismum esse, aut eum valere, quam fides nostra accederet." (Hom. de Bapt. Op. vii. p. 351.) But he is particular in adding that he speaks here not of the beneficial virtue of baptism, but only of its quality as *valid baptism*. "Loquor autem nunc non de virtute sive efficacia et usu Baptismi, sed de ipsa Baptismi substantia." (Ibid. p. 352.) "Alter potest salvari, alter damnari eodem baptismo, sed id non pertinet ad substantiam sed ad virtutem et usum baptismi." (Ibid.) "Omnes eundem baptismum accipiunt, sed non omnes ejus virtutem et utilitatem accipiunt." (Ibid. p. 363.) He only asserts that effect of baptism which takes place even in the case of an unbelieving adult. "Nam quanquam hodierno die Judæus quispiam fraudulenter quapiam simulatione et malitioso proposito veniret se baptizandum offerens, nosque eundem omni studio baptizaremus, nihil secus nobis dicendum esset Baptismus verum et rectum esse." (Cat. Maj. Op. v. p. 639.) He only speaks of that validity of baptism which Cyprian denied in the case of heretics. "Eodem errore capti sunt et isti qui putant baptismum ab hæretico aut infideli administratum, non verum esse Baptismus." (Op. t. vii. p. 349.)

NOTE 33, p. 326.

"Effusio Spiritus Sancti promittitur in Baptismo, ut in Epist. ad Titum diserte scribitur—'qui salvos nos fecit per lavacrum regenerationis.'" Peter Martyr, Loc. Comm. p. 580. "Nostra sententia utrique huic (Justificationi et Sanctificationi) adhibitum esse Sacramentum Baptismus, scilicet significandæ atque efficiendæ." Chamier, De Bapt. l. v. p. 118. "Baptismus est sacramentum regenerationis. . . . Ipse vos baptizabit Spiritu Sancto et igne—loquebatur de efficacia Spiritus Sancti in regeneratione, quem ipse Christus conferebat Baptismo." Zanchius, Explic. Ep. ad Eph. pp. 217, 218.

“M. Verum, annon aliud aquæ tribuis nisi ut ablutionis tantum sit figura? P. Sic figuram esse sentio, ut simul annexa sit veritas. Neque enim, sua nobis dona pollicendo, nos Deus frustratur. Proinde et peccatorum veniam et vitæ novitatem offerri nobis in Baptismo et recipi nobis certum est.”—Catechismus Genevensis. “Baptismus nobis testificandæ nostræ adoptioni datus est, quoniam in eo inserimur Christi corpore, et ejus sanguine abluti, simul etiam ipsius spiritu ad vitæ sanctimoniam renovamur.”—Confessio Gallicana. “Baptizari est inscribi, initiari et recipi in fœdus atque familiam adeoque in hæreditatem filiorum Dei; imo etiam nunc nuncupari nomine Dei, i. e. appellari filium Dei, purgari item a sordibus peccatorum, et donari varia Dei gratia ad vitam novam et innocentem.”—Confessio Helvetica Posterior. “Baptismus est sacramentum institutum ad significandam et contestandam internam per sanguinem Christi a peccatis absolutionem, seu eorum remissionem; simulque inchoandam per Spiritum Sanctum renovationem seu regenerationem.”—Declaratio Torunensis. “De Baptismate itaque confitemur, eo sepe liri nos in mortem Christi, Christum induere, esse lavacrum regenerationis, peccata abluere, nos salvare.”—Confessio Tetrapolitana.

“The form of expression which the churches use is indefinite, and it is necessary it should be so because they speak of baptism, considered in the nature of it, when it is applied to those within the covenant . . . yet well knowing that all are not indeed within the covenant, although born of parents that are within the visible Church . . . yea, some propositions that are universally propounded have yet their limitations implied that are discerned by all rational men that either hear or read them. . . . In like manner then must the churches be understood, if they would deliver themselves in universal terms. Because, in the Sacrament, by virtue of Christ’s institution, ordinary grace is given to all that are by election capable of it; and it being known to none who they may be that are not elected, it is more apt and proper to speak indefinitely.” Burgess, p. 147.

NOTE 34, p. 341.

Peter Martyr.—“Promissio non est generalis de omni semine, sed tantum de illo in quo una consentit electio. Alioquin posteritas Ismaelis et Esau fuerunt ex Abrahamo. Sed quia nos de arcana

Dei providentia et electione minime debemus curiosius inquirere, ideo sanctorum filios sanctos judicamus, quoad ipsi per ætatem se non declaraverint a Christo alienos . . . Neque audiendi sunt qui hac de re movent scrupulum ac dicunt. Quid si minister fallatur? Quid si revera puer *neque est filius promissionis divinæ electionis, atque misericordiæ?* Quia idem cavillus esse poterit de adultis. Nam de illis quoque ignoramus, fecte necne accedant, an vere credant, an sint filii prædestinationis an perditionis, an Christi gratiam habeant an illa sint destituti, et mendaciter dicant se credere. Quid tu illos baptizas? Scio dices, idcirco id facio, quod sequor illorum externam professionem, quam si mentiantur, mea non refert. Ita nos dicimus, ecclesiam ideo complecti nostros pueros et baptizare quod ad nos pertineant. Idque est illis divinæ voluntatis tale indicium, quale est in adultis externa professio . . . Vides ecclesiam esse quæ lavatur et baptizatur. Idcirco dum parvuli tinguntur, constat ad ecclesiam pertinere; et ecclesiæ partes vere esse non possunt, nisi spiritu Christi sint ornati. Quamobrem *parvuli qui vere ad electionem Dei pertinent*, antequam baptizentur, Spiritu Dei sunt instructi." Loc. Comm. pp. 582, 584.

"Eodem modo hodie usu venit de liberis fidelium. Habemus promissionem Deum velle non tantum nostrum esse Deum verum etiam seminis nostri; quæ promissio cum sit indefinita, *arcana Dei electione* infantibus applicatur; *non quidem semper omnibus, sed certis quibusdam prout divino proposito visum fuerit.* Quod quum nos lateat, sequi autem debeamus externum verbum quod commendatum est ecclesiæ, sub ea promissione parvulos nostros baptizamus, quemadmodum suos veteres circumcidebant. Id factum Anabaptistæ reprehendunt, quod neque de Spiritu neque de fide, neque de electione illorum parvulorum nobis quicquam constet. Verum nos ista nihil moramur: tantum respicimus verbum Dei quod in generali atque indefinita promissione nobis offertur. Executionem autem ejus Deo committimus, *cum de illius electione non possimus judicare.*" In Ep. Rom. ix. 8, p. 377.

"Quærunť nonnulli cum nesciamus utrum infantes rem sacramenti habeant, cur apponamus signum, et id, quod nobis incertum sit, obsignemus? Quibus respondemus, hanc quæstionem non contra nos adduci sed contra verbum Dei. Is enim diserte præcepit et voluit ut pueri circumciderentur. Deinde respondeant ipsi nobis, cur adultos ad baptismum aut communionem admittant, cum de animo illorum sint incerti. Etenim qui baptizantur aut communicant possunt simulare ac ecclesiam decipere. Respondent satis esse eorum habere professionem. Si mentiuntur, quid hoc ad nos?

inquiunt. Ipsi viderint. Ita nos dicimus de infantibus nobis esse satis, quod Ecclesiæ offerantur vel a parentibus vel ab illis in quorum sunt potestate. *Quod si cum actione sacramenti electio et prædestinatio concurrat, ratum est quod agimus; sin minus irritum.* Salus enim nostra pendet ab electione ac misericordia Dei. De ea vero, cum nobis occulta sit, nihil iudicamus." Ibid. in c. iv. v. 11, p. 125.

NOTE 35, p. 341.

Bucer.—“Nec enim possunt perire quæ oves Christi sunt, et habent vitam æternam, peccareque et errare perseveranter et finaliter non potest quicumque vere credit in Christo, eoque est in eo *reginitus*.” Script. Ang. p. 787.

“Baptismate enim homines debent peccatis ablui, *regigni* et innovari in vitam æternam: quæ omnia non nisi sanctorum *et ad vitam æternam electorum*.” Ibid. p. 38.

“Ex illo, Nunquam novi vos, id est, inter meos agnovi, clare docemur qui aliquando a Christo possunt excidere, eos Christi nunquam fuisse, eoque nunquam vere credidisse, aut fuisse pios, *nunquam Spiritum filiorum fuisse nactos*.” Enarr. in Matt. c. 7, p. 203.

“Si jam ad Ecclesiam pertinent et ipsorum est regnum cœlorum, cur eis signum baptismi negaremus? Si qui hædi inter eos sunt, tum excludendi nobis erunt, cum id esse sese prodiderint . . . Quid si etiam fidem non habeant, Spiritu Dei nihilominus ad salutem signati? Adest itaque *electis infantibus* Spiritus Domini.” In Matt. 19, pp. 403, 404.

“Aperte docet omnia a Divina Electione pendere, eosque, quibus semel datum fuerit oves esse, perire nunquam posse.” In Joan. p. 716.

“Ex his itaque facile cognoscitur omnem *ecclesiam veram* Dei constare tantum *renatis*, habere tamen plerumque inter se in comunione externa sacrorum *non renatos* . . . Hinc itaque planum est *vera Ecclesiæ membra esse tantum renatos* . . . Ex his jam omnibus locis clare perspicimus baptismum commendari nobis, ut instrumentum divinæ misericordiæ quo Deus non sua sed nostra causa dignatur uti, ut quo *electis suis, quibus ipse hæc sua destinavit dona, conferat regenerationem, &c.* Nec minus efficax est horum omnium donorum Dei instrumentum baptismum *electis Dei*

quos eo statuit sibi regnare, quam est ullum remedium ad conferendam sanitatem corpori." In Ep. ad Eph. pp. 558, 560, 598.

"Ecclesia est corpus Christi, i. e. congregatio hominum, quæ non aliter regitur Christi Spiritu et verbo quam totum corpus a capite regatur. Et hoc modo *electorum et renatorum tantum est.*" Ibid. p. 36.

"Nec enim servat baptismus adultos nisi credentes. Salus quidem baptismate offertur omnibus; recipiunt autem illam adulti non nisi per fidem, *infantes per arcanam Spiritus Sancti operationem, qua ad vitam æternam sanctificantur.*" Ibid. p. 146.

NOTE 36, p. 361.

Mr. Gorham's language on this head expressed no more than the *obsignatory* view of baptism, which pervades the theology of the Reformation.

"Putant vi et efficacia operis baptismi peccatum remitti, neque agnoscunt Sacramentis potius remissionem *obsignari*, quam adulti assequuntur credendo, et parvuli fidelium qui ad electionem pertinent, per Spiritum Sanctum et gratiam *jam habent* . . . Sed quærere facile posset quispiam, Si Christianorum pueri, qui ad electionem pertinent, ut dixisti, *antequam baptizentur pertinent ad fædus Dei et Spiritum Sanctum habent* . . . profecto videtur superfluere baptismus. Cui tinguntur? Quid illis accedit? Aut quid confertur illis quod prius non habuerint? Priusquam respondeam vicissim ego ex te quæram: Sit Ethnicus ætatis adultæ, qui audita prædicatione Evangelica convertatur ad Christum, vere credat: porro sua fide jam justificatus, baptismum desiderat, sed nondum habet: is cum jam votum obtinuerit, quæso te, cur est baptizandus? Quid confert ei Sacramentum . . . Verum licet ostenderit argumentum non magis contra nos quam contra nostros adversarios facere, attamen ad ipsum dissolvendum hæc addam: Præceptum Domini est adimplendum. Is iussit ut baptizemur, idemque circumcisionem imperavit. Unde si quis ista contemneret, gravissime peccaret. Huc accedit dona *quæ jam habentur*, et promissio quæ jam ad illos pertinet qui Christi sunt, consignanda est externo symbolo." Peter Martyr, Loc. Com. p. 584.

"Howbeit in plain speech it is not the receiving of the sacrament that worketh our joining with God. For whosoever is not joined to God before he receive the sacraments, he eateth and

drinketh his own judgment. *The sacraments be seals and witnesses, and not properly causes of this conjunction . . .* We confess that Christ by the Sacrament of Regeneration, as Chrysostom saith, hath made us flesh of His flesh, and bone of His bone, that we are the members and He is the Head . . . This marvellous conjunction and incorporation *is first begun and wrought by faith*; afterward the same incorporation is assured to us and increased in our baptism." Jewell, Reply to Mr. Harding's Answer, P. S. Ed. pp. 132, 140.

"M. Non ergo remissionem peccatorum externa aquæ lavatione aut aspersione consequimur. A. Minime: nam solus Christus sanguine suo animarum nostrarum maculas luit atque eluit . . . Hujus vero peccatorum nostrorum expiationis *obsignationem* atque pignus in Sacramento habemus." Nowell's Catechism.

Bullinger's "Decads" received in 1586 the *imprimatur* of the English Episcopate; the Upper House of Convocation issuing in that year an order that the junior ministers should provide themselves with a Bible and Bullinger's Decads in Latin or English, and read one chapter in the Bible every day, and one sermon in the Decads every week.

"The holy and elect people of God are not then first of all partakers of the first grace of God, and heavenly gifts, when they receive the sacraments. For they *enjoy the things before they be partakers of the signs.*" Bullinger's Decads, Lond. Ed. 1577, p. 1006.

"We believe that God of His mere grace and mercy, in the Blood of Jesus Christ, hath cleansed and adopted them, and appointed them to be heirs of eternal life. We therefore baptizing infants for these causes do abundantly testify that there is not first given unto them in baptism, but that there is *sealed and confirmed unto them, what they had before.*" P. 1007.

"They, therefore, which *before by grace* invisibly are received of God into the society of God, those selfsame are visibly now by baptism admitted into the selfsame household of God by the minister of God." P. 1018.

"Sacraments, therefore, do visibly graff us into the fellowship of Christ and His saints, who were invisibly *grafted by His grace before we were partakers of the sacraments.*" P. 1021.

"We are not first grafted into the body of Christ by partaking of the sacraments: but we which were *before* ingrafted by grace invisibly are now also visibly consecrated." P. 1023.

"The holy Scripture teacheth that we are washed clean from

our sins by baptism. For baptism is a sign, a testimony, and a sealing of our cleansing. For God verily hath promised sanctification to His Church, and He for His truth's sake purifieth His Church from all sins by His grace, through the blood of His Son, and regenerateth and cleanseth it by His Spirit, which cleansing *is sealed in us by baptism.*" P. 1060.

"Whereupon of some it is called the first sign or entrance into Christianity. Not that *before* we did not belong to the Church. For whosoever is of Christ, partaking the promises of God and of His eternal covenant, belongeth unto the Church. Baptism, therefore, is a visible sign and testimony of our ingrafting into the body of Christ." P. 1061.

NOTE 37, p. 362.

Of the numerous Protests, which appeared against the Gorham judgment at the time, the principal one, in consideration of the theological names attached to it, adopted the ground "that the *remission of original sin* to all infants in and by the grace of baptism, is an essential part of the Article 'One baptism for the remission of sins;'" but, though a Protest of some length, being extended through nine clauses, did not throughout mention the term "Regenerate." The Protest is occupied, then, with a different *term* from that with which the judgment is; which is a defect, because in regard to its subject-matter a Protest cannot keep too closely to the terms of the judgment against which it is a Protest. But moreover the term of the Protest differs essentially in meaning from the term of the judgment; because "remission of original sin" is only a part of regeneration, whereas the judgment spoke of "regeneration." The term of the judgment then covered a larger area of meaning than the term of the Protest; which is to say that the Protest was upon a different subject-matter from that of the judgment. If it be said that the remission of original sin *implies* the accompaniment of the other part of regeneration without expressing it, one part of the whole going with the other; it still remains that the *expressed* subject-matter of the Protest is different from the *expressed* subject-matter of the judgment.

And it is important to observe that that part of the contents of regeneration which the term in the Protest does *not* cover, is just that part which gave rise to the question at issue, viz. whether all infants were or were not regenerate in baptism. This other part is one of two alternatives, actual goodness or the *power* of attain-

ing actual goodness and salvation, according as regeneration is defined. But either alternative is, upon the ground of experience or the special ground of the Predestinarian respectively, an obstacle to a regeneration coextensive with infant baptism.

NOTE 38, p. 350.

In examining Hooker's baptismal language we observe first of all that it is expressly sacramental, so far that he makes the sacrament of baptism an ordained channel and instrument of grace. But I need not repeat here the caution which I have more than once given, that among divines a general assertion of the grace of baptism does not commit the asserter to any decision as to the conditions upon which such grace is actually received. This general form leaves the question open, so that a Calvinist or the opposite could alike make it, each reserving to himself the right to fill up the omission in his own way.

We observe, secondly, that Hooker admits infants as well as adults to a present participation of the grace of baptism. The solemn and judicial statements in which this decision is expressed are known to all. These again, however, are only general statements to the effect that the grace of baptism is *open* to "infants." We obtain the measure of this general language admitting infants as a *class*, not only from common usage in speaking and writing, but also specially from the usage of the theological writers of Hooker's own day. For we find this general language that "infants" are regenerate in baptism, in the writings of avowed Calvinists, who did not hesitate to use it, because they never supposed that by saying that "we" are regenerated in baptism, or that "men" are, or that "infants" are, they committed themselves to the regeneration either of all infants or all adults in baptism. "We deny," says Calvin, "that *infants* cannot be regenerated by the power of God."⁶ "What," he asks, "is there to prevent me from saying that *infants* receive that grace now in part which they will enjoy in fulness hereafter?"⁷ "In *infants*," says Peter Martyr, "the Holy Ghost supplies the room of faith, and the effusion of the Holy Ghost is promised in baptism."⁸ "Bellarmine saith that hidden grace is imparted to *infants* when they are

⁶ Instit. iv. 16. 18. ⁷ Ibid. 19. ⁸ Loc. Com. chap. 4, c. 8, § 2.

baptized: *we say so too;*" is Whitaker's statement.⁹ "When *infants* are baptized," says Junius, "God doth both offer and confer all the good things of the covenant."¹ "The *infants* of the faithful," says Zanchius, "receive the regenerating Spirit in baptism."² Burgess denies that "*infants* do not ordinarily receive the Spirit in baptism."³ The plural "*infants*" is used by these divines who are avowed Calvinists, not of course in the sense of *all* infants, but as a limited plural, implying certainly that the grace of baptism spoken of is open to infants as a class, but by no means committing the writers to the position that all infants are regenerate in baptism, which indeed they expressly denied. When Hooker, therefore, says that "*infants* have that grace given them," &c., and that "*infants* are in the first degree of their ghostly motion,"⁴ &c., the phrase by no means of itself implies that he considers that *all* infants have that grace, or that *all* infants are in the first degree of ghostly motion, &c. These are general statements, which leave it undecided whether all or only some of this class are actually partakers of this grace, whether the plural "*infants*" is used as a universal term, or only as a limited plural in the way in which the Calvinists of his own day used it.

The phrase, however, which is in itself open to either of these interpretations, receives in matter of fact from another portion and department of Hooker's own language, the latter of the two. "God hath predestinated certain men, not all men; the cause moving Him hereunto was not the foresight of any virtue in us; to Him the number of His elect is definitely known."⁵ And this pre-

⁹ Prælect. de Sacr. p. 286.

¹ Burgess, p. 176.

² In Eph. p. 222.

³ Baptismal Regeneration of Elect Infants, p. 80.

⁴ Eccl. Pol. v. 64. 2.

⁵ The following is Hooker's summary of the doctrine of predestination:—

"1. God hath predestinated certain men, not all men. 2. The cause moving Him hereunto was not the foresight of any virtue in us at all. 3. To Him the number of His elect is definitely known. 4. It cannot be but their sins must condemn them to whom the purpose of His saving mercy does not extend. 5. To God's foreknown elect final continuance in grace is given. 6. Inward grace whereby to be saved is deservedly not given unto all men. 7. No man cometh unto Christ, whom God by the inward grace of His Spirit draweth not. 8. It is not in every, no not in any man's mere ability, freedom, and power to be saved, no man's salvation being possible without grace. Howbeit God is no favourer of sloth, and therefore there can be no such absolute decree touching man's salvation as on our part includeth no necessity of care and travail, but

destination is the original cause or agent in the process of the new birth, without which that process does not take place in any human soul. But the original agent does not work without subordinate means, or an instrument, which is baptism. "Eternal election notwithstanding includeth a subordination of means, without which we are not actually brought to enjoy what God secretly did intend; predestination bringeth not to life without the grace of external vocation wherein our baptism is implied;" but with this external vocation and baptism it *does* bring to life, and baptism therefore is that "which both declareth us and maketh us Christians;" it is "the door of our actual entrance into God's House, the first apparent beginning of life, a seal, perhaps, to the grace of election before received, but to our sanctification here, a step that hath not any before it."

It is evident that in this scheme baptism figures as the instrument of predestination, the subordinate means without which that original cause of spiritual life in the human soul does not produce that life; that therefore its effect as such a subordinate means must depend upon the original cause or agent whose instrument it is, being present with it to use it for the end designed; that the

shall certainly take effect whether we ourselves do wake or sleep." Keble's Ed. vol. ii. 752. Preface, p. c.

In this summary then we observe a certain caution and reserve in stating the Calvinistic ground, and a stopping short of some harsh portions of Calvinistic language. At the same time the kernel of Calvinism is here—"God hath predestinated certain men, not all men, and the cause moving Him was not the foresight of any virtue in us at all." If a divine decree antecedent to all action or desert of the individual is the necessary condition of salvation, those who are not included in it are excluded from the possibility of salvation. Some persons are antecedently to all works of their own certain to be saved, and others are as certain not to be. It does not signify by what name we call this latter state of exclusion; whether we call it reprobation or preterition the result is the same. The substance of Calvinism is thus here, while to none of the cautions accompanying it will the Calvinist object. He will allow with Hooker, that those to whom the decree of predestination does not extend, "will be condemned by their own sins," such continuance in sin being the consequence of this exclusion; that the non-bestowal of saving grace is "deserved," by reason of original sin; that God's absolute decree does not preclude the "necessity of care and travail on our part." Whatever then Hooker's caution may imply, whether the unconscious conflict of a mild disposition with doctrinal logic, or that jealousy of any excess beyond necessary truth which thoughtful and learned men acquire, or even a latent intellectual suspicion of the Calvinistic ground as being open to a balance from other truth, it does not in effect prevent him from stating the substance of Calvinism.

grace of baptism, therefore, assumes election as the condition upon which it is received by the individual. Baptism is part of the "external vocation," but the external vocation is of no force without the antecedent election whose instrument it is.

The point in dispute between Hooker and Cartwright is, not whether election is not a necessary condition of the new birth, which is assumed on both sides, but whether the individual being elect has the new birth before baptism; Cartwright maintaining that he has, Hooker maintaining that he has not, but that baptism confers the *first* inward grace; a grace which, though it presupposes *election* [of which it is perhaps the seal], presupposes nothing else, but is "to our *sanctification* here a step that hath not any before it."

It follows upon the grace of Baptism being thus dependent upon election, that that grace when received is indefectible, because the elect necessarily persevere to the end, and to them, as Hooker says, "final continuance in grace is given." Accordingly, the next thing we observe in Hooker's language is that he does make justifying or regenerating grace indefectible. "The justified man," he says, "being aliveto God in Jesus Christ our Lord, doth as necessarily from that time forward always live, as Christ, by whom he hath life, liveth always."⁶ Again: "If the justified err, as he may, and never come to understand his error, God doth save him through general repentance: if he fall into heresy, He calleth him either at one time or another by actual repentance; but from infidelity, which is an inward direct denial of the foundation, preserveth him by special providence for ever."⁷ Again: "There was in Habakkuk that which St. John doth call 'the seed of God,' meaning thereby the first grace which God poureth into the hearts of them that are incorporated into Christ; which having received, if, because it is an adversary to sin, we do therefore think we sin not, we do but deceive ourselves. Yet they which are of God do not sin in anything any such sin as doth quite extinguish grace, because the seed of God abideth in them, and doth shield them from receiving any irremediable wound."⁸ Again: "The first thing of His so infused into our hearts in this life is the Spirit of Christ; whereupon the rest of what kind soever do all both necessarily depend and infallibly also ensue, therefore the Apostles term it sometimes the seed of God."⁹ Again: "The man which is born of God

⁶ Works, vol. iii. p. 643.

⁸ Ibid. p. 589.

⁷ Ibid. p. 647.

⁹ Eccl. Pol. v. 56. 11.

hath a promise that in him the seed of God shall abide; which seed is a sure preservative against the sins of the third suit," which are "infidelity, extreme despair, and obduration in sin."¹

We have plainly laid down in these statements the doctrine of the indefectibility of justifying or regenerating grace; for regeneration confessedly goes along with justification. But holding this doctrine, in what sense did Hooker accept the statement in the Baptismal Service over every infant, that it "is regenerate"? He could not accept it as a doctrinal statement, but only in that sense which was the current and received sense of that day, and in which his own theological friends held it, viz. the hypothetical.

To the general principle of charitable presumption, we know from the passage beginning, "We speak of infants as the rule of piety alloweth," &c., that Hooker had no objection. The particular case, indeed, in which Hooker there defends the rule of presumption is not the assertion in the service of the infant's regeneration, for no objection was made to this assertion in Hooker's day, nor did it enter into the material of controversy between the defenders of the Prayer Book and the Puritans. The case in which he defends the rule of presumption is that of the sponsor saying, in the name of the infant, "I believe," which was the assertion of the infant's belief; which Cartwright objects to because faith implies election; and therefore "it can no more be precisely said that he hath faith, than it may be said precisely that he is elected;" but which Hooker justifies on the ground that it is sometimes lawful to state a thing positively, even when we do not know that it is true, but can only presume it to be so: "We speak of infants as the rule of piety alloweth," &c. But though it was another part of the Baptismal Service which extracted this defence of positive statements having an hypothetical meaning, the defence applies generally to the rule of presumption in Church services.

But Hooker's baptismal statements are quoted as *contradicting* his Calvinistic ones. This contradiction then, were it made out, would only issue in neutralizing Hooker on the question before us, not in making him an authority on one side; but it does not appear to me to be made out. Hooker's baptismal statements speak undoubtedly of the grace of the Sacraments, and of "infants" as admitted to that grace: they do not assert, however, that *all* infants receive that grace, but are consistent with the Calvinistic limitation. "Baptism is a sacrament which God hath instituted in His

¹ Vol. iii. p. 646.

Church, to the end that *they* which receive the same might thereby be incorporated into Christ, and so through His most precious merit obtain as well that saving grace of imputation which taketh away all former guiltiness, as also that infused Divine virtue of the Holy Ghost which giveth to the powers of the soul their first disposition toward future newness of life." (E. P. v. 60. 2.)

Hooker only says here that "God hath instituted baptism" to the end that *they which receive the same* might thereby, &c., which is another thing from saying that *all* who receive the same *are* thereby, &c. It is language which leaves the conditions of the benefit open. Quoters of Hooker assume that the "first disposition toward future newness of life" is a certain implanted *faculty*, universally implanted in baptized infants; but a faculty common to all is not the ordinary meaning of the term "*disposition*;"² and if we interpret Hooker by Hooker, it is not Hooker's meaning. For why should not this "first disposition toward future newness of life" be the same with "the first grace" just now referred to, "which God poureth into the hearts of them which are incorporated into Christ," which persons "having received do not sin any such sin as doth quite extinguish grace"? Why should it not be the same with "the first thing infused into our hearts, whereupon the rest of what kind soever doth infallibly ensue:" the same with "the seed of God, which abideth in us and doth shield us from receiving any irremediable wound;" "the seed of God, which is a sure preservative"? Why should it not be the same with the "seed of faith" of Calvin, the "root of faith" of Peter Martyr, the "seed of the habit of faith" of Whitaker, the "habitual principle of grace" of Davenant, and the "initial regeneration" of Burgess; who, we may remark, expressly affixes this Calvinistic sense to this expression of Hooker's? "The life spiritual is peculiar to God's elect. Mr. Hooker delivers as much, for having said that infants 'receive the Divine virtue of the Holy Ghost in baptism, which giveth to the powers of their souls their first disposition towards future newness of life,' he afterwards adds, 'Predestination bringeth not to life

² Hooker adopts the Scholastic idea of sacramental grace, as being an actual *habit* or virtue, not assisting grace simply. "By grace we always understand, as the word of God teacheth, first, His favour and undeserved mercy toward us: secondly, the bestowing His holy Spirit which inwardly worketh: thirdly, *the effects* of that Spirit whatsoever, but especially saving *virtues*, such as *faith*, *charity*, and *hope*: lastly, the free and full remission of all our sins. This is the grace which the sacraments yield, and whereby we are all justified." App. to Book v. Eccl. Pol., vol. ii. p. 700.

without the grace of external vocation wherein our baptism is implied.”³ The authority of Hooker was always appealed to by those Calvinistic writers in our Church who held most strictly the principle of sacramental grace, regulated by predestinarian conditions.

Again: “There is delivered unto them (infants) that sacrament, a part of the due celebration whereof consisteth in answering to the articles of faith, because the habit of faith, which doth afterwards come with years, is but a further building up of the same edifice, the first foundation whereof was laid by the Sacrament of Baptism. For that, which there we professed without any understanding, when we afterwards come to acknowledge, do we anything else but only bring into ripeness the very seed that was sown before? We are *then* believers, because we then begin to be that which process of time doth make perfect.”⁴

The plurals “we” and “they,” as has been already shown, are not necessarily universals. A Calvinistic divine then could make this statement without any difficulty, as asserting the implantation of a seminal habit of faith in infants at baptism, which afterwards came out in act as they grew up: the principle of election determining in what infants this took place. Burgess’s whole treatise upon the “Baptismal Regeneration of Elect Infants” is indeed but an amplification of this statement, regeneration being a process which is there asserted to have its beginning in baptism, and to involve the seed of future faith and holiness; though this took place only in elect infants.

Again: “In sum the whole Church is a multitude of believers, all honoured with that title, even hypocrites for their profession’s sake, as well as saints because of their inward sincere persuasion, and infants as being in the first degree of their ghostly motion toward the actual habit of faith: the first sort are faithful in the eye of the world, the second faithful in the sight of God; the last in the ready direct way to become both, if all things after be suitable to these their present beginnings.”⁵

Here again, if we interpret Hooker by Hooker, why should not the first degree of the ghostly motion toward the actual habit of faith be the same with “the first grace,” which persons “having received do not sin any such sin as doth quite extinguish grace”? the same with “the first thing infused into our hearts, whereupon the rest of what kind soever do infallibly ensue”? the same with

³ Baptismal Regeneration of Elect Infants, p. 60.

⁴ Eccl. Pol. v. 64. 2.

⁵ Ibid.

"the seed of God which abideth," and "the seed of God which is a sure preservative" ? The qualification at the conclusion, "If all things after be suitable to their present beginnings," is more than significant, making as it does the future issue, i. e. the final perseverance of the infants, the test of their having entered upon "the ready direct way," "the first stage of ghostly motion toward the actual habit of faith."

Again: "When we know how Christ in general hath said that of such is the kingdom of heaven, which kingdom is the inheritance of God's elect, and do withal behold how His providence hath called them unto the first beginnings of eternal life, and presented them at the well-spring of new birth wherein original sin is purged; besides which sin there is no hindrance of their salvation known to us, as themselves will grant; hard were it that, having so many fair inducements whereupon to ground, we should not be thought to utter at the least a truth as probable and allowable in terming any such particular infant an elect babe, as in presuming the like of others, whose safety nevertheless we are not absolutely able to warrant." ⁶

Hooker appeals here to the fact of a "call" of "Providence" to the "beginnings of eternal life," and to the fact of a "presentation at the well-spring of new birth," as a legitimate ground for the charitable presumption of something more, viz. election and predestination to eternal glory. A "call" however of "Providence" is allowed in the Calvinistic scheme to those who never have the "inward" or effectual call. "*Pauci ergo electi sunt ex magno vocatorum numero; non tamen ea vocatione unde fidelibus dicimus æstimandam suam electionem.*" Calvin, Inst. iii. 24. 8. And a call to "beginnings" is openly allowed in the Calvinistic scheme to those who do not receive the grace enabling them to persevere to the end;—a distinction which Hooker himself made. "We must note there is an election the grace whereof includeth *their temporary benefit* that are chosen, and there is an election that includeth their eternal good. By temporary I do not mean any secular or worldly blessing . . . but I mean such spiritual favours as, albeit they tend to everlasting felicity, yet are not themselves everlastingly continued, neither are inwardly infused, but outwardly bestowed graces . . . This may suffice touching the outward grace, whereby God inviteth the whole world to receive wisdom, and hath opened the gates of His visible Church unto all, thereby testifying His

⁶ Eccl. Pol. v. 64. 3.

will and purpose to have all saved, if the let were not in themselves.⁷ . . . The inward means whereby His will is to bring men to eternal life, is that grace of the Holy Spirit which hath been spoken of . . . From whom this inward grace is either withheld altogether or withdrawn, such being left to themselves wax hard and obdurate in sin." Appendix to B. v. vol. ii. pp. 740, 742.

A call of Providence, then, and a call to "beginnings," are consistent with the Calvinistic scheme; and the "*presentation*" at the well-spring of new birth is a visible fact which is also consistent with that scheme. The baptismal statement before us is constructed with evident caution, balance, and adjustment; but the advantage which is common to all infants in baptism, in however favourable a light put, is still represented with a reserve, and is consistent with the Calvinistic limitation of the inward grace to some only of the number.

The estimate I have given of Hooker's *Calvinistic* statements is the same as Mr. Keble's, who admits that Hooker's doctrine of the indefectibility of grace is inconsistent with the doctrine of the regeneration of all infants in baptism. "For how could or can any person beholding what numbers fall away after baptism, hold consistently,"⁸ &c.? But the estimate of Hooker's *baptismal* statements is different. Mr. Keble assumes that when Hooker "attributes justifying or pardoning, together with the first infusion of sanctifying grace to baptism," such a mode of speaking implies that "he attributes it to baptism when not unworthily received, and therefore in all cases to infant baptism."⁹ But this is an assumption for which the language itself gives no warrant. For, as has been already explained, a writer in maintaining that a grace attaches to baptism as a sacrament, does not commit himself to a decision upon another and a further question regarding the recipients of such grace; as e. g. that all infants are such recipients. Such is not the force of this language, according to the ordinary rules of language; but moreover the force and meaning of this general kind of statement is known from the language of theological writers of the day. The most decided Calvinistic divines of that day both asserted generally the grace of the sacrament, and also that "infants" received that grace; but these were general forms

⁷ "Asserimus nullos perire *immerentes* . . . impietate, nequitia, ingratitude meriti sunt homines." Calvin, *Instit.* iii. 24. 12. "Non alieno, sed suo ipsorum vitio [originali peccato] sunt obstricti." *Ibid.* ii. 1. 8.

⁸ Preface, p. cii.

⁹ *Ibid.*

of statement which were adopted by those writers because they expressed as much as was wanted, and no more,—expressed the doctrine of the grace of baptism, and also the doctrine that it was given to infants; but did not imply that it was given to all infants, which would have been contrary to their whole theology. Hooker's baptismal language is of this type, and does not, when we examine it, commit the writer to any position respecting the conditions of baptismal grace which would be contrary to Calvinistic doctrine.

Regarded simply as the interpretation of an author, there is this advantage in the above estimate of Hooker's baptismal statements, that it makes Hooker consistent with himself. Mr. Keble's estimate of those statements obliges him to regard Hooker as contradicting himself, for he says that "these representations cannot be reconciled with Calvin's doctrine of the absolute perpetuity of justifying and of the first sanctifying grace," which he admits to be held and stated by Hooker. The cautious and considerate stamp of Hooker's theology is against the supposition of self-contradiction in Hooker, and the two sets of statements, when compared together, do not appear to me to require it.

It was the characteristic of one School of Calvinistic divines, that they discarded the common Reformation plan of modelling infant upon adult baptism. According to the common Reformation plan the condition of previous faith was required for the infant; convenient grace was necessary to implant this faith; and by virtue of this grace he was said to be regenerate *before* receiving the seal of baptism. This School, on the other hand, introduced the infant, without any medium of preparation, straight from nature to the baptismal grace; and Hooker appears to belong to this School. He vindicates the *priority* of baptismal grace, that "it is to our sanctification here a step that hath not any before it;" he will have no regeneration *before* baptism. But regeneration *in* baptism, though it presupposes no previous inward grace, still presupposes *election* in Hooker; and that it takes place in *all* infants is inconsistent with his Calvinistic statements.

Mr. Keble classes the Sermons of Hooker, in which most of the statements of the doctrine of indefectibility occur, as his "earlier productions;" but if the date which the editor assigns to these Sermons is the true one, they preceded immediately the commencement of the "Ecclesiastical Polity," to which Mr. Keble gives the date of "the summer of 1586." Nor indeed does the style or matter of these Sermons at all correspond to the presumption

which the phrase "earlier productions" is calculated to raise. They are not the crude compositions of a young preacher, expressing the mere results of a Calvinistic education unchecked by his own reflection, and taking for granted the dominant theological ground of the day. They are mature compositions, indicating a full consciousness of the claim which the Church, as well as his own particular audience, had to well-weighed statements from a preacher of the Temple; and the author has already long thought for himself, and is in fact already taking an independent line, and adopting an attitude of resistance to the dominant religious temper of the day, on the point of the indiscriminating violence against the Church of Rome, which he endeavours to check. We see in the Sermons in short the same balance and self-reliance, the same kind of tempered conclusions, and the same general controversial ground, which appear in the Ecclesiastical Polity. We must not therefore interpose too wide a mental interval between the Sermons, and the latter great work;—more especially as the "Ecclesiastical Polity" appeals as undoubtingly to the doctrine of the indefectibility of grace as the Sermons do.

No candid critic will of course deny a difference in *temper* between the Calvinism of Hooker and the popular one of the day. He was too thoughtful to like extreme statements as such, as unthinking people do, or to be carried away by the current of an age. He therefore states the Calvinistic ground with studied moderation, and with a thoughtful gentleness of doctrinal logic stops short of some harsh portions of Calvinistic language. Nor is he, in the "Ecclesiastical Polity," by any means profuse of Calvinistic language, rather reserving it for special occasions, when it is necessary in the argument that he should retire back upon it; when, either because he must make an admission to an opponent, or for some other reason, the fitting time has come for him to bring forward and unveil the basis of his system, instead of tacitly assuming it. Still, what we have to consider in estimating the ground of a writer, is not how *often* he says, but *what* he says; which being ascertained, it is sufficient if the rest of his language is consistent with, and not contradictory to, the main assertion. Calvinism was the system to which Hooker substantially attached himself; he was brought up in it; his religious circle was a Calvinistic one, and the principal patron of his mature life and authorship was Archbishop Whitgift, to whom, after the promulgation of the Lambeth Articles, he dedicated the fifth book of the Ecclesiastical Polity. It was natural that a mind of solid but gentle and slow strength, reveren-


tial, cautious, and affectionate, should cling with some pertinacity to the opinions which early education, long religious friendships, and existing Church authority fostered. There is no evidence, therefore, that he ever adopted another basis of doctrine. He may betray in his language tendencies to another system, but in defect of such tendencies (whether from strength of early convictions, or deference to religious friends, or a strong perception of the true element in Calvinism, or whatever reason) coming to a head, he is still to be considered as never having given up the Calvinistic scheme of the operation of the sacraments.

THE END.

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Includes bibliographical references.

1. Church of England--Doctrinal and controver
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(Theology) I. Title. II. Title: Baptismal co
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